Accounting for water : institutional viability and impacts of market-oriented irrigation interventions in Central Mexico by Kloezen, W.H.
NN08201.3228 
A c c o u n t i n g f o r w a t e r 
institutional viability and impacts of market-oriented 
irrigation interventions in Central Mexico 
im H. Kloezen 
Propositions 
1. As a result of decentralization and market-oriented policies, the Mexican State's 
rural intervention continues in new forms, in some ways penetrating the countryside 
more deeply than before the withdrawal of past patterns of heavy-handed state 
economic intervention. 
Fox 1995; This thesis 
Ostrom's belief -that co-production and synergy between public officials and citizens 
in diverse sets of open, nested arenas will lead to higher productivity and to more 
exixisure of all forms of opportunistic behavior- ignores the notion of Du Gay that 
private and public organizations often have competing management values, targets 
and ethos. As a result of these differences, public and private organizations aim to 
be accountable in different ways. 
Ostrom 1996; Du Gay 2000; This thesis 
Application of internal process indicators help to cross-check the quality and 
moaning of secondary data needed for comparative performance indicators. As 
such, internal process indicators and comparative indicators are complementary in 
assessing irrigation management performance. 
This thesis 
Trjere is nothing wrong with romanticism. And, there is nothing wrong with 
insitrumentalism. However, the problem starts when romanticism and 
insitrumentalism are merged into a policy that aims to encourage farmers' 
participation to achieve cost-effective irrigation management. 
This thesis 
Clear (prescriptive) institutional design principles form an important starting point for 
local users to negotiate and create institutional flexibility, credibility and 
transparency and thus institutional viability. 
This thesis 
Tiie mode and extent of water marketing are shaped by buyers' and sellers' 
wi lingness to negotiate social and political solidarity. This shows the limitation of 
economic incentive models. 
This thesis 
Unlike common policy assumptions, irrigation management transfer alone has not 
changed water use patterns within the Alto Rio Lerma irrigation district. 
This thesis 
8. Market-oriented policy reforms need programs such as irrigation management 
transfer. However, irrigation management transfer programs do not necessarily 
need market-oriented policy reforms. 
9. Any Mexican PhD thesis on the political construction of water institutions in the 
context of the Dutch Water Management in the 21st Century Policy (Waterbeheer 
21st0 Eeuw) would be at least twice as long as this Dutch thesis on Mexican water 
institutions. This is not because Mexican students are less efficient. 
10. Ais je hen vraagt naarde zin van het leven, antwoorden de meeste mensen met 
hun levensloop. 
Gyórgy Konrád 
11. Hay hombres que luchan un dia: y son buenos. 
Hay otros que luchan un año: y son mejores. 
Hay quienes luchan muchos años: y son muy buenos. 
Pero hay que luchan toda la vida: esos son los imprescindibles 
Bertolt Brecht 
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tremendous job, running the canals measuring water flows, digging into CNA files, and 
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1 Viability and impact of institutional interventions: an introduction 
1.1 Aims and background of the study 
Research aims 
The main concerns of this thesis are the reality, the viability and the impacts of recently 
established institutional arrangements for irrigation management in Central Mexico. These 
arrangements were the result of a series of state planned market-oriented intervention 
programs in the irrigation sector. The first aim of this thesis is to analyze the realities of these 
arrangements, rather than their normative (and often prescriptive) design principles. Relevant 
questions that relate to this are how these irrigation reforms are linked to a wider set of 
political and economic reforms; how they were implemented at the local level; how water 
users and irrigation managers have adopted, rejected or transformed these reform programs; 
and how viable the new institutional arrangements for water management are. This is done by 
applyng an interdisciplinary research approach, which integrates concepts of technical, 
institutional, political and economic dimensions. 
. second aim of this study is to identify the results and impacts of these reforms in terms 
of changes in water use practices, access to and spatial distribution of water, and land and 
water productivity. The third aim of this research is to explore various methods to assess the 
viability and impact of the institutional arrangements that were established during the process 
of the design, implementation and local modification of the intervention programs. Finally, 
the fourth aim of this study is to fill in some of the empirical void in the literature on Mexican 
irrigalion management transfer, and thereby contribute to a more in-depth insight in the 
meaning and content of an irrigation management transfer model that is so widely advocated. 
Market-oriented reforms as a panacea for poor irrigation performance? 
Durinjg the last decade, many countries throughout the world have attempted to improve their 
generally poor performance record of agency-managed irrigation systems by implementing 
polic} r programs to transfer some system management responsibilities to local user 
organizations. The promotion of transfer (or 'turnover') of irrigation management 
responsibilities to farmers is referred to hereafter as irrigation management transfer (IMT). 
The general belief behind these programs is that improvement in irrigation performance can 
be reached through the introduction of greater farmer involvement in irrigation management 
(Verrmllion 1991 and 1997, Meinzen-Dick et al. 1995). In addition, greater farmer 
involvement could also imply giving farmers greater financial responsibility, and in some 
cases greater financial autonomy. Not only would these help (it is believed) to encourage 
farmers to use water more efficiently, it particularly would help the government to reduce 
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public investments in irrigation management (Small 1989, Small and Carruthers 1991, 
Svendsen 1993, Perry et al. 1997). 
Improvement in irrigation performance through greater farmer involvement in irrigation 
management is not new on the international irrigation policy agenda, dating back to the 
1980s1. However, the financial crises that many governments have faced since the early 
1990s, have accelerated the attention for farmer participation, particularly in the case of 
agency managed systems. 
Among the international IMT programs, the Mexican program has been one of the most 
ambitious. This intervention program basically aimed at reducing government investment in 
the operation and maintenance (O&M ) of large scale irrigation districts and at the same time 
optimizing the use of water and other scarce resources needed for irrigation management. 
The rationale behind these ambitions can be understood by simply looking at the poor 
performance of the large scale Mexican irrigation districts. From 1950 the percentage of 
O&M costs paid by the users declined from 95 percent to 37 percent in 1990. As a result, the 
irrigation districts deferred maintenance, leading to a serious reduction in productivity and 
total outputs and decline in the sustainability of the infrastructure (Johnson 1997b). 
The three main strategies that the Mexican government followed in the early 1990s to try 
to overcome these problems were: to transfer the managerial and financial responsibilities of 
most O&M tasks from government agencies to newly to be established water user 
associations (WUAs); to provide these WUAs with secure and tradable water use rights; and 
to treat water as an economic good. 
Together, these strategies have totally reshaped the institutional environment for the 
provision of irrigation services to the users, in an attempt to do this in a more viable way for 
both users and the government. This new institutional environment comprises the enabling 
legal and policy environment (new laws, rules and regulations, policy implementation 
strategies); new and old actors, with irrigation management entities responsible for providing 
the irrigation management services; and, the government and non-government organizations 
that support those irrigation management entities through the delivery of goods and services. 
These new arrangements for managing water did not come on their own, but were 
accompanied by a much wider set of programs of financial and institutional reforms, which 
can and have been influenced by wider neo-liberal economic ideologies since the 1980s. The 
IMT program requires not only radical reduction in the role of public institutions, cost-
recovery and financial autonomy, but also requires 'market-oriented' reforms that reshape 
processes for water management, create possibilities for water markets, and also reform the 
wider provision of inputs and markets. 
The challenge of this study lies in the search on how IMT programs and other reforms are 
linked. As such, this IMT study is quite unique as most proponents (policy makers and 
scholars) of IMT programs, generally tend to look at IMT 'on its own' as if IMT were isolated 
from its wider ideological and institutional context. As a result, the World Bank and 
international donor agencies often propagate IMT as an institutional model that can be copied 
to countries as different as Mexico, Turkey and Pakistan, without sufficiently linking this 
model to the political and institutional conditions of these countries. Similarly, opponents of 
IMT often reject management transfer on mere ideological grounds, as they regard IMT as 
one of the elements of neo-liberal reform programs. However, IMT does not necessarily have 
to be linked to neo-liberal reforms, but neo-liberal reforms certainly require programs like 
IMT. This thesis attempts to unpack these different forces and their related concepts and show 
how they have shaped the reality of irrigation management under -the IMT program in 
Mexico, and how they can be used to study the mechanisms and impacts of institutional 
reform programs in the irrigation sector. 
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The locale of this study is the Alto Rio Lerma irrigation district (ARLID), a large 
irrigation district where the IMT program was implemented in 1992, rather than the central 
office!! of the irrigation agency where the IMT program was designed. Field research for this 
took place from October 1995 to May 1998. The study was part of a broader, 
nationwide research program by IWMI-Mexico (see glossary) in collaboration with several 
Mexican institutes and organizations, including the University of Montecillo Chapingo, the 
the Ministry of Agriculture and local water user associations. During the time of this 
IWMI worked in four large-scale irrigation districts, i.e. Comarca Lagunera in central 
Mexico, the Bajo Río San Juan and Bajo Río Bravo districts in North-east Mexico, 
bordeiing the United States, and ARLID. I designed, conducted and coordinated the research 
program in ARLID, which is the subject of this thesis. 
CNA, 
study, 
north 
1.2 Research debates 
This book addresses a wide audience, as it could be useful for policy makers, scholars and 
practitioners of irrigation involved in four debates. Some readers might participate in only one 
of these debates. Many, however, are involved in several of them, as these debates are highly 
related. The 'general' reader would be someone interested in irrigation reforms, institutional 
reforms and (irrigation) impact assessments, particularly in Mexico. However, general readers 
do not exist, as (like myself) everyone uses its own conceptual framework, methods and 
professional experiences to judge reality. The remaining sections of this chapter elaborate on 
the kind of concepts and methods used to study the realities of IMT in Mexico. However, first 
the academic and policy debates and research approaches that this thesis contributes to are 
described. 
Interdisciplinary approaches to irrigation 
This study deals with irrigation management. Without wanting to review and classify the wide 
body of literature on irrigation, it is important to understand how irrigation is perceived in 
this study. This study is an example of the Wageningen school of studying irrigation 
management. This school perceives irrigation management as a sociotechnical phenomenon 
and integrates concepts from technical, social and economic sciences. Many of the ideas of 
this school were initially built on the work by Uphoff (1986a), Chambers (1988), Huppert 
(1989), Keller (1990) and Uphoff et al. (1991) who define irrigation as a sociotechnical 
system. This means that in addition to recognizing the physical dimension of irrigation 
management (i.e. irrigation structures, canals and water flows), they are also aware of 
organizational requirements to make irrigation systems work (i.e. the effective organization 
of cooperation and activities needed to operate infrastructure among water users) 2. Their 
contribution lies primarily in describing, classifying and making typologies of irrigation 
activities as well as to show how these activities can be organized by irrigation management 
organizations. To some extent they also attempted to link organizational categories to more 
physical classifications of irrigation systems (size, levels, and control structures ). 
Although the Wageningen school has in part adopted some of these ideas, it argues that 
the concept of irrigation as a sociotechnical phenomenon should be thoroughly expanded. 
Whersas these above authors are looking at inter-relationships from the perspective of 
practical water management and their schematization for development planning, analysis and 
intervention, the Wageningen school has moved beyond them in its attempt to understanding 
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specifically the social and political dimension of irrigation operations and management. This 
dimension manifests itself, for instance, by the way political and socio-economic processes 
and environments like the introduction of IMT and water marketing influence the way people 
manage their irrigation systems. Much of the current conceptual groundwork done by staff 
and students of the Wageningen school is to show how technical, organizational and political 
processes are inter-related4. 
Furthermore, the Wageningen school attempts to go beyond the more reductionist and 
schematic nature of the socio-physical approach to study irrigation performance, as is 
propagated for instance by Small and Svendsen (1990 and 1992), Oad and Sampath (1995) 
and Jurriéns (1996). Finally, the Wageningen school recognizes to some extent the neo-
institutional approach to studying institutional dynamics of resource management (Ostrom 
1990 and 1992), but at the same time sees its weakness in its understanding of how 
technology and physical conditions shapes institutions within their local context. 
As is extensively discussed by proponents of this Wageningen school (see for instance 
Froentjes en de Ruiter 1991, Kloezen and Mollinga 1992, Zaag 1992, Vincent 1997, Bentum 
1995, Pradhan 1996, Bolding et al. 1996, Mollinga 1998, Manzungu 1999 and Wahaj 2001), 
another contribution of this school is its understanding that irrigation technology should not 
be treated as a black-box. 
The position of the Wageningen school, which is also chosen for this thesis, is that the 
design, construction, re-shaping, use and effects of irrigation systems embody technical as 
well as social and economic dimensions that are interlinked, and therefore can be perceived as 
social constructs. These social constructs manifest themselves, for instance in the form of 
organization of individual and collective labor input that is required, the type of irrigation 
organization, and informal social relationships among users and irrigation staff that is 
required to effectively operate and maintain irrigation structures and canals. This means that 
irrigation systems are designed with so called requirements-for-use in mind. As stated by 
Mollinga (1998), 'the purposes that technologies have to serve, and the institutional forms 
through which these purposes should be achieved, are reflected in the technical design 
characteristics of irrigation systems'. Another manifestation of irrigation as a social construct 
is that they have social (e.g. improved livelihoods), economic (e.g. economic growth) and 
technical (e.g. over-exploitation of available water resources) effects. 
In this thesis irrigation is studied at the interfaces between technical and social 
approaches. Particularly, an exploration is made of the institutional dimensions of irrigation 
systems and their management in both operational delivery and administration, and the 
internal and external processes of creating viable institutions in the context of institutional 
transformation. Thus, institutional arrangements for irrigation are seen as a social construct 
and a social process. This means that the design of irrigation technology (including its social 
requirements-for-use) is an outcome of a social and political process. This process is on 
going, which means that both the manifestations of irrigation technologies and their social, 
institutional and organizational requirements are continuously reproduced, re-interpreted and 
modified. One of the most important sets of requirements-for use of irrigation technologies 
that are studied in this thesis, are the new institutional arrangements for water management 
that have come along with a series of Mexican market-oriented intervention programs. 
Mexican IMT debate 
Another topic of this thesis is IMT and other market-oriented irrigation reforms in Mexico. 
For three reasons the recent Mexican experience with farmer participation in irrigation 
received worldwide attention from policy makers, researchers and irrigation practitioners 
alike. First, because of its scale and speed of implementation. The transfer program was 
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startec. in 1992, but by May 1999, 3.16 million hectares had been transferred to 419 WUAs, 
representing 93 percent of the area served by the 81 irrigation districts in the country (CNA 
1999). Second, because of the relative high degree of financial and managerial autonomy that 
the new WUAs received and the consequently high level of financial self-sufficiency. Third, 
because the program was accompanied by a relatively sophisticated new water law (enacted in 
1992). This law provides, among others, the creation of WUAs, the granting of water use 
concessions to them, and the definition of clear responsibilities and authority of all the 
management institutions involved in irrigation. 
Tiese achievements are applauded by many policy makers and others involved and 
interested in the Mexican transfer program. This explains why the Mexican model5 of IMT is 
highly 'on demand' worldwide, not so much by the future participants of irrigation 
management transfer programs, but certainly by many state governments and international 
loan agencies6. However, irrespective of the importance that is attached to the Mexican IMT 
case, there are relatively few empirical reports on the actual experiences, practices and 
impacts of this program. Instead, most empirical 'evidence' (all unanimously positive) is 
based on impressions from short study tours (e.g. Ujjankop 1995, Mishra 1995) to generally 
the same pilot districts and WUAs; on general reports from international seminars that are 
supported by international organizations or banks (e.g. Gorriz and Groenfeldt 1994; Gorrriz et 
al. 1996); on interviews with a very select group of policy makers and senior agency staff 
(e.g. Frederiksen 1996; Saleth and Dinar 1999); or on reviews that synthesize this type of 
evidence (e.g. Hatcho and Tsutsui 1998). Other reports are biased in favor of the IMT 
prognim as they were written by (former) agency staff involved in the design and 
implementation of the program (e.g. Palacios-Vélez 1994c, Espinosa de León and Trava-
Manzanilla 1992). Hopefully, this thesis contributes to filling this empirical gap and indeed 
helps to demythologize some of the discussions on the Mexican irrigation reforms. 
Debate on viability and impacts of market-oriented reforms and interventions 
Worlc.wide there has been quite some debate on the pro's and con's of IMT programs in 
general, and because of its scale on the Mexican IMT program in particular. The three leading 
questions around which this debate is organized are: does IMT help the government to reduce 
its expenditures in irrigation?; will the WUAs survive?; and, does IMT help to improve O&M 
performance? Out of a genuine concern about the future and impacts of these and similar 
reforrjis, this thesis attempts to contribute to answering these questions. 
sveral studies have started to answer these questions and to identify the strengths, 
weaknesses and problems of the recent institutional arrangements that were introduced by the 
transfer programs in a number of countries, including Mexico (see for instance Svendsen et 
al. 1997, Frederiksen and Vissia 1998, Vermillion and Sagardoy 1999, and several 
contributions in Johnson et al. 1995). However, in assessing the viability of the new 
institi.tional arrangements, these studies generally focused on the formal institutional and 
policy frameworks, enabling water rights systems and financial mechanisms of cost-recovery 
at the: macro or country level. Generally, many of these studies have a normative and 
prescriptive (policy) character, leaving actual local practices, reactions and outcomes of 
institutional intervention programs largely unstudied. 
Yet, from these studies it becomes apparent that there are several problems with the 
institutional conditions under which new irrigation organizations have to operate. For 
instance, both water users' associations (WUAs) and irrigation agencies face problems with 
filling the institutional void in the provision of both irrigation and non-irrigation services to 
water users. Generally, under pre-transfer arrangements the provision of these services was 
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totally controlled by a number of government agencies. After transfer, WUAs or other local 
water management entities, sometimes still in partnership with slimmed-down agencies, are 
challenged to adequately continue and improve the provision of these services to the users. 
However, it is not sufficient to only focus on arrangements for the provision of irrigation 
services. To enable the new local management organizations to adequately provide irrigation 
services, they themselves also need legal, financial and technical assistance, which they 
sometimes receive from government agencies, but often have to hire from third parties such 
as commercial companies. In order to get access to this type of assistance (or institutional 
service) and to be able to provide irrigation to their users, local management organizations 
have to develop relationships with government agencies, private companies, other local user 
organizations and of course with the recipients (or users) of their services. 
From debate to analysis 
One of the reasons for doing this study, was to demythologize the - in my view- basically 
ideologically driven debate on the pro's and con's of the current Mexican irrigation reforms. 
This, I thought, was important as it would not only help us to show what the impacts of these 
reforms were on both the welfare of the water users and the irrigation sector, but also to 
provide conceptual and methodological tools to better understand similar reforms in and 
outside of Mexico. 
This thesis, I hope, will contribute to this understanding in the following ways. First, by 
looking at irrigation intervention as one of the planned policy processes that were 
implemented to contribute to achieving the goals of a much wider set of market-oriented 
reforms. This is in contrast with much of the conventional development oriented intervention 
approach on irrigation, which generally looks at irrigation interventions as an isolated 
instrument for planning and managing irrigation in a prescriptive way. This is the position 
which many aid donors and national agencies, particularly those under pressure to account for 
performance on short time horizons, have found it expedient to adopt (Bond and Hulme 
1999). 
The second way in which I hope to contribute to the intervention debate is by departing 
from the more normative and linear design models of intervention used in the above 
prescriptive policy frameworks. Instead, the approach chosen for the analysis in this thesis 
shows how different relevant actors have developed practices and strategies to locally adopt, 
modify or reject (elements of) institutional intervention programs. 
The conceptual and methodological rationale and starting point of this thesis lies within 
the policy environment of which I, as a researcher with a policy oriented research institute 
like IWMI (see glossary), have been part of for several years. Much of the debates within this 
policy environment embarks on those current 'less state, more market' policy debates that are 
dominated by notions from neo-liberal interventionism, neo-institutional economics and 
rational choice theories. Although I have been part of that policy discussion and have adopted 
important notions of these theories, in this thesis I also aim to constructively criticize them. 
Methodological debate on intervention impact assessments 
How can one observe the way irrigation staff and users cope with new institutional 
arrangements for irrigation management and how can one assess the impacts of these 
arrangements on local irrigation management? 
Although the Mexican IMT program has received a lot of attention worldwide, very little 
groundwork has been done on developing methodologies that can provide answers to these 
questions. Several researchers from IWMI-Mexico (including myself) have started to develop 
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1.3 
and test an impact assessment methodology, aiming at systematically documenting impacts of 
the M T program in four irrigation districts (e.g. Johnson 1997a, Kloezen et al. 1997, Levine 
et al. 1998). Also in this thesis I will apply and evaluate these methodologies to show the 
impacts of IMT on irrigation performance levels. 
However, a clear limitation of this methodology is that it does not help us to observe the 
processes and mechanisms that explain the measured levels of impacts. On the other hand, the 
small number of more critical studies that primarily focus on the social and political 
dimensions of the HV1T implementation process (e.g. Whiteford and Bernal 1996, Perez-Prado 
1994), unfortunately hardly attempt to assess the impacts of the intervention in terms of 
irrigation performance. So in short: there is a felt need to report on both the process and the 
outcomes of the IMT program in a more systematic way. This requires some re-orientation on 
the kind of methodologies that can be used for such a purpose. 
The kind of intervention impact assessment method that is used for this thesis goes 
beyor d the commonly used method of comparing outputs of irrigation management before 
and after the intervention took place. It also looks at the enabling agro-ecological and 
institutional conditions, actors, practices, strategies, principles and mechanisms involved in 
these implementation; at day-to-day functioning of the institutional arrangements for 
irrigation management under post-transfer conditions and processes; and it identifies how 
these determine the strengths and weaknesses of these arrangements. 
The following four sections of this chapter discuss the interdisciplinary approach to study 
the process, viability and impacts of the planned intervention programs mat introduced new 
institutions and organizations responsible for managing water. This framework is divided into 
three sets of conceptual and methodological discussions, which will be further elaborated in 
the following sections: 
1. concepts of viability of the institutional arrangements in irrigation (section 1.3); 
2. concepts of market-oriented policies for irrigation (section 1.4); 
3. observing local practices and strategies of institutional interventions (section 1.5); 
4. assessing impacts of planned institutional interventions (section 1.6). 
Analyzing the viability of institutional arrangements 
Policy, institutional intervention, institutions and organizations 
Policy is a central concept in this thesis. The perception on the definition of policy used here 
in the context of Mexican reforms in the irrigation sector is a broad one and closely follows 
that of Weaver (1996) in his work on the political economy of forestry production in Northern 
Mexico. Irrigation policy, in this thesis, is seen as a planned impetus, energizer, or reflection 
of constructed and coordinated (induced) change in order to control the production, 
distribution, and use of irrigation resources. Viewed in this manner, the stage for ongoing 
irrigation policy making is set by the history of past policies and the socio-economic and 
political relations among relevant international and national organizations that formulate and 
implement irrigation reforms. Policy and policy making, then, are the product of negotiations 
among these organizations. This means that also the implicit or explicit representation of 
irrigation policies (in the form of an irrigation act, water rights, establishment of new WUAs, 
O&M rules and regulations, and so forth) should be seen as the outcome of an ongoing 
process. 
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Institutional reform programs, like IMT, deal with planned intervention strategies aiming 
at affecting or reshaping the administration and management of resources. This is done by 
transforming existing institutions or by introducing new institutions, generally (but not 
necessarily) with new actors involved. Planned intervention refers to formal (i.e. government 
led) design and implementation of better or new institutions7. Hence, it implies 
institutionalization of change. 
In this thesis, the concept of institution refers to a set of norms, rules, bylaws, procedures, 
roles and arrangements that actors collectively understand, agree upon and follow in order to 
achieve pre-determined results and impacts. They can be formal and official (planned) or 
informal (contingent; emerging from daily practice and interaction). New institutions under 
planned institutional reform programs like IMT are formal by their origin. However, after 
they have been introduced, they can be adopted, rejected, followed and modified in an endless 
number of ways. Often, the result of this can be that new, locally adapted, less formal (and 
often less visible) institutions emerge, with different norms, rules and arrangements and 
generally also other actors involved. Both formal and informal institutions can vary in size 
and complexity (e.g. few or many rules involved; simple or complex networks), scale (from 
individual to global) and style (Thompson 1998)8. Furthermore, their approach can be either 
top-down, bottom-up, or both, but always orchestrated by central authorities9. 
Institutions always involve relationships, which can be social, political, physical, 
economic, legal and human (skills, capacity, identity, values) in nature. Hence, (planned) 
institutional reforms create new forms or patterns of interactions and relationships between all 
actors involved. These actors can be individuals or organizations, who together form a 
network. In large scale irrigation systems, like ARLID, the two most important irrigation 
organizations are (sometimes newly established) water user associations and the (local) 
government organization, often an irrigation agency 1 0. 
Institutional reforms can deal with introducing new institutional arrangements for WUAs, 
or for government agencies, or for both. Often, these reforms comprise of packages of new 
arrangements for each of these organizations (e.g. a set of new rules for the WUAs, in 
addition to a set of new rules and roles for the agency). However, almost always these reform 
packages also include a set of new norms, rules and regulations that stipulate the new patterns 
of interactions between these different organizations. 
Institutional viability, as used in this thesis, simply refers to achieving a situation in 
which institutions will persist. Viability in this sense refers to the situation where (new) norms 
rules, roles, procedures and arrangements to achieve results and impacts are collectively 
permanently entrenched in the minds, behavior, practices and interactions of all individual 
and groups involved in these institutions. As can be learnt from Douglas (1987, cited in 
Musch 2001), norms, rules, roles, procedures and arrangements do not automatically add up 
to viable institutions. Only if they can persist without incentives of material self-interest, do 
they really become entrenched in the minds of people, with the effect of regulating processes. 
Although institutions comprise more than just organizations, in irrigation much of the 
discussion on institutional viability focuses on viable irrigation organizations. For instance, a 
key question to policy makers engaged with the introduction of IMT in Mexico, was whether 
the newly established WUAs would survive. Although there existed a major concern about 
the sustainability of the irrigation agency (particularly at the local and regional level) as a 
result of IMT, this concern was only snared with staff members and unions within these 
agencies. International policy makers and researchers seemed to put more importance on the 
viability of the WUAs. Related questions brought up, then, included which factors help these 
groups to stay together; what are the factors within the organization that determine 
organizational viability, and which factors beyond the boundaries of these organizations help 
these organizations to survive? 
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In irrigation management literature there are at least four approaches that deal with these 
question of organizational and institutional viability". These are what I would call here: the 
prescriptive and instrumental institutional design model approach; the neo-institutional 
approach to viable organizations; an extended approach for studying viability of institutional 
arrangements; and the approach that links institutions to physical environment and 
technology. These are reviewed below to show their strengths and limitations for studying the 
execution and local impact of institutional intervention in the Mexican irrigation sector. 
Prescriptive institutional design models for IMT 
The first group of people that write about the institutional changes that result from introducing 
farmer participation in irrigation and IMT are researchers who are primarily interested in the 
polic)' conditions and consequences of institutional reform programs. They generally work for 
international research institutes (like IWMI, IFPRI, FAO), or are closely associated to these 
institutes. Much of their work done on institutional changes in the irrigation sector is either 
initiated or co-funded by international loan agencies. Rather than analyzing the dynamics and 
processes of institutional reform, their main goal is to develop, present, and if possible test out 
institutional design principles and methodological frameworks that can be applied by policy 
makers and others responsible for introducing new institutional arrangements for water 
management. 
The prime focus of these papers is to come up with some sort of institutional guidelines 
(though not blue-prints) that should help implementers of new institutions to check under 
which conditions these institutional options can be applied. In that sense they are highly 
instrumental: they are aimed at "getting the arrangements right" in such ways that they 
provide incentives for people to work on improvements in irrigation management. Common 
principles that are included in these guidelines include issues that deal with membership, 
collective choice arrangements, water rights, financial accountability and transparency, 
conflict resolution, size and scale of the organizations and monitoring of performance. 
Examples of these papers include the work by Vermillion (1991, 1996), Meinzen-Dick et 
al. 1994, Meinzen-Dick et al. (1995), Merrey (1996), EDI (1996), Svendsen et al. (1997), 
Groenfeldt (1999) and Vermillion and Sagardoy (1999). In this respect, contributions to the 
discussion on the Mexican IMT program are focused to designing institutional arrangements 
and to instructing implementers of IMT at the local level on which steps to take to implement 
these arrangements as closely as possible to the plan (CNA 1994, Palacios-Vélez 1994c, 
Gorrín et al. 1996). In these contributions, irrigation intervention is seen as a development 
project, comprising a set of strong formal procedures, instructions and (participatory) 
management techniques (Craig and Porter 1997). Here, the underlying assumption is that 
defining better rules or principles, formalizing or legislating them, translating them into 
corresponding procedures, will automatically result in the planned effects (Boelens 2002). 
These frameworks for institutional designs are handy check lists and have proved then-
practical relevance for identifying, describing and classifying different types of organizations 
and their management arrangements. However, they generally lack the potential to analyze 
the dj'namics, mechanisms and processes that explain why organizations work as they worked 
in unique local institutional environments. The instrumental character of these models and 
approaches make them very appealing and influential in international policy debates on 
farmer participation and (joint) management of irrigation systems, as they help policy makers 
to support their argument for what they perceive is the rationale for farmer participation in 
management. By some, it is seen as ". . .a way of bringing irrigation management into 
line with proven management theory" (Groenfeldt and Sun 1997). This explains why more 
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and more these principles are used by policy makers as formal frameworks or prescriptions 
for 'effective institutions and organizations', particularly in the contexts of government 
retrenchment from irrigation (financial) management responsibilities. 
Neo-institutional approach to viable irrigation institutions 
The most extensive body of recent literature on institutional changes in irrigation stems from 
the neo-institutional approach to describing arrangements that "craft organizations". In 
general, this literature is concerned with the role of users in the crafting of institutional 
principles and arrangements for effective (and often collective) mobilization of resources that 
are necessary for local irrigation management. 
This approach has been particularly useful as it has helped both researchers and 
practitioners in irrigation to analyze and design institutional arrangements. Often cited papers 
that follow this approach are the ones by Ostrom (1990, 1992, 1996, 1998, 1999), Nugent 
(1993), Tang (1992), Lam (1996), Steenbergen (1997) and many others 1 2. Most of this work 
was developed to better understand the (internal) sustainability of locally managed (i.e. farmer 
managed) small scale irrigation institutions. Generally, they use a neo-institutional economics 
approach or rational choice and game theories to conceptualize and describe collective action 
in the allocation and distribution of irrigation water, as well as to identify the necessity in the 
provision of external support services that should help to sustain management organizations. 
This approach primarily focuses on the following institutional design principles and rule-
creating incentives: 
• arrangements of inclusion and exclusion of group members; 
• rules and rights of property, allocation, distribution and use of resources and benefits; 
• arrangement for selection leadership and user representation; 
• internal monitoring and auditing of everyday management, including financial; 
• arrangements of conflict resolution and sanctioning of defaulter. 
Particularly the work by Ostrom (1990, 1992, 1999) has made quite some contributions to 
understanding the system of institutional principles and arrangements for collective action in 
resource mobilization in irrigation. This has made the approach to some extent useful for this 
the study in this thesis: it will help to organize and describe the internal (i.e. within the 
WUAs) arrangements for collective action in water management. However, the approach is 
also limited in its potential to analyze the processes and mechanisms that influence the 
viability of the new institutional arrangements. 
Moore (1990) criticizes how these neo-institutional and rational choice approaches are 
organized around the following assumptions: 
1. human behavior is intentional, and economically strategic, i.e. rational and aimed at utility 
maximizing, rather than political and rooted in culture and ideology; 
2. the rationale of action is typically the individual's or group's (predominately material) 
self-interest1 3; 
3. different people (notwithstanding their cultural background) understand and thus 
operationalize self-interest in the same way; 
4. the information necessary to make fully rational choices is adequate and equally 
distributed; 
5. human behavior is a product and expression of a choice that can be made between 
alternative courses of action, rather than of coercion. 
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Moore (1989 and 1990), Mosse (1997) and Mollinga (2001), who all have conducted 
extensive field studies on irrigation, criticize these assumptions by arguing that practice, 
interaction and strategies of resource mobilization cannot only be understood by applying 
instrumental rationality to institutional problems. Elements of culture, ideology, group 
identity, and social and political coercion could be equally important to explain behavior of 
(individual and groups of) water users and irrigation practices. 
A major criticism by Moore (1990) is that these approaches generally exclude analysis of 
the way pre-existing and social and political institutions affect the rationality of alternative 
strategies. As a consequence, the relationship between for instance WUAs with other groups 
and movements (such as e.g. state agencies and farmer cooperatives) and the wider social, 
political and legal processes and institutions, are hardly considered and analyzed. Instead, 
irrigation management is deconstructed into transaction costs and other concepts of neo-
institutional economics 1 4, primarily within the organizational boundaries of a WUA. 
Finally, another shortcoming of these approaches is that they tend to be weak in their 
understanding of how technology and physical and environmental constraints shape 
institutions and their viability (see below). Although they recognize that environmental 
conditions affect the physical operation of particular systems, they still treat irrigation 
technology as a black-box and fail to link technology, environment and institutions. 
Despite these shortcomings, many policy makers find the neo-institutional approach, and 
the insititutional design principles that are derived from them, very appealing. In fact, their 
appeal to policy makers lies explicitly in its character to produce stereotypical assumptions 
about institutional and management behavior and constraints in complex situations, rather 
than explaining the causes of major changes in the institutional environment (ibid.). 
Therefore, analysis of viability of institutional arrangements for irrigation management should 
comprise both internal and external mechanisms and relationships, and should show how 
these zre linked. 
An extended approach for studying viability of institutional arrangements 
In stuc.ying the viability of the new arrangements for water management that were introduced 
as part of the IMT process in Mexico, ideas and concepts of institutional viability as proposed 
by Ostrom and others above are used where applicable. These are partly useful to describe the 
organizations and their resource mobilization activities. However, in order to overcome the 
shortcomings that were discussed above, the conceptual framework on institutional design has 
to be modified and extended. 
To enable examination of the actual (i.e. day-to-day) working of institutional 
arrangements for irrigation management and their influence on the viability of irrigation 
organizations, the following concepts of the wider socio-economic and political environment 
have to be added to the neo-institutional approach discussed above: 
® supporting conditions and services such as policy strategies and laws that both shape and 
support the formulation and implementation of new institutional arrangements; 
• individual actors and organizations involved in new institutional arrangements, both 
providing and receiving irrigation services; 
• practices and strategies chosen for coping with the implementation and impacts of new 
institutional arrangements; 
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• socio-economic and political relationships, networks and interactions between these 
actors and organizations that provide and receive irrigation services. These relationships 
networks will be defined in terms of accountability between the different providers and 
receivers of irrigation services (see below); 
• mechanisms and processes that shape accountability in institutional relationships between 
the service providers and service receivers. These concept are discussed in the following 
sub-section. 
Participation and accountability 
Unpacking institutional arrangements by understanding the above mechanisms helps us to 
unblur the, in my view, rather a-dynamic, a-political and romantic nature of the concept of 
user participation, which has dominated so much of the mainstream irrigation development 
discourse over the past two decades. Particularly in the case of IMT, the seemingly 
unconditional support for 'participatory irrigation management' as an instrumental tool to cut 
back government expenditures and at the same time improve irrigation performance is 
striking 1 5. These advocates of participatory management fail to see how participation and 
effective management are deeply contradictory. Effective management often requires meeting 
certain objectives, many of which were already established long before the interventions 
began, maintaining central control; participation means fostering local control (Craig and 
Porter 1997). 
Rather than uncritically follow the position that user involvement in the management of 
local natural resources is something positive and thus should be stimulated, this thesis 
perceives users involvement in terms of fostering autonomous control over decision making 
and access to resources in water management. This will help to better understand the 
influence that users can assert over the structure and management of institutional 
interventions in irrigation. It concerns the degree of control that users exercise over the 
WUAs and local irrigation agencies that provide them with irrigation services. Hence, it deals 
with the efficacy of the accountability systems that link users to producers of irrigation 
services (Brett 1996). 
Here, a key concept is accountability. In irrigation management accountability is defined 
as the extent to which the performance of all managers and irrigation staff having 
responsibilities at different levels of an irrigation management organization are monitored and 
controlled by the water users, i.e. by those who have the right to receive an irrigation service 
(Uphoff et al. 1991). In the case of EMT in Mexico, the irrigation management organizations 
are both the WUAs and the irrigation agency, with their own managers and leaders (see 
chapters 2 and 4). 
Generally, notions of accountability are built into or part of institutional design principles 
and planned arrangements. However, these principles and arrangements are not fixed and 
static. Rather, like all institutional arrangements, also mechanisms of accountability are 
continuously transformed and reproduced. Accountability does not come on its own, but has 
to be earned through a continuous process of negotiation and reformulation of arrangements 
(Vellema 2002). In this thesis, this notion of accountability as a process and as an outcome of 
negotiations is central to the analysis of viability of irrigation institutions. 
Several levels and types of accountability are distinguished. Levels of accountability 
refers to the question: who is accountable to whom? As will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapters, in ARLID there are several levels of accountability: between WUAs and 
the water users; between the agency and the water users; between the agency and the WUAs; 
between the federation of WUAs and individual WUAs; between the agency and the 
federation of WUAs 1 6 . 
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Most irrigation literature focuses on those types of accountability that are closely related 
to the official operation, maintenance and cost-recovery tasks of the management 
organizations. Consequently, operational accountability is the most common one used. For 
instance, van Hofwegen (1996) defines accountability in terms of monitoring and controlling 
whether or not agreed services levels ("ASL") are met. These service levels deal with 
operaton and maintenance tasks, and are monitored against internally set O&M standards 
(i.e. tetween providers and recipients of irrigation services within the physical and 
organizational boundaries of the system ). These agreed levels can be formal (e.g. through 
O&M regulations and manuals) or informal (oral agreements). 
Aiother type of accountability that is dealt with in this thesis, is financial accountability. 
Financial accountability refers to the extent in which users (i.e. buyers or payers) can monitor 
and control if providers of irrigation services (generally an irrigation agency and a WUA) are 
liable to show that there has been proper financial management and adherence to financial 
targets and budgets in the situation where these providers depend on user fees for a significant 
portion of the resources used for O&M. 
Operational and financial accountability can be related. This is the case when targets of 
financial management are not restricted to budgets and financial control, but also include 
O&M targets. For instance, when irrigation organizations depend financially on fees collected 
from farmers, they have a clear stake in providing their clients with an effective irrigation 
service, in terms of improved O&M (Small and Carruthers 1991, Svendsen 1993, Oorthuizen 
andKloezen 1995). 
There is, however, a third type of accountability that will be examined in this thesis. This 
is what is called here, socio-economic and political accountability. This is the type that is 
least acknowledged in irrigation literature. It refers to the extent that providers of irrigation 
services are liable to show that they have followed agreed upon arrangements for decision 
making, user representation, leadership selection, and equity and democratization targets. 
Hence it deals with the situation in which performance of irrigation service provision is not 
monitored and controlled along the lines of agreed upon operational and financial service 
levels, but rather by socio-economic and political dependency relations between those who 
provid3 and those who receive an irrigation service. An example that shows how the 
provision of irrigation services can be hampered by lack of control over political 
accountability is the "water for votes" kind of agreement: water users that will receive a 
(better) irrigation service if they elect the local landlord for the president of a WUA. Unlike 
operational and financial accountability, the relationship between the cost (a vote, loyalty) and 
the beiefit (access to water) is less transparent and hardly ever are expressed in terms of 
agreed service levels. Although most irrigation practitioners will know examples from the 
field, these field experiences are hardly ever documented 1 7. The study of these three forms of 
accountability form the core structure of this thesis. 
The mechanisms that are studied to unpack the three forms of accountability are 1 S : 
1. mechanisms of hierarchical decision making: comprising bureaucratic directives, 
authorization, administrative monitoring, and consultative and bureaucratic control over 
decision making processes and resource mobilization (chap 4 and 5); 
2. mechanism of democratic and electoral decision making: comprising user representation, 
construction and use of bylaws, selection of leadership, and solidarity (chap 4 and 6); 
3. mechanism of social and political bargaining: with political negotiation, political and 
moral persuasion, vote pushing, and lobbying (chap 6); 
4. financial and economic mechanisms: comprising cost recovery, financial transparency, 
cost of irrigation services, and rent-seeking (chap 7 and 8). 
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Although these mechanisms include concepts used in neo-institutional and rational choice 
approaches (e.g. financial accountability; selected leadership), they also include other 
elements, such as bureaucratic and political coercion, and bribing. Thus, these mechanisms 
are not only economic, but also social, cultural, political and often historical in nature. The 
advantage of looking at these mechanisms in this extended way is that they are applicable to 
how the organizations involved in institutional arrangements for irrigation management are 
organized both internally and externally, i.e. linked to wider institutions and networks. 
External linkages that are analyzed in this thesis include the earlier mentioned financial, 
political, bureaucratic and electoral relationships between all groups involved in the 
institutional arrangements for irrigation management. Examples of these groups are providers 
of irrigation services such as irrigation agencies, commercial enterprises, farmer cooperatives, 
hydraulic committees and WUAs, and recipients such as (groups of) farmers and the WUAs. 
Institutional viability, physical environment and irrigation technology 
One of the arguments used in this thesis is that the viability of the new arrangements for 
irrigation management under the condition of new market-oriented reforms, does not only 
depend on the institutional viability as discussed above. I argue that the absolute availability 
of water 1 9 can influence not only the type of irrigation institutions and organizations (Martin 
and Yoder 1988, Wade 1995), but can also strongly influence the institutional viability of the 
newly established WUAs (Steenbergen 1997) 2 0. Particularly in the case of Mexico this is an 
important factor as WUAs depend for their revenue (and hence existence) entirely on the 
availability of water. Absolute water scarcity is determined by climatological, water quality, 
agro-ecological and catchment (i.e. runoff, storage and ground water recharge) conditions. 
Furthermore, in addition to absolute water scarcity, the viability of institutional 
arrangements for irrigation management is also determined by relative water scarcity. 
Relative water scarcity is determined by the level and regional and local distribution of 
irrigation demand (Postel 1993) vis-á-vis water availability. Irrigation demand is determined 
by water management activities or changing patterns of water use under certain agro-
ecological conditions (Vincent 1997 and Vincent forthcoming), as well as by crop, soil and 
climatological conditions. Furthermore, demand is influenced by technical (design and re-
design of irrigation technology) and social and economic requirements of water use. Within 
this set of factors, managers and users of the water resource can apply different water 
management policy, actions and instruments to mediate the level of relative water scarcity. 
As was noted by Winpenny (1994) and Vincent (forthcoming), these policies, actions and 
instruments for mediating water scarcity can be market-based, legal-based and technology and 
managerial-based. This thesis will explore all these and show their relevance for the viability 
of particularly the irrigation organizations. 
As discussed earlier, an important orientation of the Wageningen school of irrigation is to 
link irrigation technology to its social requirements for use, and vice versa. Although the aim 
of this thesis is not to further elaborate these dimensions, some key aspects were studied to 
show the way the irrigation technology of the ARLID system where this study was conducted 
has in part shaped the functioning of the new WUAs. Important factors that were analyzed 
include how the irrigation infrastructure (canals and structures) has shaped the type and level 
of organizational requirements, and whether these requirements could be met under the kind 
of market conditions under which post-IMT WUAs had to operate. Similarly, I have looked at 
the relationship between the design and physical condition of the irrigation infrastructure at 
the time and shortly after irrigation management responsibilities were transferred from the 
agency to the users. This, I argue, has influenced the requirement of a certain levels of quality 
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and costs of O&M service that the new organizations had to provide, and hence has defined 
the room for negotiation for such service levels and the price farmers have to pay to receive 
these services. Again, the question is whether the 'design' of these organizations under post-
IMT conditions could meet the (often negotiated) provision of service requirements. 
1.4 Analyzing market-oriented policies for irrigation management 
In addition to the concern on the institutional viability, a second concern of policy makers is 
how to use economic and financial forces as tools to transform the financing and management 
along more market-oriented lines. The market-oriented irrigation policies in Mexico aim to 
achieve this in two ways. First, by introducing arrangements for cost-recovery and financial 
autonomy. This would particularly help to reduce government expenditures by charging for 
water £nd irrigation services, while at the same time stimulate more effective use of scarce 
resources. Second, by allowing the trade of water and water rights among WUAs. 
This section gives an overview of the assumptions on which the call to treat water as an 
economic good is based. Subsequently, an attempt is made to show the limitations of these 
assumptions and how they can be extended by approaches that do not only treat water as an 
economic good. 
Ideas and concepts for retrenchment of government expenditures 
Advocates of neo-liberal financial-institutional reforms propose the introduction of quasi-
market incentives into the management of large-scale irrigation systems (Repetto 1986, 
Briscoe 1996, Perry et al. 1997, Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994). In order to both reduce the 
financial burden of central governments and to stimulate effective use of scarce resources, it is 
argued that funding of both capital investment and O&M should be redirected from public 
financing to payment and collection by recipients of irrigation services (Small and Carruthers 
1991). Central concepts in the reasoning behind these policies are cost-recovery, financial 
autonomy and financial accountability. In general, one could say that this approach is part of 
and a Ihrther elaboration of the neo-institutional and rational choice theories of irrigation 
management as discussed and criticized above. They are also based on deductive assumptions 
on (economic) self-interest, economic incentives to effective use of scarce resources and 
utility maximization. Below, some of the main assumptions and arguments used in the 
literature on 'less state, more market' in irrigation are discussed. 
It is believed that in an environment of financial autonomy, irrigation performance will 
improvs both by freeing the O&M budget from the constraints imposed by the central 
government's fiscal difficulties, and by increasing the accountability of the irrigation system 
managers to the water users (Small and Carruthers 1991), thereby reducing rent-seeking 
attitudes of both users and staff of management organizations (Repetto 1986). 
As is explained in more detail by Svendsen (1993) and Oorthuizen and Kloezen (1995), 
financial autonomy is defined as a condition where the irrigation management organization 
rely on user fees for a significant portion of the resources used for O&M, and the 
management organization has expenditure control over the use of the funds generated from 
these charges. Central to this argument is the notion of cost-recovery, i.e. charging and 
collecting irrigation service fees from users. As was discussed in detail by ADB and IIMI 
(1986), Small et al. (1989), Small and Carruthers (1991) and Kay et al. (1997), there are 
many ways of charging and collecting fees from users: direct or indirect means through taxes; 
area, c o p or volumetric based charges; a flat fee or a variable fee; collected by users 
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themselves, or by agency staff, or both; and so forth. Similarly, there are various ways of 
setting fee levels and of dealing with the administrative costs that are engaged with fee 
collection. However, whatever the method used, the two crucial questions are always: will the 
recipient of and payers for irrigation fees have control over the way collected funds are used?, 
and are they able to use their paying of fees as a tool to make irrigation managers accountable 
for the quality of irrigation service that they provide? 
As was explained above, financial autonomy improves the accountability of the 
management organization to farmers, because it presumably transforms the position of 
farmers from mere water users into clients of the organization. Since the organization depends 
financially on fees collected from farmers, it has a clear stake in providing their clients with 
an effective irrigation service. 
Financial autonomy presumably also provides a strong incentive for cost-effective 
management. The organization's interest is to reduce costs to keep its budget in the black, 
while farmers like to keep the fees as low as possible. This mutual interest, it is assumed, 
stimulates a greater efficiency in resource use, for instance by keeping the transaction costs of 
arranging, monitoring, regulating access and usage of the resources within the organization 
low (Steenbergen 1997). In addition, it stimulates to reduce the opportunity costs of change in 
water institutions (Saleth and Dinar 1999). 
This thesis will show to what extent this theory on cost-recovery and financial autonomy 
holds for the case of IMT in Mexico. How this will be done is discussed after a review of 
another policy issue in restructuring irrigation management along market-oriented lines. This 
is the issue of water marketing. 
Water as an economic good: the introduction of water markets 
To market or not to market water? 
Of the alternative (institutional) arrangements proposed to tackle the poor performance of 
irrigation systems, perhaps the most advocated one in recent times is the shift from 
administratively based management regimes to market regimes by establishing water markets 
and tradable water rights (Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994; Kemper 2001). The institutional 
conditions for water markets to be able to emerge, and consequently the property right 
regimes that exist, vary widely even if one focuses on the best documented examples of water 
market development: those in the Southwest of the United States 2 1. Worldwide, many 
countries have started to introduce new water acts, or have modified existing laws, in order to 
provide market incentives for establishing secure water rights in such a way that should 
stimulate the reallocation of water through water marketing, rather than through 
administrative decision making. There exists a wide spectrum of proposed water rights 
regimes and institutional arrangements needed to stimulate the development of water markets 
(see e.g. Saleth (1994) for a concise overview). 
Since 1992, also Mexico can be added to the list of countries that have given more 
importance to water trading. This is done through the promulgation of the National Waters 
Law which, compared to previous water acts, more clearly defines water rights and users 
concessions. The new act allows users to market these rights and concessions (see chapter 4). 
The assumptions and arguments used for advocating the introduction of tradable rights 
and water markets closely follow the neo-institutional notions of economic self-interest and 
utility maximization discussed in section 1.3. The most common assumptions and arguments 
used to advocate water markets include: 
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• water markets encourage users to allocate and use water more efficiently (Colby 1988; 
Vargas-Velázquez 1996; Kemper 2001); 
• water markets stimulate buyers and sellers to treat water as an economic good and 
consequently will induce economic efficiency (Briscoe 1996; Smith et al. 1997; Perry et 
al. 1997). The assumed reason for this is that through water markets users are stimulated 
to reallocate water from low to higher valued uses (Cummings and Nercissiantz 1992), 
ibr instance by shifting the production of staple crops to export crops; 
• water markets encourage crop diversification by increasing the flexibility of farmers in 
responding to changing prices (Rosegrant et al. 1995); 
» water markets help to reduce irrigation-related water quality problems (Weinberg et al. 
1993). 
Examples that are used to debate the validity of the above assumptions and arguments for 
the market development in reallocation of surface water are generally drawn from cases in the 
Southwest of the United States. To a much lesser extent examples are drawn from other 
Western countries with a tradition in water marketing such as Israel (Becker 1995) and Spain 
(Van Bentum 1995). Many of the 'empirical' claims for the success or failure of non-Western 
surface water markets generally rest on political, ideological and theoretical beliefs. This is 
convincingly demonstrated by Bauer (1997 and 1998) and Hendriks (1998), who do use 
empirical data to demonstrate that these claims do not necessarily follow what they have 
observed are the impacts of the Chilean Water Code of 1981 on marketing of water 2 . Both 
studies demonstrate that water markets are far more limited and static than is often assumed in 
those policy papers that use the Chilean case to advocate for water markets (e.g. Rosegrant 
and Gazmuri 1994 and 1996; Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994). 
Empirical evidence that supports the success or failure of surface water markets in 
Mexico are even more scarce. Yet, several authors claim that experiences in Mexico and 
Chile indicate that water allocation through markets in tradable water rights offers a viable 
approach to improving the efficiency of water allocation (ibid.). 
The three concepts that are generally used to support this argument are: the value of 
water; use cost of water; and, opportunity costs. These concepts are briefly explained below. 
Value, use cost, and opportunity cost of water 
of the more comprehensive papers that presents the above pro-market argument is the 
one by Briscoe (1996). Briscoe states that water has an economic value in all its competing 
uses and should be recognized as an economic good. He argues that water has a value to 
consumers, who are willing to pay for it and who will use water so long as the marginal 
benefits from use of an additional cubic meter exceed the costs so incurred. 
3riscoe recognizes that the value of water (i.e. the maximum price the user would be 
willing to pay for it) is difficult to estimate 2 3 and that the relative value of water varies in 
different end-uses. Comparison of the value of irrigation water for food grain production in 
developing countries with values of water for irrigation in industrialized countries, for 
hydrapower, household, industrial, and for environmental purposes, shows that the value of 
irrigation water in public irrigation systems is typically low. It is about US$ 5.0 /1,000 m 3 
whereas the value of water in active water markets is about ten times as high 2 4 . 
Briscoe distinguishes between two different types of costs incurred in delivering water: 
use ;ost and opportunity cost. The use cost typically includes the cost of operating and 
maintaining the infrastructure for storing and distributing the water 2 5, and sometimes also 
includes the "historical costs" related to the construction of the infrastructure26. Generally, 
governments throughout the world keep use costs of publicly financed irrigation systems low. 
The reasons this are usually political in nature and include (among others): subsidizing low 
17 
CHAPTER 1 
food prices for urban constituencies; stimulating self-sufficiency in the production of staple 
foods; controlling political unrest that may result from high food prices; poverty alleviation; 
and so forth. These reasons already partly answer the question why in the past governments 
did choose not to follow market mechanisms to "get the prices right". 
Opportunity cost is defined as the value of water in its highest value alternative. 
Assessing the opportunity cost is difficult as it relies on a number of assumptions on marginal 
losses and benefits to different uses. The opportunity costs of irrigation water varies 
considerably depending on alternative uses. These alternative uses can be found within the 
irrigation sector as a whole or within a single irrigation system. An example of the latter case 
is when a farmer who irrigates a low value grain crop foregoes the opportunity of a farmer 
who wants to irrigate high value crops. Opportunity costs can also vary between different 
sectors in the economy. This is for instance the case when irrigation foregoes the transfer of 
water to neighboring industries. Furthermore, the opportunity cost can vary within a season 
and between different seasons, as water becomes more scarce or abundant as a result of 
changing river flows and dam storage. 
An extended approach to study market forces in irrigation management 
So far for the rational economic theory on pricing water along market-lines. In this thesis the 
example of water markets in ARLID is used to test the main argument for advocating the 
introduction of market forces in the allocation of water: that water markets stimulate users to 
rationally value water as an economic good and follow market mechanisms in pricing traded 
water. An attempt is made to demonstrate that this assumption is limited in its strength to 
show why prices are set at certain levels, and why transactions in water marketing do not 
necessarily follow market mechanisms. 
In most literature on water markets a comparison is made between two alternative 
mechanisms of setting prices and allocating water. However, I argue that there is a third 
mechanism that to a large extent explain why water pricing and water markets are less 
'perfect' than advocates of market oriented assume they are. The first mechanism that is 
generally recognized is the administrative one, in which water pricing, if any, and allocation 
of water is determined by bureaucratic management decisions. Examples of these are water 
management regimes that are organized around systems of rotation of irrigation deliveries 
(either volumetric based, time based, crop based or a combination of these) between different 
sub-systems. The second, alternative mechanism that is more and more propagated through 
market-oriented policies, is the setting of water prices and water allocation organized around 
market forces. The key concept in this latter mechanism is again opportunity costs. 
According to Briscoe, true opportunity costs are affected by the mode of water allocation. 
Using the case studies documented by Maass and Anderson (1978), Briscoe concludes that 
compared to administrative mechanisms of water allocation, the market allocation of 
irrigation water is far superior in terms of overall productive efficiency and equity of the 
losses resulting from water shortage. The reasons, he argues, is that in contrast to the former 
mechanism, the latter does include the command area related opportunity costs. 
Briscoe sees the water market as "a brilliant conceptual solution to the enduring problem 
of reconciling practical and economic management of water". The problem with pricing 
irrigation water is that use costs (i.e. financial O&M costs) are much lower than opportunity 
costs. Whereas in conventional administrative allocation systems water is only priced at its 
use cost, the assumption of advocates of irrigation policies along market-lines is that in water 
markets the behavior of the user is not driven by the low use cost of the water but rather by 
the much higher opportunity cost. According to Briscoe, "this is the genius of the water 
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mark;t approach - it ensures that the user will in fact face the appropriate economic incentive, 
but de-links these incentives from the tariff (which is set on "common-sense" grounds"). 
By presenting some first experiences with price setting and water marketing in ARLID 
(chapter 8), an attempt is made to demonstrate that also socio-political accountability 
influences the level of water price setting and water marketing. The approach chosen in this 
thesis is to show that price setting and water marketing are influenced by a combination of 
these three mechanisms: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
administrative mechanism of decision making; 
market mechanism (rational choice and economic maximization); 
socio-political mechanisms. 
.n addition to applying and testing the concepts that are related to the first of the above 
three mechanisms, this study will particularly focus on the third mechanism, looking at key 
reforms in the following ways: 
Measure financial performance and level of water trading. Levels of (changes) in cost-
recovery, financial autonomy and price setting will be measured by applying financial 
performance indicators (see section 1.6). In this way it is possible to describe both the 
changes over time (before and after IMT) and the differences between system levels within 
the district. 
Study financial and market goals as negotiated arrangements. Rather than simply assuming 
that users and management staff will follow the stipulated institutional arrangements for cost-
recovery, financial autonomy and water marketing, this thesis proposes that financial 
management and water marketing comprises elements and mechanisms that managers and 
users have (at least in part) negotiated for. This follows the argument made by Moore (1990) 
and others that economic utility maximization is only one of the forces that shape human 
behavior. In the case of, for instance fee level setting, socio-economic and political forces as 
well as cultural (e.g. loyalty to group identity) factors are of equal importance and hence 
should be included in the analysis of financial viability. 
Study daily financial management and water marketing as contingent practices. Similarly, 
once the financial and marketing arrangements have been negotiated for and set, also 
eveiyday practices of financial management and trading are influenced by factors and 
mechanisms that go beyond the sphere of economic rational choice. One of the main concerns 
of international policy makers interested in improving the financial performance of large 
irrigation systems, is the rent-seeking practice (see e.g. Repetto 1986). Repetto and others 
explain these practices in terms of a search for economic self-interest of those involved in 
rent-seeking. Also other 'less than perfect' practices in the sphere of financial management, 
such as poor cost-recovery rates, are often explained in terms of imperfect economic 
incentives and practices. In this thesis I will try to unfold the economic and other mechanisms 
that explain these 'imperfect' incentives and practices. 
Link financial performance and water marketing to the environment and technology. As was 
explained above, one of the contentions of this thesis is that institutional viability is linked to 
the physical environment and technology. In this thesis I argue that this is particularly the case 
for financial viability of irrigation management organizations. In order to support this 
contention, I will observe how the mode and quality of cost-recovery, financial accountability 
and financial autonomy are influenced by the conditions of the physical environment 
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(particularly water availability) and the type and physical condition of the infrastructure, and 
vice versa. 
1.5 Observing local strategies of institutional interventions 
This study is about the reality and local impacts of market-oriented reforms, rather than about 
their formal institutional design. Hence, this thesis deals with everyday human practices and 
behavior. It deals with how actors involved in irrigation under post-reform conditions cope 
with everyday problems and it shows what the impacts are of these practices and problems on 
performance and viability of their irrigation organizations. 
Much of the literature on intervention policies in irrigation follows an instrumentalistic 
approach, focussing on how agents of interventions can best achieve desired goals. For 
several reasons this approach is (at least in part) inapplicable for studying everyday local 
practices and impacts of planned intervention in irrigation. 
First, it assumes a linearity between policy design, implementation and impacts of 
intervention. However, as Long and van der Ploeg (1989) and Long (2001) state, the 
separation of 'policy', 'implementation' and 'outcomes' is a gross over-simplification of a 
much more complicated set of processes which involves the reinterpretation or transformation 
of policy during the implementation process, such as that there is no straight line from policy 
to outcomes. Particularly Long (1988, 1989, 2001) and his staff and students in rural 
sociology (Hebinck et al. 2001) have provided detail empirical evidence that support the 
general observation by Long (2001: 27) that (planned) intervention is an on-going 
transformational process, without 'project' boundaries in time and space, that is constantly re-
shaped by its own internal organizational and political dynamic at the local level. 
Long and his group conducted intensive studies on planned intervention in large scale 
irrigation systems. A central approach in their work is to interpret agricultural and social 
change as an outcome of strategy, struggles and negotiations that take place between 
individuals and intervening groups, rather than the outcome of the prescriptive execution of 
top-down irrigation policies. Examples of this in irrigation, include the work by Siriwardena 
(1989) on farmers' response to planned intervention in a settlement irrigation scheme in Sri 
Lanka, and by Zaag (1992) on how water users and irrigation managers in the field cope with 
planned decentralization policies in Western Mexico. They show that the way water users and 
irrigation managers perceive, adopt and transform intervention policies into daily irrigation 
practices is a result of contingent social and political strategies and interactions between all 
involved actors, rather than of planned strategic conduct. As Long (2001) summarizes these 
and similar studies: the strategies that local actors devise, and the types of interactions that 
evolve between them and the intervening parties shape the nature and outcomes of such 
interventions. 
This kind of local interpretation of planned interventions, often leads to what can be 
perceived as contingency irrigation management (Manzungu 1999): management that is in 
great influenced by the specific set of local socio-economic and physical conditions, rather 
than by mere institutional design 2 7. Although institutional principles shape the form and 
direction of human interaction, it does not predict actual day-to-day strategic and operational 
management. 
The second limitation of the conventional (i.e. neo-institutional) approach to look at actual 
practices and impacts of market-oriented reforms like IMT and water marketing closely 
follows the criticism earlier made on rational choice. Rather than analyzing actors and their 
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daily practices in terms of rational (economic) decision makers, it is important to perceive 
their behavior and practices in a wider socio-economic and political context. 
A third limitation of most studies on interventions for institutional reforms is a 
methodological one. In general, reform impact studies focus at impacts at the meso or macro 
(i.e. regional, national, global) levels, rather than at the implications of reforms at the local 
level. In addition, most studies use census data to show the performance and impacts of 
institutional changes, rather than observation and measurement of daily local practices and 
strategies, and performance. This confronts us with the methodological questions of how to 
assess the impact of market-oriented reforms in irrigation in terms of performance and 
activities of users and irrigation managers that operate irrigation systems under these new 
institutional conditions. 
ITius, this thesis looks at day-to-day practices, social interactions and group strategies of 
coping with the institutional arrangements that were implemented as a result of the 
intervention programs. It shows who the key strategic actors are in (re)negotiating the 
prescriptions of the IMT policy, their networks and arenas in which they operate. And, it 
shows that also non-economic elements shape the direction and results of the behavior of 
policy implementers and their target-groups. 
1.6 Analyzing impacts of institutional interventions on irrigation 
performance 
The choice of research methodology for this thesis integrates observing local processes and 
practices of institutional intervention with their impacts on irrigation performance. 
One of the objectives of the IWMI research program in Mexico to which this study 
contributed, was to observe and measure the impacts of the Mexican M T program. This 
study was also part of the global IWMI research program on developing irrigation 
performance indicators for both internal operational performance assessments of irrigation 
systems and comparative indicators to assess impacts of interventions in the irrigation sector. 
However, from the start of my research in Mexico I realized that applying performance 
indicators and measuring financial and O&M effects at several levels within the irrigation 
district would not be sufficient to understand the processes and dynamics that explain why 
certain levels of performance were achieved or not. Nor would they help explain why users 
and irrigation managers alike cope with the newly introduced institutional arrangements in the 
way we observe they cope. Hence, the choice to apply a mixture of methods and data 
collection techniques, borrowed from both technical and social sciences, was born and 
worked out in the way described below. 
THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF PERFORMANCE AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 
By using a set of indicators, changes in quantitative irrigation performance levels are 
measured. This study mainly focuses at performance assessments at the levels of the selected 
irrigation district, several of its sub-systems as well as the level the selected water user 
associations and other management agencies within the boundaries of the district. 
Abernethy (1989, cited in Murray-Rust and Snellen 1993) defines performance as: 
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The performance of a system is represented by its measured levels of achievements in 
terms of one, or several, parameters which are chosen as indicators of the system's 
goal. 
While Abernethy focuses on the performance of the irrigation system, Murray-Rust and 
Snellen (1993) propose a definition for the (effective) performance of an irrigation 
organization, measured by two complementary criteria: 
• the degree to which the organizations 'products /services respond to the needs of its 
customers; and 
• The efficiency with which the organization uses resources in supplying these needs. 
Hence, the performance of an organization (i.e. the effectiveness of its activities) is a 
measure both of the degree of fulfillment of the output objectives and the management of the 
available resources. Small and Svendsen (1990 and 1992) distinguish between three types of 
performance measures: 
• internal process measures of performance relate to a system's internal operations and 
procedures in the creation of intermediate and final outputs (Am I doing things right?); 
• output measures of performance examine the quantity and quality of the system's final 
output; 
• impact measures of performance pertain to the effects of the system's outputs on the 
larger environment (Am I doing the right thing?). 
As is noted by Bos et al. (1994), this distinction is useful because it helps to understand 
that performance means different things to different people and has different purposes for 
different groups with interests in irrigation. Different categories of groups of water users, 
system managers, planning and monitoring agencies, researchers and policy makers will have 
different purposes for applying performance assessments. 
An impressive body of literature on irrigation performance assessments methodologies 
has expanded rapidly over the last two decades, each having its own assessment purpose, 
looking at different dimensions and perspectives and using their own sets of performance 
indicators 2 8. Of these methodologies three approaches are of particularly interest to this study: 
internal performance assessments of O&M, comparative performance assessments, and 
institutional performance assessments. I will discuss these below. 
INTERNAL OPERATIONS ASSESSMENTS 
In conventional irrigation science, the most commonly used method of assessing irrigation 
performance, is to measure actual levels relative to daily, weekly, monthly or seasonally set 
management targets by managers of irrigation systems. The purpose of such assessment 
methods is to evaluate the system's internal operations and procedures by using internally 
agreed service levels (Van Hofwegen 1996; Bos 1997) and internally set standards and 
indicators (Small and Svendsen 1990 and 1992). This evaluation approach is both technical 
and descriptive as it characterizes internal patterns, strengths and weaknesses with respect to 
certain stated management targets (Guda and Lincoln 1987). As such, it provides detailed 
information on management strategies and constraints. It therefore can help system managers 
to monitor the quality of operational performance (Murray-Rust and Snellen 1993). 
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Examples of typical internal process indicators include: 
» Conveyance, distribution, field and application, and project efficiencies (Bos and 
Nugteren 1990; Molden and Gates 1990; Wolters 1992). 
o Reliability and dependability of water distribution (Abernethy 1986; Molden and Gates 
1990; Oad and Sampath 1995). 
© Equity or spatial uniformity of water distribution (Abernethy 1986; Levine and Coward 
1989; Sampath 1988; Sharma et al. 1991; Molden and Gates 1990; Wahaj 2001). 
o Adequacy and timeliness of irrigation delivery (Levine 1982; Abernethy 1986; Molden 
and Gates 1990; Oad and Sampath 1995; Meinzen-Dick 1995). 
Many authors have applied one or more of these and other indicators at particular 
irrigation systems 2 9. Beyond doubt, all are useful as they provide important information about 
operational performance processes of the particular systems studied. However, the indicators 
mentioned above have shown some limitations as well, which include: 
» Different authors propose to use different types and sets of indicators. In other cases, 
similar indicators are used but the definition of these indicators and the methodologies or 
tools to measure them differ. Although some efforts have tried to standardize internal 
operations indicators (Bos et al. 1994, Burt and Styles 1999), proposals for new sets of 
indicators or other methodologies to measure indicators are still emerging. As a result, 
comparisons across systems or over time are hardly possible 3 0. 
» These indicators are based on the existence of clearly defined management goals and 
operational targets. However, in many irrigation systems, these goals and targets are either 
absent, or are too widely defined and inconsistent with one another (e.g. Brewer et al. 
19J97). 
pointed out by Small and Svendsen (1990), measuring internal operations indicators 
lowing a goal-model approach, implies that subjectivity enters the performance 
evaluation both in the establishment of the goals and targets themselves, and in the way 
differing goals are weighted. System managers, policy makers, farmers, and researchers 
might all set different goals and targets, especially in systems where both are not yet (or 
poorly) defined, or where goals have changed as a result of dramatic changes in, for 
instance, cropping patterns, water availability or the political and economic systems. 
<» Generally, these indicators address how the input (water) is used, but do not provide 
information on to what wider hydrological, agricultural, economic, social, and 
environmental impacts the inputs have led. 
o Most of the performance assessment exercises described in literature were done in the 
context of intensive research programs, often to test new indicators introduced by 
researchers, rather than proposed by system managers. As a consequence, little is known 
about how system managers perceive the usefulness of these indicators for daily system 
operation, and how easy it is to apply these indicators for day-to-day monitoring purposes, 
o Measurement of most internal operations indicators requires complicated data collection 
procedures. Monitoring systems are normally not set up to collect these required data. As 
a consequence, applying the indicators requires additional staff, skills, and equipment, 
which are generally not available within irrigation systems, or which are hard to obtain. 
o As 
fo! 
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COMPARATIVE IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 
The second approach discussed here compares system characteristics and outputs of irrigated 
agricultural systems found in one place or period with those found elsewhere or different 
periods. Comparative indicators aim to help system managers, researchers and policy makers 
to compare outputs and impacts of interventions in individual systems relative to outputs in 
other systems or system levels (Molden et al., 1998; Sakthivadivel et al. 1999). 
This type of evaluation approach stays deliberately close to the objectives of most 
technical and institutional intervention policies and programs, meaning that the indicators 
used are essentially economic output oriented in nature. It assesses system performance by 
applying comparative indicators using relative standards rather than internally set operational 
standards. Unlike internal operational indicators, application of comparative indicators does 
not aim to make a normative judgment on the quality of irrigation performance. Comparative 
indicators simply provide information about the level of performance at a given system level 
relative to other system levels, or relative to time. Comparative indicators are based on inputs 
(such as land and water) into a given system, and outputs from that system (such as actual 
volume of water used relative to the crop demand, or productivity per unit of water and land). 
So far, application of these indicators in several systems world wide has demonstrated 
that, compared to internal process indicators, data collection procedures required for 
measurement of external performance are relatively cheap and less time and resource 
consuming (ibid.). Generally, comparative indicators are only measured at higher system 
levels, such as modules or the entire district. 
Table 1.1 Performance indicators applied in this study 
Entire Cortazar Salvatierra Selected Selected 
Comparative indicators district module module canals fields 
Relative water supply (ratio) • • / • • 
Relative irrigation supply (ratio) • • / X X 
Water delivery capacity (ratio) • • / X X 
Output per cropped area ($/ha) / X • 
Output per unit command ($/ha) • • / X X 
Output per unit irrigation supply ($/m3) • / X X 
Output per unit water consumed ($/m3) • • / X X 
Gross return on investment (%) • • • X X 
Part of canal network maintained (%) • • • X X 
Maintenance expenditure ($/ha) • • • X X 
Financial self sufficiency (%) • • • X X 
Internal operations indicators 
Actual supply over planned supply (%) • • • • 
Actual supply over concessioned supply (%) • • • X X 
Actual supply over reported supply (%) X X X • • 
Actual RWS over planned RWS (%) • y X • 
Actual RWS over reported RWS (%) • / / X / 
Spatial distribution of RWS (ratio) X X X • X 
Fee collection rate (%) • • • X X 
Note: •/ = applied X = not applied 
A list of comparative and internal process indicators used in this thesis is presented in 
table 1.1 The selected internal operations indicators basically follow the irrigation 
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1.7 
management targets of CNA mentioned in section 5.3 of this thesis. Definitions of the 
comparative indicators are given in Appendix 4, as well as in Molden et al. (1998), Kloezen 
and Garcés-Restrepo (1998a), Sakthivadivel et al. (1999), and Burt and Styles (1999) 3 1. 
Assessing the viability of institutional arrangements for irrigation management 
Comparative indicators help system managers, policy makers and researchers to point out 
where problems occur and if more detailed studies are required. However, they do not identify 
the factors and processes that cause these problems. Internal operations indicators help to 
describe the level of system specific performance levels and often also help to indicate where 
the reasons for poor internal performance can be found. However, they do not provide 
information on the causes and mechanisms that lie behind poor performance levels. Both 
approaches are used to measure effects of management practices under certain institutional 
arrangements (like IMT), but they do not measure the viability of these arrangements. 
However, it is not sufficient to only measure viability indirectly in terms of effects. One also 
has 1:0 observe directly how irrigation organizations and users cope with institutional 
arrangements. As was argued in section 1.5, the method used to 'assess' or 'monitor', the 
viability of institutions is to daily observe actual practices, strategies, social interactions and 
networks of all actors and intervening groups involved. 
Research design and data collection techniques 
Research design 
Much of the empirical data presented in this thesis were collected as part of the author's work 
with the Mexico office of IWML The field study for this thesis began in October 1995 and 
was ended by mid-1998. 
ARLU) was chosen because it was one of the first of the large scale irrigation districts 
that had been transferred from agency management to joint agency-farmer management. 
Henc e, it was possible to observe the first experiences with the new institutional arrangements 
and with additional observations to measure the impacts of IMT on irrigation performance. 
Moreover, it was reported that some of the WUAs in ARLU) were so far enthusiastic about 
IMT, while others had expressed their concerns. Hence, in ARLID IMT had received a mixed 
reception at the part of the users. 
ARLID provided the opportunity to study how and why different WUAs within a single 
irrigation district had reacted to and coped with a similar institutional policy model. This 
meant, it was assumed, that they were applying more or less similar water allocation and 
distribution rules; that they were using basically a similar type of irrigation infrastructure; that 
they were conditioned by a same level of water availability; and that they were dealing the 
same local irrigation agency. Given all these similarities in institutional and physical 
conditions, it would be interesting to observe if and how these WUAS coped differently with 
the same set of newly introduced institutional arrangements for water management. 
Informants at CNA and the University at Chapingo had mentioned that particularly 
Cortiizar and Salvatierra WUAs were reacting quite differently to IMT, in terms of the way 
the \yUAs operate, and in terms of the effects of IMT on irrigation performance. Rather than 
wanting to do a mere comparative research on two WUAs, the idea for selecting two different 
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organizations was that this would help to map out diversity in the way people cope with 
interventions. In addition to some other criteria, it was decided that these two WUAs were a 
good starting point to start doing intensive field research. 
Other criteria that were used to select these two WUAs were: the availability of some 
initial information on the differences in module management as a result of IMT; their locality 
within the district; their past experiences with academic and action research; and related to 
that, the availability and access of baseline data, and their accessibility relative to the city of 
Celaya where the CNA district office is located. 
In order to assist me with the daily water measurement program (see below), I hired and 
trained two field assistants, who were located in Cortázar and Salvatierra, respectively. I also 
trained them to assist me with some of the process documentation, interviewing and survey 
work for this and some other studies in ARLED. 
Limitations 
Although the design, implementation and outcomes of irrigation reform and intervention 
programs cannot be separated, this thesis primarily focuses on the implementation and 
impacts of these programs. Although an attempt is made to contextualize IMT policies in their 
wider political economic environments, only little attention is paid on how these policies were 
politically constructed before being implemented. The two reasons to this choice are 
pragmatic. First, as virtually all my time was spent in the irrigation district, which is five 
hours drive to Mexico City where most people involved in formulating the IMT policy work. 
Second, to keep the study focused on local experiences. 
Primary data collection 
Data collected include primary sources in the two modules and secondary sources with 
respect to the files kept by the respective WUA and CNA at regional, state, and central levels. 
Furthermore, other organizations related to the agriculture sector were visited periodically to 
collect additional information, and to cross-check data collected from the WUAs and CNA. 
Primary field data collection activities included four components: 
Process documentation and participatory observations 
Small research offices were opened in the buildings of the WUAs in Cortázar and Salvatierra. 
This enabled daily interaction with WUA leaders, module staff, ditch tenders, CNA officers, 
farmers and others, and provided an excellent venue for monitoring and documenting the 
process of institutional interventions in the research area. According to Mosse (1998) process 
monitoring helps researchers to describe the unplanned impact or unexpected changes of 
planned intervention. Moreover, it helps to explain why or how observed outcomes were 
achieved, particularly as it is aimed at understanding relationships between different actors 
involved in the intervention process. 
During the entire period, numerous intensive participatory observations and unstructured 
interviews (Bernard 1988) related to daily practices of water management were made. Daily 
field visits provided opportunities to meet water users and discuss all kinds of topics with 
them. Furthermore, meetings of the general assemblies of WUAs, the Hydraulic Committee 
and the Limited Responsibility Society were attended. Frequent visits to the CNA district 
office were made to discuss issues with CNA staff at all levels. Finally, several workshops 
and seminars were organized, which provided opportunities to present and discuss 
preliminary results and observations with a wide range of actors involved in irrigated 
agriculture. 
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Figure 1.1 Schematic representation of selected distributary canals and measurement 
points in the Cortazar module 
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Figuite 1.2 Schematic representation of measurement points in the Gugorrones main 
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Water measurement program 
In order to monitor irrigation performance in different sections within selected canals, as well 
as to selected fields, a daily water measurement program for both surface and ground water 
irrigation was established in Cortázar and Salvatierra modules. These measurements provided 
complementary quantitative support to the daily observations on irrigation activities, and 
hence provided evidence of the level of performance under post-EMT conditions. Only in this 
way it was possible to test the general belief (i.e. no actual measurements) among many 
policy makers and irrigation managers that IMT had resulted in more effective use of water. 
In Cortázar two distributary canals were monitored. Lateral "A" commands 650 hectares, 
while lateral "B" serves 352 hectares. Eleven control points were selected, calibrated and the 
Q-h relation established (see Appendix 2 for an example of a rating curve). As discharge 
characteristics may change because of for instance canal maintenance, each sub-season the 
calibration procedures were repeated. At these calibrated points, flow measurement readings 
were made twice a day during the winter and summer sub-seasons. These readings were 
entered in a spreadsheet and converted into discharges, volumes and water depths for periods 
of 12 hours. In order to calculate the irrigation depths per canal section (i.e. between two 
measurement points), size measurements were made of all the plots within each section. 
Within each lateral, 20 users were selected who were located at head, middle, and tail 
reaches of canals, representing existing land tenure arrangements (ejido versus private) and 
the water source (canal versus well). In each one of the selected fields the volume delivered 
for each irrigation was measured. In addition, the cost of production as well as gross value of 
production was calculated for each of these fields. Wells were also calibrated and monitored 
daily for both volumes pumped and energy consumption. In figure 1.1, a schematic 
representation of the research layout for the Cortázar module is provided. 
For Salvatierra, the entire Gugorrones main canal, commanding 1,200 hectares, and its 
six short laterals were selected. Flow measurements were made twice daily at four points in 
the main canal, and the headwork of each lateral. In addition, in two of the laterals, four 
additional points were monitored. Within these two laterals, 15 users were selected, and the 
same measurements were taken as in the case of the selected fields in Cortázar. Figure 1.2 
shows the research layout in the case of the Salvatierra module. 
In order to observe unauthorized changes in water levels, if any, as well as night 
irrigation, a data plotter with probe was installed at strategic points in the selected canals and 
water levels were plotted at 15 minutes intervals during periods of at least one complete 
irrigation turn (normally 2 weeks). 
Farm surveys 
A multi-visit household survey was conducted with the 35 water users of the selected fields in 
the water measurement program. The objective of the survey was to disclose information on 
the cost of water and energy use, relative to other costs of production and outputs of seasonal 
production under the kind of market conditions that were introduced with IMT. The other 
costs of production included costs associated with hiring labor, renting machinery or draft 
animals, fertilizers and agro-chemicals. 
In addition, a structured farm survey was conducted with 125 farmers, scattered over four 
modules, to collect information on water users' opinion on current experiences with system 
O&M as well as their opinion on the impact of DvIT on daily O&M practices, WUA 
management and access to inputs, information and other support services3 . The following 
criteria were used for the development of the sample frame: 
• Given the logistic difficulties associated with the size of the irrigation district, and the 
consequent research costs, it was not possible to include all 11 modules of ARLID as sub-
28 
INTRODUCTION 
target populations. Instead, it was decided to divide farmers of the district in groups of 
modules that share the same characteristics in terms of cropping pattern, tenancy 
(ejidatario versus private grower) and condition of the irrigation infrastructure. From each 
group, one module was selected and had to represent the other modules in the group. Four 
groups were formed and of each group one module was selected for the survey (see 
Appendix 3 for details). 
• The main parameter of the survey done in ARLID was the O&M service provided by the 
WUAs. The survey did not include parameters of interest like the impact of IMT on yields, 
cost of production, cropping pattern and agro-chemicals. As a consequence, the sample 
size could be relatively small and was estimated at 125 farmers. 
• Within each group only the following stratum was used: ejidatarios versus private 
growers. The 125 farmers were first allocated proportional to the total number of farmers 
within each group. Subsequently, in each group the selected stratum was allocated 
proportional to the number of ejidatarios and private growers, respectively (Appendix 3). 
• It was decided to select farmers geographically within each module in order to represent 
faimers in the head, middle and tail end reaches of the selected modules, as well as to 
account for the proportional distribution of farmers with and farmers without private wells. 
Rather than pre-select plots from a map, it was decided to pre-select canals (and areas 
within these canals) and try to locate farmers that meet the criteria of the sample frame and 
th^ geographical distribution mentioned above. 
Semilstructured interviews on irrigation support services 
Information was also collected on the access to and provision of services that WUAs and 
indiv: dual farmers needed to support irrigation. In addition to the daily process observations 
and documentation, this information was collected from the WUAs by using a semi-structured 
questionnaire. These questionnaires were explained and handed out to leaders and 
management staff of all 11 WUAs during one of the hydraulic committee meetings. 
Subsequently, multiple visits were made to these WUAs to discuss their answers and fill in 
information gaps. 
SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION 
The study also uses a wide range of secondary data, particularly for the purpose of time series 
analysis. Time series data for the cropping seasons 1982-97 stem from records kept by CNA 
at irrigation district, regional, and central levels, as well as from the 11 WUAs at the module 
level. These data included cropping patterns, crop yields, farm gate prices, climate data from 
sever selected stations within, and near the district, monthly and seasonal canal flows at 
different system levels, dam storage and releases, cost and volumes of maintenance work 
done, irrigation fees collected and planned, and actual O&M budgets. Where possible, daily 
or weekly records were used and aggregated, rather than using seasonal or annual summary 
reports published by the agency and the WUAs. 
CNA as well as most WUAs use computers to enter, monitor, and process their data. 
CNA and the WUAs always gave full and unconditional access to these as well as other files, 
which provided excellent transparency of the data used for this study. Several tools were 
applied to check the quality of the secondary data 3 3. Aggregation of module level data 
provided a cross-check for data collected at the district level. Secondary data were further 
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cross-checked by data collected from other sources like rural development banks. Primary 
flow data allowed cross-checking on the quality of officially reported canal flows at different 
hydrologie control points in the system during a period of four irrigation seasons. Similarly, 
primary information from the farmer household survey was used to cross-check the quality of 
secondary production data (yields, farm gate prices, etc) that was aggregated by the WUAs 
(module level) and CNA (district level). 
CALCULATION OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
The basis of process monitoring of operational performance comprises the data collected by 
the ditch tenders at the field level. A number of indicators were also applied for selected 
secondary canals, and fields. 
In order to establish total crop water requirement for each selected canal section and field, 
the FAO's CROPWAT 3 4 , and its complement CLIMWAT software packages were utilized 
(FAO 1996). Required data on humidity, wind speed and hours of sunshine were taken from 
two nearby stations given in CLIMWAT. Rainfall as well as the maximum and minimum 
temperature data were collected from five weather stations within or near the district, and 
from the two selected WUA offices. 
In order to calculate the total crop water requirement (ETCROPWAT)35, cropping patterns of 
each selected module, canal section and field were established through field observations. For 
each crop that was irrigated within these sections and fields, data on crop characteristics were 
collected, including crop variety 3 6, growing period, planting date, crop coefficient (Kc) values 
for each crop development stage and soil type. 
For all system levels (district, module, selected canals and selected fields) and irrigation 
seasons, crop production values are expressed in standardized values of a base or main crop. 
This makes comparison between different cropping patterns possible. To do this, yields of the 
various crops grown were converted into 'equivalent' yields following the procedure defined 
in Appendix 4. For the winter season, wheat was chosen as the 'equivalent' base crop; for the 
summer sorghum was chosen. 
Unless explained otherwise, all prices are local farm gate prices. Also, all prices have 
been converted to constant July 1994 US dollars, with an exchange rate of 3.5 pesos per US 
dollar. Nominal peso prices are given only if these clarify the impact analysis. Especially for 
the time series analysis, it proved to be important to express prices in both constant US dollar 
prices and nominal pesos prices as by December 1994 Mexico faced an economic crisis, 
which was followed by a devaluation of the peso against the dollar (from 3.5 pesos per dollar 
in 1994 to 7.8 pesos per dollar in July 1996). Moreover, the crisis was followed by an 
inflation rate of approximately 50 percent in 1995. The start of the crisis fell exactly in the 
middle of the four post transfer years reported here. 
1.8 Thesis outline 
Chapter 2 provides general background information on the location, history, lay-out and 
different groups of users of the Alto Rio Lerma irrigation district. It also provides a brief 
description of the two module area, canals and WUAs that were selected for this study. The 
empirical chapters 3 to 9 are basically organized around the conceptual discussion presented 
in sections 1.3 to 1.6. 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the historical and political economic context 
in which the recent market-oriented irrigation reforms were formulated. The chapter follows 
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the assertion that institutional intervention programs like the Mexican EMT program and the 
introduction of water markets do not come on their own, but are generally preceded, 
accompanied and followed by other intervention programs that share the same ideological 
legitimization. 
In chapter 4 an account is given of how the recent institutional arrangements under 
irrigation management transfer and water marketing were formulated and implemented, both 
at the national level and at the level of the case study. 
Chapter 5 deals with the issue of operational accountability and O&M practices under 
post-iransfer conditions. It provides a detailed analysis of both the official institutional 
arrangements for O&M in ARLED and the actual irrigation practices. From these practices 
one can observe how and to what extent the new arrangements for O&M have been adopted 
or modified by both the new irrigation managers and the users. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion on the impact of these arrangements and practices on water use, spatial distribution 
of water, and on land and water productivity. 
Chapter 6 gives a detailed account of the practices, processes and mechanisms that both 
strenj»then and weaken socio-economic and political accountability in the context of the new 
institutional arrangements for local water management. 
In chapter 7 an analysis is made of the financial viability of the post-transfer institutional 
arrangements for irrigation management. This is done by giving detailed accounts of practices 
and mechanisms of financial accountability, transparency, autonomy and rent-seeking. 
Furthermore, the chapter provides a detailed analysis of the impact of irrigation management 
transfer on both the financial self-sufficiency of the WUAs and the change in cost of water to 
farmers. 
In chapter 8 the focus of analysis is shifted from IMT towards issues of water trading. It 
assesses how the new arrangement of providing WUAs with water use concessions have 
affeci:ed the practice of water trade, both between individual water users and between WUAs. 
It shows how WUAs and farmers perceive the concepts of cost and value of water in the 
context of the new arrangements. 
Chapter 9 returns to the official objectives of the IMT program and assesses the 
program's impact on irrigation performance in terms of changes in water distribution, ground 
water use, system maintenance and improvement, land and water productivity, and the 
provision of a series of non-irrigation related services to farmers. 
Chapter 10 summarizes the key empirical findings of IMT and water markets in ARLH). 
It first deals with the question whether institutional design principles matter at all in ARLU). 
It then discusses the mechanisms that have influenced the viability of the new institutional 
arrangements. Subsequently, in the chapter a revisit is made to some of the conceptual and 
methodological considerations on studying the viability of institutional arrangements for local 
water management under market-oriented conditions. The chapter continues with a discussion 
on policy implementation for designing and implementing market-oriented intervention 
program similar than the ones studies for this thesis. An assessment is made whether or not 
the Mexican model can be applicable for other countries. Furthermore, it discusses if and how 
programs of institutional modernization should be linked to programs that aim to introduce 
modernization in irrigation technology. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on 
the research orientation that universities and international research institutes could take while 
studying the institutional arrangements for local water management and their impacts on 
irrigation performance and practices of water control. 
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Notes 
1. See for instance Uphoff (1986a and 1992), Repetto (1986), Jopillo and de los Reyes (1988), 
Chambers (1988), Korten and Siy (1988) and Merrey 1996. 
2. For concise reviews of these early literatures reference can be made to most PhD theses on 
irrigation written in Wageningen (e.g. the recent thesis of Mollinga, Pradhan, Manzungu, and 
Wahaj) and the work by Coward (1980), Uphoff (1986a) and Chambers (1988). On the technical 
dimension of irrigation management reference can be made to Clemmens (1987) and Plusquellec 
etal. (1994). 
3. See for instance the papers that try to link size of irrigation systems to the numbers of staff 
required (Hunt 1988). According to Hunt, there is no clear empirical correlation between the size 
of the system and the length of the canal system and the type of administrative structures. Others 
tried to link the size of the system to the type of organization and authority in order to asses 
whether a system can be transferred from government to farmer management (e.g. farmer, agency 
or joint management) (Merrey and Bulankulama 1987). Others have started to link design 
characteristics of (physical) irrigation control structures and management requirements (e.g. 
Horst (1998) and Murray-Rust and Snellen (1993)). 
4. Much of that theoretical groundwork is developed and discussed by Mollinga (1998). 
5. I deliberately use the term model here, as this is how the Mexican IMT experience is often 
referred to in international seminars on IMT programs. In chapter 41 try to unravel this 'model'. 
6. The high level of attention that the Mexican IMT case has received explains why, for instance, 
the international network on Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) was launched in Mexico 
in 1994. During the first years of existence, this network was coordinated and financially 
supported by the World Bank and primarily involved national and international policy makers 
and local implementers of PIM policies worldwide. The network's mission is 'to facilitate PIM 
through the exchange of people, ideas, and training materials', in which the Mexican case of 
irrigation management transfer has become the key example. 
7. Particularly in literature on farmer managed irrigation, the term '•crafting institutions' is more in 
vogue than 'designing institutions'. More than the term design (as it generally refers to a one-
shot decision, bases on a model), the term crafting has a more dynamic connotation as it refers to 
process, ongoing investment, in an uncertain and ever changing environment (Ostrom 1992). 
8. These styles are, for instance: market-oriented, hierarchical, egalitarian, or fatalistic styles 
(Thompson 1998). Thompson argues that, contrary to general new-institutional focus on scale, it 
is style that distinguishes the institutions that are managing natural resources. 
9. A typical model of introducing farmer participation in irrigation management in many countries, 
is that a top-down approach is used in the process of designing a program, formulating legal 
frameworks, reforming agencies, and rehabilitating infrastructure (Groenfeldt and Sun 1997). In 
addition, a bottom-up approach in often propagated when WUAs are to be organized, while 
understanding and local (political, social en often financial) commitment to adopt the program 
has to be strengthened. As will be described in chapter 3, the Mexican IMT program followed this 
approach as well. Only rarely potential users are involved (either invited or through own 
initiative) from the beginning of the reform in for instance designing the new institutional 
arrangements, such as the legal framework. One of the exceptions might be the case of the 
construction of a new institutional framework of the irrigation sector in Ecuador, starting in 1994. 
Here, several support and farmer entities have taken the initiative of actively contributing, 
analyzing and discussing various options of the legal framework as well as IMT (CNRH et al. 
1996,Boelense/a/. 1998). 
10. In most cases of large scale irrigation, the local government agency with responsibilities for water 
management is some sort of irrigation agency. However, in other cases these responsibilities lay 
with a public works ministry, a ministry of administration, or a ministry of agriculture. As will be 
demonstrated in chapter 3, in Mexico the responsibility for managing irrigation districts has 
shifted several times between these different types of agencies. 
11. I am aware of other approaches to understanding sustainability of institutions and organizations 
than the neo-institutional en political-economic ones mentioned here and used in this thesis. 
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Piirticularly the Cultural Theory could provide an interesting critique to the neo-institutional 
approaches that are so popular amongst irrigation policy makers. Cultural Theory looks at styles 
arid identity of institutions. See the work by e.g. Douglas (1992) and Thompson (1998). 
According to Mollinga (2001), the cultural theoretical critique against new institutionalism is that 
there are more repertoires for transactional human behavior than the utility maximizing one used 
by rational choice and other new institutionalist approaches. Another current debate is the one on 
Social Capital, which originate from the work by Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993), who look 
at action and the structure of relations between and among persons and organizations, primarily 
within networks in civil society. Important concepts in this debate are civic engagement, social 
trust, communication, tradition, social norms and social obligations. However, as Harris and de 
Rsnzio (1997) argue, it largely fails to explain the mechanisms or processes whereby networks of 
civic engagement lead to more effective government, nor does it appear to explain variations 
among apparently similar types of organizations. 
As the work by Ostrom and her colleagues and students at the Workshop in Political Theory and 
Policy Analysis is widely known and appreciated, I decided not to review this in depth. 
Although, at the same time, as Mollinga (2001) notes (citing another paper of Moore), concern 
for the welfare of the collectivity often dominates over issues of individual self-interest in shaping 
political attitudes and actions. 
This does not mean that analysis of transactions costs is of no importance for understanding the 
viability of institutional arrangements, because (as the examples in chapter 7 show) they are. 
However, the notion that these costs in themselves are also politically and socially constructed is 
irissed by most researchers in the school of rational choice theory. 
S;e for instance Gorriz and Groenfeldt (1995), Meinzen-Dick et al. (1995), Groenfeldt and Sun 
(1997), Groenfeldt (1999). 
In fact, in this case study several other levels could have been distinguished as well. Examples of 
these include: between the central agency and the local agency; between the central agency and 
individual WUAS (particularly in the case of IMT pilot WUAs). However, I focused my work on 
the levels mentioned in the main text. 
Documentation of this type of accountability are for instance Wade (1982 and 1989), Moore 
(i 989), Kloezen (1995), Oorthuizen (1998) and Mollinga (1998). 
See Huppert and Urban (1998) for similar suggestions. 
I will deal with the concept of relative water availability in detail in many other parts of this thesis 
(see particularly section 1.4 and chapters 5 and 9). 
Steenbergen (1997:17) calls this 'the integrity of the resource base'. 
See Colby (1988) for an excellent overview of experiences with the different water codes in the 
Western United States. 
Unlike non-western surface water marketing, empirical examples of marketing of groundwater 
a-e well documented. Examples include Meinzen-Dick and Sullins (1993), Shah (1993), Strosser 
and Kuper (1994) and Strosser (1997). 
Eriscoe provides several useful reference to methods used to estimate the value of water in 
different end uses. These include Gibbons (1986), Arrow et al. (1993) and Griffin et al. (1995). 
See also Bhatia (1997), who argues that the value of agricultural output from irrigation should 
take factors of poverty alleviation, food security and employment generation into consideration as 
well. 
Briscoe shows that price elasticity of water demand in irrigated agriculture is low (and negative). 
He warns that this does not mean that demand is not reduced as prices change, but rather that 
demand is reduced less when prices increase. The reason for this low elasticity, he further argues, 
is that buyers' reactions to price changes depend on the original low price, which are generally 
artificially held low in the case of irrigation water. Hence, the higher the original price of water, 
the higher the decline in demand when prices are increased. 
Another way of looking at use costs is to consider the marginal cost of water. This is the cost that 
will have to be incurred if capacity needs to be expanded to produce an additional unit of water. 
Briscoe argues that for a society as whole, welfare is maximized when water is priced at its 
marginal costs, and when water is used until the marginal costs is equal to the marginal benefit. 
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26. As Briscoe states, it can be argued that the value of the asset is not correctly measured by its 
historic costs, but rather by the cost that would be incurred in replacing the asset. 
27. Many policy makers get frustrated by contingency management as a reaction to their institutional 
design principles, as they perceive that this hampers, what they often call, "getting the process 
right". Typical reactions that follow their frustrations are: (1) complete denial - they argue that 
users do follow their design principles and their subsequent guidelines, (2) they react to this in 
terms of imperfect institutional designs, often resulting in yet another, even more prescriptive 
guidelines (i.e. a further technocratization of institutional designs), and (3) they blame the 
incapability ("we have to educate the farmers") and unwillingness of both users and managers, 
often resulting in expensive motivation and training programs. 
28. For overviews, see Rao (1993), Bos etal. (1994) and Bos (1997). 
29. See for instance the studies by Jurriens (1996) on performance assessments in India, and Bos and 
Chambouleyron (1998) on irrigation performance in Mendoza, Argentina. 
30. See for example Oad and Sampath (1995) and Meinzen-Dick (1995). 
31. Burt and Styles (1999) give a full description of these comparative indicators, which they applied 
to 17 irrigation systems in ten developing countries. The authors also provide some suggestions 
for modifications of the indicators and propose three new indicators. 
32. The questionnaire used for the survey in ARLID is based on the farmer questionnaire designed by 
the Irrigation Management Reform Group at IWMI (of which I formed part), but has been 
considerably modified to meet local circumstances at ARLID. 
33. Cross-checking secondary (or official government) data is necessary given the often rather 
unsatisfactory quality of these data. According to Gill (1993), the problem of "unreliability, gaps, 
over-aggregation, inaccuracies, mutual inconsistencies and lack of timely reporting" are 
especially marked in the realm of natural resource management, since the relevant variables are 
often unusually hard to quantify and the necessary data difficult to collect and verify. See also 
Polly Hill's (1984) often quoted article on the poor quality of official socio-economic statistics. 
34. The program is based on the calculation of reference evapotranspiration (ETo) through the 
modified Penman-Montieth equation (Doorenbos and Kassam 1986). 
35. In order to make clear that I calculated the crop water requirement through the FAO CROP WAT 
method, I prefer to use the expression ETCROPWAT- Other common expressions found in the 
literature are ETm and ETcrop. ETCROPWAT = kc. ET0, where kc is the crop coefficient for a 
certain crop development stage, and ET0 is the Penman-Montieth reference evapotranspiration. 
36. Particularly for wheat, a distinction had to be made between the most common varieties as these 
varieties have different growing periods and hence different crop water requirements. For 
examples on crop water requirements of two wheat varieties, see table 5.3. 
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The Alto Río Lerma irrigation district 
2.1 
This chapter provides background information on the location, history, lay-out, water 
availability of the irrigation district that was selected to for this study. It also gives some 
information on the two most important groups of water users (ejidatarios and private growers, 
respectively) and discusses to what extent these groups have differentiated access to land and 
water resources. Finally, some general information is provided on Cortázar and Salvatierra 
modules, which were the two (out of eleven) modules that were selected to make in-depth and 
detailed observations, to conduct farm surveys, and to make flow measurements. 
2.2 
Introduction 
Location and history 
ARLID is located in the State of Guanajuato, central Mexico (see figure 2.1). It is part of one 
of the most prosperous agricultural regions of Mexico, called the Bajío. It is characterized by 
fertile soils, relatively good water availability and consequently high crop yields. As a result, 
the Bajío, and particularly the area in and around ARLID, are famous for its high density of 
national and international commercial agricultural enterprises. Its main town is Celaya: a 
medium size agricultural town of approximately 400,000 inhabitants and with literally 
hundreds of mechanical workshops, dealers of fertilizers and other agricultural inputs, banks 
and sellers of irrigation pumps and equipment (nicely called casas de riego, irrigation 
houses). It is also the town where the CNA district office responsible for ARLID is located. 
If one: travels from Celaya to the much smaller city of Salamanca (famous for its huge 
PEMEX oil refinery), one is struck by the lush irrigation fields as well as by the great number 
of agricultural firms that put out their billboards to advertise the price they pay for sorghum, 
maize and wheat produces, and others who advertise with new HYV seeds. 
The history of ARLID dates back to pre-Hispanic times when some of the present canals, 
like the Gugorrones main canal in Salvatierra, were constructed. Under the Spaniards, new 
irrigation structures like small diversion weirs and storage dams were developed (Roemer 
1997). The first reported major work undertaken that shaped the present lay-out of the district, 
was the change of the river bed of the Lerma. This created the Yuriria lake in 1548 (Aguilar-
Sánchez 1993). These and other works stimulated the rapid expansion of the irrigated area in 
central Guanajuato. According to Aguilar-Sánchez (1993), these first irrigation works helped 
to meet the increasing food demand of the new large-scale dairy farms (which were 
established by the Spanish clergy and military as well as by local hacendados and rancheros) 
and silver mines (which were discovered between 1554 and 1556). These dairy farms and 
silver mines depended heavily on the food supplies of the irrigated area, and in turn also 
motivated the first agricultural traders to come to the Bajío and to found commercially 
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important agricultural centers like Celaya, Salamanca, León, Salvatierra, Irapuato and 
Acámbaro (see figure 2.2) 1. 
Figure 2.1 Mexico aud the location of the Alto Río Lerma irrigation district 
IRRIGATION INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 
Until the start of the 20th century, most of the irrigation mfrastructure that was developed 
during the time of the haciendas and ranches were managed entirely independent from each 
other. However, three major developments shaped the way the district is currently designed 
and organized. First, in the 1930s, many of these ancient canals were rehabilitated during the 
expansion of new hydraulic works that were started after the first water law was promulgated 
in 1926 (see section 4.2 for further details on these historical developments). The district 
boundaries were first established in 1938 and approved by the Presidential Degree of 1 
August 1938, after which the operation of the new hydraulic works first started in 1939. 
Second, the district was officially created on 21 February 1953 by Presidential degree 
(Roemer 1997), with which several smaller irrigation systems were merged into one irrigation 
district. A series of infrastructural works in the 1960s further integrated these smaller systems 
into the district. The first phase of these infrastructural developments started in 1964, when 
the then National Irrigation Commission constructed the Soils dam as well as the Lower 
Salamanca main canal and some diversion weirs in the river Lerma. The irrigation units of 
Acámbaro, Salvatierra, Valle, Salamanca, Huanímaro and Corralejo were created. 
The second phase took place under the responsibility of the then Ministry of Hydraulic 
Resources (SRH) and included the construction of the Coria main canal, the rehabilitation of 
some other weirs and the inclusion of Cortázar, Irapuato and Abasólo into the district (ibid.). 
During a third phase, the Soli's dam was made higher and the smaller Purísima dam was 
constructed under the responsibility of the then Secretary of Agriculture and Hydraulic 
Resources (SARH) and integrated into the district in 1980 (CNA 1996a.). 
The third historical development that determined the current irrigation regime was the 
promulgation of the National Waters Law in 1992 and as a consequence the transfer of 
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irrigation management responsibilities from the National Water Commission (CNA) to newly 
created WUAs in November 1992. 
2.3 
The district is situated in the upper reach of the 54,421 km 2 Lerma-Chapala river basin (see 
figure 2.1), which crosses five states and serves nine irrigation districts as well as the huge 
lake Chapala near Guadalajara (Mestre 1997; Scott and Garces-Restrepo 1999). 
Surface water for the district is provided by four dams with a combined storage capacity 
of 2,138 million cubic meters (Mm 3) serving 77,697 hectares. Of these dams, Tepuxtepec 
(538 Mm 3 ) 2 , Solis (1,217 Mm 3 ) and lake Yuriria (188 Mm 3 ) are interconnected by the Lerma 
river. The Purisima dam (196 Mm 3 ) is fed independently from the other three dams. These 
storage dams are complemented by five diversion dams located along the Lerma River. 
The irrigation district is divided into 11 sub-units called modules 3, each managed by an 
individual water users association (WUA) and ranging in size from 1,513 hectares to 18,694 
hectares (figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2 The Alto Rio Lerma irrigation district and its 11 modules 
Lay-out and infrastructure 
Following the irrigation classification system used by Murray-Rust and Snellen (1993), 
the district is designed as an open channel, upstream control system with gradually-variable 
manually operated cross-regulators and canal off-takes in main and secondary canals. Field 
inlets are normally gated pipes. However, ungated pipes that are closed with mud and stones 
are also found. Water deliveries are measured at the main intakes of the modules, whereas 
volumetric supply to secondary canals and fields are estimated by the ditch tenders. 
The irrigation network comprises 475 km of main canals and 1,658 km of secondary and 
tertiaiy canals4. The two most important main canals are the Ing Antonio Coria canal (with 
desigi discharge of almost 30 m 3/s and a total length of 117.7 km) and the Lower Salamanca 
canal (17.5 m 3/s; 60.3 km). There is a network of approximately 1,031 km of drainage canals 
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(Appendix 1). Generally, main canal capacity is sufficient to allow simultaneous deliveries to 
all secondary canals within one module area, thus rotation between secondary canals is not 
necessary. For example, the water delivery capacity5 of the Coria main canal was 1.3 during 
the winter 1995-96 winter season. For the selected Gugorrones main canal in Salvatierra 
module (see below), a water delivery capacity of 2.2 was found6. 
In addition to surface water, there are 1,714 deep tubewells serving an additional 35,075 
hectares within the district; thus the district relies on both surface water and groundwater, 
with their combined use playing a vital role in system operation. The State of Guanajuato is 
underlaid by 18 different aquifers, three of which are partly exploited by farmers within the 
ARLID. The estimated total annual recharge of these three aquifers is 500 Mm 3 //year 7. The 
State of Guanajuato has a high concentration of wells. Approximately 20 percent of all wells 
in Mexico are found in this State. Over-exploitation of the aquifers is a major problem. 
Groundwater table fluctuations have been monitored by CNA and point towards a worrisome 
situation. In 1995, and following a trend over five years, static water tables were falling at an 
average annual rate of 2 to 5 meters (Mufioz 1996), reaching an average depth of more than 
100 meters, with some wells reaching 150 meters in parts of Salamanca module. Unpublished 
CNA data suggest that the total over-exploitation of the 18 aquifers in the State is 829 
Mm 3/year, while it is 117 MmVyear for the three aquifers that serve the irrigation district. 
These volumes correspond to an overexploitation of the aquifers by factors of 1.4 and 1.2 for 
the State and the district, respectively. 
2.4 Water availability 
MEXICO'S WATER BALANCE 
Irrigation is important to the country's national economy: it produces more than 50 percent of 
the agricultural gross product, while it only occupies 30 percent of the arable land. With 5.9 
million hectares, Mexico has the seventh largest irrigation area in the world. Eighty large-
scale irrigation districts serve an area of 3.2 million hectares. In addition, more than 1,300 
small reservoirs serve 1.7 million hectares of irrigated land in small farmer managed systems. 
The remaining surface of approximately 1.0 million hectares is irrigated by an estimated 
35,000 wells (Garcés-Restrepo et al. 1997). 
Total surface runoff is approximately 417 knrVyear and the volume of renewable 
groundwater is estimated at 55 kmVyear (Herrera-Toledo 1997). Total withdrawals of water 
have increased from 38 km 3/year in 1950 to over 190 km 3/year in 1990 (ibid.), which is 40 
percent of the total available water 8. Palacios-Vélez (1994) and Paredes (1997) estimate that 
total consumption of the entire irrigation sector is 46.5 kmVyear of water, while Seckler et al. 
(1998) estimate a gross withdrawal for irrigation at 65.3 knrVyear based on 1990 data. Seckler 
et al. also project that by the year 2025 the total withdrawal for irrigation will be 105.6 
knrVyear (or 22 percent of the total availability, assuming that population growth rates and 
irrigation efficiencies do not change after 1990). 
The major problem with the Mexican national water balance is that it shows high 
regional differences with enormous deficits in both surface and groundwater sources in 
important river basins like the Lerma-Chapala in central Mexico. González-Villarreal and 
Garduño (1994) note that less than one third of the country's water lies within 75% of its area. 
This is in central and north Mexico, where most of the irrigation districts as well as large 
cities and industries are located. Whereas in the remaining 25 percent of the area the water 
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availability is more than 5,000 m 3 per capita per year (Paredes 1997), in those areas where 
demands are high, less than 2,500 m 3 per capita per year is available. Only four percent of the 
total runoff is found in the northern region, which has about 30 percent of Mexico's total area 
(Arrejmin et al. 1996) Moreover, many of those water deficit regions suffer from extremely 
dry spells in yearly rainfall. Such was the case in the Northern Gulf region in 1994-1996 
(Rymshaw 1998) and the Lerma-Chapala basin in 1997-98. Finally, cases of high water 
pollution and increasing competition between various water sectors as a result of booming 
cities like Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey have more than ever brought the problem 
of regional water scarcity to the surface (Tortajada and Biswas 1997; Ongley and Barrios-
Ordoftez 1997). 
CLIMATE 
The climate is moderately subhumid with an average yearly precipitation of 750 mm/year and 
an average temperature of 19 °C. Yearly évapotranspiration is approximately 1,900 mm/year 
and relative humidity is about 60 percent. The dry winter season, which receives 
approximately 80 mm of rainfall, starts in November and ends in April. The average potential 
évapotranspiration (ET 0) for this season is 704 mm. The summer season lasts from May until 
November and has a thirty years average of 670 mm of rainfall and an ET 0 of 722 mm. 
Monthly average climatic data for the district are presented in figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3 Monthly climate data for the Alto Rio Lerma irrigation district 
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RELATIVE WATER AVAILABILITY IN ARLID 
The total catchment run-off of the Lerma-Chapala water basin 9, in which ARLID is located, is 
approximately 4,740 MnrVyear, while the total estimated demand for irrigation and domestic 
use is 3,850 MnrVyear. Of this demand, 52 percent or 2,020 MnrVyear is made available for 
the nine irrigation districts, 38 percent to small-scale irrigation systems and 10 percent to 
domestic and industrial uses. The difference of 890 MnrVyear between total run-off and 
demand is almost entirely designated to Lake Chapala. However, with an average annual 
evaporation of 1,400 MmVyear, it is clear that this lake is gradually drying up (CNA 1991). 
Of the nine irrigation districts in the basin, ARLID is the largest with a gross command 
area of 112,772 hectares, covering 33 percent of the area under irrigation districts. Yet, it 
takes approximately 44 percent (or 880 MmVyear) of all the surface water stored for use 
within the districts (CNA 1991), indicating that the district receives relatively more water 
than the other eight districts in the basin (table 2.1) 1 0 . As will be demonstrated in chapters 5 
and 8, respectively, this has major impacts for both the way water is allocated to and used by 
the farmers, and for the potential and meaning of water trading between WUAs. 
Table 2.1 Water allocation between the irrigation districts in the Lerma-Chapala water 
basin 
Irrigation Command area Water demand 
District Ha % of total MmVyear % of total mVha/year 
Edo de México 17,539 5 90 4 5,131 
Alto Río Lerma 112,772 33 880 44 7,803 
La Begofia 10,487 3 124 6 11,824 
Zacapu 1,214 0.4 8 0.4 6,590 
Ciénega de Chapala 45,901 14 170 8 3,704 
Maravatio 18,365 5 90 4 4,901 
Zamora 18,010 5 200 10 11,105 
Rosario-Mezquite 55,403 16 308 15 5,559 
Edo Jalisco 57,190 17 150 7 2,623 
Total 336,881 100' 2,020 100' 
CoefVar(%) 48 
Average 37,431 224 6,582 
Note : as a result of rounding, total percentage does not equal 100. 
Both rainfall and the amount of water released from the four dams determine surface 
water availability to the district. The average yearly rainfall during the time series period 
between 1982 and 1997 that is used in this study, is 614 mm/year (CV = 20%). This is lower 
than the 30-year average of 750 mm/year. Although the four dams have a total storage 
capacity of 2,140 M m , on the average only 1,085 Mm 3 was stored at the start of the 
agricultural years between 1982 and 1997. Of this storage, a total yearly average of 777 Mm 3 
(CV = 29%) was released for irrigation. This is also lower than the long-term average of 815 
MmVyear. Both data indicate that total surface water availability during the period of analysis 
of this study is slightly lower relative to long-term averages. Particularly 1983 and 1990 were 
dry years (figure 2.4). 
Figure 2.5 shows how available dam storage is divided over the winter and summer sub-
seasons, respectively. Here, water availability is expressed in mm of water available per 
hectare of (surface irrigation) command area. For the winter season, on average 743 mm/ha-
command is released (CV = 38%), while for the summer season an average of 292 mrn/ha-
command is available (CV = 43%). As will be demonstrated and explained in chapters 5 and 
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9, the actual supply per hectare irrigated is higher because irrigation intensities per sub-season 
are below one hundred percent. 
Figurje 2.4 Changes in the total annual rainfall and irrigation deliveries of ARLID, 1982-
1997 
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Figure 2.5 Dam releases for the winter and summer sub-seasons in ARLID, 1982-1997 
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2.5 The water users: ejidatarios and private growers 
This is not the place to review the mixed record of the cause and the development of the 
Revolution of 1910 1 1, but is clear that the major thrust of this agrarian revolution was to 
redistribute land by expropriating the haciendas and provide 'land to the tillers', the landless 
peasant. Lands were granted to the land reform communities called ejidos, and their members 
(ejidatarios). Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 determines who may hold the lands and 
provides the legal basis for the land distribution program. The nation retains direct ownership 
of these lands, while ejidatarios either in common or individually were given the right to use 
it (Randall 1996). 
Until 1911, fewer than 11,000 haciendas controlled 57 percent of the national territory 
while 834 of these land owners held 1.3 million km 2 , leaving 15 million peasants landless 
(Thiesenhusen 1996). In 1923, haciendas of more than 1,000 hectares had still 2.1 percent of 
properties, 58.2 percent of area, and 54.4 percent of value (Randall 1996). In 1992, when an 
end was made to the Revolution by revising Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917, 27,410 
ejidos occupied more than half of Mexico's arable land, which is cultivated by 3.1 million 
ejidatarios (Wayne and Myhre 1998) 1 2. The land reforms did not mean that former 
hacendados and rancheros were expropriated from their lands all together. Article 27 also 
makes provisions for private ownership of land up to certain limits (see below). Farmers who 
cultivated these private lands are called "small private growers" 1 3. 
The land redistribution program that was started in the 1920s caused a dramatic 
redistribution of land in central Guanajuato. At present, this area is dominated by intensive 
irrigated agriculture, both in the two irrigation districts (ARLID and the much smaller 
neighboring district of La Begofla) and in the small-scale farmer managed irrigation 
systems 1 4. Census data on the development of land distribution within the district are not 
available, but the development for the administrative region of Celaya (which partially 
overlaps with ARLID) can serve as an indication how the disparity between ejidatarios and 
private growers evolved since the land reform program was started. 
Between 1915 and 1925 only 109 individual requests for establishing ejidos were made 
in this region, of which only 34 were actually approved. Also in the years between 1923 and 
1934 little land was redistributed. Most of the distributed land was rainfed. In Valle de 
Santiago (to which the present module of Valle belongs), almost 10,000 hectares were handed 
out to 1,300 ejidatarios, but only 512 hectares of this land was irrigated land. The land reform 
program was speeded up considerably under the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940). 
During his presidency the amount of ejido land in Valle de Santiago increased to a little over 
37,000 hectares, of which 4,387 hectares were irrigated. In 1940 approximately 854,000 
hectares were distributed in the entire State of Guanajuato. This was further increased to 
almost 1,200,000 hectares in 1982. In 1982, thirty-nine percent of the total amount of 
cultivated land in Guanajuato was cropped by ejidatarios, while the private growers 
cultivated 62 percent of the land (Aguilar-Sánchez 1993). 
According to Cummings et al. (1989), the land reform program has resulted in sharp 
disparities between ejidatarios and small private growers in terms of access to resources. 
There are three factors that influenced these disparities. First, especially in irrigation districts 
maldistribution of land under the agrarian reform is evident. The average holding of a private 
grower is 37 hectares. This is almost four times the size of an average holding of ejidatarios. 
In ARLID these disparities are less sharp 1 5. There are roughly 24,000 water users in the 
irrigation district, 72 percent of whom are ejidatarios of the 281 ejidos, using 55 percent of 
the land within the district. Twenty-eight percent are classified as small private growers, 
occupying 45 percent of the land. The average landholding in the irrigation district is 4.8 
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the 
hecares, with 3.7 hectares, and 7.6 hectares being the averages for the ejidatarios and the 
private growers, respectively (Table 2.1). But the difference in holdings between these two 
categories of farmers vary from module to module. While in general the average holding of a 
private grower is larger than the holding of an ejidatario, in Salvatierra module private 
growers cultivate 2.4 hectares, which is 0.25 hectares less than the average holding of an 
ejidatario. Salvatierra module has also the highest concentration of users: 6,054, with an 
average holding of 2.6 hectares, while Corralejo has only 275 users with an average 
landholding of 5.5 hectares (Appendix 1). The highest concentration of large land holdings 
can be found in Abasolo, with an average of 6.8 hectares per user, followed by Irapuato (6.6 
ha/user), Valle (5.9 ha/user) and Cortazar (5.8 ha/user). 
The second factor that caused social economic disparities in access to land and water, is 
way distribution of land was organized under the agrarian code of 1934. Private farmers 
wer|e permitted to own 150 hectares of land and to select the location of the land, even if it 
meant retaining title to widely dispersed parcels. The remaining lands were then distributed 
among the ejidatarios (ibid.), causing intermixture between ejidal lands and private lands. As 
can be observed from table 2.2, there is not a clear top-tail bias of distribution of land among 
the modules in ARLID. Also within the modules a high degree of intermixture of lands can be 
observed, although the typical head-tail end bias of social economic distribution can still be 
observed along a few distributary canals. On the other hand, it is widely known that legal 
limtations on the size of individual holdings are ignored or skirted through the practice of 
distributing titles among members of a family, its retainers, and other willing "name lenders" 
(prestanombres) (Foley 1995). Also in ARLID, and particularly in newer modules that were 
created in a round of modernization and rapid expansion of irrigation districts in the 1950s, 
holdings that exceed 500 hectares are common. However, the average holding of private 
growers range from 2.4 hectares in Salvatierra to 27 hectares in Corralejo (where 11 private 
growers irrigate 20 percent of all the land). 
The third factor that has determined disparities in access to land and water is the 
differentiated access to groundwater in areas where farmers can supplement surface water 
with groundwater. In general, the percentage of well owners is higher under private farmers 
than under the group of ejidatarios because the former group often cultivate higher value 
crops and have better access to credit. As a result they have more opportunities to carry the 
cos: associated with capital investment and pump operation. In areas such as the Comarca 
Lagunera, more than 70 percent of the wells are in private hands (Palacios-Vêlez 1985), while 
92 percent of the farmers are ejidatarios (Ahlers et al. 1998). In ARLID, more than 35,000 
hectares are irrigated by wells, but district level census data on the distribution of ownership 
of wells between private farmers and ejidatarios are not reliable. The farm survey done for 
this study (n=125) shows that of all sampled farmers, 21 percent has access to both ground 
and surface water and 17 percent uses groundwater without using surface water. The survey 
also shows that 34 percent of all ejidatarios and 50 percent of all private growers have access 
to groundwater (with or without also having access to surface water) (see table 2.2). 
Socio-economic disparities between ejidatarios and private growers are not only 
determined by direct access to land and water but also indirectly by access to credit, inputs, 
markets and other agricultural support services necessary for profitable irrigated agriculture. 
Montgomery (1983) argues that, while in principle the administration of irrigation water is 
highly formalized and tightly regulated, in practice there is a great deal of manipulation of 
this formal structure. According to her, because of their larger holdings, private growers are 
more heavily involved in export cropping and, therefore, more lucrative than ejidal farming, 
they are given priority to water, credit and other inputs. Moreover, she argues that private 
growers have better access to water by bribing irrigation staff and other forms of political 
43 
CHAPTER 2 
maneuvering. Unfortunately, the author does not provide empirical evidence that would 
support these observations. 
Table 2.2 Land and water distribution between private growers and ejidatarios in 
ARL1D 
Average % of land % of land Average Average %of %of 
holding irrigated by irrigated holding holding ejidatario private 
(ha) ejidatarios by private ejidatario private who use growers 
growers (ha) grower 
(ha) 
wells' who use 
wells1 
Entire 7.6 34 50 district 4.8 55 45 3.7 
Acámbaro 4.6 74 26 4.0 7.5 unknown unknown 
Salvatierra 2.6 85 15 2.7 2.4 33 57 
Jaral 4.6 48 52 3.0 8.6 unknown unknown 
Valle 5.9 54 46 4.2 11.8 35 80 
Cortázar 5.8 53 47 4.5 8.7 38 38 
Salamanca 5.2 36 64 4.4 5.7 unknown unknown 
Irapuato 6.6 49 51 4.1 15.1 unknown unknown 
Abasólo 6.8 32 68 4.5 8.8 unknown unknown 
Huanímaro 4.4 61 39 3.7 6.4 17 50 
Corralejo 5.5 80 20 4.6 27.0 unknown unknown 
Purísima 4.2 78 22 3.7 8.3 unknown unknown 
Note': information on access to groundwater is derived from the farm survey (n=125), 1996. 
As was demonstrated above, direct differential access to land and water is less clear in 
the case of ARLID than elsewhere. Chapter 5 will provide some quantitative evidence on both 
top-tail end differentiation along the canals and differentiated access to water between 
ejidatarios and private growers. Indirect differentiated access is discussed in sections of 
several other chapters in this thesis. 
2.6 Two selected modules 
Although several research activities for this thesis focused on the entire district, detailed 
studies were conducted in Cortázar and Salvatierra modules. As these two modules differ 
considerably from each other, a brief description of each of them is given below. 
Cortázar module 
Cortázar module is located at the center of the district and has a total command area of 18,694 
hectares, including 7,760 hectares served by wells. It draws surface water supplies from the 
Coria main canal that conveys water from the Soils reservoir and the Toro de Lomo headwork 
on the Lerma River (figure 2.2). The main canal runs along the east edge of the module for 
72.2 km and irrigates 10,934 hectares on the left bank between the canal and the Salamanca 
main canal. The module is long and thin and is served by 54 secondary canals with a total 
length of 222 km. The drainage network extends to 95 km. Groundwater is extracted through 
340 deep tubewells, supplying 5,796 hectares from wells installed by private owners and 
1,964 hectares supplied from public wells managed by the module. Normally, areas irrigated 
by canals are different from areas irrigated by wells, but some farmers use both irrigation 
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sources. Although areas have been assigned to most public deep tubewells, often farmers have 
to make use of the canal infrastructure to be able to transport groundwater to their fields. This 
complicates the management of surface water (see chapter 5). Ejidatarios utilize 53 percent of 
the land area, under 32 ejidos with 1,962 users; 1,028 small private growers farm the 
reimiining 47 percent of the land. 
Salvatierra module 
Salvatierra module is located upstream of Cortázar in the southern upstream part of the 
district. It has a total command area of 16,093 hectares and 6,054 users. It draws water from 
two reservoirs, Tepuxtepec and Soils (figure 2.2) through six canal intakes on the Lerma 
river. The canal network is 251 km long. The total length of the drainage channels in the 
module is 208 km. There are 21 public wells and 170 private wells, irrigating 565 hectares 
and 2,753 hectares, respectively. 
Approximately 85 percent of the land is farmed by ejidatarios with average landholding 
of 2.7 hectares grouped in 44 ejidos. Fifteen percent of the land is farmed by 972 small 
private growers with average holdings of 2.4 hectares. 
Not^s 
1. 
2. 
For readers who are interested in the agricultural history of this part of the Bajío, reference can be 
made to Aguilar- Sánchez (1993), Florescano (1986) and Chías- Becerril (1982). 
The Tepuxtepec dam primarily serves the generation of hydro-power. However, because of its 
location it also serves as a storage dam for ARLID. Water from Tepuxtepec is first carried to the 
Solis dam before it reaches the district. CNA (1996a) estimates that between the two dams 10 
percent is lost as a result of conveyance losses and evaporation. 
Before 1992, irrigation districts were divided into hydraulic units called unidades, which at the 
time of the IMT process were more or less converted into one or more modules (módulos). See 
section 4.2 for further discussion of this change. 
According to the data from the CNA district office in Celaya, 17 percent of the main canal has 
concrete lining, 25 percent has masonry, while the 57 percent is earthen canal. For the secondary 
canals these numbers are 5%, 6% and 89%, respectively. 
The water delivery capacity (WDC) is defined as the capacity to deliver water at (sub)system 
head, divided by the peak consumptive use. As both the delivery and the peak consumptive used 
are expressed in mm/day, the WDC is non-dimensional. For more examples of WDC values, see 
Molden et al. (1998) and Sakthivadivel et al. (1999). 
It is important to note that the water delivery capacity of the Gugorrones main canal reduces 
rapidly from head to tail as a result of its very poor physical condition.. 
Unpublished data, provided by the CNA office in Celaya. These data are based on a CNA study 
carried out during the early 1990s. Currently, CNA is in the process of updating the data, but 
preliminary results could not yet be made available. 
Another estimate is that the total water abstraction has increased to 186 MmVyear, which 
accounts for 43 percent of Mexico's renewable water resources, while total consumption 
represents 15 percent of the total renewable water. Hydropower generation accounts for 69 
percent and irrigation accounts for over 80 percent of the total consumption (Tortajada and 
Biswas 1997). 
River basin development and coordination is a relatively new concept in Mexico. Presently, there 
are only a handful of River Basin Councils, of which the Lerma-Chapala council is the oldest. 
The history of this council only dates back to 1989 when the first basin-wide water diagnosis was 
carried out. This diagnosis pointed towards the problem of "water scarcity, as well as unsuitable 
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water allocation, pollution, inefficiency of water use, and environmental depredation". On 
September 1,1989 a Consultative Council was integrated to follow up and evaluate goals derived 
from a water agenda formulated by the federal government and the 5 river basin state 
governments. This Consultative Council became the first river basin council ever in Mexico in 
January 1993. The council comprises representatives from a wide range of federal ministries and 
agencies, the 5 state governors as well as user representatives from agriculture, municipal water 
supply, industry, aquaculture and other uses (Mestre 1997). 
10. According to Mestre (1997), a surface water distribution agreement has been in force since 1991, 
which "established clear mathematical rules for water distribution and reservoir operation, in 
accordance with users". However, Mestre does not mention what (the assumption behind) these 
rules are, nor can these be found in the original agreement document (CNA 1991). 
11. The Mexican Revolution was started in 1910 with an armed movement, but formally began with 
the issuance of the Agrarian Law of 1915. This law determines, among other things, the form and 
procedure for land distribution (Ibarra-Mendivil 1996). 
12. The speed of the land redistribution program differs much between each presidency of 6 years. 
Between 1917 and 1934, a total of almost 11 million hectares were redistributed into 
approximately six-thousand ejidos (Esteva 1984), while during the administration of Lázaro-
Cárdenas (1934-1940) 20 million hectares were handed out to 0.75 million ejidatarios in eleven-
thousand ejidos (Cummings et al. 1989). 
13. The term "small private grower" {pequeño propietario) is a misnomer because, under the new 
Agrarian Law that was enacted in 1992, individual farmers are limited to 100 hectares of irrigated 
land or its much greater equivalent in less productive rainfed lands or pastures (Cornelius and 
Myhre 1998). As far as the ejidos are concerned, no single ejidatario can acquire, through 
private purchase, more than five percent of the land in any ejido. Until 1992, an individual owner 
could possess up to a maximum of 20 hectares within an irrigation district (Federal water Act of 
1972). 
14. Although approximately 1.9 million of the 5.9 million hectares of irrigated land in Mexico is 
found in small-scale farmer managed irrigation systems (called Unidades de Riego), little is 
known about the way these small systems are organized and perform. Although some sources 
claim that these systems have higher productivity (see for instance Palacios-Vélez 1994a), 
empirical evidence that support this claim and largely lacking. A study on 54 small-scale 
reservoir systems in Guanajuato, conducted by Dayton-Johnson (1997a and 1997b) provide 
productivity data that are much lower than the data on land and water productivity in ARLID, 
reported in chapters 5 and 9 of this thesis. Scarce official sources on small-scale irrigation 
systems in Mexico and Guanajuato include CNA (1994) and SARH (n.d.; 1994a; 1994b). 
15. The less than average social economic differentiation along the division between the ejido sector 
(in Mexico often referred to as 'the social sector') and the private sector that can be observed in 
ARLID does by no means imply that in general in the State of Guanajuato this type of class 
differentiation did not increase. As is demonstrated by Aguilar-Sanchez (1993), particularly in the 
1950s and 1960s private growers had in general access to more land of a better quality, better 
access to water and more access to training, credit, new technologies and off-farm labor 
opportunities. However, in his case the disparities are caused by differentiated access to lands 
between irrigation districts (like ARLID), small-scale farmer managed irrigation systems, or 
rainfed agriculture, rather than by differentiation within each one of these land use types. The 
disparities are further determined by farmers who cultivate the land (generally in central and 
southern Guanajuato), and commercial dairy farmers in North-central Guanajuato (McDonald 
1991 and 1997). 
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3 The road to pro-market irrigation reforms: from centralized to decentralized state intervention 
3.1 
3.2 
The 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed description of the historical and political economic context of 
the recent irrigation reforms in Mexico. The construction and implementation of the market-
orieited reforms in irrigation is approached in the context of the history of the way the 
Mexican state is organized. As is argued by Long (1988), Long and van der Ploeg (1989) and 
Vries (1992), programs of planned institutional state intervention are themselves shaped and 
legitimized by the organization and culture of policy processes, and the planning and policy 
models that are a result of these processes. These models themselves are the result of the 
political decisions, struggles and negotiations between the government agencies that are 
responsible for planning and implementing state programs, their groups of 'recipients' (i.e. 
electorate) and other organizations, such as political parties, farmer unions and international 
loan agencies. 
Programs like the Mexican IMT and the introduction of water markets do not come on 
their own, but are generally preceded, accompanied, and followed by other intervention 
programs that share the same ideological legitimization. This chapter shows how institutional 
viability of the new arrangements for water management in Mexico should be viewed within 
the context of a much wider set of centrally planned institutional intervention programs. By 
doing so, it questions whether IMT and water marketing need a wider set of market-oriented 
reforms, or the other way around. 
State intervention and economic and political reforms: 1930s-
1988 
: irrigation reforms of the 1980s and 1990s that are discussed in this book did not come on 
their own. Rather, they were part of a much wider set of economic, political and constitutional 
reforms that were implemented since the mid-1980s. Similar to other countries around the 
globe, in Mexico these reforms emerged as a strong reaction against a long period of 
extensive state intervention in the market (such as nationalization of private banks and 
industry) in the 1970s. They were followed by a series of political and economic crises in the 
1980s and early 1990s. As is argued by Grindle (1996) 1, these crises opened up an increased 
space for deliberate efforts to craft new relationships between state and economy and to 
redefine relationships of power and accountability with society. These reforms form the 
economic and political context in which the irrigation reforms were developed and 
implemented. In this section, the road that led to these reforms, as well as the reforms 
themselves are discussed. 
CHAPTER 3 
Economic development 
The period from 1940 to the mid-1970s is often referred to as the "Mexican miracle" as it is 
characterized by decades of economic growth along with political stability. Mexico 
experienced a period of overall economic growth between 1940 and 1970, basically as a result 
of the land reform program in the 1930s, heavy investments in basic industry and irrigation 
infrastructure, and a policy of import substitution. From 1934 to 1965, Mexican agricultural 
production increased by 325 percent. This growth clearly benefited from heavy government 
investments during the period 1940 to 1955. From 1945 to 1947 these investments were as 
high as 14 percent of total government expenditures. Despite these investments, there was a 
slowdown in food production from 1965 to 1979, resulting in a rise in food imports in the 
1970s. Not all farmers benefited equally from this growth; as a result of the push for import-
substituting industrialization after the early 1940s and the modernization of commercial 
oriented agriculture, the economic gap between private growers and ejidatarios became wider 
(Thiesenhusen 1996). 
By the early 1970s, the first signs of the end of the "miracle" could be observed. While 
Mexico exported 1.3 million tons of corn during 1965, by the mid-1970s it had become a net 
importer (Cummings et al. 1989), indicating that as far as agriculture was concerned the 
"miracle" had come to an end. Economists started to warn that the strategy of import 
substitution, along with extensive subsidies and price control, encouraged inefficiencies in 
both the industrial and the agricultural sector. During the early 1970s, the populistic response 
of the Echeverría administration (1970-76) to these emergent economic problems was to 
further increase the role of government in the economy: subsidies were increased, the number 
of central government employees grew from 0.4 to 1.3 million between 1969 and 1976, while 
also the number of state-owned enterprises increased. As a result of these policies and the 
1973 oil-crisis, the public sector deficit, foreign debt and inflation rates increased, and the 
peso became seriously overvalued. As these policies could not be sustained, the government 
announced a devaluation in 1976 and signed a stabilization agreement with the IMF (Grindle 
1996). 
The hope in the economy was temporarily re-established in 1978, when Mexico became a 
major exporter of oil. The economy started to boom again. Revenues from oil were used to 
dramatically increase public expenditures, which in 1982 reached a rate as high as 22.4 
percent of the GDP. In 1982 oil accounted for 77.2 percent of the total exports, inflation 
reached 58.9 percent, and foreign debts had risen to 86 billion dollars. In the same year, the 
banking system was nationalized, causing high levels of capital flight and discontent with the 
political leadership. 
The almost full dependency on oil exports, combined with high inflation rates and capital 
flights made the economy collapse. The economic situation further aggravated when 
international oil prices began to fall in 1983 and when the resources from oil exports and 
foreign borrowing had dried up. Under pressure from the IMF, Mexico had to start to rethink 
its economic policies. Several stabilization plans were introduced during the period 1983 and 
1985 under the de la Madrid administration. These plans included the devaluation of the peso, 
the reduction of public expenditures and control of inflation, the introduction of trade 
liberalization, and an attempt to reassert government control over exchange rate policies. Yet, 
inflation rates continued very high, while public investments and foreign debts (over 100 
billion dollars in 1986 and 1987) increased. The crisis was further deepened when oil prices 
dropped to 12 dollars per barrel in 1986, down from 33 dollars in 1981 (ibid.). 
As the public sector deficit grew, also public expenditures for irrigation had to be sharply 
reduced. While construction expenditures had risen from an annual average of 16 billion 
dollars in 1970 to 60 billion in 1980, they declined to 45 billion dollars in 1982 and 1983 
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(Cummings et al. 1989) and had become almost insignificant towards the end of the 1980s 
(Palacios-Velez 1994)2. 
Po'itical development 
How the different administrations reacted to the economic developments described above can 
be understood from the way the Mexican state is organized and the kind of political 
challenges it has faced since the creation of the PRI in 1928. The Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI) was able to consolidate its hegemonic control over society far into the 1980s. This 
cortrol was characterized by corporate representation of farmers (primarily through the 
National Confederation of Campesinos, CNC) and laborers, and by patron-client relationships 
between economically powerful elite groups and political leaders. Formal and informal links 
between the government and the PRI created an effective system of patronage and political 
mobility. Individual and regional interests were incorporated through the distribution of 
development projects and access to credit, jobs, and other state-controlled resources (Grindle 
1996). 
Within the agrarian sector, local authority was often in the hands of new local political 
bosses (called caciques) within the ejidos. These bosses were empowered by the agrarian land 
reforms of the 1920s and 1930s and hence politically loyal to the PRI. After the 1930s 
corporatist and patronage structures effectively served to reproduce the revolutionary policy 
of "land to the tiller" and at the same time control unrest (Nelson 1997). Throughout the 
period of the "economic miracle', the government held out the revolutionary promise and the 
hope of land reform to Mexico's farmers and thus retained its grip on the farmer vote (Foley 
1995). 
State intervention in agriculture was organized via paternalistic and centralistic regulatory 
price policies and public investment (such as for irrigation). According to Fox (1995), this 
type of state intervention did not require an institutional relationship between the federal 
government and the farmers. Rather, the relationship was mediated by local and regional 
caciques, who were granted relative local autonomy in exchange for delivering PRI votes and 
political stability. 
Subsidized inputs particularly promoted high productivity on modernized private 
irrigated farms, leaving many small farmers and ejidatarios behind. Yet, also these 
commercial farmers found government prices increasingly unattractive, while small farmers 
got more and more frustrated by the increasingly limited access to land and low guarantee 
prices. In 1976, these problems culminated in resistance and mobilization of small farmers. 
Heace, by the end of the 1970s, both small (generally ejido) farmers and large commercial 
oriented farmers alike started to resist the corporatist and patronage structures and started to 
mobilize against the regime that kept these structures in place (Foley 1995). 
In sum, by the 1970s and the 1980s, political leaders had become uninterested in agrarian 
reforms, the peasantry had become largely co-opted and controlled by the PRI, and large 
landowners had become powerful politically and economically as a result of the successful 
development of commercial agriculture (Grindle 1988, cited in Thiesenhusen 1996). In 
addition, political instability was fueled by the inability of the Lopez-Portillo (1976-82) and 
the de la Madrid (1982-88) administrations to deal with the economic crises and accumulating 
evidence of extensive corruption within the bureaucracy. Furthermore, the hegemony of the 
PRI was challenged, not only by the emergence of other political parties, but also by new 
independent regional farmer unions that sought a far more democratic form of internal 
organization than the PRI-allied CNC. The mobilizations of these unions were no longer 
centered around the traditional revolutionary PRI slogans, clientelism and patronage, but 
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rather around a range of productivist demands and activities, including better prices, credit, 
subsidies and commercialization schemes (Foley 1995). For these unions, autonomy from 
government meant the right to raise these demands independent of the CNC and the PRI, and 
demand accountability from their leaders (Grindle 1996). 
The collapse of the economy together with the increasing dissatisfaction and criticism of 
government policies, and the lack of participation in political decision making processes, 
opened the door to fundamentally new economic and political reforms in the late 1980s. 
3.3 Pro-market oriented agrarian reforms: 1988 - 1994 
The economic and political crisis of the 1980s called for a new style of state intervention in 
order to restructure economic and institutional relations and to reconfigure the meaning of 
state-society relationships (Nelson 1997). Three policies that supported this type of 
reconfiguration are of particular interest for understanding new state-society relationships 
within the agricultural sector: (1) dismantling, downsizing and (re)privatization of firms, 
banks and other institutions with major state participation; (2) globalization or 
internationalization of (agricultural) trade; and (3), constitutional revisions of a series of laws, 
which fundamentally altered land and water property rights. These policies were already 
introduced during the initial years of the de la Madrid administration and can be seen as a 
clear shift away from the highly statist orientation of the previous Echeverria and Lopez 
Portillo administrations. 
Privatization 
Radically dirnmishing the size and scope of state intervention by disbanding state industry, 
parastatal organizations and marketing boards was seen as an important first step of the 
market oriented economic reforms. Under pressure from the IMF, privatization started in 
1983 with the sale of some small state enterprises, but it considerably gained momentum after 
1985. By October 1991, the number of firms with state participation was reduced to 247, 
down from 1155 in 1982 and 941 in 1985 (Rodriguez 1992). Agricultural investment was 
particularly hit by the reprivatization of banks and by the restructuring of official rural 
financial institutions like the National Bank of Rural Credit (BANRURAL). These changes 
by and large undermined the access of small farmers to credit (Myhre 1996). Similarly, the 
descaling or cancellation of many public agencies that traditionally assisted the agricultural 
sector, affected access to crop insurance (through ANAGSA), fertilizers (through 
FERTfMEX), seed subsidies (through PRONASE), and other services (de Janvry et dl. 1996). 
Liberalization of international agricultural trade 
Parallel to this privatization policy, Mexico began also to restructure the nature of state 
intervention in the economy by gradually dismantling the revolutionary nationalist legacy in 
favor of increased integration into the international market (Fox 1995). Liberalization and 
internationalization of markets were particularly established through a process of gradually 
diminishing regulatory and tariff constraints, which so far had created a large bureaucratic 
apparatus and had encouraged extensive rent seeking by both private agents and public 
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officials (Grindle 1996). In 1987, Mexico entered the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). Tariff barriers were further reduced and international agricultural was 
increased with the approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between 
Canada, the United States and Mexico on 1 January 1994, under the presidency of Salinas de 
Gortari (1988-1994). Holding a PhD in political economy and government from Harvard, 
Salinas de Gortari was firmly committed to these deregulation policies. 
So far, the consequences of the implementation of these trade liberalization programs and 
agreements for Mexican farmers have shown a mixed record while good documentation on 
the;se consequences remain scarce3. According to Appendini (1998), the beneficiaries of this 
global project" were primarily large private growers with sufficient technological and market 
know-how to take advantage of opportunities to export to foreign markets. As is noted by de 
Janvry et al. (1995), these programs and agreements would sharply decrease farm level prices 
of the farm produce. Others predicted the displacement (and migration) of hundreds of 
thousands of agricultural workers as a consequence of the price fall (Levy and van 
Wijnbergen 1992). Furthermore, some scholars warn that, as a result of insufficient state 
support in terms of credit, agricultural investment and extension services, many small farmers 
will never succeed in participating in the international market, which is controlled by large 
commercial oriented farmers as well as by multinational agricultural enterprises (Stanford 
199^6). 
Although the de la Madrid administration had made some progress in implementing the 
abrjve policies, it was noted more for its failure to manage the political and economic 
challenges and its inability to bring reform (Grindle 1996). When Salinas de Gortari took over 
office in 1988, few people had confidence in the new president's capacity to fundamentally 
redefine the relationship between the political institutions and the economy. Much of this 
doubt was rooted in the fact that he had won a historically low majority of 50.7 percent of the 
votes 4. Many of his rivals believed that Salinas de Gortari could only win this election 
because of electoral fraud, which further reduced the legitimacy of and credibility in the PRI's 
capacity to adopt and continue the reform process that was started under his predecessor. 
However, contrary to general expectations, Salinas de Gortari came to be known as the 
president who effectively pushed reforms and deregulations in virtually all sectors of the 
economy. Furthermore, by signing NAFTA he gave a big push to liberalized international 
trade, resulting in increased import prices and import and export activities. 
Reforming the countryside: constitutional revisions 
Salinas de Gortari firmly believed that his privatization, deregulation and internationalization 
programs should be accompanied by a series of constitutional 'modernization' reforms. For 
the country side, probably the most important reforms that Salinas de Gortari introduced, 
were the revision of Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 and the issuance of a new Agrarian 
Law (Ley Agrarid) in 1992. Article 27 provides the basis for federal legislation to provide 
land to ejidatarios. The key element of the revision of this article is to make it possible to 
legally sell and rent out ejido lands, and hence to end the constitutional obligation of the 
Mexican government to redistribute state-owned land. In other words, it legally ends the land 
reform program that had lasted for almost 75 years. The new provisions also allow ejidatarios 
to legally sell, rent, sharecrop, or mortgage their land as collateral for loans. Those who opt 
not to sell or rent their land can enter into joint ventures or corporations with outside 
investors, thereby stimulating the opening up of the ejido sector to foreign direct investment. 
The new Agrarian Law establishes the requirements for the formation, membership, and 
function of these corporations. It also provides for the settlement of land right disputes by 
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decentralized autonomous Agrarian Tribunals (Cornelius and Myhre 1998; Ibarra-Mendivil 
1996; Alcalá etal. 1996). 
Salinas de Gortari was very clear about his objectives to revise land and property rights. 
On 14 November 1991, in a speech to the twelve organizations of the Permanent Agrarian 
Congress (CAP), Salinas announced his famous 'ten points to bring liberty and justice for the 
Mexican countryside'. In this speech, he announced that he would "call a halt to injustice and 
poverty by ending the land reform program" (i.e. by revising Article 27), and hence alter 
existing tenure relationships (Salinas de Gortari 1991, cited in Ginzberg 1997). In addition, he 
argued that the revision would help to capitalize the countryside, open productive options, and 
juridically protect farmers and common property (Salinas de Gortari 1992, cited in Foley 
1995). 
Although discussions about the revision had already started in 1989, this sudden 
announcement took most people by surprise. Also the time between its announcement in 
November 1991 and its implementation in January 1992 can be considered to be extremely 
short. Maybe equally surprising, the sudden announcement triggered relatively little resistance 
and mobilization on the part of the farmer movements and unions. There are five factors that 
help to understand how Salinas de Gortari and his team were able to implement such dramatic 
revisions, within such a short period of time, while meeting so little resistance. These factors 
are characteristic of the way Salinas de Gortari tried to move away from a 'revolutionary' 
PRI approach towards what he himself called an approach of 'social liberalism'. 
The first factor is the technocratization ofpolitics and policies. Rather than hiring public 
officials who had primarily political (i.e. PRI) credentials, Salinas de Gortari recruited a team 
of highly trained and qualified technocrats who fully supported his neoliberal program, and 
who at the same time could practice bureaucratic politics. The percentage of his cabinet 
officials with training in economics or related fields was 59 percent. Many of these officials 
hold PhDs in economics, commerce or political economy from Yale, Harvard, UCLA, MIT, 
Princeton or the Mexican university of UNAM (Grindle 1996). Mexico's presidents have 
extensive powers of appointment, which reaches down to middle-levels in both the 
government bureaucracy and the PRI. Under Salinas, these powers were even further 
centralized and personalized. This type of presidential executive powers helped Salinas not 
only to restructure government in ways that gave added influence to his technocrats, but also 
to move like-minded people with technical skills to the head of the PRI. 
As a result of this technocratization of politics, Salinas was able to effectively change the 
language of discussion from revolutionary rhetoric to debates about economic modernization, 
using neoliberal concepts and arguments. Consequently, more and more decisions were based 
on technical and economic data and arguments. This type of data and arguments convinced 
Salinas and his team of technocrats that the traditional land tenure system was economically 
not productive. They were particularly convinced that the production of maize and sorghum 
by the more than 2 million small producers was economically not viable because these grains 
could be imported at lower prices. However, the question was how the number of small 
farmers engaged in the production of these grains could be reduced (Cornelius and Myhre 
1998). The group concluded in secret meetings that to them legal reform of land property was 
the only proper tool to break the deadlock of stagnating and expensive grain production and to 
end rural misery. The underlying assumption of such a reform was that privatization of ejido 
lands and the legal protection of land property rights would stimulate the establishment of 
economies of scale (through land consolidation) and induce investment in agriculture. In 
short, these reforms were seen as the key to recapitalization of the ejido sector. The idea of 
revising Article 27 was born. 
The second factor is the lack of alternative policies. Opponents of the proposed reform 
were left with empty hands, as the only known alternative they could bring forward was the 
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existing land distribution system (Grindle 1996). Salinas de Gortari and his team could simply 
refute this 'alternative' by showing them the economic statistics and data that proved that the 
land tenure system had resulted in low productivity levels, high degrees of corruption and an 
impoverished countryside. Or, as the Sub-Secretary of Agrarian Reform (Gustavo Gordillo) in 
Salinas de Gortari administration put it: "government regulation of the ejidos all too often 
been just a screen concealing private accumulation processes" (Gordillo 1992, cited in 
Cornelius and Myhre 1998)5. Gordillo argued that also those state institutions that gave 
support to the agricultural sector needed to be modernized. According to him, paternalism of 
the government, which was designed to guarantee social justice in rural Mexico, had 
gradually evolved into government institutions becoming the protagonist of rural development 
instead of the producers. This had resulted in bureaucratization, inefficiencies and the 
obstruction of production (Gordillo 1990, cited in Zaag 1992: 171). Gordillo believed that 
these processes could be stopped through modernizing rural Mexico. This, according to him, 
would imply that the central role in rural development should be returned to the farmers, and 
that government institutions should become flexible. 
The third factor is the lack of unity among the farmer unions. The president had 
deliberately decided not to involve the farmer unions and local political leaders in the 
discussion. By the time the revision of Article 27 was announced, the farmer organizations 
had only a few weeks to react. A series of articles and reactions (both in favor and against the 
revisions) were published in national newspapers6, but these could not turn the tide. The 
unions and other farmer organizations were hopelessly divided on how to react to the 
proposed revisions. Initially, the debate that followed the announcement in November 1991 
created a high a degree of unity under the farmer movements. However, soon the movement 
was split in its response, between those groups who rejected the revision, and those who 
accïpted the reform. Many peasant organizations supported the idea of securing property 
rights over ejido resources, but they were less enthusiastic about unconditionally freeing ejido 
land for privatization (Appendini 1998). As is described in detail by Foley (1995) and De 
Grammont (1996b), the revisions produced consternation not only among ejidatarios, but also 
among the organizations of private growers 7. 
The fourth factor is the international support. The revision was welcomed and supported 
by international loan institutions. On 13 December 1991, one month after the announcement, 
the Secretary of Agriculture submitted a letter to the World Bank. In this letter the 
government declared that, now that the President and his advisors had shown that they were 
genuinely committed to make a halt to rural poverty, Mexico was ready to respond to the 
international request to enter the open economy and to join NAFTA (Alcala 1996: 59). 
According to Cornelius and Myhre (1998), the Secretary and his group of like-minded 
reformers clearly saw the privatization of ejido lands and a well defined system of property 
rights as tools to recapitalize and increase the export of those sectors of agriculture that would 
be attractive to foreign investors. A few months later Mexico signed the NAFTA agreement. 
The fifth factor is the renewed political support of the PRI. Any revision of the 
Constitution would need a two-thirds majority in congress. As Salinas was elected with a very 
meager victory of just over 50 percent, the reformers were not confident that they would gain 
such a majority. However, the congressional elections of 1991 were a clear victory for 
Salinas, which made it easy to get the approval for the reforms from the PRI-dominated 
congress (Grindle 1996). 
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3.4 Reforming the agrarian reform: new forms of state 
intervention 
As is noted by Fox (1995), the conventional view is that as a result of Salinas' pro-market and 
international trade liberalization policies, the Mexican state has also withdrawn its hands from 
regulating rural markets and land and water property. However, the technocrats clearly 
recognized some need of price support as a social safety net, particularly for small maize 
producers. In addition they realized that in order to buffer the political conflicts that were 
expected in rural areas as a result of the economic reforms, some kind of government 
intervention was required (Cornelius and Myhre 1998:6). 
In order to mitigate the negative impacts of trade liberalization and the withdrawal of 
subsidies for small farmers, the government directed a wave of resources to the countryside. 
These resources would also serve to ease the escalating tensions and to hold the political 
allegiance of particular groups or regions that were pressing demands at a time when 
traditional resources of public support were depleted. As such, these resources were used as 
bargaining chips in negotiations with these groups (Appendini 1998). Among the many 
support programs that were established during these years of transition from highly statist and 
paternalistic government policies to 'social liberalism', three are of particular interest for this 
thesis: PRONASOL, PROCAMPO and PROCEDE. 
Solidarity program: decentralization and déconcentration 
The National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL) was created in late 1988 and directly 
organized by the office of the presidency (Grindle 1996). Its objective was to make funds 
available to local communities in order to address the social costs of the pro-market reforms. 
This was done through a series of sub-programs that distributed resources for projects related 
to, among others, social community development, small enterprises, credit for small holders 
{Crédito a la Palabra) and infrastructure. 
Another aim of the Solidarity program was to stimulate decentralization and 
democratization by devolving resource allocation decisions to local (user) groups, away from 
the paternalistic centralization approach of the past. As Fox (1995) notes, Solidarity promised 
to reform social programs with its commitment to the principles of community participation, 
public transparency and co-responsibility between government and society. The program 
became indeed known as a decentralized federal program. In 1994 it transferred 95 percent of 
its resources to state governments, of which 50 percent was to go to municipal governments 
{ibid.). Although Solidarity funds were actually delivered to the local projects, the projects did 
not necessarily reach the lower-income citizens, nor did they necessarily prioritize the most 
pressing serving needs 8. One of the conclusions that Fox draws is, that the state government 
continued to play a major role by significantly influencing project choices. The state 
government retained discretionary power of inter-municipal distribution of funds and virtual 
monopoly on the technical assistance needed for community development projects of any 
magnitude 9. This made it very easy for the state government to condition access to its 
development program on political subordination. 
According to the World Bank (1999), the Solidarity program can be regarded as an 
example of successfully inducing processes of decentralization and devolution of authority in 
the countryside. However, the decentralization process in general has been incomplete to the 
extent that the real responsibilities given to local governments are generic functions but do not 
include functions specifically targeting rural development. From this point of view, the Bank 
argues, its should be considered as an extensive déconcentration of services of the Ministry of 
Agriculture rather than a true decentralization process involving the devolution of functions 
and powers to local communities. Apart from the devolution of O&M responsibilities to user 
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organizations in large irrigation districts (see chapter 4), the level of devolution to other rural 
civil society organizations has been rather low. The authority and financing of activities 
relaled to rural development planning and the design of strategic intervention programs 
essentially remained with the federal government, with coordination at the regional level 
(ibid). 
PROCAMPO: developing new accountability relationships 
A second measure that the Salinas de Gortari administration took to compensate farmers for 
loss of income because of trade liberalization, the elimination of input subsidies and the 
removal of guarantee prices, was PROCAMPO (Direct Rural Support Program). The program 
was launched in 1993 and gave direct crop subsidies based on acreage rather than on output 
(via price guarantees), without regard to who owns the land. This meant that farmers on 
marginal soils and with limited access to irrigation (and hence lower yields) received the same 
subsidy as more productive farmers. All producers that were engaged in cultivating basic 
crops could obtain PROCAMPO support, even if their entire crop was not sold on the market 
but rather directed to household consumption (Appendini 1998), or if they decided not to 
harvest at all 1 0 . Although PROCAMPO's contribution to the value of crop production has 
been significant1 1, its overall economic impact is limited as it could not replace the funds lost 
to the cutbacks in institutional credit. Nor could it effectively stimulate agricultural 
investment (Myhre 1998). 
The program reached millions of farmers that had not benefited under the previous 
system of price guarantees. However, the patterns of inclusion and exclusion in PROCAMPO 
were not very clear. Fox (1996) document cases in which PROCAMPO checks were used to 
pressure voters during the 1994 presidential elections. He also raises questions about the state 
capacity to develop accountable relationships with millions of farmers. The issuing of 
PROCAMPO checks required a new agrarian regulatory apparatus, with thousands of agrarian 
officials. In order to determine who was growing which crop, with how many hectares, and 
whether PROCAMPO recipients had legal use-rights to the land, the officials had to develop 
formal relationships with millions of farmers. As such, and contrary to the ideological spirit of 
Salinas' deregulation and liberalization policies, the state had to penetrate in to the 
countryside more deeply than it had done before. 
Land certificates program: the reproduction of control mechanisms 
A third program that required the development of new and intimate state-farmer relationships, 
was the Ejido Land Rights Certification and Titling Program (PROCEDE), which was needed 
to rr ake the privatization of ejido land under Article 27 work. PROCEDE was inaugurated in 
1993 to regularize and map the boundaries of ejidos and ejido plots and to provide ejidatarios 
with land certificates (Appendini 1998). This also meant that government officials from the 
newly created Procuraderia Agraria had to visit ejidos and settle land and boundary disputes. 
State-farmer relationships were further tightened and deepened when PROCEDE certificates 
wen: demanded for getting access to other government services, such as for obtaining credit 
and receiving a PROCAMPO check. Similar to the Solidarity and PROCAMPO programs, 
these new accountability relationships affected voting practices. As is described by 
Baitenmann (1998) in the case of the State of Veracruz, by reproducing old clientelistic 
control mechanisms, field staff from the Procuraderia Agraria used an arsenal of threats and 
pressure tactics to force ejidatarios to join PROCEDE. 
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3.5 Irrigation reforms from 1920s -1989 
The political and economic reforms that were discussed above form the context in which 
institutional reforms within the irrigation sector were established. It is important to realize that 
the same factors that determined the direction and shape of state intervention in mechanisms 
of regulation of rural markets and property rights, have also largely influenced the shape and 
direction of the market-oriented irrigation reforms that are discussed in this thesis. Moreover, 
for understanding both the implementation strategies of these irrigation reforms, as well as 
their impact on irrigation performance, one should keep in mind that these reforms were 
preceded, followed, and accompanied by several other state intervention programs. 
Centralizing irrigation management 
Small scale irrigation has been practiced in Mexico since pre-historic times (Hunt and Hunt 
1976; Enge and Whiteford 1989; Nederlof and van Wayjen 1996). The development of large 
scale irrigation systems, however, started with the Spanish Conquest and was expanded under 
the dictatorship of General Porfirio Díaz in the 1880s, who gave out concessions to national 
and foreign companies to develop irrigated agriculture. State involvement in irrigation 
development received a legal push with the promulgation of the Water Law (Ley de Aguas) of 
1910, which followed the Constitution of 1857 that said that all federal waters are public 
property and for common use. As was noted in the previous section, the Mexican Revolution 
did not change this. Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 made it explicit that "land and 
water property belong to the Nation", but "the Nation has the right to transmit these property 
rights to individuals, thereby creating private property". 
The many political conflicts between the hacendados who supported General Porfirio 
Díaz, and the mainly landless farmers who supported the land reform program, made further 
agricultural and irrigation development hardly possible in the years after the revolution of the 
1910s (Aguilar-Sánchez 1993). Expansion of new hydraulic works only started again when 
the first Irrigation and Federal Water Law (Ley sobre Irrigación y Aguas Federales) was 
promulgated in 1926. This law foresaw in the establishment of the National Irrigation 
Commission, whose main mandate was to design and build irrigation districts. However, 
owing to a lack of sufficient technical expertise, the Commission decided to hire J.C. White 
Engineering Corp, an American firm, to design large scale irrigation systems (Palacios-Vêlez 
1994a; Roemer 1997) 1 2. 
The law of 1926 was quickly followed by a series of other water-related laws, such as the 
first and second National Property Water Laws (Leyes de Aguas de Propiedad Nacional) of 
1929 and 1934, respectively, and their Rules and Regulations of 1936. One of the 
particularities of these laws was that they provided for the possibility to form user 
associations, who could manage government owned irrigation districts. Yet, in practice the 
management of these districts remained firmly in the central hands of the National Irrigation 
Commission. 
Access to both irrigation water and credit were seen as two of the most important means 
to keep up which increasing population numbers and food demands. As a result, it is not 
surprising that, for instance, between 1935 and 1944 the management of ten newly 
constructed irrigation districts became directly under the supervision of yet another 
centralized institution, the National Rural Credit Bank (Banco National de Crédito 
Agrícola)13. Yet, despite all these bureaucratic incentives and central control, irrigation 
development could not keep pace with the increase in cultivated land. Furthermore, more and 
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evidence that these new districts were managed in an inefficient way emerged (Palacios-Vêlez 
1994). 
With the objective to dramatically improve the management of the irrigation districts, a 
new Irrigation Law (Ley de Riegos) was promulgated in 1947. At the same time, and as a 
result of the new law, the National Irrigation Commission was changed into the Ministry of 
Hydraulic Resources (SRH, Secretaría de Recursos Hidráulicos). This Ministry became 
responsible for the establishment of all integrated water policies and programs, including the 
operation and maintenance of all government-managed irrigation districts. Although SRH's 
main mandate was to construct new irrigation districts, the need for better management of 
these districts was also felt. This resulted in the establishment of a special sub-ministry (the 
Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería) under SRH engaged with O&M of irrigation districts. 
However, owing to coordination problems, this ministry could not manage the districts 
properly. As a result, in 1951 all O&M responsibilities were re-established with SRH, which 
ftxther centralized government involvement in irrigation (ibid.). 
Fully in line with the statist-oriented policies of the Echeverría administration, and in a 
reaction to stagnating production and increasing food imports (see section 3.2), centralized 
irrigation development was high on the political agenda during the 1970s as it was seen as the 
solution to meet ever increasing food demands. In 1975, this resulted in the first National 
Hydraulic Plan (Plan Nacional Hidráulico), which laid out massive development plans for the 
next 25 years. These plans were going to be supported by the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank, and coordinated by the Federal (central) government. For the 
first time in the Mexican history of centralized irrigation management, the Plan mentioned the 
role of users in the fields of both cost-recovery and O&M. Yet, it was not made clear how 
this type of user participation was going to be institutionalized. 
The Federal Water Law (Ley Federal de Aguas) of January 1972 provided the legal 
foundation for such type of centralized state coordination in irrigation development, but does 
not explicitly provide a basis for the above mentioned user participation. The main objective 
o:. this new law was to integrate and replace the various existing laws that dealt with the use 
o:i* national waters and water development, including the irrigation acts mentioned above. The 
law further limited private initiative in irrigation development, among others by imposing a 
land ceiling for private growers with plots within irrigation districts, by dramatically reducing 
the possibility to sell or rent out water rights, and by attempting to further centralize the 
setting of irrigation fee levels 1 4. 
The Federal Water Law had several institutional implications. First, in 1976 the SRH was 
merged with the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (SAG) into a new Ministry of 
Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos), 
SARH. As a result of this, the Department which until then had been responsible for 
managing irrigation districts, and another Department engaged with the development of small 
farmer managed irrigation systems, were also merged 1 5. This meant that the control over all 
irrigation related issues was concentrated in the hands of one single department with SARH. 
The second institutional implication of the Federal Water Law was the establishment of 
the so called Agricultural Governing Boards of the irrigation districts (Comités Directivos 
Agrícolas). The charter of these boards was to dictate, based on the availability of water, what 
percentage of land was planted with which crop (Whiteford and Bernai 1996). The most 
important task of these boards was to approve the annual irrigation plan. Although officially 
user representatives of the ejidos and private growers organization participated in the 
boards 1 , in practice their involvement in decision making processes was virtually nil (Zaag 
1992). As Zaag has observed in the case of El Grullo irrigation district, all decisions taken in 
the boards were planned by local SARH staff and rubber stamped by the regional and central 
SARH offices. According to Whiteford and Bernai (1996), these boards were highly political 
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organizations. Moreover, as Mares (1980, cited in Zaag 1992) noted, government officials in 
these boards often acted in collusion with the region's elite through their membership of such 
boards. 
As a consequence of the felt need to reduce government expenditures and to induce 
efficient use of resources, the then 77 irrigation districts were merged with 150 so called 
'rainfed districts' (Distritos de Temporal) during the early years of the 1980s. This resulted 
into the creation of 192 Rural Development Districts (Distritos de Desarrollo Rural). The 
governing boards of these development districts also took over the Agricultural Governing 
Boards of the irrigation districts. Hence, these new boards were not only engaged with 
irrigation planning issues, but were also made responsible for coordinating all kinds of other 
activities related to, for instance, small farmer managed irrigation systems, livestock 
development and rainfed agricultural. The result of these types of institutional reforms was 
that even more authority and control were concentrated in the central hands of the SARH. 
By the end of the 1980s, farmer groups had experienced that the concentration of so 
many tasks and control within one central institution had resulted in the bureaucratization and 
politicization of the access to agricultural resources. Furthermore, several 'water-minded' 
technocrats within the Ministry of SARH, engaged with the design and coordination of the 
National Hydraulic Plan, were aware that the institutional concentration of these tasks and 
control had diverted the political and bureaucratic control over water development resources 
away from them. As we will see below, these technocrats argued that in order to achieve 
higher levels of (financial and water use) efficiencies, all water related tasks should be 
administratively separated from other agricultural government responsibilities. This argument 
found clear support from President Salinas de Gortari, who saw the creation of efficient and 
decisive government institutions as an important condition to push his 'administrative 
modernization' programs 1 7. The newly created National Water Commission (CNA) was going 
to be the first of such 'modern institutions' created by the pro-market administration of 
Salinas de Gortari (Ramos-Osorio 1999). 
The creation of the National Water Commission 
The creation of CNA in January 1989 can clearly be regarded as an example of the way 
Salinas de Gortari established his liberalization, privatization and political modernization 
reforms. Some of the factors that explained the sudden and seemingly smooth constitutional 
reform of land use rights (see section 3.2) can also be found in the history of the formation of 
CNA. 
Similar to way he dealt with the land tenure system, also in the discussion on the 
modernization of the water sector Salinas de Gortari gathered around him a team of like-
minded technocrats that supported his policies. Among the most important of these 
technocrats was González-Villarreal1 8. In the trajectory of modernization of the irrigation 
bureaucracy, this person assumed a number of important positions. During the period 1975 to 
1982 he was the coordinator of the National Hydraulic Plan, which gave him the technical and 
bureaucratic credentials to deal with the development of the water sector in an integrated way. 
He earned his political credentials under the de la Madrid administration, where he took the 
position of Sub-Secretary of Hydraulic Resources during years 1982 to 1988. In this position 
he was responsible for, among others, the development and management of irrigation 
districts, and he became known as a dedicated and very well informed'professional. During 
that same time, he also coordinated the PRI meetings that dealt with water related issues. He 
had known Salinas de Gortari from the time when Salinas de Gortari was campaign 
coordinator of the presidential election of de la Madrid. 
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into; 
the 
too 
Another person in this group of technocrats was Guerrero-Villalobos, who started as a 
director general in construction and hydraulic operations under the Echeverría adniinistration, 
He earned his political credentials and confidence in 1987 and 1988, when he was the PRI 
coordinator on water issues of Salinas de Gortari's presidential election campaign. 
Both persons saw their professional and administrative credentials and their political 
loyalty rewarded by Salinas de Gortari. González-Villarreal became the first director general 
of CNA, while Guerrero-Villalobos assumed this position in 1994. 
González-Villarreal was among the first who actively discussed his observations on the 
administrative organization of water related government responsibilities with Salinas de 
Gortari. According to him, the merger between water resources (SRH) and agriculture (SAG) 
SARH had led to a number of problems 1 9. First, he argued that the merger had hampered 
provision of an effective and efficient water service as the responsibilities of SARH were 
fragmented. Second, he argued that under the existing legislation and aclministration it 
as not possible to introduce a system of O&M cost-recovery. Third, it was argued that the 
development of strong policies of integrated management of water required a strong and 
decisive government institution. Not only were these arguments discussed among the 'water 
technocrats', they also found support from the World Bank office in Mexico. 
González-Villarreal and his group argued for more administrative autonomy and hence 
tike re-establishment of control over water development related issues within a single 
institution. These technocrats 
were particularly interested in 
regaining control over the 
management of all dams and 
main infrastructure and the 
access to all major 
rehabilitation measures, i.e. the 
control over the bulk of the 
resources that go into irrigation 
through the major international 
donors (Urban et al. 2000). 
They felt that under the 
existing arrangement with the 
SARH, control over access to 
these resources was too 
dispersed. In exchange, they 
were willing to partially hand 
over control over the 
management of irrigation 
districts to newly to be 
established WUAs. Moreover, 
the advantage of this 
arrangement, they argued, 
would be that cost-recovery 
from the users and consequently the revenue for the agency would be improved. 
The administrative solution to achieving these goals was the establishment of an 
autonomous 'deconcentrated' entity within the SARH, called the National Water Commission 
arid headed by González-Villarreal. CNA became the sole Mexican authority responsible for 
design, planning and implementing all water related policies (see box 3.1). In order to give 
this new administrative entity the legal authority for executing these tasks, the existing 
Federal Water Law of 1972 had to be revised as well (see section 3.5). In 1994, CNA was 
Box 3.1 Some responsibilities of CNA 
• Propose policies and define and monitor national plans 
related to hydrological developments; 
• Define criteria and guidelines for the integration of 
government plans and activities in the field of water; 
• Coordinate all administrative institutions that deal with 
water; 
• Administer, regulate all national water and hydraulic 
infrastructure; 
• Program, study, construct and manage new hydrological 
facilities and structures; 
• Grant user concessions and register these in a Public 
Registrar of Water Rights; 
• Promote efficient use of all national water; 
• Assure and supervise the coordination of all water related 
programs and assign public funds to carry out these 
programs; 
• Study, propose and execute financial systems that allow 
the development of water related infrastructure and the 
provision of water related services. 
Source: Article 8, Ley de Aguas Nacionales 
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administratively transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the much smaller Ministry of 
Environment, Natural Resources and Fishery. However, it continues to be the sole federal 
authority dealing with water management (Herrera-Toledo 1997). 
3.6 Conclusions 
The political and economic crisis of the 1980s forced the Mexican government to rethink its 
centralized and statist oriented intervention policies that had characterized the political 
economic developments since the 1910s. As a result, since 1982 successive administrations 
have opted to introduce (re)privatization, deregulation and liberalization of international 
markets, political democratization, and devolution of the authority to decide on the allocation 
of resources. These policies were strengthened by constitutional revisions of land use rights. 
A combination of factors explain why, under the Salinas de Gortari administration, these 
changes could be established at such a high pace, while at the same time meeting relatively 
little resistance. Together these factors characterize the way in Mexico political and economic 
institutions are organized and as such shape the direction and extent of the political and 
economic reforms. These factors include: the technocratization of the political discourse; the 
use of executive presidential powers to break the corporatist alliance between the PRI and the 
farmer unions; division of farmer organizations along different ideological lines; support from 
international loan institutions; and congressional and political support for important 
constitutional revisions. 
Rather than pushing the pro-market policies too far, Salinas de Gortari realized that he 
needed to establish a number of new state programs. These would not only help to make the 
transition from highly statist and paternalistic interventions towards 'social liberalism', but 
would also reduce the political unrest and social cost of the agrarian reforms. Contrary to the 
spirit of the privatization and liberalization policies that were introduced across all sectors in 
the economy, the new programs did not free rural civil society from the hand of government 
control and regulation. Rather, they should be seen as new forms of state intervention in 
which intimate state-society relationships are largely reproduced. 
The social liberalism movement also affected the irrigation sector in a big way. Not only 
were water-minded technocrats within the Ministry of Agriculture advocating the introduction 
of pro-market mechanisms in the recovery of O&M costs through user organizations, they 
also opted for the creation of a deconcentrated, adrninistratively autonomous, water 
institution. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, these policies of market-
oriented water management, user participation and deconcentrated authority dramatically 
altered user-state relationships, as well as user-user relationships. They have had major 
impacts on the way irrigation districts are managed under these new arrangements. 
This chapter has shown that that the 'introduction' of market-oriented irrigation reforms 
should be understood in the context of a much wider set of similar reforms that all aimed at 
totally restructuring the political and economic control over resources. As such, the IMT 
program and the introduction of water marketing should be seen as two elements of a 
historical process of political and economic reforms. An important conclusion from this 
chapter is that the kind of market-oriented constitutional reforms that were envisaged by the 
Salinas and subsequent administrations do need programs like IMT and the introduction of 
water markets. These are the kind of policy tools that help the government to achieve its 
wider political-economic goals, rather than the other way around. In that sense, the process of 
formulating, implementing, and assessing impacts of EMT and water marketing should not be 
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analyzed on their own, which is commonly done, but rather in the context of other 
constitutional and market-oriented policy processes. 
Another important lessons can be drawn from looking at IMT and water marketing as 
part of a much more extended policy process in Mexico. This is that these irrigation reforms 
have essentially been initiated, formulated and implemented by political and economic forces 
from within the Mexican government. Although international loan agencies have been 
supportive to these forces, they were not, as is often assumed, the impetus to these reforms. 
Notes 
The description in this section of the political and economic crises in Mexico and the response of 
the Mexican government to them is largely inspired on the excellent work of Merilee Grindle 
(1996). 
Palacios-Vélez (1994a: 90) provides an historical overview of public expenditures in irrigation 
(for both irrigation districts and small farmer managed irrigation systems) for the eight 
presidential terms since 1947. Unfortunately, as his data include several assumed expenditures, 
they are not totally reliable. Yet, the data give a good impression of the magnitude in change in 
irrigation expenditures as a result of the economic crises. For instance, total expenditures for the 
four terms since 1971 are about 51 billion pesos (during 1971-76), 90 billion pesos (1977-82), 45 
billion pesos (1983-88), and only 10 billion during the period from 1989 to 1992 (all these 
expenditures are in constant 1979 Mexican pesos). 
Among the few exceptions are the contributions in an edited volume by Lara-Flores and Chauvet 
(1996), which document the impact of NAFTA on a number of agricultural sub-sectors including 
the ones for maize, fruits, horticulture and cotton. 
Most of the remaining votes went to two opposition parties: the center-right Partido Acción 
Nacional (PAN) and the center-left Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). After 1988, 
PAN was able to capture 6 governorships, including the one for the State of Guanajuato. In July 
2000, the PAN governor of Guanajuato (Vicente Fox) won the presidential elections. The 
political agenda of the PAN is very much in line with the neoliberal agenda of the Salinas 
administration (Grindle 1996) and as such, much of the 1988 vote for the PAN was a protest 
against the undemocratic organization of the PRI. Officially, the PRD candidate (Cuauhtemoc 
Cárdenas, the son of the popular former president Lázaro Cárdenas) won 31 percent of the 
presidential vote in 1988. Democratization, social welfare and a nationalistic foreign policy 
approach characterized the agenda of the PRD. 
Within this group of reformers in the Salinas administration, Gordillo was among those who 
believed that even under a system of privatization of ejido land, the ejido could still be 
reconstructed economically as a unit where subsistence fanning can be practiced, particularly by 
'part-time' farmers whose income, for instance, primarily depend on revenue from migration 
(Cornelius and Myhre 1998). 
See Alcalá et al. (1996) for an extensive overview of the reactions. 
For detailed examples on the impact of the neoliberal reforms on the mobilization of farmer 
organizations and unions, see the contribution in a volume edited by De Grammont (1996a). 
For examples on the participation of different farmer groups in the Solidarity program see 
Covarrubias-Patifio (1996). 
Fox (1995) draws his examples mainly from the southern states of Oaxaca and Chiapas and 
rightly points out that his results cannot be generalized to other states, mainly because the prior 
structured of local government, and their relations with state governments, are so different. 
In several irrigation districts in the North-East of Mexico, some farmers choose to sow a basic 
crop without harvesting it. Particularly in times of water scarcity, yields in these areas can be 
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relatively low (for instance 3 ton/ha of maize in Río San Juan irrigation district, compared to 
almost 6 ton/ha in ARLID). In combination with low market prices, these low yields make the 
cultivation of crops like maize economically unviable. Yet, some farmers choose to sow maize as 
it gives them access to PROCAMPO support (personal communication by Ellen Rymshaw). 
11. Since 1994, annual PROCAMPO transfers have been equivalent to about 5.4 percent of the 
agricultural sector GDP (Myhre 1998). 
12. Much of this historical overview of Mexican water laws is derived from Palacios-Vélez (1994a) 
and Roemer (1997). 
13. The National Rural Credit Bank's role in supervising the operation of these ten irrigations 
districts were defined in the Rural Credit Law (Ley de Crédito Agrícola) and enforced by the 
Presidential Decree of 20 December 1935. 
14. In 1985 studies were conducted to find out whether it was feasible to establish fixed fee levels for 
entire regions. Based on the overall water availability, the country was divided into four regions 
and fee levels for each of these regions were proposes. However, the proposal was not accepted 
by the Congress. 
15. The name of this new Department was Dirección General de Distritos y Unidades de Riego. 
16. Along with the establishment of the Agricultural Governing Boards, which were engaged with 
managing large scale irrigation districts, also the so called Rural Development Governing Boards 
of Irrigation Units (Comités Directivos de Unidades de Riego para el Desarrollo Rural) were 
created for the management of the much smaller 'farmer-managed' irrigation systems. Generally, 
these smaller systems had their own water user associations. According to Article 77 of the 
Federal Water law of 1972, representatives of these WUAs were allowed to participate in these 
boards, along with representatives of a series of government agencies (including the SRH, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, the Federal Electricity Board, and official government 
banks). 
17. The administrative modernization plans were part of the reforms package that was initiated by 
Salinas de Gortari. These plans aimed at more efficient, more effective and more accountable 
public decision making at all levels of the government (Fox 1995). Administrative and political 
decentralization and déconcentration of government institutions were seen as the key condition to 
achieve these goals. These plans were continued under the administration of Zedillo-Ponce de 
León (1994-2000) and came to be known as the 'New Federalism' or PROMAP (Programa de 
Modernización de la Administración Pública Federal). 
18. This description of the role that González-Villarreal played in the creation of CNA is 
predominantly taken from Ramos-Osorio (1999). 
19. Ramos-Osorio (1999) cite several discussions between González-Villarreal and Salinas de Gortari 
from minutes from the PRI meetings of the Institute of Political, Economic and Social Studies, 
held in 1987 and 1988. 
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for water management 
4.1 Introduction 
I i this chapter an account is given of how the new institutional arrangements for local water 
management in Mexico were formulated and implemented, both at the national level and at 
tiie level of the case study in ARLDD. It examines the official objectives of the IMT program, 
the underlying institutional design principles as well as the implementation strategies that 
were chosen to introduce these new principles. It also shows how constitutional revisions, 
particularly in the water law, support the implementation of these new arrangements. 
Furthermore, examples are given on how local irrigation staff and water users have adopted, 
accommodated and in part transformed these arrangements. In addition to examining the 
f armal design principles, this chapter particularly focuses on those strategies and mechanisms 
that would eventually help the new institutions to sustain. 
4.2 The Mexican IMT program: policy objectives and 
implementation process 
The economic crisis of the 1980s and the consequent introduction of pro-market and 
liberalization reform programs led to the creation of the National Development Plan for 1989-
1994. Under this plan the newly created National Water Commission was given the mandate 
to develop a National Program for Decentralization of the Irrigation Districts (here called the 
IMT Program) to establish a market-oriented system of co-responsibility between CNA and 
t i e water users. 
The reform of the irrigation sector through the introduction of the IMT program 
completely follows the pro-market approach that the Salinas de Gortari administration 
established in other sectors of the economy. The main objective of the IMT program was to 
reduce public expenditure on irrigation O&M by introducing a system of cost-recovery and 
financial self-sufficiency (Espinosa-de León and Trava-Manzanilla 1992, Trava 1994, Gorriz 
et ah 1996, Johnson 1997 and 1999). Another objective was to transfer O&M responsibilities 
(including the full recovery of all O&M costs) from CNA to newly established financially 
autonomous WUAs. The assumption behind greater user involvement in irrigation 
management was that management by local organizations would better reflect the actual 
needs and local conditions of the irrigation community. In addition, financial autonomy would 
g;ive these users an incentive to manage water resources more efficiently than the government. 
To further induce these greater efficiencies, the program would also provide technical 
assistance, such as on-farm development initiatives to enhance farm-level productivity and 
water conservation. Finally, according to Whiteford and Bernal (1996) another reason for 
transferring responsibilities to users was that the new local management organizations would 
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be more democratic, and as a result, greater political accountability would be built into the 
management organization (see also section 6.2). This section discusses how these objectives 
were translated into the different steps that the Mexican government followed to establish the 
IMT program. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the official steps that had to be followed during the implementation 
of the IMT program. From this figure it becomes clear that the program followed a mere top-
down approach, leaving little room for farmer participation in terms of decision making on the 
design of the institutional, financial, organizational and legal frameworks and approaches. As 
will be illustrated in the next section of this chapter, farmers were simply informed about the 
program objectives and program implementation strategies. During program implementation, 
real farmer participation was limited to the election of their representatives to the assemblies 
of the to be established WUAs, attending training programs, and signing the concessions. 
While underemphasizing the diversity in the ways the program has been implemented and 
adopted, international organizations have advocated the Mexican IMT program as "the 
transfer model" to other countries such as Turkey and India (Andhra Pradesh), apparently due 
to the program's scale and speed of implementation. By May 1999, 3.16 million hectares had 
been transferred to 419 WUAs, representing 93 percent of the area served by the 81 irrigation 
districts in the country (CNA 1999). 
Figure 4.1 The official implementation 
program 
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Foreign visitors of international agencies, banks and foreign irrigation agencies often 
mention the 'Mexican IMT model', thereby explicitly referring to the scale and speed of the 
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program implementation process (e.g. Mishra 1995, Gorriz and Groenfeldt 1996 and 
Ujjankop 1995). However, if one unpacks this 'model', other characteristics than scale and 
speed become more important as they help to link the content and process of 1MT 
implementation with the viability of the new arrangements. They also show the nature of IMT 
within the local Mexican organization of political and agrarian structures. This makes it easier 
to understand why the Mexican 'model', if any exists, cannot be regarded as a blueprint for 
countries with other socio-economic and political conditions and histories. The characteristics 
that make the Mexican IMT model unique are: 
Wider package of reforms 
As was demonstrated in chapter 3, IMT did not come on its own but rather followed and was 
par: of a wider set of similar market-oriented reforms, as a result of which the provision of 
many agricultural services had already been privatized. Consequently, farmers realized that 
also the O&M services, which were traditionally provided by CNA, would soon cease to 
exiiit, leaving them without any irrigation service unless they would start organizing these 
services themselves. To most farmers the concept of transfer was completely new and many 
user delegates were hardly aware of what their new roles would comprise (Whiteford and 
Bemal 1996) or what the financial implications of these would be for them. On the other 
hand, farmers had experienced that the quality of service provided before transfer had 
declined. CNA succeeded in convincing farmers that WUAs could provide a better O&M 
service at lower costs. 
Political commitment to reduce government staff 
Implementation of the IMT process could be introduced at a high pace because of the firm 
political commitment at the presidential level, not only to create an autonomous water 
institution (see section 3.5), but also to use this institution to introduce market mechanisms in 
irrigation management and to reduce public investments in O&M. An effective way of 
reducing public costs, is to make public agency staff redundant. As noted above, by 
weakening and marginalizing the role of the PRI and unions, Salinas de Gortari was able to 
make the political system far less corporatist in nature than before. This made it relatively 
easy to reduce the number of government employees and, more importantly, to by-pass to a 
great extent their labor unions. 
From 1990 to 1994, 42 percent of the 7,808 CNA personnel involved in irrigation O&M 
were retired or released. In addition, another 2,382 staff were supposed to be made redundant, 
of whom 2,326 were members of the union (CNA 1994)1. Most of these retired or reduced 
staif used to work at the field level (ditch tenders and other technical staff), but considerable 
reductions were also made with the CNA district and regional offices. In some cases, former 
CNA staff were rehired by the WUAs, but there was no obligation to do so. In other cases, 
CNA made use of a retirement program or could transfer personnel to other departments or 
government agencies. Finally, the remaining staff made redundant had to look for other 
employment opportunities. 
Constitutional framework 
The Mexican government clearly understood that the IMT program could only be introduced 
after a thorough revision of the water law (Palacios-Vêlez 1994b; Rosegrant and Schleyer 
1996), which would follow similar market-oriented modifications as the revisions to Article 
27 and the Agrarian Act (see section 3.2). As will be discussed in detail below, in 1992 a new 
National Water Law was enacted, which combines public ownership with private 
management of national water and irrigation facilities. The act provides for: 
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• the government being the sole authority to retain ownership of national water resources as 
well as all infrastructure and irrigation facilities; 
• the formation of WUAs as legally recognized non-profit civil associations (asociaciones 
civiles) to whom CNA can grant user concessions for a period of up to 50 years (but 
generally 20 years). These concessions give WUAs the right not only to use national 
water resources and manage irrigation facilities, but also to buy and sell water either 
within the agriculture sector or with other sectors in the economy; 
• the definition of the obligations of WUAs to operate and maintain the system in 
accordance with the District Regulations and Instructions of O&M and administration of 
the module. In addition, the Law stipulates that WUAs are responsible for fee collection 
and that these fees should cover the full O&M and administration costs of the entire 
system. 
• the creation of a hydraulic committee at the level of the district, in which representatives 
of all WUAs, CNA and the State of Guanajuato decide on issues related to seasonal 
planning, water trading between WUAs and access to externally funded system 
improvement programs. 
• the registration of water rights (i.e. concessions) in a Public Registry of Water Rights 
(REPDA) in order to ensure legal certainty of these rights. The legal concessions ('titles') 
are deposited with a public notary. 
Hydraulic boundaries 
The program was built around the idea of two organization levels: the district and the 
modules. Each module is managed by a WUA. The boundaries of the these modules are based 
upon hydraulic considerations: water delivery to the area should be easy and efficient to 
accomplish and, where possible, fit within existing irrigation sections (Trava 1994, cited in 
Johnson 1997a). In order to have an economically viable management size with relatively low 
fixed overhead costs, the sizes of the module areas are relatively large, ranging in size from 
1,500 hectares (e.g. Corralejo module in ARLTD) to 50,000 hectares (e.g. in Bajo Río Bravo 
irrigation district), each managed by an individual WUA. Formal irrigation management 
organizations below these module levels do not exist. 
Existing institutional agrarian structure 
The program was developed on an already existing strong institutional and ideological base: 
the ejidos and the organizations of private growers, along which most of the agrarian 
production was organized. WUAs are constituted as civil associations and are comprised of 
elected user representatives to the general assembly. From the assembly an executive board is 
elected, who is charged with the supervision of a hired team of technical and administrative 
staff headed by a general manager (see chapter 6 for more details). Water users are members 
rather than stakeholders of the association. 
It was decided that the general assemblies of the new WUAs should also be organized 
around the lines of ejidos and private growers, with representatives from both groups of 
farmers. Each ejido within the command area of the WUA could elect one representative (plus 
a replacement) to the assembly of the WUA. In addition, each municipality within the 
governing area of the WUA could appoint one farmer (plus a replacement) to represent the 
private growers. 
The election of user representatives along existing institutional liries made it logistically 
and politically easy for government officials to visit these organizations and promote the 
transfer program to farmers. Furthermore, by embarking on these existing organizations and 
their internal power relationships, delegates of both ejidatarios and private growers—who 
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normally are organized through their cooperatives and growers' unions (Foley 1995)— could 
be elected following the already existing procedures and patronage-oriented practices of 
electing delegates from within these organizations. As will be demonstrated in the case of 
ARLID, this sometimes resulted in the election of existing leaders, who used their new 
position in the assembly or board of the WUA to further strengthen their own economic and 
political networks (see section 6.6). Yet, irrespective of the political opportunistic and 
pragmatic choice to organize WUAs along existing lines of the agrarian structure, the IMT 
program was certainly ambitious in its attempt to bring two groups that differ so much socio-
eccnomically and politically together into one management organization. 
Financial autonomy 
As will be further demonstrated in chapter 7, WUAs are charged with fully recovering the 
cost of O&M at all system levels to achieve hundred percent financial self-sufficiency. Except 
for a negotiated percentage of the revenue from fees that the WUA has to pay to CNA for 
O&M of the dams, head works and the main canal system, all income can be used by the 
WUA. As such, the WUA is financially autonomous. Similarly, costs associated to O&M 
activities executed by CNA staff from the district offices are also to be paid out of irrigation 
fees. However, in practice some CNA staff at the district offices continue to be paid by CNA 
cer.tral office in Mexico City. As actual O&M costs differ from district to district, both the 
mechanism and levels of fee settings differ from place to place and may even vary between 
individual WUAs within the same district2. 
Arrangements for co-management 
The introduction of the IMT program did not result in a complete replacement of the existing 
management agency (CNA) by new management entities (the WUAs), but rather was built 
around a framework of co-management between the two. IMT is implemented in two stages. 
In the first stage, WUAs will assume responsibilities for managing the irrigation district 
below the level of the main canal, while CNA retains the responsibility for managing the 
dams, head-works and main systems. An important strategy during this stage was that CNA 
agreed to work in a collaborative mode for a fixed period of six months from the time of 
transfer so that the new WUAs could gain experience with managing the secondary system 
before they where left on their own, both financially and managerially. 
During the second stage of IMT, WUAs would federate themselves into Limited 
Responsibility Societies (LRSs) and take over responsibilities for O&M, administration and 
financing of the main system (canal and drains) as well, while CNA continues to have control 
over management of head-works and dams 3. During both stages CNA would have monitoring, 
regulatory, training and advisory roles. 
Political support from large farmers 
O Í A clearly decided to first transfer the larger irrigation districts in the north-west of Mexico 
to show that IMT was workable4. In these districts many large private producers would 
politically support this kind of neoliberal reforms. These farmers felt that by taking over 
responsibilities for O&M from the government, they would get an opportunity to better 
control the rehabilitation, modernization and efficient use of the irrigation facilities, which 
were needed to further expand their export oriented businesses (Gutiérrez 1998). 
Low program cost 
The organization of WUAs and training of agency staff and farmers come with a cost. 
However, the institutional development costs are a relatively small fraction of the World 
Bank's Irrigation and Drainage Sector program loan to Mexico, under which the IMT 
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program falls: 1.9 percent (or 24 million US dollars) of the approximately 1.3 billion dollars. 
These costs equal to approximately 8 US$ per hectare (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1995)5. As to the 
farmers: CNA granted concessions to the WUAs to use its machinery and equipment to 
maintain the canals, which meant that (at least initially) WUAs were not confronted with high 
capital costs. 
Training and policy promotion 
The Mexican Institute of Water Technology (TMTA) started an extensive training program 
(financed by CNA) to leaders and technical staff of the WUAs. These programs focused on 
O&M and financial and administrative management (including the usage of computer 
packages) of the modules as well as on the general idea behind IMT. Other training programs 
were aimed at improving the technical skills of remaining CNA staff. Between 1992 and 1994 
a total number of 5,214 participants attended these training programs, of which 68 percent 
were WUA staff and leaders, and 32 percent were CNA technical staff (Rendon et al. 1996). 
In addition, with the objective to promote IMT and to convince farmers to support the 
program, CNA ran an extensive mass media campaign prepared by communication 
specialists6, along with universities and industry (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1995). 
4.3 Supportive constitutional revisions: the new water law 
Colby (1988) and Perry et al. (1997) see the existence of clearly defined water use rights or 
entitlements of all users under all levels of resource availability as one of the major 
preconditions for the establishment of cost-recovery through WUAs and the introduction of 
market forces into the allocation of water. The bases for current water rights in Mexico are 
laid down in the National Water Law (Ley de Aguas Nacionales) of 1992. 
The law clearly follows and supports the kind of economic and political reforms in 
agricultural pricing and market policies that were discussed in section 3.3. In fact, it is crucial 
to the entire nature and existence of the IMT program as it gives central authority to the newly 
created CNA to coordinate and establish these policies. The revision of Article 27 of the 
Constitution of 1917 and the Agrarian Law thoroughly redefined land property rights, and 
also helped the government to phase out economic and legal obstacles to transferring property 
rights, and stimulate commercialization and commoditization of (ejido) land and national 
waters. In order to tune the exploitation of national waters and the use of federal irrigation 
infrastructure with these liberalization and market-oriented policies, CNA, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (SARH) and several other ministries and departments 
appointed a great number of economists, lawyers and environmentalists to evaluate the 
Federal Water Law of 1972 and to propose a new water law (Roemer 1997; Ramos-Osorio 
1999). After a process of discussion and negotiation at the levels of the Cabinet, political 
parties, the House of Representatives (Cámara de Diputados) and CNA, the new law was 
passed without considerable changes in December 1992, less than a year after the revision of 
Article 27 7 . In comparison with the Federal Water Law of 1972, the new law provides for 
several arrangements that seek to facilitate, among others: 
• users to create their own financial autonomous water user associations (WUAs) and 
participate in decisions and investments. This implied that new WUAs had to be created, 
to whom CNA could grant titles of water concessions and permits to use irrigation 
infrastructure (CNA 1996; Whiteford and Bernal 1996; Svendsen et al. 1997); 
• users to assume responsibility for O&M activities; 
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users to assume responsibility for O&M cost recovery and to financially contribute to the 
physical improvement of the infrastructure (Roemer 1997); 
the granting of water use rights (concessions) and rights to make use of irrigation 
infrastructure and facilities; 
the provision of certainty in user rights by creating a Public Registry of Water Rights 
(Roemer 1997; Ibarra-Mendivil 1996; Bray 1996); 
the possibility to transmit and market water rights between users within the same basin or 
between those who make use of the same aquifer (DOF 1992). 
What do these revisions mean for the definition of water rights? As far as surface water is 
concerned, Mexico does not have a tradition in what Sampath (1992) classifies as riparian 
rights and prior rights. Instead, it follows an administered system of public allocation of 
rights. Generally, these rights are defined in terms of a proportion or share of flow or storage. 
Historically there is a clear difference between Mexican property rights of water and 
concessions (or usufruct rights). This concept of separating water property rights from use 
concessions was introduced during the Spanish period (Easter and Hearne 1995; Roemer 
1997) and was re-affirmed in Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917. Nowadays, property 
rights for water are exclusively held by CNA, but CNA can grant concessions to individual 
users and WUAs. This means that under the new law, the allocation of water rights largely 
continues to follow an administered system, but it allows, within certain limitations, the 
marketing of concessions. 
The National Water Law and its Regulations provide for CNA to grant three types of 
concessions that are relevant to the rights and obligations of WUAs and individual users in 
ARLID: 
1. a concession to a corporate body for the use of national waters for agricultural purposes8. 
In the case of ARLID this means that concessions can be issued to WUAs 9 . 
2. a concession or permit to a corporate body or WUA to use or manage irrigation 
infrastructure10. If the federal government has participated in the financing, construction 
and O&M of the district, CNA has to hand over O&M to the users 1 1 , organized in a WUA 
and following the bylaws of this organization1 2. 
3. a concession to an individual user for the use of national waters for agricultural purposes. 
This means that, in theory, concessions could be granted to individual water users for the 
use of surface water within each of the modules and to individual well owners within the 
district for the use of groundwater. 
Once issued, these concessions have to be recorded in the Public Registry of Water 
Rights (REPDA), maintained by CNA and in theory open to the public 1 3. Registration of 
concessions allows CNA and the hydraulic committee of the district to control whether actual 
volumes drawn do not exceed concessioned volumes. Furthermore, registration should give 
grantees legal certainty over their rights to use the water. Under certain conditions and 
regulations, CNA can authorize transfer of rights or concessions within a given basin or 
aquifer through a simple notice of change of the title holder and registration of this in 
REPDA. Concessions can be issued for periods ranging from 5 to 50 years and are 
renewable 1 4. By granting them concessions, WUAs legally assume O&M responsibilities, 
which are monitored by CNA. These responsibilities include: 
carry out the O&M works necessary for the exploitation and use of the water; 
satisfy the requirements for efficient use of the water and ensure its reuse; 
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• develop and follow bylaws which include regulations with regard to (among others): 
decision making on distribution of water among members of the WUA, the form in which 
individual rights of members are guaranteed, the form of system O&M and investment in 
infrastructure, the forms of O&M cost recovery, and procedures for dealing with 
complaints and sanctions; 
• fully recover O&M costs from the water users as well as to amortize the cost for capital 
investment related to construction and rehabilitation of irrigation facilities from the 
users 1 5 . WUAs are required to pay to CNA a certain percentage of the revenues from fee 
collection in order to pay for CNA services related to O&M of the dams, headworks and 
main canal system. The fee has to be presented to CNA for approval; 
• prepare seasonal O&M budgets based on expected revenue from cost-recovery. Prepare 
monthly financial statements that show to what extent planned activities have been 
executed. These budgets and statements have to be sent to CNA for monitoring and 
recommendations for improvements; 
• distribute the water among the WUAs according to operational rules and regulations that 
are set out by a hydraulic committee. And, distribute water among individual users 
following the operational rules and regulations set out by the particular WUA. 
An important peculiarity of the law lies in the definition of consumptive use and return 
flows that determine which fraction of the concession is tradable (Rosegrant et al. 1995; 
Rosegrant and Gazmuri 1996). Unlike in for instance California and Colorado, the tradable 
proportion in a district like ARLID is not limited to consumptive use but rather is the full 
share including return flows. The law does not provide for third-party rights to return 
flows, which means that in effect these return flows, if any, are made available to down-
stream users at no charge. According to Cunimings and Nercissiantz (1992) this reduces 
transaction costs to water trade. On the other hand, Rosegrant et al. (1995) caution that this 
system does not protect third parties against adverse impacts from water trades. 
O&M rules under the new law 
Following Ostrom (1990 and 1992) and Tang (1992), three layers of rules that cumulatively 
affect the management of Mexican irrigation districts can be distinguished. First, 
constitutional-choice rules determine who is eligible to participate in irrigation management, 
and who can be excluded as a user. They also determine the rights, ownership, authority and 
obligations of each institution involved in irrigation management. Changes in constitutional-
choice rules automatically affect the definition of the second layer of rules, i.e. the collective-
choice rules. Collective-choice rules are used by irrigation agencies, WUAs and sometimes 
other external agencies in making the policies for water management at the district level. 
These rules determine the general principles for allocating and distributing water between and 
to a lesser extent within modules. These rules indirectly affect the lowest layer of rules, i.e. 
the operational rules. Operational rules are used by WUAs, their technical staff and individual 
members to decide on day-to-day management decisions, including irrigation scheduling and 
distribution of water, canal maintenance, monitoring and evaluation procedures, modes of 
sanctioning and enforcement. Ostrom (1992) also argues that it is useful to distinguish 
between formal (or official) rules set by for instance legislatures, courts and other regulatory 
agencies, and informal rules set by informal collective-choice arenas such as gathering of 
users and private associations. In many cases one can find an interaction, if not co-existence, 
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between these two orders of rules, which together determine the actual operational rules-in-
use 6 . 
In the case of post-transfer Mexican irrigation districts rales and principles for O&M are 
founded at two levels. First, constitutional rules exist in the form of the National Water Law 
of 1992 discussed above. The act regulates the formal ownership and use of national waters 
and defines the rights and obligations of all water users with respect to capture, preservation, 
allocation, system O&M, registration of water rights, construction and rehabilitation of 
syslems, and cost-recovery. Second, collective-choice rules are defined in two documents. 
The first document is the O&M manual (attached to the concession), which regulates the 
modes of water appropriation, allocation and distribution at the level of the entire district, 
monitoring of maintenance activities, and administration and cost-recovery (see below). The 
second document is the bylaws of the individual WUA, which regulates the mechanisms of 
user representation, conflict resolution and rights and obligation of the general assembly, the 
oversight committee and the executive board (see below). 
As was discussed in section 1.3, O&M rales are one reflection (or manifestation) of an 
institutional policy. As these policies are an outcome of a political process of negotiation, 
modification and reproduction over institutional design principles, also these O&M rales 
should be seen as an outcome of such processes, rather than a set of formal and static norms 
that everybody follows they way they are supposed to. This will be further demonstrated in 
chapters 5 to 7. 
4.4 Post-transfer institutional arrangements in ARLID 
ACRORS INVOLVED 
Five main groups of actors are involved in post-transfer institutional arrangement for 
managing ARLID: CNA, the WUAs, the Hydraulic Committee, the Limited Responsibility 
Society, and the individual users. 
CNA 
Prior to management transfer in 1992, the irrigation district was entirely managed by the CNA 
and its predecessors. The CNA employed heads of the irrigation units (now called modules) 
and ditch tenders who were responsible for daily O&M. Farmers had to go to the CNA offices 
to pay their fees. After transfer, these units were transferred to the WUAs. WUAs were made 
responsible for O&M of the district below the main canal, while officially CNA's role now is 
restricted to management of the four dams, headworks, and main canals 1 7. The CNA district 
office is located in the town of Celaya and is headed by a chief engineer, who is also 
resp| onsible for the management of the much smaller neighboring district of La Begofta. 
Presently, CNA shares responsibilities for the operation and maintenance of the district 
witli the newly created WUAs. Even so, CNA continues to be responsible for the overall 
management of the district and it plays important monitoring, regulatory, training, and 
advisory roles (see also box 3.1). Similar to the pre-transfer organization of the CNA district 
office, the chief engineer is assisted by a chief of operation and a chief of maintenance, as 
well as by several other technical and administrative staff. Also, the CNA district office 
continues to have zone or unit offices within the district, with staff responsible for daily O&M 
of trie main canals and headworks. 
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WUAs 
Each WUA is comprised of four managerial and institutional layers: the general assembly, 
the oversight committee, the executive board and the group of technical staff. Whereas the 
first three groups is comprised of water user members who have assumed non-paid positions 
within the WUA, the technical staff are paid professionals who are directly hired and 
controlled by the executive board of the WUA. 
The general assembly elects representatives of both the ejido sector and the group of 
private growers. Following the bylaws of the WUAs in ARLID, each ejido within the service 
area of the WUA sends one representative plus an alternate to the assembly, whereas each 
municipality can also send one person to represent the sector of private growers. Ejido 
representatives are elected by the ejido assembly of which all ejidatarios are member. The 
ejido assembly is headed by a commissioner (comisariado) who presides the executive 
committee of the ejido. This committee plays a key role in helping ejidatarios to get access to 
the package of official support associated with ejido property. This package included crucial 
government services like preferential credit through BANRURAL, tax advantages, access to 
subsidized inputs and water and rights to common lands for grazing and pasture (Goldring 
1996a). Being key persons in the interface between government services and ejidatarios often 
give the comisariado as well as the other members of the executive ejido committee prestige 
and political clout which they can use for accumulating social, economic and political power 
(Goldring 1996b). As a result, also the 'election' of ejido representatives to the assemblies of 
the WUAs is often controlled by the comisariado and other powerful ejido members, which 
justifies a certain level of skepticism about the level representation and democracy within the 
general assembly of the WUA (see chapter 6 for examples). 
The main rights and obligations of a general assembly include: 
• to elect the executive board and 
the oversight committee; 
• to approve the seasonal 
operation and maintenance 
programs; 
• to approve the annual budget; 
• to approve the level of the 
proposed irrigation service fee. 
The general assembly elects 
from their members an oversight 
committee, which is comprised of 
farmer inspectors from the groups 
of ejidatarios and private growers 
as well as from the CNA district 
office and the state government. 
The oversight committee's main 
task is to inspect the accounting 
records, assets, inventory and 
reconciliation of bank accounts of the WUA (Gorriz et al. 1996). The general assembly's 
most important task is to elect and control the executive board of the WUA. 
The board is comprised of a president, a secretary, a treasurer and their deputies. 
According to the bylaws (which each WUA in ARLID has formulated), every three years the 
Box 4.1 Some rights and obligations of the executive 
board of a WUA 
• Administer and direct the affairs and resources 
• Agree, sign, amend and renew contracts 
• Acquire immovable and movable property needed 
• Represent the WUA before the authorities 
• Oversee all matters related to administrative and 
technical staff in order to exceed the budget 
• Carry out resolutions adopted by the general assembly 
• Monitor O&M and administration in accordance with 
the authorized agricultural planning 
• Forward to the CNA for its information and approval 
the O&M budgets 
• Issue calls for tenders and official correspondence 
• Submit a detailed financial statement to the general 
assembly at least annually. 
Source: Gorriz et al. 1996:26 
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entire board has to be replaced, and re-election of board members for another three years is 
nol allowed. Also, every three years the office of the president of the board has to alternate 
between the groups of ejidatarios and private growers. 
The duties of the executive board are summarized in box 4.1. The general assembly of the 
WUA meets several times per year 1 8. The board calls meetings, particularly to discuss issues 
related to the annual irrigation plan, fee setting, finances, and maintenance and rehabilitation 
pre grams. Often these meetings are also used to exchange information about market prices of 
inputs and produce, problems with pests and diseases, and other relevant agricultural 
information. Occasionally experts from CNA, other public agencies or commercial companies 
are invited to give short courses or presentations to the members of the assembly on a wide 
range of subjects, ranging from water use efficiencies to the applications of a new variety. 
The positions in the general assembly, oversight committee and executive board are 
honorary and unpaid. WUAs employ their own general managers (gerentes), ditch tenders 
(canaleros) and maintenance and administrative staff, paid out of the fees which the 
associations collect from its members. This group of technical and administrative staff is 
accountable to and is controlled by the board. Together, the board and the technical staff are 
responsible for delivering a number of O&M and administration services to the members of 
the WUAs. These services are summarized in table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 O&M service provision from WUA to water users 
T;/pe of service Description 
System operation negotiate seasonal dam releases and irrigation schedule in HC 
preparation of seasonal irrigation schedule 
delivery of irrigation at the right place, the right time and sufficient for 
the hectares that the user has paid a turn for 
monitoring of operations 
water theft prevention and conflict resolution between farmers 
technical advise on how to use water more efficiently 
channeling complaints and requests via HC to CNA 
System maintenance preparation of seasonal maintenance plan 
cleaning of secondary canals and drains 
maintenance and repair of structures and service roads 
monitoring of cleaning of farm ditches 
channeling complaints and request via HC to CNA 
negotiate better O&M service provided by CNA (for dams, headworks 
and main canal) 
System improvements minor system improvements 
information on externally funded system improvement programs 
facilitate access to externally funded farm improvement programs 
Administration preparation and presentation of O&M budgets 
setting and negotiating of fee levels in HC 
administration of fee collection 
inform users about actual fee levels 
maintaining and updating the list of users 
administration of farmers' cropping patterns 
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Hydraulic Committee 
Also in 1992, a hydraulic committee was formed at the district level. By law, each district 
should create such a committee, which is comprised of representatives of CNA, the presidents 
of the WUAs and the State (i.e. the Secretary of Agriculture). One of the most important 
obligations of this committee is to formulate the O&M rules and regulations of the district and 
monitor whether those who have been given user concessions follow these rules. Under these 
rules, the hydraulic committee 
also has to develop and approve 
the seasonal operation and 
maintenance programs (see 
chapter 5). These approvals need 
the signature of all committee 
members. For ARLID this 
implies that WUAs hold 11 
votes, whereas CNA only holds 
one vote. However, in addition 
to carrying the signature of the 
11 presidents and the CNA chief 
engineer of the district, all 
seasonal irrigation plans are 
generally also signed by the 
CNA State manager and his 
deputy, as well as by the State 
secretary of Agriculture and two other officials from SAGAR. The tasks of the hydraulic 
committee are summarized in box 4.2. Hydraulic committee meetings are chaired by the chief 
engineer of the district. Occasionally CNA officials from the State, regional or even central 
offices participate in the meetings of the committee to discuss issues that go beyond the 
boundaries of the district. Examples of such issues include management of multi-purpose 
dams, basinwide allocation of water, or access to State or federal funds that are channeled 
through CNA offices at the State, regional or central levels. 
Limited Responsibility Society 
A fourth and more recent group of actors that are involved in the management of irrigation 
district are the Limited Responsibility Societies (LRSs). During the second stage of irrigation 
management transfer, LRSs have taken over from CNA actual O&M as well as financial 
responsibilities for the main canal system. The LRS federates all WUAs within the district 
and is comprised of the WUAs' presidents. The LRS hires technical staff such as a general 
manager, heads of operation and maintenance, ditch tenders for daily O&M of the main 
canals as well as administrative staff. 
Individual users 
All users that have land within the command area of the irrigation district and are registered 
within the list of users (padrôn de usuarios) held by both the WUAs and CNA, are members 
of the WUA. Unlike similar participatory irrigation reform programs in for instance South 
Asia, the Mexican IMT program does not aim to maximize direct participation in O&M of all 
users but involves farmers through their representatives on the general assembly. Although 
formal direct participation in decision making processes does not take place, individual users 
can have indirect control over O&M related decisions by channeling their complaints and 
suggestions to the board and the general assembly via their representatives. Individual users 
do also approach board members directly to air their problems or ideas. The most common 
Box 4.2 Some obligations of the hydraulic committee at 
the district level 
• Formulate the O&M rules of the district and present 
these to the CNA for approval 
• Call committee meetings and distribute the minutes with 
all decisions to the users 
• Monitor the annual irrigation and maintenance plans 
• Conduct studies and implement programs related to 
better use of water, soils and infrastructure 
• Monitor the cost-recovery program 
• Promote training programs and technical assistance 
provided by the CNA 
Source: Article 99 of the 1994 regulations to the National 
Waters Act of 1992. 
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way used by individual members to have influence over daily and weekly O&M schedules 
and practices is to approach the ditch tenders or general manager of the WUA directly. 
In general, individual users have two obligations: follow the O&M rules and regulations 
that are set out by the district and the WUA, and fully pay the cost related to the O&M 
sendee that is provided by the WUA and CNA. The O&M rules and regulations say, for 
inslance, that all farmers need to clean their field ditches (or tertiary canals) prior to paying 
and receiving the first irrigation. In return, farmers have the right to receive the irrigation turn 
they have requested and paid for, as well as to be kept informed by their representatives about 
thel decisions made by the board and the general assembly. 
INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Figure 4.2 shows the organizational set-up of the district after transfer. The figure clearly 
shows that, in theory, CNA and the WUAs are equal partners who are both responsible for 
managing O&M at different system levels. It also shows the central role of the hydraulic 
committee in having the agency and the WUAs together decide on issues related to planning 
the irrigation season. 
Figure 4.3 shows the most important relationships between CNA and the users involved 
in O&M of the system during the pre-transfer period. Similarly, figure 4.4 shows the 
relationships between the four organizations (CNA, the hydraulic committee, the WUAs and 
the LRS) and the users since the introduction of IMT in 1992. Each of these relationships will 
be discussed in detail in the chapters that follow, but some general characteristics are briefly 
discussed here, basically to illustrate the kind of complex institutional transformation the 
organization of O&M has undergone. The institutional relationships between CNA and the 
users can be described by the four mechanisms that are studied in order to unpack the new 
institutional relationships (see section 1.3). 
Relationships between different actors and groups are generally determined by more than 
one of these mechanisms. In addition to these mechanisms, the figures also show the most 
important O&M services delivered by each managing organization as well as the kind of 
pajment that others have to make to receive these services and as such describe the 
accountability mechanisms between the actors. Although the figures highlight the delivery of 
O&M services in return for fee payment, other accountability relationships also exist. 
Examples of these are, delivery of improved maintenance services in return for political 
support, or illicit delivery of water in return for bribes (chapter 7). However, for reasons of 
clarity, these accountability mechanisms are not shown in both figures. For the same reason, 
external actors that influence these mechanisms (such as local politicians and other 
government agencies) are also not shown in the figures but their roles and relationships are 
discussed in the relevant chapters that follow. 
75 
Figure 4.2 The organizational structure of ARLID after transfer 
Hydraulic Committee 
Seasonal planning and monitoring 
Represenlatives of CNA, the 11 WUAs and the State of Guanajuato 
O x > 
m 
7¡ 
National Water Cornmission (CNA) 
O&M of dams and head works, and general monitoring 
Water Users Associations 1 to 11 
O&M of secondary system 
and fee collection 
Limited Responsibility Society 
O&M of main canal system 
Chief ofDistrict 
Chief of Operation 
Zone Chiefs 
Operation staff 
Hydrology and water 
measurement staff 
General Assembly 
(user representatives of the ejido and private sectors) 
Chief of Maintenance Administrative staff 
Maintenance staff 
Chief of operation 
L Ditch tenders 
Oversight 
(elected from as 
Committee 
embly members) 
Executh 
(president, trea. 
«Board 
urer, secretary) 
General Manager 
Maintenance staff Administrative staff 
General Manager 
_ Operation staff 
Maintenance staff 
Adninistrative staff 
Fee collecter 
IMPLEMENTING NEW INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Before transfer, O&M at all system levels was bureaucratically managed by agency staff 
froi^i the CNA district office. This means that relationships between the agency and the water 
were primarily administrative (based on instructions on how to follow bureaucratically 
irrigation schedules) and financial. Farmers were hardly involved in decision making 
related to developing and executing O&M plans. In return for the provision of 
services, farmers had to pay the agency an irrigation fee. However, as will be 
denkonstrated in chapter 7, cost recovery rates were very low resulting in financial self-
sufficiency rates as low as 15 percent during the early 1980s. An important reason that 
ted to these low cost recovery rates, were the poor O&M service provided by the 
agency. As a consequence of these low rates, the agency found it even more difficult to 
improve the service. As is described in detail by Zaag (1992), who studied irrigation 
management practices during the pre-transfer period in another irrigation district, ditch 
tenders hired by the irrigation bureaucracy formed the day-to-day linkage between the users 
and the agency. 
Figtire 43 The most important relationships between CNA and users prior to IMT 
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Figure 4.4 The most important relationships between irrigation management 
organizations and users after EVIT 
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As real 'frontline workers' these ditch tenders had to maintain good working 
relationships with both their employer and the users. Generally, this meant that ditch tenders 
tended to be more accountable to the users, with whom they had daily contact, than to the 
agency from whom they receive a salary irrespective of the quality of their work performance. 
In addition to these weak mechanisms of administrative and financial accountability, 
relationships between users and lower agency staff at the field level were further characterized 
by high levels of rent-seeking, bribing and favoritism (see chapter 6). 
The post-transfer accountability relationships are discussed in detail in the three chapters 
that follow, but a quick comparison between figures 4.3 and 4.4 immediately points to a 
number of major changes in the way O&M is now organized. The first obvious difference is 
the dramatic increase in the number of formal organizations within the district involved in 
managing O&M. Three new organizations produce the link between the agency and the users: 
the WUAs 1 9 , the hydraulic committee and the LRS. As will be demonstrated in the chapters 
that follow, ditch tenders (who are now employed by the WUAs) continue to be important 
'middlemen' between the users and the management organizations. Yet, users can now find 
more easily direct ways to the new management organizations, of whom they are members 
and to whose assemblies they directly elect user representatives. 
Another major difference between the two figures is the change in payment flows. Users 
now pay their fees directly to the WUAs, who in their turn pay a percentage of their revenue 
to CNA (and later also the LRS). This means that CNA has now become directly dependent 
on the WUAs for their income. 
A third observation that can be made by simply comparing the two figures, is that in 
addition to the three sets of relationships that already existed before management transfer was 
introduced, another set of relationships has become important: electoral. This implies that 
under the current management arrangements, relationships between users and managers are 
now, at least partially, determined by mechanisms of user representation, solidarity and 
democratization as well (see chapter 6). 
One important aspect that cannot be shown in both figures, is that several groups of 
actors are comprised of persons that are also member of other groups. The most obvious 
example is that of the presidents of the 11 WUAs, who do not only lead their own 
associations, but also represent these associations in both the hydraulic committee and the 
LRS. Similarly, the CNA chief engineer of the district is responsible for managing the dams 
and main infrastructure and also chairs the meeting of the hydraulic committee. This situation 
could imply that in some cases these actors might have to defend conflicting interests. This 
will become clear, for instance, in the case of negotiating the volumes and prices of water that 
is traded between the WUAs. As leader of a WUA that wants to sell water, the president 
needs to negotiate the highest water price possible (see chapter 8). At the same time, however, 
he is also member of the LRS, whose success in replacing CNA in main system management 
is built on a high level of solidarity among the eleven presidents of which the LRS is 
comprised. This required level of solidarity might conflict with demanding a high water price 
from fellow WUAs that desperately need water but cannot afford to pay high market prices. 
Finally, the same president is member of the hydraulic committee, which has to guarantee that 
water marketing does not negatively affect the access to water by all WUAs. 
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4.5 Implementation of irrigation reforms in ARLID 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
The JMT process at ARLID started in 1992, with CNA officials paying visits to the 281 ejidos 
in the district. More than 470 promotion meetings were held with farmers to convince them of 
the assumed benefits of the IMT program and the need to raise water fee levels (Gorriz and 
Groenfeldt 1995). 
During the second half of 1992, each ejido within the module area had to elect its 
delegates to the general assemblies of the WUAs. Subsequently, these delegates elected their 
boards. Irrigation fee levels were established for each WUA, using a methodology designed 
by CNA based on the volume that each WUA is buying. The percentage of total fee collection 
to be paid to CNA was negotiated (see chapter 7). By November 1992, all eleven WUAs had 
officially assumed responsibilities for fee collection and O&M of the infrastructure below the 
main canals. From June 1992 to December 1994, CNA provided 18 framing courses (table 
4.2). These courses were mainly directed at the technical staff of the new WUAs and focused 
on the concept of IMT, system O&M, and seasonal planning. By November 1992, the new 
WUAs started hiring their own staff, but until mid-1993 CNA helped the WUAs to manage 
the distributary canals and those below them. 
In 1992, concessions permitting WUAs to use the infrastructure were signed between the 
WUAs and CNA. As will be further discussed in chapter 8, by law, these usufructuary rights 
should be accompanied by volumetric water concessions. In the case of ARLID, these 
volumetric concessions are based on the average volume of water of 880 MnrVyear (see table 
2.1) available in the four reservoirs at the start of the agricultural year for the period 1949-94. 
Each WUA is entitled to a share of this volume proportional to the area of the module under 
canal irrigation, provided that the volume is available at the start of the season. By law, these 
volumes should be registered in REPDA at CNA. However, by April 1997, although signed 
by CNA, these volumetric concessions had not been passed on to the register. 
CNA, through its training and research institute IMTA, provided many training programs 
to leaders, farmer representatives and staff of the new WUAs as well as to remaining CNA 
staff. In the first two years after transfer 331 persons participated in these courses (table 4.2). 
Later, other government agencies such as the ministry of agriculture, universities and 
international institutes like IWMI provided free short technical training programs or organized 
workshops in which experiences and problems related to IMT were discussed. More recently, 
the national association of water users association (ANUR) has created the National Center 
for the Transfer of Irrigation and Drainage Technology (CENATRYD) with funding by the 
WUAs, CNA, and the Spanish International Cooperation Agency. This center receives 
technical support from IMTA and will provide continuing training to ANUR's own staff, 
CNA staff, and technical and administrative staff from the WUAs (De León-Mojarro et al. 
1999). Occasionally WUAs themselves hire experts to help them out with technical problems, 
particularly in the field of installation and use of computer software for financial 
administration systems. 
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Table 4.2 Training courses for technical staff and leaders of the WUAs in ARLID, as 
psirt of the EMT process (1992-1994) 
ear Month Title Participants 
1992 June 
August 
September 
November 
December 
1^ 93 February 
March 
May 
July 
August 
October 
November 
November 
1994 February 
February 
September 
October 
December 
Regional course on irrigation management transfer 1 
Seminar to promote and initiate irrigation management transfer 1 
of irrigation districts 
Course on transfer, for the CNA heads of irrigation units 8 
October and November 1992: IMT 
Regional course on system operation 2 
Management course, for leaders of WUAs 37 
Professional practice course on operation of the secondary 34 
canal system in Abasólo, Huanímaro and Corralejo 
Professional practice course on operation of the secondary 28 
canal system in Salvatierra and Acámbaro 
Professional practice course on operation of the secondary 32 
canal system in Jaral, Valle and Cortázar 
Professional practice course on operation of the secondary 21 
canal system in Irapuato, Salamanca and La Purísima 
Course on the design of irrigation plans, for WUAs 42 
Course on water distribution 85 
Diploma in drainage and salinity control 1 
Workshop on technical improvements in canal irrigation 2 
Course on efficient use of water and energy 30 
Workshop on aero-mapping (AU2) of irrigation districts 1 
Diploma in the planning of the improvement of production in 1 
irrigation districts 
Course on AU2 in Windows 2 
Workshop on technical improvements in canal irrigation 3 
Tatal 331 
Source: CNA district office, Celaya. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WUAS AND THE LRS 
Being used to paternalistic agencies and centrally controlled agricultural development 
programs, the sudden message that farmers now had to assume management and financial 
responsibilities for operating national water resources and their associated infrastructure came 
a surprise to most water users in ARLID. All farmers had experienced a deterioration in the 
provision of O&M services over the last two decades and were concerned about the viability 
their irrigation resource. But few farmers would have thought that the government would 
transfer the control over water resources and irrigation facilities so easily into the hands of the 
users. Similarly, as a result of the neoliberal reforms all farmers had faced a dramatic 
reduction in all kinds of agricultural support services, such as credit programs and subsidized 
inputs. But few would have imagined that the neoliberal thinking would imply that most CNA 
staff in the district were going to be made redundant and that farmers themselves were being 
made responsible not only for controlling the management of large parts of the system but for 
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financing O&M services as well. Hence, the idea that CNA would transfer much of its control 
over valuable resources to the farmers was completely new to most of the farmers and they 
found it hard to respond swiftly to it in a more or less organized way. 
Irrespective of the massive promotion and training campaigns, elected WUA leaders, user 
representatives and common water users alike reported that they had no idea what the exact 
implications of the management transfer would be. However, the campaigns were certainly 
successful in getting two messages across: that the IMT program would definitely be 
implemented, with all its managerial and financial consequences for the farmers; and, that 
farmers were given the opportunity to gain full control over cost-recovery and hence to use 
this income to considerably improve the quality of O&M. Particularly the latter message was 
welcomed by farmers that actively sought to become involved in the new WUAs, either out of 
a genuine belief that the provision of O&M could be improved and be delivered at a lower 
cost to the farmers, or out of personal and opportunistic financial and political motivations to 
have a greater stake in the control over large amounts of funds and resources, or both. 
Initially, many farmers were doubtful and reluctant to accept the program. One of the 
reasons for this was that they were afraid that, given their large ideological and sometimes 
economic differences, private growers and ejidatarios could never cooperate in the same 
management organization. Many ejidatarios feared that private growers would assume most 
of the control over resources and decision making processes. Yet another group of farmers 
believed that the control over irrigation resources should maintain with paternalistic state 
agencies in order to avoid conflicts between politically and economically divided groups of 
water users. Although these farmers initially resisted the IMT program, they soon came to 
realize that the implementation of the program was a fact and that there was not going to be a 
way back to traditional government controlled management. 
In ARLE) water users never succeeded in effectively mobilizing their resistance, as many 
farmers realized that openly opposing CNA could have a negative impact on their personal 
access to government assistance. Even though CNA's control over canal irrigation was going 
to be reduced, farmers knew that in the future they still would have to deal with the agency. 
For instance, at the time of management transfer (and as a result of the new National Water 
Law), CNA had also started the process of updating and recording concessions for the use of 
groundwater. Many farmers knew that they still needed CNA to get their groundwater 
concessions recorded in REPDA and thereby safeguarding their rights to use groundwater. 
Similarly, even in the early stages of the transfer program, it became clear that CNA would 
continue to be the agency through which all kinds of funds for government and externally 
financed system improvement programs would be channeled. Hence, farmers were afraid that 
open resistance to CNA would jeopardize their future access to these programs. 
Two examples from Cortázar illustrate how the newly elected WUA leaders came to 
know about the program and how they got involved in managing the WUA. The first example 
shows the experience of the first president of Cortázar WUA, an ejidatario. This person lives 
in one of the 35 ejidos that are located within the governing module area of the WUA. 
Although he comes from a well known and influential family, he and his family never played 
important roles in wider regional social and political networks. His farther used to occupy 43 
hectares of ejido land, which were divided between his sons after he died. When the new 
president assumed the position as the first president of Cortázar WUA, he owned 8 hectares of 
land. Virtually all of this land was irrigated by private deep tubewells. Although his father 
never made it to the comisariado (head) of the ejido assembly, as the assembly member 
responsible for organizing access to national credit programs for ejidos, he certainly had an 
influential and well respected position within his ejido. 
His son, who was in its early thirties when the IMT program was started, first learned 
about transfer when CNA officials called a meeting. In this meeting water users were simply 
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told that farmers had to take over O&M tasks and become responsible for fee collection as 
well. They were also told that this would result in better O&M and lower fees at the same 
time. During this meeting few farmers argued against the program. According to the new 
president, farmers were used to be informed about new government programs and activities in 
this way and to even sign in on government programs without knowing what they meant. 
During this same meeting, CNA officials also told the farmers to appoint representatives from 
each ejido as well as from the group of private growers. Out of these groups, 10 candidates 
had to be nominated as new leaders of the WUA board. During the meeting farmers were 
also told that the first president should be elected from the group of ejidatarios "as they 
occupy the majority of land". To the president's own surprise, his name showed up several 
times during the election. 
Although he felt he was too young, inexperienced and certainly too ignorant about the 
transfer, he said that he accepted the position as first president of the new WUA as it would 
provide him opportunities to gain some management experience and above all to expand his 
social network. According to him, it took him and his fellow leaders quite some time to fully 
realize the financial and legal implications of this new management arrangement between 
CNA and the association. As they had no idea about the actual cost of managing the system, 
they simply accepted the 'negotiated' high percentage of almost 27 percent of the total fee 
collection that the WUA had to pay to CNA; which they later regretted. On the other hand, the 
president is very positive about the way CNA helped them to get started with the new WUA 
and to manage the system. He was impressed with CNA when the agency offered them the 
keys of the heavy machinery, even though much of the machinery was in total disrepair. 
The story of the first treasurer (and later president during the second administration) of 
the WUA draws a similar picture of the transfer process in Cortázar. Like the ejidatario that 
became the first president, the treasurer first learnt about the IMT program in the meeting that 
was called by CNA. Being a large export-oriented private grower, with 25 years of farming 
experience in the United States, he is a well known and respected person within the entire 
district. He cultivates more than 500 hectares of land, not only in Cortázar but also in other 
module areas and even in other States. In addition, he owns a bull farm, with more than 300 
bulls, and he is a leading person in one of the producers cooperative in the city of Salamanca. 
When CNA told them to nominate candidates to represent the group of private growers in the 
new WUA, he was elected unanimously. Other private growers thought he was the ideal 
candidate because of his extensive business oriented experience, management skills and 
important networks. Furthermore, initially hardly any other private grower was interested in 
the IMT program (which is geared at managing canal water) as for irrigation most of them 
rely on their own private deep tubewells. So there were simply not enough candidates that 
were interested in representing the group of private growers within the new association. 
Although he was used to administer financial and commercial matters, he noted that also 
he lacked the experience of managing an irrigation system. When he started as a treasurer he 
found it difficult to assess the actual costs associated with operating and maintaining canals 
and other irrigation facilities. Which, according to him, is the reason why initially he also 
accepted the agreement to transfer 27 percent of revenue from their fee collection to CNA. 
Only after having managed the system for two or three years he started to realize that this 
percentage did not reflect the actual cost of managing the main system and the district 
headworks. At this point he started to openly discuss the possibility of taking over O&M 
responsibilities for managing the main canal from CNA as well. 
The creation of the LRS 
Uilike the establishment of the WUAs, the creation of the LRS in 1997 was a process which 
was greatly determined by the water users themselves. Creation of LRSs was already planned 
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to happen under the second phase of the EVIT program but in the case of ARLJD, leaders of 
most WUAs played a very active role themselves. Only WUAs that pay a relatively low 
percentage of their income to CNA initially resisted to the idea of federating the WUAs into a 
LRS, as they were afraid that this would increase their financial contribution to managing the 
main system. Yet, the majority of the WUAs liked the idea of a LRS for five reasons: 
1. As noted by the first treasurer of Cortazar WUA, after a few years of management 
experience the WUAs got a better feel for the actual costs related to managing a system 
and they realized that it could be done at much lower costs than what they were paying 
CNA. This idea was supported by the National Association of Water Users (ANUR), 
whose number one priority at that time was to try to reduce the overall financial 
contribution of WUAs to CNA 2 0 . 
2. Although WUAs were transferring large amounts of their income to CNA, they felt that 
they did not receive the kind of O&M service they had paid for. WUAs were particularly 
concerned by the lack of maintenance in the main canals and in fact had started to clean 
some sections of those canals themselves (see chapter 9). 
3. Irrespective of the large reductions in CNA staff already made, leaders and technical staff 
of WUAs felt that CNA was still employing too many redundant staff, particularly in the 
CNA field (or unit) offices. They felt that their financial contributions to CNA only 
served to keep this staff in their positions. 
4. Particularly leaders from Cortazar and Valle felt that once they had created a LRS, it 
would be easier to get access to all kinds of externally funded system improvement 
programs. More importantly, they had experienced that so far they had not had any 
control over the cost and quality of the works as they were not involved for instance in 
selecting the companies to whom the contracts were granted. 
5. Leaders from business oriented WUAs like Cortazar, Valle, Jaral and Salamanca felt that 
once the LRS was created it would be easier to also establish sideline companies that deal 
with the bulk marketing of seeds and agro-chemicals and to construct a storehouse for 
their own produce. 
During the course of 1996, the idea of creating a LRS was heavily discussed, not only in 
meetings of the hydraulic committee but also at regional and national seminars and workshops 
on irrigation related issues. The idea was further openly supported by the then Secretary of 
Agriculture to the State of Guanajuato (who runs a large commercial farm in Cortazar 
module) as well as by the then Governor of Guanajuato, a member of the center-right 
opposition Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and advocate of neoliberal agrarian reforms 2 1. The 
idea also received a positive response from both the CNA State office of Guanajuato and the 
head of the district in Celaya. Although the latter person would lose most of his staff (see 
below) as a result of this development, he accepted it as part of the official IMT program 
strategy and never argued against it in public. 
The most important discussion held, not only between the LRS and CNA but also among 
the individual WUAs, was the level and distribution of financial contribution by WUAs to 
both the LRS itself and CNA. As to the height of the contribution: it became clear that CNA 
would receive much less as it would only continue to be responsible for managing the 
headworks and dams. Furthermore, unlike the existing arrangement between CNA and the 
WUAs in which the percentage of contribution differed from WUAs to WUAs 2 2 , leaders now 
argued that all WUAs equally benefit from O&M of the district head works and hence would 
pay an equal percentage of their fee collection to CNA. This percentage was negotiated at 9.5 
percent, down from for instance 28 percent in the case of Valle and 11 percent in the case of 
Salvatierra. 
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In addition to having to contribute to CNA's costs of managing the headworks, the 
WUAs also had to pay the LRS for managing the main canals 2 3. Those leaders that had 
actively advocated and initiated the creation of the LRS argued that all WUAs would have to 
pay an equal percentage of their revenue to the LRS. However, as this would imply that some 
WUAs would see their total contribution be reduced by half and others would have to accept a 
100 percent increase, it was decided to initially differentiate between the WUAs. All WUAs 
have started to pay the LRS the difference between the 9.5 percent for CNA and then-
previous overall contribution to CNA. In that sense, the creation of the LRS has become cost 
neutral for all WUAs. However, the main target of the LRS is to use this income more 
eifectively by considerably increasing the quality of O&M services at the level of the main 
cjinals. 
Conclusions 
With the introduction of the IMT program in the early years of the 1990s, the Mexican 
government started a very ambitious policy reform program, aiming at a rather dramatic 
change in the institutional set-up of irrigation management in Mexico. This program has been 
applauded worldwide, mainly because of its high pace of implementation and the fact that 
more than 90 percent of the irrigated area under agency management has now been 
transferred to newly created local user associations. As a result, by the end of 1998 new 
WUAs were established in 77 of the 81 large-scale irrigation districts in the country (Ramos-
VJaldés et al. 1999). 
Irrespective of the effectiveness and the viability of these reforms, it is worth 
summarizing the conditions that made the implementation of the new WUAs for the provision 
of irrigation services possible on such a large scale in a relatively short period of less than 10 
years: 
it was part of a much wider set of similar neoliberal policy reforms; 
it received the political commitment at the highest policy level to reduce redundant 
agency staff; 
it was accompanied with a new water law, that defined property rights over water and 
provided the new service organizations with clear rights and responsibilities; 
it was built around clearly defined boundaries; 
it was developed on already existing strong institutional and ideological basis for user 
representation in the new organizations; 
it was clear about its financial targets: total cost recovery from the users as well as 
financial autonomy of the service organizations; 
it was clear about the extent and content of arrangements of co-management during the 
transition phase from agency management to user management; 
it received the political support from large groups of economical powerful farmers; 
it was established at a relatively low cost; 
it was made possible through extensive promotion and training campaigns. 
The above constitutional revisions and implementation strategies have certainly 
supported the adoption of IMT on part of the local users. On the other hand, one has to realize 
that the water users were left without a choice. The government was firmly committed to 
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reducing its role in the provision of irrigation services. Furthermore, the government 
succeeded in convincing large groups of farmers that users themselves could probably do a 
better O&M job than the government, at a lower cost. This made users realize that there was 
not going to be a way back. This in part explains the relatively low level of farmer resistance 
to these reforms. However, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters, of equal 
importance has been the fact that the supportive attitude chosen by CNA to implement IMT in 
the way as it was described in this chapter. They provided the kind of credibility and 
institutional flexibility to jointly start the process of creating mechanisms of accountability. It 
will be demonstrated that these mechanisms are important to make the newly introduced 
institutional design principles work, rather than the implementation of the principles itself. 
Notes 
1. Unfortunately, I do not have post-1994 staff numbers for all districts. See table 6.4 in chapter 6, 
for changes in staff numbers in ARLID. 
2. The most commonly found way of fee setting is a fee per hectare per irrigation turn, irrespective 
of the crop that a fanner grows. However, differentiation of fees per crop also exist. Generally 
farmers pay per irrigation delivery (normally with planned water depths per turn; hence indirectly 
a volumetric payment per hectare). However, in some districts farmers pay a seasonal flat fee, 
irrespective whether they receive water at all or the number of deliveries. 
3. So far, Limited Responsibility Societies have been created in nine of the eighty irrigation 
districts, including ALRID in February 1997. 
4. The first districts that were transferred were Culiacan-Humaya (1990-92), Rio Mayo (1991), Rio 
Fuerte (1992) and Rio Yaqui (1991-92) in the North-east and Delicias (1991-92) in the North 
(CNA 1994). 
5. In comparison, institutional development costs of the participatory irrigation programs in the 
Philippines totaled US$ 25 per hectare, or 3 percent of the construction costs (Meinzen-Dick et al. 
1995). 
6. Meinzen-Dick et al. (1995:13) mention that these campaigns were coordinated by communication 
specialists from FAO. However, as far as I know CNA and FAO never came to an agreement on 
this and consequently the promotion campaigns were coordinated by IMTA. For these promotion 
campaigns IMTA produced a number of videos (of which several scenes were shot in ARLID) on 
the preliminary results of the IMT program. 
7. Among the few issues that were actually discussed in the House of Representatives, was to what 
extent the State could allow private initiative in the construction and use of government 
infrastructural facilities. However, the consensus of these discussions seemed to be that the time 
of paternalistic State control over irrigation facilities was over, and that a thorough revision of the 
existing water law would help to tune irrigation development policies to other process of 
liberalization and privatization (Ramos-Osorio 1999). 
8. Ley de Aguas Nacionales, article 50-1. 
9. In legal terminology, WUAs are referred to as Civil Associations. In order to exempt civil 
associations that operate and maintain irrigation systems from paying income taxes over their fee 
collection, the Value Added Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto Sobre la Renta) had to be modified 
(Palacios-Velez 1994). 
10. Ley de Aguas Nacionales, article 50-11. 
11. Ley de Aguas Nacionales, articles 64 and 65. 
12. Ley de Aguas Nacionales, article 51. 
13. Ley de Aguas Nacionales, articles 3 0 and 31. 
14. Ley de Aguas Nacionales, article 24. 
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The National Water Law is subject to a number of laws that regulate federal property rights. 
These laws include the Contribution to Improvements of Public Works for Federal Hydraulic 
Infrastructure Law (Ley de Contribuciones de Mejoras para Obras Públicas de Infraestructura 
Hidráulica Federal) and the Federal Rights Law (Ley de Derechos Federales) (Roemer 1997). 
16¡. The same concept of co-existence between legal construction of State and other formal legislative 
law and customary, often community based, people's law is dealt with in-depth in the legal 
pluralism literature (for theoretical overviews of this literature, see von Benda-Beckmann 1992 
and von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1998; for the application of the concept of interaction between 
relevant legal frameworks in irrigation management, see de Jong 1989 and Spiertz 1992). A 
somewhat different piece of literature on legal pluralism in water management is chapter 6 in 
Maass and Anderson (1978). Rather than showing how state and people's law co-exist, they 
provide a fascinating case how the new system of prior appropriation derogated the generally 
accepted common law. 
17|. In February 1997 the LRS was created, which federates the 11 WUAs of ARLID. As the 
operation of the LRS became only effective in early 1998, its performance is not described in this 
thesis. 
18. According to their bylaws, the general assemblies should meet at least once every two months. 
19. For reason of clarity, in Figure 4.4 only two instead of 11 WUAs are included. This is only to 
emphasize that relationships also exist between two or more WUAs. 
2(}. The National Association of Water Users (Association National de Usuarios de Riego, ANUR) 
was initiated in 1994 as a result of the First International Seminar on Transfer of Irrigation 
Districts (held in Cd. Obregón) and federates all Mexican WUAs. The association's objectives 
include the promotion of and gaining access to system improvement projects, training, studies, 
legal and financial assistance for all WUAs and LRSs. In that sense it works in close 
collaboration with CNA and IMTA, but it certainly also has it own policy agenda. Reducing the 
financial contributions of WUAs to CNA ranks very high on this agenda. Other issues for 
discussion and negotiation that are promoted by ANUR include the share between WUAs and the 
government for system improvement and rehabilitation works and the creation of a nation wide 
contingency fund to help WUAs that are affected by sudden droughts (and hence have no income 
from irrigation fee revenues). 
21. See also note 4, chapter 3. 
22 . CNA's argument to differentiate in the percentages of total fee collection that WUAs have to pay 
to the agency, is that WUAs do not make equal use of the main systems. WUAs like Salvatierra 
that hardly make use of the main system infrastructure would contribute less than a WUA like 
Cortázar, which is served by 72 kilometers of main canal. Although this argument was accepted 
by the WUAs when they signed the concessions in 1992, by comparing percentages and length of 
main canals they later found out that their was not a clear correlation between the two. This made 
them very suspicious about the level and fairness of contribution they had to pay. 
23|. The LRS had to hire its own technical and administrative staff. However, due to severe droughts 
dams remained closed during 1997-98 the winter season, which was going to be the first season 
of self-management by the LRS. As a result, except for hiring a general manager (a former CNA 
engineer) and a head of operations, the hiring of other staff was postponed until the 1998 summer 
season. By that time all field activities for this study had already ended and no further 
observations on the actual performance of the LRS could be made. 
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5 Formal arrangements and practices of operation and maintenance 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the official post-transfer arrangements for O&M 
in ARLLD, the actual irrigation practices, and outputs of these practices in terms of relative 
water supply, equity and land and water productivity1. The aim of this chapter is to assess 
how irrigation managers (from both the irrigation agency and the WUAs) and users cope with 
the new arrangement for allocating, distributing and using water. It shows how and why the 
practices of coping with these arrangements sometimes differ from the institutional design 
principles. An important argument that can be made here is that eventually viability of 
institutional arrangements for O&M is more influenced by the way local irrigation managers 
and users jointly choose their strategies to work with these arrangements, rather than by 
fcflowing the design principles of these arrangements. It helps managers and users to jointly 
create operational accountability. 
A second aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed analysis of how local irrigation 
nianagers and water users use their water in the context of both relative water scarcity (see 
chapter 2) and the market-oriented aim of policy makers to motivate farmers to maximize the 
economic outputs per unit of water and land. The latter has become particularly relevant as 
more and more state subsidies that support the production of 'low value' food crops have 
been dismantled (see chapter 3). 
.2 Institutional design principles for water management 
FORMAL WATER ALLOCATION, DISTRIBUTION, AND SCHEDULING PRINCIPLES 
Between modules 
In ARLLTJ, water allocation between modules is based on three principles, defined in the 
C&M manual. First, pre-seasonal allocation takes place at the beginning of each agricultural 
year (November). CNA determines the water availability in the four reservoirs serving the 
district and present these results to the hydraulic committee. Following the O&M manual, 
each module is concessioned a percentage of the available volume in the reservoirs. These 
concessions are in proportion to areas with surface water rights in each module, and are 
irrespective of the actual area irrigated, or the crops grown. The actually yearly concessioned 
volumes should be delivered at the intake of each module and hence do not include main 
canal conveyance losses between the dam and the module intake. The concessions are given 
in table 5.1. 
CHAPTER 5 
Table 5.1 Concessions (in percentage of available dam storage) often modules in ARIJD 
Head-end modules Middle-reach modules1 Tail-end modules 
Acámbaro 8.4% Cortázar 17.5% Abasólo and 
Salvatierra 16.4% Salamanca 15.0% Corralejo2 14.2% 
Jaral 6.2% Irapuato 5.9% Huanímaro 3.7% 
Valle 12.6% 
Notes: 1 Purísima could also be regarded as middle-reach module, but as it has its own dam it is 
excluded here. 2 Abasólo and Corralejo share the same intake and hence are taken together. 
Based on these concessions and the water availability at the start of the agricultural year, 
the hydraulic committee makes the annual plan of how much volume will be allocated to each 
module. These planned volumes can differ slightly from the concessioned percentage as every 
year these volumes are adjusted for under-usage or over-usage of water by the WUA in the 
previous year. Furthermore, as will be discussed in chapter 8, water can be traded between 
WUAs. If this occurs at the start of the agricultural year, these traded volumes can be 
included in the plan. 
Second, normally the full command area of each module can be irrigated. However, in 
times of water scarcity, the total area to be irrigated is determined by negotiation between 
CNA and the WUAs in the hydraulic committee. This varies from module to module and is 
basically determined by physical characteristics of the module, the patterns of land 
distribution, experiences with past cropping patterns, and farmer's crop preferences. For 
example, in years of water scarcity a module with an average land holding of 8 hectares might 
decide to restrict irrigation to a maximum of 5 hectares per user (irrespective of the total 
holding a farmer has), whereas a module with an average holding of 4 hectares might decide 
to limit irrigation to a maximum of 2.5 hectares per user. Such restrictions were made in the 
1996-97 agricultural year, when for instance irrigation in Salvatierra was restricted to 2.5 
hectares per user, whereas in Cortazar the restriction was 5 hectares. The restriction was 
decided upon by the individual general assemblies of each WUA and approved by the 
hydraulic committee at the start of that particular agricultural year. Enforcement of area 
restriction is not the only cause for not irrigating the entire command area. Farmers can also 
deliberately decide to irrigate less land than they are entitled to. 
Third, the hydraulic committee also decides on the number of irrigation turns that can be 
delivered to each module, the start and the end of each irrigation period, and whether 
irrigation will be provided during both winter and summer seasons. Generally, this decision 
counts for all modules as CNA is reluctant to open the dams to deliver water to only a few 
modules as this would mean considerable conveyance losses in the main system. In years of 
normal water availability, four irrigation turns per user can be delivered during the dry winter 
season. Farmers can even receive a fifth turn at the end of the dry winter season if there is 
sufficient water left for the following wet season. Also, under normal conditions of water 
availability, two irrigation turns are delivered at the start of the summer season in April or 
May. However, deviations from this principle occur, normally in combination with area 
restrictions. For example, also for the agricultural year of 1996-97, the hydraulic committee 
decided to restrict deliveries to no more than 4 irrigations during the winter season and only 
one turn at the start of the summer rainy season up and above area restrictions2. 
The WUAs (and previously CNA) make suggestions but do not enforce the cultivation of 
particular crops. Farmers can cultivate whatever crop they like to grow provided that the 
growing stages coincide with the general seasonal irrigation schedule, which normally has 
one or two closing weeks of each distributary canal between the subsequent turns (see below). 
In addition, many farmers have access to groundwater (either through ownership of a private 
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well, or though rental of water from private or public wells, or both), which makes it possible 
for those farmers to grow crops that require more flexible irrigation scheduling. This explains 
the high diversity in cropping patterns described in chapter 9. Occasionally one can observe 
posters in the offices of the WUAs that advise (but do not prohibit) farmers not to grow a 
particular crop. However, in those cases this is always related to the occurrence of pests or 
diseases, or to expected low market prices for the produce. 
Within modules 
Tiie method of water control within the modules can be classified as arranged demand, with 
restrictions on the number and duration of deliveries. In-seasonal allocation rules within 
modules are based on four principles. First, a farmer cannot receive more turns than the 
maximum number of irrigations allocated to the module. Exceptions are made for farmers 
who grow crops like beans that require more frequent irrigation turns, but only if this extra 
irrigation falls within an irrigation period determined by the third allocation rule mentioned 
above. Second, each farmer can grow any crop he or she wants to grow. Third, farmers cannot 
request water for more than the area registered in their names. In case the hydraulic 
committee decides that less than the full command of the module can be irrigated, the WUA 
decides on the maximum area that can be irrigated by a farmer. Finally, the maximum volume 
o:7 water a farmer can receive is determined by the WUA, based on a theoretical or planned 
water depth per irrigation. Generally, the WUA does not distinguish between water 
requirements of different crops, but plans with delivering flat water depths across its farmers, 
irrespective of the crops these farmers grow. 
Scheduling 
Based on the total number of turns requested and the planned water depth, the WUA 
calculates the total volume of water requested for the week. The weekly requests are 
communicated to CNA for scheduling deliveries to the modules. Everyday CNA and WUA 
slaff check at the module intake whether requested volumes are actually delivered. Water 
distribution between the secondary canals or laterals within a module is based on the same 
airanged scheduling. For each canal the total volume requested is calculated, and gates are set 
accordingly. Unlike what is practiced at the head intake point of the module, volumes that 
enter the secondary canals are not measured, but are estimated and reported by ditch tenders 
based on their experiences and strategies (see section 5.5). 
OPERATIONAL TARGETS AND MONITORING 
Explicit management targets do not exist for ARLJD. However, my own interpretation of the 
system operation manual, interviews with system managers and daily observations of 
irrigation management practices reveal that CNA and the WUAs share a consensus about 
meeting the following six management targets: 
WUAs get the seasonal volume of water they have been allocated at the start of the 
agricultural year; 
WUAs do not irrigate an area that exceeds the planned area; 
WUAs receive the weekly scheduled volume of water they have requested for at the start 
of each week; 
farmers receive the number of turns they are entitled to, have requested, and have paid for; 
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• farmers receive sufficient water to irrigate the area that they are entitled to irrigate; 
• O&M costs should be fully recovered from the farmers. 
System managers of both CNA and the WUAs use several techniques to monitor whether 
these targets are met, at field, module, and district levels. 
At the field level, ditch tenders report daily to their WUA how many farmers did receive 
water, for how much area, and for which crop. At the end of each day, ditch tenders meet at 
the module office to check whether their reports correspond with the weekly schedule. An 
estimate of the volumes delivered to each farmer is also reported. These reports are 
aggregated for the entire module, and are sent to the CNA district office weekly. 
At the module level, daily measurements are taken at the head of the main canal, as well 
as at a small number of other hydrological control points. Daily reports mention both planned 
and actual volumes. They carry signatures of both the CNA official responsible for deliveries 
to (a group of) modules and of a technical staff member of the WUA. This is generally the 
head of ditch tenders or sometimes the general module manager. A weekly report that totals 
daily volumes is sent to the CNA district office. 
At the district level, CNA aggregates the reported volumes, irrigated areas and crops, and 
produces monthly reports, which are presented and discussed at the hydraulic committee 
meeting. Furthermore, as farmers have to pay prior to each irrigation turn they receive, WUAs 
are able to keep good track of the total amount of fees paid by farmers. At the end of each 
season, the WUAs report their total fee collection to CNA. As the seasonal plan defines the 
total area to be irrigated as well as the number of turns to be delivered, it is easy to calculate 
the total planned fee collection, and to monitor whether actual collection follows planned 
collection. 
It is the legal obligation3 of the CNA to collect information from the WUAs that detail 
the irrigation operation, maintenance and financial plans and their budgets as well as the 
monthly progress of these plans and budgets in terms of area cropped, the cropping pattern, 
the volumes actually delivered and the average yields per crop 4. CNA has handed out 
standard formats to the WUAs, which they can use for their progress reports. Although some 
WUAs have made slight modifications to these formats, all associations continue to use them. 
It is the task of the CNA chiefs of operation and maintenance (district level) to see that all 
WUAs submit their reports in time. At the start of the season, each district office has to send 
to CNA headquarters in Mexico City the O&M and financial targets for the entire agricultural 
year. At the end of the season, the district office aggregates all information obtained from the 
WUAs plus their own information on main system and dam management and produce 
seasonal reports which they need to send to CNA headquarters. Subsequently, CNA 
headquarters closely monitors whether at the district level operational, maintenance and 
financial targets were met. 
Although the described activities should be sufficient to monitor daily, weekly, monthly, 
and seasonal performance relative to the six targets mentioned above, a few practices limit 
this. First, ditch tenders' reports form the basis for most of the data reported to both the 
modules and the CNA district office. As will be demonstrated in the following section, these 
flow estimates are often inaccurate and unreliable. Second, monitoring of daily and weekly 
water deliveries are based on aggregated field reports. Rather than making real measurements 
at the canal level (except for the head of the main canal), conveyance and distribution 
efficiency rates are applied to these aggregated field level volumes to obtain 'gross' volumes 
at canal intakes. However, it is not clear where these efficiencies rates are derived from. 
Although CNA and others periodically measure canal losses, this is normally only done for 
isolated studies in a very small number of canals. As a consequence it is not clear how close 
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these efficiency and loss rates are to real values, nor to what extent historical changes in 
efficiencies that result from canal improvements or deterioration are accounted for5. Even 
though all WUAs use computers, aggregation of field-level data takes much time. As a 
consequence, the production of weekly, monthly, and seasonal reports takes a long time, and 
these reports hardly serve as decision support tools to take immediate managerial action when 
needed. 
5.3 Arrangements for system maintenance 
Compared to problems related to system operations, the decision making process of 
maintenance planning, budgeting and priority setting receive very little attention in the 
literature of Mexican irrigation. Documentation of examples that show the impact of 
management transfer on maintenance practices and results are even more scarce 6 . This lack 
of attention is not justified by the importance of maintenance to the WUAs, who also had to 
ta le over responsibility for maintaining secondary canals and drains with their structures. 
As will be demonstrated in chapter 9, approximately 60 percent of the entire O&M 
budget is supposed to be spent on system maintenance activities. However, both before and 
after transfer neither CNA nor the WUAs use a well tested and standardized methodology of 
irrigation asset management7. Yet, CNA wants all WUAs to follow this "60 percent rule". 
Before management transfer 
Before management transfer, all maintenance was done by the CNA in Celaya. Before 
management transfer, most maintenance was done at the level of the main system, dams and 
other headworks, resulting in a neglect of the secondary canals and particularly of the drains. 
Maintenance activities at these levels were executed by the maintenance department of the 
CNA office. They were organized around a cluster of irrigation units (similar to the present 
modules) rather than for each individual unit within the district. This facilitated the movement 
of heavy machinery within this cluster of units as to the urgency of maintenance requirements 
within a relatively large geographical area 8. Farmers were only responsible for cleaning their 
fiejld ditches. This cleaning had to be finished before the start of the first irrigation turn. 
CNA followed a top-down approach in developing their maintenance program. 
Maintenance priority setting was mainly based on the judgments of the head of the 
maintenance department, rather than on a methodology that identified the hydraulic 
importance of a structure or canal stretch, their structural and functional conditions and the 
consequent effects of deterioration on hydraulic and agricultural performance. Although the 
head of maintenance was accountable to the district's chief engineer, he was virtually the only 
person to decide on the annual and day-to-day maintenance programs and the priority setting 
within these programs. For the development of the maintenance program he used three sets of 
information. 
First, he evaluated the maintenance program of the previous year. This gave him an idea 
of both the kind of routine activities that had to take place and the kind of works that could 
not be done in the previous year and should be included in the present year's program. 
Second, he made an estimate of the O&M budget that he might receive from CNA central 
office in Mexico City. By experience he knew that the budget that he had submitted to 
Mexico City (which is based on real needs) would be less than the actual funds he would 
receive. This indicates the strong influence and control the central office maintained. The 
submitted maintenance budget was calculated using standard cost units for each maintenance 
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item, per m , canal surface or canal length. Third, to be able to make these calculation in 
addition to the routine activities the information from field officers on the need for any 
additional urgent (non-routine) maintenance activity that to his judgment had to take place 
was crucial. He clearly considered the suggestions provided by the head of the irrigation units 
within the district, who in turn received information from the CNA-employed ditch tenders. 
These field officers needed to report daily to the head of the maintenance department on 
any kind of necessary maintenance work as well as on the progress of the works that were 
executed. In some cases the ditch tenders received complaints and suggestions from farmers. 
Because of both the difference in political and social status between the farmers and the CNA 
engineers in Celaya and the long distances farmers had to travel to the CNA office in Celaya, 
few water users went directly to see the district chief or head of the maintenance department. 
As a result, farmers' complaints or suggestions about maintenance requirements always had 
to travel the bureaucratic route via the ditch tenders and heads of irrigation units and were 
filtered accordingly. Whether the ditch tender regarded a fanner complaint to be relevant or 
justified to be reported depended a lot on the economic and political position of this farmer 
and on his relationship with the ditch tender. Interviews with farmers revealed that there was 
a lot of 'favoritism' on the side of the CNA technical staff, favoring private growers and large 
landowners. 
One of the most important consequences of the kind of neglect of maintenance from the 
part of the CNA (particularly at lower system levels) was that farmers had completely lost 
their confidence in CNA as being a reliable organization that can solve their maintenance 
problems. As a result, farmers were forced to solve the most critical problems themselves. 
There are numerous reports from fanners who claim that they did most of the desilting of the 
secondary canals themselves, sometimes in organized small work parties (faenas) with fellow 
ejidatarios along the same canal or even neighboring ejidos, but often individually as well. In 
most of these cases farmers had not even tried to have CNA involved as experience had 
taught that attempts to get access to for instance heavy CNA machinery generally remained 
fruitless. Whereas farmers were actively involved in desilting and weeding of the secondary 
canal systems, the drains generally remained untouched. Consequently, some of the drains in 
ARLID had not been cleaned for more than 15 years, causing problems of water logging in 
for instance parts of Salvatierra module. 
The poor performance of maintenance by CNA provoked another important reaction. 
Among the most important reasons why farmers accepted the conditions for management 
transfer so easily (see chapter 4), was that many users saw management transfer as a way out 
of the maintenance trap. Although they did not have hands-on experience with developing 
maintenance programs and budgets, they simply suspected that farmers themselves could do a 
much better maintenance job than CNA. 
During management transfer 
CNA and the WUAs agreed to work in a collaborative mode for at least 6 months from the 
time of transfer so that the new WUAs could gain experience with maintenance before they 
were left on their own. One of the preconditions for transfer was that CNA should grant 
concessions to the WUAs to use almost all of its heavy machinery, such as draglines and 
hydraulic excavators. In total, 25 pieces of equipment (including some relatively new pieces), 
with a total estimated value of 1.7 million US dollars, have been transferred to the WUAs in 
ARLID. However, some of this machinery was in severe disrepair and WUAs felt that 
maintenance of this machinery would cost them more than buying new equipment. As a 
consequence, during the period December 1992 to July 1995, the WUAs bought 29 pieces of 
heavy machinery. These were paid for out of fees collected from the users. In addition, three 
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WUAs received new equipment, such as trucks and laser equipment for land leveling, as part 
of a World Bank assisted program for on-farm water management improvement (PRODEP). 
This brings the total of number of heavy machinery currently used by the WUAs to 
approximately 60. However, the distribution of these among the WUAs are rather unequal: 
Cortázar has about 10 machines whereas La Purísima only has one excavator. Consequently, 
some WUAs need to borrow machinery from others. So far, WUAs have not asked high rental 
prices when they rent out their machinery to other association (and occasionally to CNA as 
well). The borrower only covers the operational expenses (fuel, and sometimes an operator) 
and do not contribute to the depreciation costs. On the other hand, those who borrow 
machinery are totally dependent on the availability of the machinery, which particularly is 
very limited during the two months before the start of the season when all WUAs maintain 
their irrigation networks. 
After management transfer 
Since transfer, the WUAs have been responsible for maintenance of the entire secondary 
system (distributary canals, drains and structures). Each WUA has employed specialized 
maintenance staff, who are directly controlled by the general managers of these associations. 
Normally, the general manager develops the maintenance program for the entire year, 
including the budget, in October. At the start of the season this plan has first to be approved 
by the general assembly of the association. The proposed maintenance programs rarely 
provoke critical questions from the farmer representatives to the assembly. Although the 
WUAs are financially responsible for all maintenance, once the assembly has approved the 
program, WUAs still have to submit their maintenance budgets, as well as the monthly 
progress reports (of planned and actually executed maintenance activities) and the associated 
financial statements to the CNA office in Celaya for comments and approval. 
The district chief engineer and his head of the maintenance department make a personal 
judgment on whether the proposed activities are relevant and whether they can be executed 
within the proposed budget. If necessary they recommend some modification to the planned 
activities. However, interviews with managers and leaders of all eleven WUAs showed that in 
practice CNA accepts the proposals without providing any comments. Furthermore, CNA has 
employed three technicians who should run the canals of all modules and check whether the 
proposed activities have actually been executed. However, I never came across these people 
in the field and also the WUAs report that such field inspections by CNA do not take place. 
On the other hand, the district chief and his heads of maintenance and operations do make 
frequent field trips to the module areas to attend all kinds of requests from the WUAs as well 
as to check whether contract works along the main canals take place in a proper way. During 
these trips they also make general observations on the condition of the infrastructure that is 
maintained by the WUAs. However, they do not systematically keep records of these 
observations. 
As to approving the maintenance budget, CNA also sees whether approximately 60 
percent of the expected income from fee collection is proposed to be spent on maintenance. 
However, as is demonstrated below, actual expenditures deviate considerably from the 
planned budget. Although CNA can easily monitor these actual expenditures by means of the 
monthly progress reports that the WUAs need to submit, they hardly do so. It was observed 
that their only concern with the progress reports is that these are submitted in time. Once 
sujmitted, they are not used to advise WUAs on how to better set priorities and execute the 
maintenance activities. 
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Figure 5.1 The post-transfer maintenance planning cycle 
Farmer 
observations/complaint 
List of needs, prepared 
by ditch tenders for each 
section of the module 
Ditch tenders' 
own inspection 
Field inspection by 
module manager / head 
of ditch tenders 
Define priority order: 
a) by section 
b) for complete module 
Determine expected 
volume of water 
available and hence the 
expected income to 
module 
w 
r 
Present preliminary 
maintenance plan (incl. 
budget) to CNA in Celaya 
Make "adjustments" to 
plan and implement 
I 
Present monthly progress 
reports to CNA 
Source: IWMI-HR Wallingford training workshop on priority setting in maintenance, Irapuato, May 
1998. 
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After four to five years of experience with executing maintenance programs, some WUAs 
staked to realize that they should use a better system to set priorities for the kind of 
maintenance works that have to take place within the given and often limited budget 9. So far, 
all WUAs have basically followed the same method of ad hoc maintenance, which they 
ini erited from CNA. However, as is shown in figure 5.1 there are differences. 
The main difference now is that the administrative lines between those who make fields 
observations on maintenance needs, and those who are responsible for carrying out 
maintenance works, are much shorter. Each ditch tender now makes his own list with 
maintenance needs. This list is based on his own observations as well as on complaints and 
reports he receives from farmers. Every week, during a meeting with his colleagues, the ditch 
tender submits this list to the general manager of the WUA. This manager prepares a program 
based on priorities set for each section within the module as well as for the entire module. The 
way these priorities are set do not differ from the way the CNA head of the maintenance 
department used to do it before IMT. 
Another major difference between pre- and post-transfer maintenance procedures is, that 
aftbr transfer users visit the office more frequently to report maintenance problems directly to 
the: WUA's manager or to board members. As a result, priority setting is currently more 
influenced by mechanisms of favoritism, particularly in those cases where farmers maintain 
good personal relationships with the president and the general manager of the WUA. 
4 Actual water allocation between modules 
In the previous section, the official arrangement for water allocations and distribution 
between and within the modules were described. In the chapters that follow, several accounts 
will be given on how these arrangements have changed historically as a consequence of 
irrigation management transfer, the new water law and the development of water trading 
between WUAs. However, in order to better understand how in practice water is allocated, 
distributed and used under the current arrangements and water availability, some detailed 
examples of daily water use practices in pre-selected canals and fields in Cortázar and 
Salvatierra are given in this section. The basis of this analysis are the twice daily flow 
measurements and observations during the 1995-96 winter season and 1996 summer season 1 0. 
The examples compare actual flow measurements and operational targets with reported and 
planned values by the WUAs and hence follow the evaluation approach which uses the 
internal operations indicators as explained in section 1.6 
Similar to others years since management transfer, also the 1995-96 agricultural year 
started with a meeting of the hydraulic committee. In this meeting a first assessment of actual 
dam storage was presented by CNA to the other members of the committee. In November 
1995, the gross storage in the four reservoirs supplying the district was 1,118 Mm 3 , of which 
approximately 742 Mm 3 were assigned to irrigation . This gross storage was the seventh 
lowest level recorded but yet slightly above the average of the series of 15 years reported in 
chapter 9 while the volume assigned to irrigation was 73 Mm 3 less than the 30 years annual 
average of 815 MmVyear available for the district. The hydraulic committee decided that this 
volume was sufficient to supply five irrigation turns to each farmer: four for irrigation of 
winter wheat, and a single irrigation for summer sorghum. As this suggestion followed the 
usual pattern (i.e. no crop or area restrictions were enforced), all WUAs agreed to it. 
Based on the available storage, the WUAs were given a volumetric concession for the 
eritire year following the percentages given in table 5.1. Once the volumes were determined, 
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they were published in the local newspapers by means of a statement signed by CNA, the 
Secretary of Agriculture of the State of Guanajuato, as well as by the presidents of all eleven 
WUAs. Irrigation of the winter crop started in the second week of December 1995. To assess 
whether at the end of the season the WUAs and CNA were able to follow this plan, a 
comparison is made between concessioned volumes and actually supplied volumes during 
both the winter and the summer season of that year (table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 The distribution of concessioned, planned and actual volumes between the 
modules of ARI ID for the agricultural year 1995-96 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Module Water Planned Actual volume supplied to irrigated area Actual/ Actual/ 
concession volume Winter Summer Total Total as % of total Planned Concess. 
(% of total water) (Mm3) (mm) (mm) (mm) (Mm3) actual supply % % 
Head 
Acámbaro 8 67.8 1895 168 2063 62.9 8 93 97 
Salvatierra 16 125.7 1846 310 2156 145.9 19 116 115 
Jaral 6 43.3 1239 267 1506 49.7 6 115 103 
Valle 13 99.2 865 259 1124 90.1 12 91 91 
Middle 
Cortázar 17 133.3 1013 291 1304 132.9 17 100 98 
Salamanca 15 90.1 794 212 1006 95.2 12 106 82 
Irapuato 6 44.8 1065 282 1347 47.1 6 105 103 
Tail 
Abasólo and 
Corralejo 
14 111.2 na na na 118.3 15 106 108 
Huanímaro 4 26.4 na na na 30.5 4 116 107 
Total 100 741.8 772.5 100 
Average 1245 256 1501 105 101 
CV 451 49 446 9 10 
Note: na = not available as precise data on actually irrigated area could not be obtained. 
The average annual irrigation application was 1,500 mm/year; however, the recorded 
irrigation depths in the winter season show a marked variation between the modules, with for 
instance 1,895 mm/year of irrigation per hectare actually cropped in Acambaro and only 794 
mm/year in Salamanca. The explanation for this variation is that once the total volumes 
assigned to each module are determined, the WUAs can decide individually how they want 
use the water. A WUA can either try to irrigate its entire command by allowing each farmer to 
irrigate all of his land within the module area, or it can aim at reducing the total area actually 
irrigated by applying higher water depths on each hectare that is irrigated. WUAs of modules 
with higher apparent water depths opted to crop a reduced area, resulting in lower irrigation 
intensities for the winter season, ranging from 42 percent in Acambaro to 91 percent in Valle. 
Despite the differences in irrigation application strategies, overall the actual water 
volume supplied closely matched the concessioned and planned volumes, though actual 
deliveries exceeded the allocated volumes by 5 percent. There is some evidence of variations 
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in Wter allocations between modules (CV=10%). However, as will be explained in chapter 8, 
this: is the result of water trading rather than of poor allocation. As examples in chapter 8 will 
shew, the key to equitable water allocation between the WUAs is the performance of the 
hydraulic committee and the way it succeeds in monitoring actual allocation relative to 
planned allocation. 
5.$ Actual water distribution and use in selected canals and 
fields 
DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN ACTUAL SUPPLIES AND PLANNED & REPORTED SUPPLIES 
One way to internally assess the performance level of the WUAs is to measure whether actual 
irrigation supplies meet their own planned supplies (see section 1.6 on internal performance 
assessment). As discussed above, water deliveries are scheduled around planned water depths 
plot level), which are subsequently converted to planned weekly deliveries at the levels of 
distributaries and main canals. 
At the level of the selected canals and laterals in Cortazar and Salvatierra, actual water 
supplies were obtained by the daily flow measurements that were taken for this study. Figures 
and 5.3 analyze the weekly supplies for each lateral monitored in Cortazar. The cycles 
observed in the graphs correspond to individual irrigation turns provided by the WUA. 
Planned and reported values show a very high correlation. The reason for this is the way the 
ch tenders report water distribution. Although the WUAs use planned water depths to 
calculate the volumetric demand and distribution for each week and each secondary canal, 
actual distribution is not based on volumetric measurements. 
At the level of the secondary canals and fields, ditch tenders estimate but do not measure 
flokvs. Although each delivery should provide a uniform, planned irrigation depth to each 
farmer who requested and paid an irrigation, the ditch tender fixes the time needed to fully 
irrigate one hectare. The duration of supply is determined by the ditch tender's experience 
and the relationship with the individual water users rather than by planned water depths. 
Di;ch tenders only roughly report the time farmers receive water. The ditch tender's main 
concern is to report the area a farmer had requested and paid an irrigation for, rather than the 
acfual volume supplied. Using the planned water depth, he calculates the theoretical discharge 
7s), and records these in his daily irrigation reports to the WUAs. 
For the two selected secondary canals, measured values are almost consistently higher 
than planned values. Furthermore, planned and reported values supplies show a very high 
coiTelation. For secondary canal A (figure 5.2) the ditch tender reported weekly supplies that 
were on average as close as 97 percent of planned values, whereas the supplies actually 
measured for this study were 2.7 times higher than the planned and reported ones. This can be 
explained through a combination of poor control at the intakes of the laterals, the ditch 
tender's particular position as the cousin of the WUA's president (see chapter 6), and failure 
adjust gate settings after the conditions of the infrastructure had changed as a result of 
(at 
the 
(m 
to 
intra-season maintenance, as was the case in week 7 of distributary canal A (figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2 Planned, measured, and reported volumes of distributary canal A in 
Cortazar module, during winter and summer seasons of 1995-96 
Figure 53 Planned, measured, and reported volumes of distributary canal B in Cortazar 
module, during winter and summer seasons of 1995-96 
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Figure 5.4 Planned, measured, and reported volumes of the Gugorrones main canal, in 
Salvatierra module, during the winter and summer seasons of 1995-96 
1,400 
• •* - - Planned volume - Measured volume • Reported volume 
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Figure 5.4 shows the weekly supplies for the selected main canal in Salvatierra module. 
Unlike the examples from Cortázar, the results from Salvatierra show more consistency 
between what was measured and what the WUA had planned to deliver. This suggests better 
water control at the intake point. However, close analysis of the daily reports shows that most 
ditch tenders in Salvatierra are aware of the scheduled discharge at the intakes of the six main 
canals and did report accordingly 1 2. Moreover, because of the short distances of the main 
canals in Salvatierra ditch tenders can frequently visit the intake point and check and report 
the actual delivery at the intakes of these main canals. The large difference between reported 
and measured values is caused by the practice of most ditch tenders to calculate reported 
volumes at the field level, whereas actual supplies are measured at the canal intakes. 
Therefore, reported volumes do not include conveyance losses in the main canal. 
PU\NNED AND ACTUAL CROP WATER DEMANDS 
Wiih respect to the water demand, table 5.3 compares the planned water requirements for the 
winter season of both modules with the theoretical crop water requirements obtained through 
CROPWAT. The requirements planned by the WUAs incorporate the perceived canal losses 
at each level of the system. For Cortázar, the ratio of the CROPWAT to the field-level values 
corresponds to the planned application efficiency, in this case 70 percent. The ratio between 
field and secondary canal values constitutes the distribution efficiency planned by the WUA, 
in this case 85 percent. Finally, the ratio between secondary and main canal values 
corresponds to the planned conveyance efficiency, in this case 80 percent. Thus, the system 
has an overall planned distribution efficiency of 48 percent (0.7*0.85*0.8), which is 
considerably higher than the overall system efficiency rate of 32 percent measured by both 
Palacios-Vélez and Exebio-Garcia (1992) and Peña-Peña and Herrera-Ponce (1999) 1 3, or the 
27.6 percent reported by Tenango-Zitlalapa and Hernández-Saucedo (1994). These low 
irrigation efficiency rates for ARLID can be considered typical of most Mexican irrigation 
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districts (Palacios-Vélez and Exebio-García 1992; Palacios-Vélez 1994b). Although CNA 
claims to base these planned efficiency rates on actual measurements, no evidence was found 
that these measurements actual took place at several strategic points in the system and at fixed 
time intervals during the cropping season. Moreover, official CNA records on conveyance 
efficiencies suggest that these rates have not changed for a number of years, even though 
canal maintenance practices have changed considerably as a result of management transfer 
(see chapter 9). Yet, when making their irrigation plans and schedules both CNA and the 
WUAs use these assumed efficiency rates as if they were actual rates. 
Because of the irrigation network configuration of Salvatierra module there are no 
secondary canals as such. Two reasons explain the difference in the theoretical crop water 
requirements between Cortázar and Salvatierra: the difference in evaporation (Appendix 3) as 
a result of altitude and humidity differences, and the considerable difference in planting dates. 
An important observation from table 5.3 is that both WUAs do not differentiate on crop 
water requirements for different crops. Irrigation scheduling and planning are based on the 
main crop, in this case wheat. This practice results in excess calculation of irrigation 
requirements, especially in Salvatierra with its diversified cropping pattern, which during the 
1995-96 winter season comprised 68 percent wheat, 22 percent beans, and 10 percent 
vegetables. 
Table 5 3 Calculated (CROPWAT) and planned water requirements in the Cortázar 
and Salvatierra modules, in winter 1995-96 (mm/season) 
Crop CROPWAT Planned Requirements by the Module (mm/season) 
requirements (mm) Field Secondary canal Main canal 
Cortázar module 
Aconchi wheat 607 775 930 1175 
Salamanca wheat 523 775 930 1175 
Onion 477 775 930 1175 
Barley 466 775 930 1175 
Tomato 493 775 930 1175 
Vegetables 310 775 930 1175 
Salvatierra module Field Main canal 
Aconchi wheat 580 850 1350 
Salamanca' wheat 505 850 1350 
Tomato 508 850 1350 
Onion 477 850 1350 
Chillies 470 850 1350 
Chickpea 460 850 1350 
Barley 409 850 1350 
Beans 303 850 1350 
Vegetables 280 850 1350 
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MA NAGING IRRIGATION WATER WITH HIGH SAFETY MARGINS 
The Relative Water Supply (RWS, see section 1.6 and Appendix 4) indicator was used to 
compare actual water use with planned and reported use. Three different RWS values were 
measured, using different supplies in the numerator of the indicator (table 5.4). Actual RWS, 
was. calculated using actual water supplies obtained from flow measurements by CNA and the 
WUAs at the intakes of all modules; planned RWS, using planned water supplies obtained 
from administrative records from both CNA and the WUAs; and reported RWS, using 
recorded volumes by ditch tenders. In the case of the private wells, two different RWS values 
are calculated: actual RWS, using actual pumped volumes; and reported RWS, using pumped 
volumes as recorded by ditch tenders. 
The first conclusion that can be derived from table 5.4 is that at the module intake level 
the actual RWS winter value for Cortázar is slightly lower than the average value of 2.4 for 
the entire district, whereas the value for Salvatierra is more than twice as high, suggesting 
concentration of water on that area that is actually irrigated, resulting in a low irrigation 
intensity for the winter season of 50 percent compared to 81 percent for Cortázar. 
A second conclusion from table 5.4 is that in Salvatierra actual and planned RWS values 
match relatively well at the module (i.e. intake) level. Also, at the module intake actual RWS 
values are only slightly higher than reported values. This again suggests that the management 
succeeds in closely following the irrigation plan. However, this correlation is closely related 
to the fact that ditch tenders are familiar with daily planned flow levels at the intake of the 
Gujpirrones canal and generally report those volumes as being the actual ones. At the field 
level high discrepancies were found between actual and reported values (table 5.5). There are 
several reasons that explain this. First, because of the high number of farmers and a high 
degree of land fragmentation14, ditch tenders of Salvatierra WUA have many problems in 
obtaining adequate information on the crops farmers actually grow, causing severe problems 
with seasonal and weekly irrigation scheduling as well as with reporting actual deliveries at 
the field level. Second, Salvatierra is the only module where winter and summer crops are 
mixed. As a result, there is an overlap in cropping patterns, which makes scheduling and 
defvering a very complicated activity. Rather than trying to deliver water closely to the actual 
irrigation requirement of each distributary canal, ditch tenders choose to deliver an amount of 
water with a high margin of safety (which explains the high RWS values reported below). 
Third, and related to the previous point, Salvatierra has a very diverse cropping pattern. 
Although the WUA schedules water delivery as if all crop were the main crop (wheat and 
sorghum for the winter and summer sub-seasons, respectively), many farmers grow crops that 
need less water albeit more frequent irrigation turns. Ditch tenders are supposed to give 
fanners only the number of irrigations that conespond with the main crop, but in practice they 
try to adjust the schedule in such a way that it meets the irrigation requirement of a particular 
fanner. There are two ways in which this is done. The first way of accommodating to the 
fanners' real irrigation demand (both in terms of irrigation depth and frequency of deliveries) 
is tD change a farmer's official winter turn for an extra turn in the summer, or to deliver less 
wai:er per turn, yet more frequently. The other way is to bribe the ditch tender in turn for an 
extra irrigation delivery. With the high water depths delivered to the farmers, this can be done 
without depriving other users too much of their requirements (see the next section on equity). 
These arrangements are always made between the individual farmer and the ditch tender. 
However, for reasons explained in the previous section of this chapter, the ditch tender is 
particularly concerned about reporting closely to programmed values. As a consequence, he 
has to modify the extra-official deliveries in his daily reports. 
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Table 5.4 Actual over planned and reported RWS valúes in ARLED and the Cortázar 
and Salvatierra modules, in winter 1995-96, and summer 1996 
Season RWS type Entire Cortázar Salvatierra ratio Entire Cortázar Salva-
district module module district module tierra 
module 
Surface irrigation 
Winter 1995-96 Actual 
Planned 
2.4 
2.5 
2.1 
2.4 
4.4 
3.3 
A / P : 96% 87% 133% 
Reported 1.6 1.5 2.0 A/R: 151% 137% 218% 
Summer 1996 Actual 
Planned 
1.9 
2.1 
1.9 
2.0 
2.0 
2.1 
A / P : 90% 92% 93% 
Reported 2.0 1.8 2.3 A/R: 98% 105% 84% 
Private wells 
Winter 1995-96 Actual 
Reported 
2.1 
1.8 
2.1 
2.0 
2.1 
not reported 
A/R: 118% 107% -
Summer 1996 Actual 2.2 2.2 2.3 
Reported 1.3 2.2 not reported A/R: 172% 100% -Note: A / P means actual (measured) RWS values over planned values; A / R means actual RWS 
values over reported values. 
A fourth reason why ditch tenders in Salvatierra have difficulties in actually measuring 
and reporting real deliveries at the field level, is that in most canals surface water is mixed 
with pumped water from both private and public deep tubewells (see below). This makes it 
difficult to assess how much water actually flows to each plot. 
Table 5.5 shows that during the winter season, the actual RWS value is much higher than 
the reported one. Part of the reason for this is that actual values are measured at the intake of 
the modules while reported values are estimated at the field level. 
The observations on table 5.5 are supported by the data obtained from own flow 
measurements at the field level. Actual, planned, and reported RWS values of selected fields 
in the two modules were calculated. In the case of Cortázar, the values show little variation 
between the different fields observed, and are in line with those obtained for higher levels of 
the system. Values for Salvatierra are consistently higher than those for Cortázar. They also 
show more variation, corroborating higher water availability. The last three columns again 
highlight the high correlation between planned and reported values. 
Table 5.6 provides similar information for the summer season in Cortázar. For the same 
reason as explained above, the summer season values show a high difference between fields 
irrigated with surface water and those irrigated with wells: an average of 1.8 for the former 
and 2.4 for the latter. For Salvatierra, only actual values were available. The average value of 
the actual RWS of fields irrigated by canals is 2.3, while the average value for fields irrigated 
by wells is 2.4. 
It can be concluded that the irrigation district operated during the winter 1995-96 and the 
summer 1996 seasons under conditions of relatively abundant water availability. It was 
possible for the managers to supply the crop water requirements with a good margin of safety. 
This is indicated by the high RWS values at different system levels. Generally, RWS values 
in Salvatierra exceed the district's average levels while values in Cortázar are slightly below 
this average. 
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Furthermore, RWS values obtained at all levels suggest that well users use more water 
peri hectare than those using canal water. The reasons for this are a relatively low pumping 
cost as a consequence of subsidized energy tariff (see chapter 7) and the attempt to avoid risks 
by not waiting until the rains have started. Finally, crop water requirements are calculated on 
the basis of a single main crop, normally a relatively high water-consuming one in order to be 
the 'safe' side. Particularly in Salvatierra, where farmers grow relatively more crops that 
require less water, this has led to over-calculation of irrigation depths and consequently to the 
high RWS values observed. 
Table 5.5 Actual, planned, and reported RWS values in selected fields in the Cortázar 
and Salvatierra modules, in winter 1995-96 
Cortázar 
Field* 
Irrigation 
source 
Measured Reported 1 2 3 4 5 6 
water depth water depth RWS- RWS- RWS- 1/2 1/3 2 / 3 
(mm) (mm) Act Plan Rep (%) (%) (%) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Surface 
Surface 
Surface 
Surface 
Surface 
Surface 
Surface 
Surface 
Surface 
Surface 
Surface 
Public well 
Private well 
Private well 
Private well 
834 
832 
898 
961 
825 
844 
931 
1122 
1040 
1057 
1177 
994 
958 
861 
971 
728 
794 
803 
813 
760 
801 
797 
781 
781 
828 
795 
762 
1.7 
1.7 
1.6 
1.9 
1.7 
1.7 
1.9 
2.2 
1.8 
1.8 
2.3 
2.0 
1.7 
1.5 
2.0 
1.6 
1.6 
1.4 
1.6 
1.6 
1.6 
1.6 
1.6 
1.4 
1.4 
1.6 
1.6 
1.4 
1.4 
1.6 
1.5 
1.6 
1.4 
1.7 
1.6 
1.6 
1.6 
1.6 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.6 
106 
106 
114 
119 
106 
106 
119 
138 
129 
129 
144 
125 
121 
107 
125 
113 
106 
114 
112 
106 
106 
119 
138 
129 
120 
144 
125 
107 
100 
100 
94 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
93 
100 
100 
Average 954 787 1.8 1.5 1.6 120 119 100 
Salvatierra Irrigation 
Field # source 
Measured Reported 1 2 3 4 5 6 
water depth water depth RWS- RWS- RWS- 1/2 1/3 2 / 3 
(mm) (mm) Act Plan Rep (%) (%) ' (%) 
Private well 
Private well 
Surface 
Private well 
Surface 
Surface 
Surface 
1151 
1007 
843 
1110 
732 
1173 
858 
915 
0 
846 
1296 
0 
2.1 
2.0 
1.7 
2.2 
3.1 
2.3 
2.3 
1.6 
1.7 
1.7 
1.7 
3.5 
1.7 
2.3 
3.5 
2.6 
0 
131 
118 
100 
129 
89 
135 
100 
94 
89 
94 
100 
65 
Average 982 611 2.2 2.0 2.0 108 90 87 
No'te: RWS-Act = actual (measured) relative water supply; RWS-Plan = planned relative water supply 
(by the WUA); RWS-Rep = reported relative water supply (derived from the ditch tenders' daily 
reports). 
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Table 5.6 Actual, planned, and reported RWS values in selected fields in the Cortazar 
module, in summer 1996 
Irrigation Measured Reported 1 2 3 4 5 6 
field* source water depth water depth (mm) (mm) 
RWS-
Act 
RWS-
Plan 
RWS-
Rep 
1/2 
(%) 
1/3 
(%) 
2 / 3 
(%) 
1 Surface 274 0 1.9 1.8 1.3 102 138 135 
2 Surface 225 196 1.8 1.8 1.7 97 103 106 
3 Surface 269 232 1.8 1.8 1.8 102 104 102 
4 Surface 491 253 2.3 1.8 1.8 125 124 100 
5 Surface 210 228 1.7 1.8 1.8 96 98 102 
6 Surface 260 231 1.8 1.8 1.8 101 103 102 
7 Surface 208 229 1.7 1.8 1.8 96 98 102 
8 Surface 253 229 1.8 1.8 1.8 100 103 102 
9 Surface 253 231 1.8 1.8 1.8 100 102 102 
Average Surface 271 203 1.8 1.8 1.7 102 108 106 
10 Well 599 204 2.5 1.8 1.7 136 143 105 
11 Well 438 216 2.2 1.8 1.7 119 124 104 
12 Well 595 207 2.4 1.8 1.7 135 142 105 
13 Well 620 289 2.5 1.8 1.9 138 133 96 
14 Well 757 216 2.7 1.8 1.7 152 158 104 
15 Well 719 248 2.7 1.8 1.8 148 148 100 
16 Well 633 215 2.5 1.8 1.7 139 145 104 
17 Well 628 216 2.5 1.8 1.7 139 144 104 
18 Well 456 216 2.2 1.8 1.7 121 126 104 
19 Well 693 278 2.6 1.8 1.9 145 141 97 
20 Well 690 216 2.0 1.4 1.4 145 150 104 
Average Wells 621 229 2.4 1.8 1.7 138 141 102 
Overall 454 214 2.2 1.8 1.7 121 125 104 
Note: RWS-Act = actual (measured) relative water supply; RWS-Plan = planned relative water supply 
(by the WUA); RWS-Rep = reported relative water supply (derived from the ditch tenders' daily 
reports). 
5.6 Equity and differentiated access to irrigation water 
EQUITY AND SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF RWS: WHO LOSES? 
RWS values obtained at the head of the different reaches within the selected distributary 
canals were also used as an indicator of spatial distribution of water. These values are shown 
in figures 5.5 and 5.6. The tail-end of secondary canal B in Cortazar received more water 
during the winter season than the head-end or the middle reaches. For all distributary sections, 
RWS values exceeded 1.0. This means that actual water delivery always exceeded planned 
deliveries. Because of the good condition of the lateral, fanners in middle and head-end 
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reaches never have difficulties with taking in water to their fields. As a consequence, excess 
water is carried to the tail-end, which explains the high RWS value. Lateral A is much longer 
and suffers from physical problems, inducing the typical head-tail difference. Yet, also in this 
case: tail-end farmers still receive sufficient water to meet crop demand. The explanation of 
the high RWS value of 6.9 is that canal losses in this reach are very high as the canal runs 
very close along the river in very coarse soils, causing high levels of seepage. 
The summer values follow the same pattern as during the winter. Unlike the head-end 
area, which is dominated by large landholdings of private growers, control of water 
distribution in the tail-end is difficult because of the large number of small fields that are 
cultivated by ejidatarios. In general, summer RWS values are much lower, and show more 
spatial uniformity as all farmers get equal rainfall and only one irrigation is supplied. 
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5.5 Spatial distribution of RWS values across different sections in selected 
canals in Cortazar module 
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are J 995-96 winter values. 
Figure 5.6 shows the distribution of RWS values for the selected canal in Salvatierra 
module. Also in this canal, all sections received sufficient water to meet crop requirements. 
However, water control in the Gugorrones main canal and its secondary canals is difficult 
because of severe disrepair of the infrastructure, the large number of farmers, and the 
ively small plots. Three public deep rubewells pump directly in the canal network, which 
complicates water management. Furthermore, daily observations and measurements at 
control points, selected wells, and fields show that many private well owners also illicitly 
irrigate with canal water, particularly by mixing groundwater and canal water as explained 
above. Although RWS values generally exceed 1.0, there is no uniform distribution of RWS 
values along the selected main canal and distributary canals. 
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Figure 5.6 Spatial distribution of RWS values in the Gugorrones main canal and its 
laterals, in the Salvatierra module 
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Note: values within parentheses are RWS values for the 1996 summer season, while the other values 
are 1995-96 winter values. 
A general observation on these results is that although water distribution between and 
within secondary canals can be highly uneven, an important characteristic of water 
management within the selected areas is that no farmer suffers from water shortages. There 
are five reasons that explain this. First, as was demonstrated with tables 5.5 and 5.6, at the 
field level ditch tenders generally allocate sufficient water to irrigate a farmer's crop as they 
feel committed to supply sufficient water to the area a farmer has paid an irrigation turn for, 
rather than allocating water on a strictly volumetric basis. 
Second, in an arranged schedule controlled system like ARLJD, where farmers pay for 
each irrigation turn, users make sure that they receive the water they have requested and paid 
for. They do this by making the WUA financially accountable for the way they distribute the 
water (see chapter 7). Given the relatively high levels of water availability, ditch tenders can 
easily meet these requests without having to control the system in a very strict way. 
Furthermore, the group of farmers along a particular secondary canal who can irrigate at the 
same day is restricted and hardly ever exceeds ten farmers. This makes controlling water 
distribution relatively easy. 
Third, as a major feature of the arranged schedule controlled system, farmers know when 
they are to receive the turn they have paid for. Normally, those farmers that were told they 
could irrigate on a particular day try to meet the ditch tender. Generally this happens early in 
the morning at main canal where the ditch tender sets the gate to take water into the secondary 
canal. As farmers know that the time they can irrigate their fields is not unlimited (although 
generally they can irrigate as long as they want), they try to prevent that other farmers illicitly 
take water during their turn. If a farmer observes that the water level to his field falls, he runs 
the canal upstream until he has found the cause. He tries to solve it on the spot, with or 
without the help of the ditch tender. As will be demonstrated in chapter 7, this does not mean 
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thai: illicitly taking water by private well owners and larger farmers who can bribe the ditch 
tender, does not occur. 
Fourth, there is no clear head-tail bias in holding sizes. Large and small holdings are 
scattered from head to tail-end. Likewise, ejidatarios and private growers are distributed 
unevenly along the distributaries. The only exception to this is secondary canal B in Cortazar. 
Here, two private growers (brothers) cultivate most of the area in the head-end section. 
However, these growers possess and use their own private wells and consequently make no 
use of canal water. 
Fifth, with RWS values generally above 1.5, guaranteeing access to water is not a major 
problem to farmers, irrespective the location of their fields. This reduces the need to illicitly 
take water. However, it does not entirely eliminate the practice of water stealing, with or 
without the involvement of the ditch tender. 
PREFERENTIAL ACCESS TO WATER BY LARGE FARMERS AND WELL USERS 
According to Montgomery (1983), in general Mexican private growers are given preferential 
access to water by the ditch tenders, basically as the result of bribing and other forms of 
political maneuvering. However, results from volumetric measurements in the limited set of 
20 parcels selected for this study, do not point in the same direction. For instance, during the 
19S5-96 winter season the actual applied water depth on fields irrigated by ejidatarios 
averages 948 mm, whereas private growers received an average of 972 mm. Also in terms of 
actual over reported RWS there is no bias towards one of the groups of water users: 
ejidatarios received 17 percent more than reported while private growers received 16 percent 
more than reported by the ditch tenders. These observations do no necessarily mean that 
preferential water distribution does not occur. Preferential distribution is more related to well 
owners, who according to the bylaws of the WUAs do not have a right to canal water if they 
have access to groundwater. However, in practice it frequently occurs that these well owners 
take canal water without having paid the official fee for it. As in general private growers own 
more wells than ejidatarios (table 2.2), preferential water distribution to users of wells will 
favor private growers more than ejidatarios. 
There are four modes of appropriation of canal water by well users. First, through direct 
stealing, i.e. without the ditch tender's or leaders' permission. For reasons explained above, 
the magnitude of water theft is relatively low. During the time of our field observations and 
measurements, we came across a number of cases where well owners had appropriated some 
canal water, basically to supplement own pumping. However, we never came across cases 
where well users were continuously stealing water, i.e. for every irrigation turn that the crop 
required. 
Second, with permission from the ditch tender, the technical manager of the WUA, or 
frorh one or more of the WUA leaders, canal water is obtained through bribing. The most 
common practice observed is that well owners bribe ditch tenders to give them one or more 
irrigation turns. Generally this happens when well owners seek to supplement their well water 
with canal water, normally at the start of the irrigation season when there is a peak crop 
requirement. In some cases, when farmers cultivate several plots, it is possible that one plot is 
offirially registered with a well while for other plots they have a right to use canal water. 
Several times it has been observed that these farmers pay a water right for only a portion of 
the fields with canal water rights, while for the remaining part (including sometimes the fields 
irrigated by wells) water is bought directly (and of course illicitly) from the ditch tender. 
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Many farmers also reported that sometimes general managers of WUAs (often with 
consent of the leaders) hand out bogus receipts of payment, which a farmer can show to the 
ditch tender and receive water for. Although farmers and even ditch tenders from several 
WUAs confirmed this, as far as has been observed, only in Cortázar this resulted in the 
general managers to be fired15. These practices involving general managers and leaders of 
WUAs are almost always related to forms of nepotism along the lines of family, political or 
ejido relationships between the manager or leader and the farmer. As will be illustrated in 
chapter 6, in some WUAs these forms of nepotism and political accountability severely 
undermined the WUA's credibility towards the users and could eventually jeopardize the 
institutional viability of the association. 
Finally, sometimes leaders of WUAs also use their political and economic positions to 
gain better access to water themselves. Several water users reported that in some cases there 
is a preferential distribution of canal water to leaders of WUAs, even if officially they have no 
right to use canal water such as in case they have their own wells. When asked, only one 
leader confirmed that (before management transfer) he had frequently bribed former CNA 
ditch tenders to irrigate major parts of his fields despite the fact that he could have pumped 
water from his own well. In all these cases ditch tenders did not include these supplies in their 
daily reports to the WUA 1 6 . 
Third, with permission from ditch tenders and other WUA staff, canal water is given to 
farmers with wells that have a very low pumping capacity. According to the bylaws of the 
WUAs, farmers who own wells with very low pumping capacities can request and buy canal 
water. This was for instance the case with field 14 in Cortázar (table 5.5). This field of 8 
hectares is located in the middle reach of distributary canal B and is owned by a private 
grower. The farmer owns a 6 inch pump, with a measured discharge capacity of only 18 liters 
per second 1 7. As this discharge is far too low to irrigate the entire 8 hectares, the farmer 
requested the ditch tender to supplement groundwater with canal water. In similar cases, the 
WUA allows farmers with low capacity wells to use canal water, provided that they pay the 
normal fee. However, in this case the deal was made between the ditch tender and the farmer. 
As a consequence the farmer received four full irrigation turns from the canal, in addition to 
his own groundwater. As can be seen from table 5.5, the ditch tender did not report these 
turns, nor did the farmer pay the official fee to the WUA. 
The fourth mode of appropriation of canal water by well owners is the most common one. 
Here, canal water and groundwater are mixed within the open canal system and a 
disproportionate amount of canal water is let into the farmers' fields. This deserves further 
explanation and illustration. In most cases of farmers who use wells, water is pumped directly 
into the field. However, particularly when the pump serves several plots, or when water is 
sold to other farmers (chapter 8), the canal infrastructure has to be used to transport the water. 
Water is pumped into the canal and taken into the field, which sometimes is located more than 
a thousand meters from the well. These fields can be located downstream of the well, but 
cases in which fields are located upstream of the well do also exist. In these latter cases water 
in the canal can be temporally checked in order to raise its level. However, in most cases 
groundwater is simply mixed with canal water and the farmer takes into the field as much 
water as he needs. 
Comparative measurements of both pump discharges and water intakes at the field level, 
show that in most cases farmers take more (mixed) water from the canal than the discharge 
capacity of the pump that they use. These practices do not only occur .in the case of private 
wells, but are even more common in the case of the public wells managed by the WUA. This 
has a historical reason. Originally these public wells were constructed by CNA to supplement 
canal water in times of water scarcity. They were built along main distributaries or (in the 
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case of Salvatierra) along main canals. When in 1992 CNA handed over O&M 
responsibilities to the WUAs, also these wells were transferred. However, rather than using 
them as a supplemental source to canal water, compact areas were assigned to each of these 
wells. These compact areas range in size from approximately 20 hectares to 60 hectares and 
average 43 hectares per well. Farmers with land within these compact areas were supposed to 
only use the water pumped from this wells, for which they had to pay the WUA a fee (see 
chapter 6). Yet, to be able to transport water to these compact areas, users of public wells 
have to make use of the canal infrastructure. As a result, groundwater and canal water are 
mixed. Measurements show that at the field level public deep tubewell users take more water 
than the maximum discharge capacity of the pump. 
NIGHT IRRIGATION 
All the above observations on how farmers and ditch tenders distribute water and deal with 
other farmers illicitly taking water were made during daytime. Although the five arguments 
provided above suggest that there is no reason to illicitly take water at night, it is still possible 
water stealing or water movements other than those scheduled occur. Chambers (1988) that 
was 
spof 
and continues to be right when he stated that canal irrigation at night is a real blind 
18 
In order to observe deviations between authorized (or planned) and actual water levels 
and gate settings at night, a data logger was installed at three different locations along the 
selected distributary canals in Cortázar 1 9. For each of these points the fluctuations in water 
levels were plotted every 30 minutes (see Appendices 6.1 to 6.3) in order to show differences 
between day and night. Generally, the ditch tender sets the gates every morning between 6.00 
a.m. and 9.00 a.m. and again in the afternoon between 5.00 p.m. and 8.00 p.m. Most of the 
changes in the three graphs of Appendix 6 are the result of these authorized gate settings and 
the subsequent changes in water levels. By analyzing the fluctuations in water levels in 
between these planned changes, one gets an idea of the frequency of unplanned changes in 
water levels. These changes can have several causes. First, when a farmer has finished 
irrigating his fields, he will close the pipe outlet even if he has not used the entire entitled 
irrigation time. As a result the water level in the distributary will rise slightly. Second, the 
ditch tender sets the gate according to the number of hectares that are scheduled to receive 
water during a particular day. Any additional area irrigated will cause an unexpected fall in 
the water level. 
Table 5.7 provides the analyses of fluctuations of water levels during day-time and night-
time. Several observations can be made from this table. First, there is no significant difference 
between the average (over the entire period of observations) between day-time and night-time 
water levels. This suggests that during the night no additional area is irrigated. Second, there 
is no significant difference in the CV of water levels between day-time and night-time 
observations. This also suggests that the frequency of gate manipulations during the day and 
at night are similar. The only exception to this is the observation in the tail-end reach of 
distributary B, which produce CV values of 56 percent during the day and 71 percent during 
the night. However, as only a few farmers receive irrigation in this area, opening and closing 
of the gate in this part of the distributary occurs by definition less frequently. 
Finally, the number of unexpected changes in water level were counted during day and 
night, respectively2 0. In general, given the long period of observations, few unexpected 
changes in water level were recorded. This suggests that farmers generally respect their 
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irrigation turns and do not take water outside these turns. Furthermore, the frequency of 
unexpected changes during the night follows the pattern of changes during the day. Only in 
the tail-end area of distributary canal B, a relative high number of unexpected changes can be 
observed during night time. However, five out of seven times this is caused by farmers 
closing their pipe outlets. The only clearly observed example of water theft during the night 
was on 4 February 1997, in the tail-end area of distributary B. The previous night around 8.00 
p.m. the ditch tender had closed a upstream gate, which caused a drop in the water level from 
0.40 meter to approximately 0.10 meter at midnight. However, a farmer in this area opened a 
upstream gate to release more water and the water level raised to 0.55 meter at 3.00 a.m. At 
7.00 a.m. he closed the gate, which made the water level fall to 0.10 meter. At 9.30 a.m. the 
ditch tender came by to set the gate and start the official irrigation schedule for that day. 
Table 5.7 Day-time and night-time fluctuations of water level in the selected distributary 
canals, Cortazar module, winter season 1996-97 
Head-end reach, Middle reach, Tail-end reach, 
distributary B distributary A distributary B 
day 1 night 2 day night day night 
Observation period 
during winter season Feb 28- March 7 March 12- March 28 Jan 31--Feb 7 
1997 
Average water level (m)3 0.57 0.56 0.63 0.64 0.30 0.32 
CV of water level (%) 26 29 31 30 56 71 
Number of unexpected 
changes in water level 
between gate settings 
lx higher 
lx lower 
2x higher 
2x lower 
6x higher 
8x lower 3x lower 
4x 
higher 
5x lower 
5x higher 
2x lower 
Notes:1 day-time observations from 6.00 to 18.00 hours. 2 night-time observations from 18.00 to 6.00 
hours. 3 these are the averages of all recordings with a 30 minutes time-interval during the entire 
observation period. 
5.7 Comparison across WUAs: pursuing land or water 
productivity? 
This section explores the strategies that farmers chose to maximize the economic output per 
unit of land or water. The reason for this is that one of the assumptions of market-oriented 
irrigation policies is that these policies will provide incentives to farmers to maximize their 
economic output. One way of looking at these strategies is to observe whether there are 
differences in the ways farmers from different WUAs cope with this issue. As all WUAs in 
ARLID operate under a similar model and conditions of market-oriented irrigation 
management, one could assume that they equally deal with this issue of economic 
maximization. This section will test this assumption and analyze what to farmers is more 
important: maximizing outputs per unit of land, per unit of water, or both? 
The results presented in the previous section only show the situation for one year and 
within two modules. In order to see whether these results are representative for other years 
and other modules as well, RWS values were also compared across the 11 modules within the 
same irrigation district for the three post-transfer years from 1994 to 1997. Figure 5.7 shows 
the RWS values for three successive winter seasons, plus the average of these values per 
module. The results indicate that there is a clear difference between the modules. The average 
value of three years of the 11 modules is a RWS value of 2.6. Yet, as is demonstrated in the 
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figure, especially Acambaro and Salvatierra modules produce much higher averages (3.5 and 
6, respectively), whereas Valle has a RWS value of only 1.7. The rest of the modules have 
values that range from 1.9 to 2.9. The high value of Acámbaro can be explained by the fact 
that owing to climate conditions the crops require less irrigation services (three instead of four 
o:- five). Yet, it receives its full proportional allocation. As a consequence, it can use this 
allocation to apply higher water depths per irrigation turn resulting in higher RWS values. 
The reasons that explain the high RWS values in Salvatierra were already discussed above. 
Figure 5.7 Average RWS values for the modules of ARLD3, winter seasons 1994-97 
6.0 
Acambaro Salvatierra Valle Jaral Gortázar Salamanca Irapuato Abasoloand Huanrmaro LaPuriárna 
Corraiejo 
This comparison across 11 modules for a period of three years clearly suggests that users 
abply an irrigation regime that points to high levels of water use. This is surprising given the 
fact that the average irrigation intensity for these three years is only 71 percent during the 
winter season (and less than 140 percent for the entire agricultural year, with two crops). If 
the overall seasonal surface water availability is limited, then why are farmers applying so 
much water per hectare cropped if water is so limited? And why do they not opt to increase 
the irrigated area by applying less water per hectare cropped? The answers to these questions 
may be found in the comparison between water and land productivity. For this comparison, 
c-op yields (ton/ha), standardized gross value of production (SGVP) per unit of water 
supplied and consumed, and the SGVP per irrigated cropped area and command are measured 
fipr the 11 modules during three winter seasons (for definitions see Appendix 4 ) 2 1 . 
Comparison across the 11 modules shows that although actual wheat yields ranged from 
5 ton/ha to 7.0 ton/ha in the three years after management transfer, equivalent wheat yields 
ringed from 5.2 ton/ha in Huanimaro (1994-95) to 7.6 ton/ha in Salvatierra (1996-97). This 
high equivalent yield in Salvatierra is explained by the fact that during the 1996-97 winter 
season 21 percent or the irrigated area was cropped with beans, which produce high wheat 
equivalents because of their high market price. Both actual and equivalent yield levels are 
high compared to other irrigation district in Mexico (Palacios-Vêlez 1994a) and nearby small 
scale irrigation systems in the State of Guanajuato (Dayton-Johnson 1997). 
Figure 5.8 shows little difference in SGVP per hectare cropped. The average value is 
ÜS$ 1,279 per hectare, while the CV is only 6.3 percent. This suggests that the modules are 
ahle to receive approximately the same return to land, irrespective of their cropping pattern 
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and their high differences in water availability. There is no correlation between the RWS 
values and the productivity of the modules: the correlation coefficients between these values 
are -0.13, -0.50 and -0.11 for 1994-95,1995-96 and 1996-97, respectively. 
Figure 5.8 Standardized gross value of production (SGVF) per hectare cropped for the 
modules of ARLID, winter seasons 1994 to 1997 
2,500 
Acambaro Salvatierra Valle Irapuato Abasólo Hu¡ 
and 
Corralejo 
La 
Purísima 
Another observation from figure 5.8 is the high difference in values between three years 
that are reported. The average values for these years are 973 US$/ha, 1,769 US$/ha and 1,095 
ÜS$/ha. These difference can be attributed to the change in world market price for wheat in 
those years: 159 US$/ton in 1994-95, 262 US$/ton in 1995-96 and 173 US$/ton in 1996-97 2 2. 
Although yields are considered to be high, the low prices farmers receive for their wheat crop 
explains why returns to land cropped are not among the highest of the systems studied by 
IWMI (Molden et ah 1998; Sakthivadivel et al. 1999). 
Returns to unit of command are again considerably lower than returns to land cropped 
and vary widely between the modules. The average return is US$ 869 per hectare command, 
while the coefficient of variation is 26 percent. The lowest average values over three years are 
for Acámbaro module (434 US$/ha) and Salvatierra module (586 US$/ha) while Valle 
module has the highest return with 1,165 US$/ha. 
Figure 5.9 shows the output per unit of irrigation water supplied. The graph shows the 
high range in values, with no clear bias to the location of the module. The average value is 
0.12 US$/m 3, while the coefficient of variation is 25 percent. 
Finally, figure 5.10 shows the output per unit of water consumed. Similar to the output 
per unit of water supplied (figure 5.9), there is relatively little difference (CV is 10%) in 
output per unit of water consumed between the modules. The only clear exception is again 
Salvatierra module, which has a much higher output per unit of water consumed as a result of 
its high percentage of high value crops like beans and vegetables. 
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Figure 5.9 Standardized gross value of production (SGVP) per m 3 of water supplied to 
tlie modules of ARLID, winter seasons 1994 to 1997 
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Figure 5.10 Standardized gross value of production (SGVP) per m 3 of water consumed 
t a the modules of ARLID, winter seasons 1994 to 1997 
Acambaro Salvatierra Valle Jaral Cortázar Salamanca Irapuato Abasólo Huanimaro La 
and Purísima 
Corralejo 
Comparison of returns to land and water across modules shows that returns to land 
cropped are relatively high, with low coefficients of variations. On the other hand, returns to 
unit of command area are generally very low, with high coefficients of variations. Similarly, 
while returns to consumed water are high with low coefficients of variation, returns to water 
upplied are low with high coefficients of variation. This demonstrates that irrespective of 
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what the water availability situation of each module is, system managers and farmers try to 
maximize their returns to land cropped, resulting in high returns to a unit of water consumed. 
Rather than trying to spread water more thinly over a larger area and increase the depleted 
fraction of the water supplied, users chose to apply more water to the area that is actually 
cropped resulting in high RWS values and low returns to water supplied. In theory this means 
that farmers could crop more land by applying less water per hectare irrigated and hence 
increasing their productivity of the water supplied. 
The comparison also shows that although RWS values vary considerably between the 
modules (figure 5.7), their returns to land cropped are approximately the same. This suggest 
that those modules with the highest RWS values could reduce the volume of water per hectare 
irrigated without affecting the returns to land. This would particularly be the case for 
Salvatierra and Acámbaro modules, which have very high RWS values, low returns to water 
supplied, and because of low cropping intensities very low returns to unit of command. Given 
the fact that Salvatierra has the highest return to unit of water consumed, it shows that the 
module has high potential to considerably increase its output per water supplied. 
The general conclusion that can be drawn from the cases presented above is that although 
water is the limiting factor in ARLLD, the irrigation management strategy chosen by users of 
the district is to maximize returns per unit of land cropped, rather than increasing returns per 
unit of water allocated to their fields. This results in relatively high returns to land cropped 
and water consumed, but very low returns to unit of command and water supplied. On the 
average, the volume of water applied to each hectare of land cropped is almost twice as high 
as the required demand for crop évapotranspiration. 
5.8 Conclusions 
One of the aims of this chapter was to analyze how local irrigation managers and farmers 
practice irrigation management under the current arrangements for O&M. The observations 
made in this chapter can be summarized as follows. 
Actual allocation of irrigation water between the modules closely matched the 
concessioned and assigned allocation (see chapter 8 for a more detailed analysis). This 
suggests that at the start of the season, WUAs know how much water will be delivered to 
them. Establishment of a hydraulic committee at the district level, in which all WUAs 
participate, has given the WUAs an effective means to monitor the actual supplies against the 
concessioned and assigned volumes. 
The hydraulic committee decides on the dates of the opening and closing of the dams. 
Farmers schedule their irrigation around these days. These irrigation periods are long enough 
to provide for flexible scheduling within these periods. This is certainly the case under the 
arranged scheduling arrangement in ARLLD in which farmers request and pay for an 
irrigation service to be provided on a certain day. 
The irrigation district operated during the winter 1995-96 and the summer 1996 seasons 
under conditions of relatively abundant water availability. It was possible for the managers to 
supply the crop water requirements with a good margin of safety, as indicated by the high 
values of RWS at different system levels. Generally, RWS values in Salvatierra are much 
above the district average levels, while values in Cortázar are slightly below them. Also, on-
field flow measurements point to high adequacy of water at the field level. However, the way 
irrigation deliveries are reported by ditch tenders blurs this high adequacy in official reports. 
Generally, ditch tenders underreport the volumes allocated to farmers. Furthermore, reported 
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volumes are roughly calculated or even calculated using the planned water depth as a 
reference. As these reported volumes are the basis of the monitoring of water management 
from the field up to the district level, this practice has considerable consequences for the 
quality of the performance monitoring done by CNA and the WUAs. 
Crop water requirements are calculated on the basis of a single main crop, normally a 
relatively high water-consuming one in order to be on the 'safe' side. This leads to over-
calculation of irrigation depths, especially in Salvatierra where farmers grow relatively more 
cifops that require less water. This has translated into the high RWS values observed. 
RWS values obtained at all levels suggest that well users use more water per hectare than 
those using canal water. The reasons for this are a relatively low pumping cost as a 
consequence of subsidized energy tariff (see section 7.4) as well as the attempt to avoid risks 
by not waiting until the rains have started. 
As a result of high actual RWS values, spatial distribution of RWS values along selected 
cinals is not a major concern to farmers. Daily measurements at selected canal and field 
levels, indicate that all farmers receive sufficient water to meet crop requirements. While 
some variation in spatial distribution exists, there is no bias to user location (head-middle-tail) 
within the irrigation network. The reason for this is that farmers closely monitor that they 
receive the irrigation service they have requested and paid for. At on-farm level, personal 
interactions between users and ditch tenders play a significant role since this determines both 
flow size and number of hours that a particular plot may get water. 
Finally, standardized gross values of production per unit of irrigation supplied or to the 
water consumed are relatively new concepts and there is a dearth of information that would 
allow comparison. Some preliminary values have been obtained by IWMI for other systems 
worldwide and indicate that, generally, values found in ARLLD are high, especially for crops 
irrigated under wells (Molden et al. 1998 and Sakthivadivel et al. 1999). 
CONFLICTS IN OPERATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
hi section 1.3, a distinction was made between mechanisms of operational, financial and 
palitical accountability. These three forms of accountability play a role in the way water is 
actually distributed between the beneficiaries of the services provided by CNA and the 
ViTJAs. The above examples of water distribution in selected canals and to selected fields 
provide detailed information on the mechanisms of operational accountability in water 
distribution. Examples of political and financial accountability mechanisms are given in 
chapters 6 and 7, respectively. Although the latter two cannot be separated from operational 
accountability, analysis of operational accountability shows that water managers at different 
system levels are concerned about different ways of being accountable to their constituencies. 
This has sometimes led to conflicting operational accountability mechanisms. 
The direct access to the WUAs' representatives is the major advantage of the new 
mstitutional arrangement compared to the situation before IMT. In case of irregularities that 
iirmers want to have solved, they can now more directly approach the irrigation managers, 
who like themselves are water users. If they do not want to approach the board members 
directly they can and do contact their delegates who will bring their matter to be discussed in 
the general assembly. The WUA is directly accountable to them and its members have the 
pDwer to 'vote out' the board and elect a new one in case of irregularities - as has already 
happened in one occasion in the Irapuato WUA (see section 6.3). 
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Whereas the accountability mechanisms for O&M at the 'lower level', especially 
between the farmers and their organizations (WUAs, SRL) are clearly established and 
function well (see Urban et al. 2000 and the chapters that follow), several possible 
weaknesses regarding the accountability mechanisms at the 'higher level' can be identified. 
The rules defining the relationship between CNA and the users' organizations obviously leave 
some scope for flexibility in the distribution of the management roles between CNA and the 
WUAs. In the case of ARLLD this flexibility is used by the CNA to grant a large degree of 
'freedom' to the users organizations in the O&M of their irrigation systems and to reduce 
CNA's formal supervising role to a minimum. Up to the present this has worked well, partly 
due to the close personal and professional links between CNA and the user representatives, 
such as influential private farmers who reside in the district. 
According to the water law the hydraulic committee defines the "rules of the game" for 
the district in the district regulations. These regulations, however, have to be approved by 
CNA. In the case of coincidence of opinions and interests - as in ARLID - this works 
smoothly. However, how will this work in situations of conflicting interests? What if in cases 
of water shortage (and consequently shortage of funds for maintenance) the interests of the 
individual parties differ? How will CNA react, if the WUAs decide to allocate significantly 
less than 60% of their income (as presently proposed by CNA and done by the WUAs) to 
maintenance? Will CNA continue to let the hydraulic committee take the respective decisions 
or will it resume its role as supervising and finally decisive entity and take on a conflicting 
position towards the users? Potentially there is the danger of conflicting interests: whereas 
CNA has to safeguard its assets that they concessioned to the users (irrigation infrastructure, 
rural roads), the WUAs might pursue slightly different primary objectives (concentration on 
maintenance issues that are directly relevant for production goals). Let us explore some of 
these questions. 
The examples presented in this chapter show that, so far, the CNA and the hydraulic 
committee have been accountable to the WUAs. Their main concern is that water is strictly 
distributed proportional to the service areas with rights to canal water that each of the WUAs 
within the district has. Furthermore, the CNA district office is mainly concerned to meet the 
operational targets of irrigated area and cost-recovery. They are accountable to the CNA 
headquarters for producing seasonal reports that show that the district performs according 
these administratively set targets. This accountability has a trickle-down effect via the WUAs 
to the ditch tenders. The WUAs' main concern is that a farmer receives irrigation water and 
that he does not irrigate more than the planned area, irrespective of the crop he grows, the soil 
type of his farm, or how much water is actually supplied to his plot. As a result, as long as the 
WUAs receive sufficient water to meet the water requirement of irrigated crops in the fields 
that farmers have paid an irrigation turn for, WUAs do not always check whether CNA 
actually delivers the volumes requested. 
Also, ditch tenders generally record the calculated (i.e. planned) rather than the actual 
flow in their daily irrigation reports. Strategically this practice satisfies the two groups the 
ditch tenders are accountable to. Farmers are satisfied when they receive all the water they 
need and have paid for (per hectare), while the management and leadership of the WUAs are 
satisfied when the daily reports reflect the operational targets. As a consequence of these two 
practices, there are large differences between the volumes planned, reported and what was 
actually measured in the system. This system of accountability based on making daily reports 
that reflect planned rather than actual performance at all management levels shows that ditch 
tenders tend to administer rather than manage water distribution. One of the end-results of 
these accountability mechanisms is that water is distributed in a 'safe' way, i.e. with levels of 
water supply that satisfies all end-users. This is reflected in the relatively high values of 
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RWS. It was possible for both CNA and the WUAs to supply the crop water requirements 
with a good margin of safety. 
EVALUATING IRRIGATION PRACTICES USING AN INTEGRATED BASIN APPROACH 
T i e above O&M strategies and accountability mechanisms have helped to reproduce existing 
practices and arrangements of water management, resulting in relative high levels of water 
use. This is in contrast with the idea that the new institutional arrangements would encourage 
managers and farmers to use water more efficiently. Yet, the problem with qualifying this 
reproduction as being right or wrong lies with the problematic concept of 'efficiency'. 
"Whether the above practices of high water use per unit of land cropped within ARLE) should 
be evaluated as being right or wrong depends on the reasons behind this strategy and whether 
users have options to manage their water differently. Among the most important internal 
factors and processes that explain the present management strategy are: the poor physical 
conditions of the infrastructure (particularly in Salvatierra); high land fragmentation; and 
scheduling and distributing water to meet water requirements of the main crop rather than real 
crop requirements. However, the most important incentive to not wanting to change irrigation 
practices and arrangements, is that irrigation managers pursue planned area rather than actual 
volumetric needs as the management objective. This raises the question which options do 
local irrigation managers and farmers prefer to change these practices? 
The first option that users have, is to adhere to the current situation as it guarantees them 
high returns to every hectare that they are allowed to crop. At the field level this option results 
in low consumed fractions of supplied water. A second option is probably the most 
conventional one and is often advocated by irrigation engineers: attempting to improve water 
use efficiencies at all system levels resulting in increased returns to water supplied to the 
fields. The above examples provide several opportunities for technical and managerial 
recommendations, which include to increase field application efficiencies through field 
leveling and reduce conveyance efficiencies (for instance by lining canals and improving 
structures). This would allow the WUAs to spread water more thinly. Similarly, several 
WUAs could better match planned and scheduled water distribution with real crop 
re quirements, resulting in lower RWS. Furthermore, WUA staff could be trained to distribute 
water according to the principle of management by volume instead of management by area 
targets. 
In the case of ARLLD, the water that is saved if this approach is followed could be used 
ir three different ways. First, it could be used to expand the area actually cropped within the 
module areas, resulting in higher returns per hectare of command. Second, it could be saved 
for a supplementary irrigation service during the summer season. However, as rainfall 
generally meets crop requirements in the summer, this strategy would not increase returns per 
land and water. A third way, and one that is now being followed by WUAs like Valle, is to 
sell some of their annual volumetric allocation to other WUAs (see chapter 8). 
A third option would be to allocate less water to the district and to allow more water to be 
used by users downstream of ARLID. As mentioned in the description of the district, 44 
percent of the water available for the nine districts in the basin is allocated to ARLID, while it 
only has 33 percent of the area covered by these districts. This indicates that the allocation is 
relatively high and that other districts receive less water per unit of command than ARLID. 
Technically it possible to introduce the second and third option. Yet, one has to be 
cautious to recommend either one of these on the basis of the data presented above. Keller et 
a!. (1996), Molden (1997) and Solomon and Burt (1999) argue that the above classical 
thinking on irrigation efficiencies can lead to erroneous conclusions and serious 
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mismanagement of scarce water resources. The main argument they use is that the classical 
efficiency approach ignores the potential beneficial reuse of irrigation return flows. 
Translated to the context of ARLID, they would argue that although farmers fail to increase 
the returns to the water supplied, it does not necessarily mean that the non-consumed (or non-
depleted) fraction of that water cannot be reused and generate new returns elsewhere for other 
beneficial (Molden 1997) or reasonable (Solomon and Burt 1999) uses 2 3 . 
Whether the high RWS values and consequently low returns to supplied water can be 
justified given the fact that other users in the basin receive relatively less water, depends on 
how return flows from irrigation can be used both within and outside the district. Thirty-one 
percent of the command area in ARLID is served by wells, which pump water from three 
different aquifers. Each of these aquifers are already over-exploited resulting in an annual fall 
of the static water table from two to five meters per year (Mufioz 1996), approaching depths 
in the range of 100 to 200 meters 2 4. Although the direct hydrological relationships between 
irrigation in ARLID and recharge of these aquifers are not fully clear, one could hypothesize 
that any attempt to increase the consumed factor of the water that is used for surface irrigation 
through rehabilitation and modernization programs would jeopardize groundwater recharge, 
which could result in making groundwater inaccessible to generate any additional returns. 
Scott and Garcés-Restrepo (1999) assess the impact of three alternative scenarios of surface 
irrigation management on static water levels in the middle reach of the Rio Lerma basin 
through the application of a simple conjunctive surface-groundwater model that accounts for 
groundwater recharge from surface irrigation. They show that, contrary to conventional 
thinking, decreasing the surface RWS by 10 percent was simulated to result in an extra 
average decline of 0.91 m/year in addition to a historical average static water level decline of 
2.12 m/year for the 1982-98 period. Increasing the RWS by 10 percent (equivalent to 
increasing reservoir releases by 25 percent) was simulated to reduce average decline to 1.21 
m/year (down from an average of 2.12 m/year). These results indicate that the sustainability 
of groundwater trends are highly sensitive to the surface water management practices. 
Similarly, prior to concluding that water use practices at ARLID have to be shifted to 
producing higher outputs per unit of water applied within the district, it is necessary to first 
develop a better understanding if and how outflows of the district are used more downstream 
in the basin. ARLID is located in the upper reach of the basin. Reducing outflows of ARLID 
would have an effect on the volume of water available to downstream users and consequently 
on the return to water that these users can produce. 
Notes 
1. Parts of this chapter are drawn from Kloezen and Garcés-Restrepo (1998a and 1999b) and 
Kloezen (1998). 
2. For the agricultural year 1997-98 it was decided to not irrigate at all during the winter season and 
to provide only one turn for the 1998 summer season. This decision was the result of exceptional 
low rainfall in central Mexico during the summer and autumn of 1997 and the consequently low 
storage of all major dams. As this decision not to irrigate at all during the winter season falls 
beyond the timeframe of this study, it is not further discussed here. 
3. Article 99 of the Regulations (reglamentos) to the 1992 National Waters-Act. The document that 
stipulates the O&M rules of the district, says that WUAs are obliged to inform CNA about the 
annual irrigation plans (including acreage irrigated and cropping pattern) as well as about the 
maintenance and administrative plans with their respective budgets. It is not clear in what way 
CNA can sanction those WUAs who do not meet these obligations. 
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Ditch tenders have to report yield levels obtained by farmers. Rather than checking actual yields 
of (or sample of) all their farmers, they ask a few farmers in each section of the module to report 
on their yields. As farmers generally sell all their produce to nearby commercial enterprises, these 
reported yields can easily be cross-checked. Comparison between yields reported by other ditch 
tenders in the same module, and by commercial enterprises, agricultural banks and local 
departments of the ministry of agriculture show a high level of consistency. 
Although both CNA and the WUAs in ARLID produce 'exact' efficiency rates (up to two 
decimals), no one could explain how these values were obtained. Tenango and Hernandez (1994) 
give a number of efficiency rates for ARLID for the years 1985-1990, but unfortunately they do 
not explain how these were obtained. 
Among the few exceptions of literature that report on canal maintenance in Mexico are Sijbrandij 
(1989) Zaag (1992) and Sijbrandij and Zaag (1993), who studied farmers' involvement in 
maintenance in the Autlan-El Grullo irrigation district in Jalisco. Most of the (gray) literature on 
maintenance in Mexico focus on measures for aquatic weed control (see for instance the several 
contributions by IMTA in Palacios-Velez et al. 1996). Studies explicitly looking at the impact of 
IMT on canal maintenance programs include: Vermillion and Garces-Restrepo (1996 and 1998) 
on Colombia; Svendsen and Nott (1997a and 1997b), Scheumann and Valletin (1997) and 
Scheumann (1998) on Turkey; Oortbuizen and Kloezen (1995) on the Philippines. Studies that 
looked at the impact of participatory management on the maintenance of pump systems include 
Wester et al. (1995) on Senegal; and Johnson and Reiss (1993) on Indonesia. 
Unlike in irrigation, Integrated Asset Management Systems are commonly used in other fields 
related to infrastructure, such as roads maintenance. Asset management planning deals with the 
identification and inventory of assets and quantifies their condition and their performance both in 
terms of the individual asset and the overall system (Rumsey and Harris 1990, cited in Burton et 
al. 1996). The only two papers on the application of this approach in the field of irrigation that I 
came across are Ferguson et al. (1993) on maintenance planning in the Yanco irrigation district in 
New South Wales (Australia) and Burton et al. (1996) on irrigation investment planning in 
Indonesia. 
The drawback of this 'cluster approach' for this study is that, unlike the present WUAs, CNA did 
not keep their maintenance records at the level of the individual irrigation unit or module level 
but were kept at the level of these clusters. This made a before-after comparison of actual costs 
and volumes of maintenance executed at the level of the modules impossible. 
During the last phase of the field research on which this thesis reports, IWMI in collaboration 
with HR-Wallingford and the Irapuato WUA started an action-research project on priority setting 
in maintenance program planning. The project followed and modified the software-driven 
methodology on condition assessment procedures for irrigation infrastructure, developed by HR-
Wallingford (see Cornish and Skutsch 1997, and Cornish 1998). As this project was started after 
completion of the field work for this thesis, results of this project are not discussed here. The final 
results of this project are published by IWMI (Wester et al. 2001). MARLIN draws heavily on 
Integrated Asset Management Planning theory described in note 7. 
1^ ). Appendix 5 provides some contextual data on cropping intensities, cropping patterns, production 
levels, water use and climate for the particular year reported here. Production values in this 
appendix are already in 'equivalent' yields, following the measurement procedure defined in 
Appendix 4. 
For reasons explained above, dam storage data for La Purisima are excluded from this analysis. 
Unlike for instance Cortazar, Salvatierra does not have one or two large main canals but 6 smaller 
ones. The design discharges do not exceed 3 m3/s (compared to almost 30 m3/s in the case of the 
Coria main canal in Cortazar) and the canals are much shorter. 
l£. Pefla-Pefla and Herrera-Ponce (1999) measured an overall system efficiency of 31.8 percent, 
comprising of a conveyance efficiency of 76 percent for the main and secondary canals, an on-
farm conveyance efficiency of 71 percent, and a field application efficiency of 59 percent. 
1^ 1. Salvatierra has 25 percent of all the users within the district, while it occupies 14 percent of the 
district area. 
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15. According to this manager, the official reason why he had resigned was that he was given another 
job with the Ministry of Agriculture in the State of Guanajuato. However, after a few months he 
was re-hired by the WUA, but this time as the supervisor of the other ditch tenders, which is one 
position below his previous assignment. The reason why he was re-hired is that this person, more 
than any of the other technical staff, was very familiar with the module area as he had previously 
worked in the same area as a CNA employee (see also chapter 7). 
16. Of the selected fields in which water measurements were taken (tables 5.5 and 5.6), in one case 
supply of canal water was not reported by the ditch tender (table 5.5, Salvatierra field 7). 
However, this is the result of problems with updating the list of actual users rather than an 
example of illicit appropriation of water. The part of the Salvatierra command area where this 
field is located has recently been extended, but plots have not been mapped and given proper 
numbers yet, which makes it difficult for the ditch tender to report water deliveries. 
17. Normally in this part of the command area (with pumping depths of 50 to 100 meters) discharges 
of 6 inch pumps range from 35 to 50 liters per second. 
18. After Chambers (1988) drew attention for studying night irrigation, few papers have emerged on 
this subject. An exception is a section in the MSc thesis by Bolding (1992), who describes an 
example of a night control by a Work Inspector in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, India. Also 
for the case of Mexico, documents on night irrigation could not be found. Probably the most 
important reason that explain this is that the combination of robbery, use of weapons, and high 
alcohol intake can make the experience of field visits at night a very unpleasant one (and the 
reason why I did not even attempt to survey at night). 
19. A Starlog System data logger (model 6301B AUE, software version 3.032, November 1995) was 
used to record the water level with an interval of 30 seconds. Subsequently, the 30 minutes 
averages were downloaded as a spreadsheet file and plotted to the three graphs in Appendix 6. 
20. Changes that are due to planned re-setting of the gate have been excluded from this calculation. 
Also, only water level changes of more than 10 percent were considered. 
21. For definitions plus examples see also Kloezen and Garc6s-Restrepo 1998a; Molden et al. 1998; 
Sakthivadivelera/. 1999. 
22. These and all other values in figures 5.8 to 5.10 are based on actual (current) World Market 
Prices for wheat. 
23. Molden (1997) distinguishes between beneficial and non-beneficial uses. Beneficial uses include 
water depletion for consumptive uses and process depletion for beneficial consumptive uses. 
Non-beneficial uses include non-depleted uses like outflows to the sea. Solomon and Burt (1997) 
introduce the parameter 'irrigation sagacity'. In addition to the beneficial uses identified by 
Molden, irrigation sagacity also considers reasonable uses, i.e. those uses that may not contribute 
to agronomic production, but are nonetheless justified under certain particular circumstances such 
as water used to maintain a salt-balance or for other environmental protection reasons. 
24. Chavez (1998, cited in Scott and Garces-Restrepo 1999) reports depths of 500 to 1,000 meters in 
the Salamanca area. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with political accountability mechanisms that influence the administrative 
performance of the new WUAs 1 . It looks at the socio-economic and political relationships 
between leaders and staff of WUAs with the members of these associations2. The level and 
extent of political accountability in WUAs is shaped by the means that users have to monitor 
arid control the decisions taken by their leaders and management. The extent to which users 
actually can monitor and control decision making is determined by the way they are 
represented in the general assemblies and boards of their WUAs. Section 6.2 discusses how 
user representation is formally (de jure) defined in the bylaws that were drafted by CNA 
during the early stages of EMT implementation. In addition, it shows how de facto these users 
are represented and to what extent they can and do monitor and control the decisions that are 
tafeen by their leaders. 
In section 1.3 it was argued that accountability is a process in which mechanisms of 
monitoring and controlling management performance of leaders and staff are created and 
earned. In section 6.3 a detailed account is given of two strategies that leaders of WUAs in 
ARLLÜ have developed in order to maintain and expand their control over decision making 
processes within their WUAs: 1) they try to make use of their political power to become re-
elected as a WUA leader; 2) they use their position as WUA leader to further expand the 
economic and political networks, on which the existence of WUAs more and more depend. 
Examples are given on how users try to counter-balance this to ensure accountability rather 
than despotism. 
In section 6.4 some examples are given on how the above mechanisms of maintaining 
political control are weakened by the employment policies of the WUAs and by the role CNA 
plays in conflict resolution, particularly in the case of conflicts between users and leaders. 
2 User control over decision making processes 
REPRESENTATION IN GENERAL ASSEMBLIES 
Individual membership of WUAs, and the water rights attributed to this membership, is 
regulated through Articles 51, 52 and 67 of the 1994 National Waters Law. All private 
growers and ejidatarios that own or occupy land within the command area of the WUA are 
members of this organization provided that their names appear in the list of users (padron de 
wmarios) which has to be maintained by the WUA (i.e. the official concession holder). This 
list of users is a legal document, annexed to the concession title signed between the WUA and 
CNA, and has to be recorded in REPDA. 
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One of the major challenges that all new WUAs faced when they started was to update 
the user lists. In some cases the list had not been updated for more than 25 years. Yet, for 
demographic reasons, and as the result of the illicit practice of selling and renting out ejido 
land before modification of Article 27 in 1992, there was a large discrepancy between the 
officially registered users, and users who actually owned or occupied the land. Although all 
WUAs have started the process of updating their lists3, by 1998 none of them had finished 
doing so. 
Only farmers whose names appear in the list of users can be elected as representatives to 
the general assembly of a WUA. According to Whiteford and Bernal (1996), one objective of 
the IMT program was to create greater political accountability by introducing a system of 
democratic representation of ejidatarios and private growers in the general assemblies of the 
WUAs. Historically, these two categories of farmers belonged to different farmer unions, 
processing cooperatives organizations, often competing for control over agrarian production, 
access to credit and others means of production whose distribution were controlled by the 
State. The IMT program was certainly ambitious in respect to the fact that it officially tried to 
bring these two user categories together in a management organization (see section 4.2). 
From a democratic point of view, the IMT experience would be a success if both 
categories would have equitable representation in the management of the module. The 
conceptual problem that arises here is the definition of equity4. The official definition of 
equity is clearly defined in the bylaws of each WUA. 'Equitable' representation of the users 
in the general assembly is defined as 'one ejido, one vote for ejidatarios' and 'one 
municipality, one vote for private growers'. For all WUAs in ARLLD this means that 
ejidatarios far outnumber private growers as there are many more ejidos within the district or 
module area than municipalities. Also if one uses other means of measuring representation, it 
is clear that ejidatarios are relatively over-represented in the general assemblies. In the case 
of Cortázar, for instance, this implies that the general assembly comprises 70 ejidatarios (35 
ejidos, each with one representative and one replacement) and 14 private growers, totaling 84 
members. In the case of Salvatierra, 8 private growers compete with 88 ejidatarios (44 ejidos) 
in the same assembly. In Cortázar these numbers equate to one ejidatario representative for 
31 ejidatario members, or for every 140 hectares of ejido land, compared to one private 
grower representative for 71 private growers and for every 876 hectares of private land. In 
comparison, in Salvatierra one ejidatario member represents 58 ejidatarios (or 154 hectares 
of ejido land) and. one private grower represents 122 private growers (or 292 hectares of 
private land). On the other hand, one has to note that particularly in Salvatierra private 
growers have relatively more access to groundwater and hence have less interest in the 
managing canal water. 
Formal representation in the general assembly does not necessarily mean that all 
members have similar control or influence over decision making processes during the 
meetings. Observations of several assembly meetings in various WUAs show that generally 
little discussion takes place. In most cases the meetings are used to inform farmer 
representatives about the irrigation and maintenance programs, the current market prices, 
changes in fee levels, expected problems with diseases, the existence of externally funded 
system improvement programs and other government programs, and on how individual users 
can try to get access to these programs, et cetera5. Discussions, if any, are generally held 
between board members and only a handful of farmers. Real discussions only take place 
during the presentation of the yearly financial statements, when farmers generally ask for 
clarifications (see chapter 7), or during times of conflicts over the (re-) election of board 
members (box 6.1) or modifications of the bylaws (box 6.2). 
It is difficult to assess why most assembly members remain silent during the meetings. 
However, studies on formal farmer organizations in Mexico suggest several possible reasons 
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tb.pt might explain the lack of actual contribution to discussion in general assembly meetings. 
first reason is related to the social, political, economic and ideological differentiation and 
power relationships between generally well-trained and outspoken board members, and 
ccmmon farmer representatives (Zaag 1992). This is particularly the case if the latter group 
belongs to the category of ejidatarios and the former to the group of private growers. Many 
farmers are reluctant to disagree with leaders, on whom they often are dependent 
economically, politically or socially. Female representatives often remain silent during 
official assembly meetings. They have experienced that in a culture dominated by prevailing 
stereotypical ideas about the gender division of labor, it is hard for female WUA members to 
be listened to 6 . 
Probably the most plausible explanation of why user representatives hardly ever 
participate actively in decision making processes in meetings, is that negotiation over access 
and control over resources as well as problem resolution normally takes place in more 
informal arenas rather than in formal settings like assembly meetings. WUA issues are 
heavily discussed in other social-political networks and during all kind of occasions where 
groups of farmers meet. These include gatherings at farmer cooperatives or farmer unions, 
ejldo meetings, political party meetings and social happenings like weddings and festivals. 
A so, WUA issues are normally heavily discussed at the entrance of the WUA office prior to 
the official meetings, when all farmers are waiting for the board members to arrive. It is 
miinly during these 'waiting sessions' that representatives exchange ideas and arguments and 
decide on which decisions they would support and which they would reject. As soon as the 
etings have started, most farmers prefer to leave the presentation of 'their' arguments to 
oiie or two outspoken and generally higher educated and economically and politically more 
powerful farmers who feel less reluctant to argue with board members in public meetings. 
LEADERSHIP AND CONTROL OVER DECISION MAKING PROCESSES 
The second component of the official definition of equal farmer representation stipulated by 
the bylaws of the WUA is that leadership should alternate every three years when elections of 
bcjard members are held. Officially a leader cannot be re-elected into the same position. 
The general popular assumption among observers of the LMT process is that within a few 
yejars private growers would have assumed all leader positions and as a result would have 
taicen de facto control over irrigation management in the districts. Table 6.1 provides some 
information on how the leadership positions were formally distributed between ejidatarios 
and private growers at the start of the second adrninistration in 1996. Of the 12 presidents (11 
WUAs and the LRS), six belonged to the group of ejidatarios and six to the group of private 
growers. Hence, given their lower number in the district, presidents that belong to the 
category of private growers are relatively over-represented. If one looks at all leader positions 
(including the secretaries and treasurers), the distribution of ejidatarios and private growers 
w: thin the boards better reflect the actual distribution of users within the district. In order to 
better understand the significance of these numbers for the desired democratization process 
Ofhiteford and Bernal 1996), three remarks have to be made here. 
First, the de jure distribution of leader positions does not necessarily reflect the de facto 
cdntrol over decision making power within a WUA. For instance, in some WUAs leaders 
other than the president control major decisions. During its first administration (1993-1996), 
the board of Cortazar WUA was presided over by an ejidatario, but it was clear that all 
decisions were actually controlled by the treasurer of the association. This treasurer was a 
large and business-minded private grower, maintaining good relationships with regional and 
national politicians. 
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The second remark is that all three leaders of the LRS are private growers. As it is 
expected that the LRS will become more and more important for the management of the 
district, it is clear that private growers have more control over decision making processes, 
resources and external support programs related to this management. The LRS' ambition to 
expand its mandate to providing agricultural support services other than O&M can also be 
understood within this context. All three leaders run large export-oriented farms and maintain 
extensive contacts and networks with agricultural enterprises and regional and national 
politicians. 
A final remark that has to be made in connection to table 6.1 is in line with the first 
remark. Actual control over power within the WUAs is best illustrated by the way and the 
extent to which leader positions are mobilized within the association, particularly over the 
three administration terms since the creation of the WUAs in 1993. Before this is further 
discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter, it is useful to first discuss to what extent 
common water users are aware of who their leaders are and what they do. 
Table 6.1 Distribution of leader positions between ejidatarios and private growers during 
the second administration (1996 - 1999) 
President Secretary Treasurer 
WUA ejidatario private ejidatario private ejidatario private ejidatarios private 
grower grower grower growers 
LRS 1 1 1 0 (federation) 3 
Acámbaro 1 1 1 3 0 
Salvatierra 1 1 1 2 1 
Jaral 1 1 1 2 1 
Valle 1 1 1 1 2 
Cortázar 1 1 1 2 1 
Salamanca 1 1 1 2 1 
Irapuato 1 1 1 2 1 
Abasólo 1 1 1 2 1 
Corralejo 1 1 1 2 1 
Huanímaro 1 1 1 1 2 
La Purísima 1 1 1 2 1 
total 6 6 8 4 7 5 21 15 
% 50 50 67 33 58 42 58 42 
Total 
Lack of communication between users and their leaders and representatives has been a 
common complaint put forward by many users. Although 90 percent of the 125 farmers that 
were surveyed for this study said they knew that O&M responsibilities had been transferred 
from the government to the WUAs 7 , only 63 percent of these farmers knew who the president 
of their association was. On the other hand, 80 percent knew who their representative was to 
the general assembly of the WUA (table 6.2). The table also shows that private growers are 
generally better aware of who their president is than ejidatarios. At the same time, less private 
growers knew by whom they were represented. This is explained by the fact that large private 
growers normally prefer to deal directly with the president of the WUA, particularly if the 
latter is a private grower himself whom he frequently meets in producer confederations and 
cooperatives. For ejidatarios it is easier to first approach the representatives from his own 
ejido, with whom he generally has daily contact. 
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able 6.2 Percentage of farmers surveyed (n-=125) who know who the WUA president 
id their own representative to the general assembly are 
Knows the president Knows his representative 
yes no Yes no 
] 
1 
I 
yidatarios (n=90) 60 40 87 13 
>rivate growers (n=35) 71 29 62 38 
Ul farmers (n=125) 63 37 80 20 
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Answers to survey questions on how leaders and delegates are actually elected present a 
ss rosy picture of the democratization process (table 6.3). Approximately 70 percent of both 
idatarios and private growers have no idea of how board members are elected. This shows 
)w little control they have over these elections. Ejidatarios are better aware of how their 
ilegates are elected as elections take place in the meetings of the ejido assembly. These 
eetings generally show a high turnout as many other issues are being discussed and decided 
)on (several in connection with other neoliberal reforms, such as the PROCEDE program 
id the sale of ejido land). 
able 6 3 Percentage of farmers surveyed (n-=125) who know how the board of leaders 
id their own representative to the general assembly are elected 
Knows how the board is Knows how own 
elected representative is elected 
yes no Yes no 
I 
1 
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yidatarios (n=90) 34 66 64 36 
"rivate growers (n=3 5) 30 70 35 65 
Ul farmers (n=125) 33 67 43 43 
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In addition to the lack of knowledge of these official election procedures, farmers are 
'en more concerned about the lack of information on what has actually been discussed in the 
eetings of the general assembly. Although minutes of assembly meetings are sent to all 
presentatives, they hardly ever reach the water users. Numerous farmers complain that they 
ere never informed by their leaders and representatives on issues like the start of the 
ligation season, irrigation schedules, the maintenance program, training activities and 
langes in fee levels. Most farmers have to find out about decisions on these issues by 
tperience or via word by mouth. 
Whiteford and Bernal (1996) report that 40 percent of the ejidatarios whom they 
terviewed were not pleased with their WUA leaders, while 78 percent of the private growers 
id they were pleased. According to them, these figures clearly show which group controlled 
e WUA leadership. However, it is doubtful whether the level of satisfaction of each of the 
ro categories is a good indication of who actually controls leadership. Although the above 
scussion on leadership in ARLLD points to relatively higher control over decision making 
ocesses by private growers, an almost equally high percentage of farmers surveyed said 
ey have confidence in e.g. the way leaders manage the WUA financially (see also table 7.1). 
lis indicates that water users do not automatically link their (dis)satisfaction with the 
adership to the fact whether the leader belongs to the same user category. When asked what 
:cording to them is the main reason why leaders wanted to be elected on the board of the 
TJA, only 8 percent of the ejidatarios and 13 percent of the private growers said that they 
:lieved that these leaders primarily wanted to use their position for their own financial and 
)litical benefits. All other farmers said that, according to them, the leaders' main concern 
as to improve the O&M of the district. 
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6.3 Strategies to maintain political accountability 
Strategy 1: remobilization of WUA leaders 
To most leaders, getting elected as a leader of one of the new WUAs is an effective way of 
establishing and reproducing their socio-economic and political relationships with water 
users. As such, becoming a leader of a WUAs is seen as an effective way of gaining more 
control over decision making processes within the organization of agricultural production. 
As was noted in section 6.2, the change or remobilization of leader positions with every 
new administration period of three years is a good indication of who actually controls 
management decisions. Officially, leaders cannot be re-elected into the same position. Yet, a 
common strategy followed by leaders who try to maintain control over WUA management is 
to get re-elected into another position. As is illustrated in box 6.1, a WUA president 
succeeded in getting re-elected in the same position through buying votes and loyalty from 
technical staff and farmers as well as through political manipulation of members of the 
general assembly. In other cases (such as Cortázar), leaders were re-elected into other board 
positions because members of the general assembly had positive experiences with those 
leaders and did not want to lose their access to important political and commercial networks 
and their capacity to manage the WUA in effective and financially sound ways. 
Figure 6.1 shows how leaders and some managers are mobilized in four WUAs since the 
start of their creation in 1992. All initials in bold indicate that leaders were elected more than 
once, generally into different positions. The sequence in their positions is indicated by arrows. 
All other leaders, (whose initials are not given), were elected only once and have stopped to 
play an active role in the board once their terms were over. The figure allows for several 
interesting observations. 
The first observation is that even by glancing at the figure, it becomes clear that some 
WUAs have more bold initials and arrows than others, indicating a higher activity of 
mobilization of leadership and management positions. Salvatierra has clearly the highest 
frequency of re-mobilization and re-election of leaders. As is illustrated in box 6.1, this is 
clearly the result of the WUA president trying to maintain control over the association. At the 
start of every new administration, La Purísima WUA seems to completely replace its leaders. 
In the cases of Cortázar and Irapuato WUAs, one or two leaders are re-elected into new 
positions. In two of these cases, members of the over-seeing committee were re-elected as 
board members, particularly as they had gained experience with WUA matters as well as 
confidence with the other users. 
A second observation is that Salvatierra has had two mid-term elections and Irapuato had 
one election before the official term of the sitting leaders was ended. In the case of Salvatierra 
this was the result of ongoing political struggles within the association and consequently the 
farmers' dissatisfaction with their leaders. In some cases treasurers and secretaries had to step 
down as they had lost their fights with the president of Salvatierra WUA. 
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^Figure 6.1 JA leaders and general managersuacross positions, and within aí is, in four WTTAs 
during three terms of administration, 1992-1999 
WUA Position 
1st term flate 1992- early 1996) 
user category 
2nd term (early 1996- early 1999) 
user category 
3rd term (early 1999 onwards) 
user category 
president AAA (ejid.) - > 
secretary ejidatario DDD (ejid.)— — > 
Salvaticrra t r e a s u r e r ELE (priv. grower) BBB (priv. grower) , 
overseer EEE (priv. grower) ^ 
manager (paid) ARG PLP 
AAA (ejid.) 
DDD (ejid.) private grower 
BBB (priv. grower) 
EEE (priv. grower) 
and FFF(cjid.) -
PLP * FFF C C C > 
CCC (ejid.) 
DLE (ejid.) 
priv. grower 
ejidatario 
CCC and GF 
president ejidatario T 
secretary ejidatario 
Cortazar treasurer JJJ (priv. grower) 
overseer ejidatario 
manager (paid) MVM 
JJJ (priv. grower) ••-••^  
ejidatario """ 
ejidatario """ 
KKK(ejid.) 
GPH SO 
KKK (ejid.) 
ejidatario 
private grower 
ejidatario 
SO 
president private grower 
secretary LLL (priv. grower) , . y 
Irapuato treasurer ejidatario ' •> 
overseer MMM (ejid.) 
manager (paid) JBF 
ejidatario ejidatario 
MMM (ejid.) 
LLL (priv. grower) private grower 
private grower 
RSH,.. EA 
ejidatario 
ejidatario 
private grower 
ejidatario 
EA 
president private grower private grower 
secretary ejidatario 
La Purisima treasurer ejidatario 
overseer ejidatario 
manager (paid) EA 
ejidatariö-.. 
ejidatario 
ejidatario 
ejidataijo'' '"-^  
EA RSH 
ejidatario 
ejidatario 
private grower 
ejidatario 
RSH 
Notes: Initials in bold are leaders that were elected more than once. All the other leaders (both ejidatarios and private growers) were elected only once. 
Initials in italics are general managers who are hired by the WUA (and hence do not represent any of the two user categories). 
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Box 6.1 Political conflicts around the re-election of a WUA president: an example from 
Salvatierra 
According to the bylaws of each WUA in ARLID, every three year the position of president of the 
user association should alternate between the categories of private growers and ejidatarios. The first 
elected president of the Salvatierra WUA was an ejidatario. Unlike most other ejidatarios, this 
person was from a well-to-do family. Furthermore, the family had gained quite some political 
leverage in the town of Salvatierra, which is demonstrated by the fact that the brother of the WUA 
president was the mayor of the city of Salvatierra. 
By the end of 1995, the president had come to the end of his term and farmers had started talking 
about electing a new president. Many farmers welcomed the idea to elect a new leader as the present 
person could apparently not solve the many O&M problems associated with the poor condition of 
mfrastracture, land fragmentation, crop diversity and extremely high number of farmers that had to 
be served (see chapter 5). Furthermore, under his administration the WUA had received quite some 
negative publicity as a result of financial mismanagement, and corruption (see chapter 7). Finally, 
many farmers were fed up with the high turnover and re-mobilization of positions within the board 
of the WUA as well as with the frequent changes of technical staff, including the general manager 
(see figure 6.1). This was believed to be the result of internal political conflicts and favoritism. The 
start of a new administration would provide a good opportunity for a new beginning, with new 
leaders. However, irrespective of the bylaws, the president refused to step down. What followed was 
a high level political battle between two different factions within the WUA, who both tried to 'gain 
votes' by manipulating election meetings as well as individual users and technical staff. 
Mid October 1995: The first open demonstration against the re-election of the president took place. 
A group of about 10 user representatives to the general assembly of the WUA accused the president 
and the treasurer of financial mismanagement (see chapter 7) and of using their positions for 
strengthening their own interests. In addition, the president was accused of "giving loans to himself 
(autopréstamos). This group also warned that they would strongly oppose the re-election of the 
president. 
Mid November 1995: Knowing the tense political situation in the WUA of Salvatierra, the State 
manager of CNA Guanajuato sent a letter to all 44 ejidos within the module area, saying that these 
ejidos should send their representatives to the election of the new general assembly. This new 
assembly should elect from their members the new board of leaders. CNA suggested that none of the 
present leaders nor any of the technical staff that worked for the WUA should attend this meeting. 
CNA also proposed to send an observer to the meeting (without the right to vote). 
13 December 1995: The new assembly has to vote for a new board, including a new president. The 
planned meeting had to start at 9.00 a.m., but more than 30 opponents of the WUA president did not 
allow him to attend the meeting. They also rejected the idea to allow the brother of the president 
(who is the mayor of Salvatierra) to attend the meeting as an observer. For this reason, 
representatives that supported the re-election of the president left the meeting and as a consequence 
there was no quorum. An official observer from the State of Guanajuato suggested to not only allow 
the thirty representatives that opposed the president, but also to invite their replacements to attend 
the meeting. According to the bylaws this is possible and it would guarantee sufficient quorum. 
However, some of the farmers entered the meeting without being able to present the official legal 
documents that show that they were officially registered as users and hence eligible representatives 
to the assembly. This made the observers from both CNA and the State of Guanajuato leave the 
meeting around noon and it helped the supporters of the acting WUA president to postpone the 
meeting. The next day, CNA officially announced in the local press the reasons why the meeting was 
cancelled and informed users that a new meeting would be called for January 
16 December 1995: A new meeting was called by the opponents of the acting president. However, 
this president did not show up and three new board members and their replacements were elected. 
(continue next page) 
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18 December 1995: More than 50 fanners came to the WUA office to officially install the new 
oard. The problem, however, was that the acting president did not show up to hand over both his 
osition and the keys to the office. The office remained closed and nobody could enter the building 
ntil a public notary would have made an inventory of the assets that belonged to the WUA. During 
ie days that followed, supporters of the acting president started arguing that the election of the new 
oard did not have a legal basis as most of the farmers that attended the meeting were replacements 
a the official representatives. Moreover, it was argued that election could not have taken place 
rithout the presence of observers from CNA and the State of Guanajuato. 
n the three weeks that followed, the tension between the two factions increased, resulting into 
lashes between technical staff that remained loyal to the acting president and those who supported 
lie unofficially elected new president. The latter group is led by engineer CCC (see figure 6.1), who 
vould play an important role later on. However, his group lost more and more political clout as 
upporters of the new president felt threatened by the acting president, who in the mean time had 
nobilized quite some political support from his PRI friends, including his own brother (the mayor) 
nd the head of PRI-tied farmers' union CNC. Initially, when the WUA was established in 1992, 
XC supported the acting president but he totally disagreed with the president's attempt to be re-
jected. Moreover, he became more and more concerned with the lack of technical expertise of 
ome of the staff that were hired by the president. 
J January 1996: A new official meeting was called, observed by the head of CNA Guanajuato, the 
Secretary of Agriculture of the State of Guanajuato and the mayor of Salvatierra. Although one third 
if the farmers voted against the acting president, with 51 votes the president was re-elected. Farmer 
X C that had led the group against the president was elected as vice-president. According to some 
epresentatives and technical staff, the election of CCC as a vice-president was the results of 
legotiations that had taken place between these two persons during the weeks that followed the 
neeting of December 16. As soon as the voting results were clear, 30 farmers left the meeting 
vithout waiting until the head of CNA Guanajuato had officially taken notice of these results. 
14 February 1996: A special meeting was called to present the annual financial statement for 1994-
)5 to the assembly. Inuring that meeting a group of farmers, including the new vice-president CCC, 
landed out a 'list of observations" which showed a high number of incidents and accusations of 
ihancial mismanagement and corruption (see chapter 7) . This further weakened the position of the 
aresident and he had to give in on a number of changes in his technical staff, some of whom were 
aired merely because they were politically loyal to the president. Also the ejidatario member of the 
sverseeing committee that controls the board had signed this list of accusations. Later on he was 
rired as the new general manager of the WUA . 
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In other cases, water users from the opposition factions forced the president to accept 
eir candidate to become the vice-president of the WUA (not indicated in the figure), to 
impensate for the re-election of the president. In order to further compensate for his re-
ection, later on the president had to hire this opposition candidate (with the initials CCC) as 
e general manager of the WUA, paying him a very competitive salary. During his time as 
^position candidate for the presidency, as vice-president and as general manager, 
spectively, this CCC had gained sufficient political support from both technical staff and the 
»ers to be elected as the president of the third administration and at the same time assume the 
aid) position of general manager. 
In the case of Irapuato, the general assembly forced the president and the treasurer to step 
)wn one year before the end of the second administration. The main reasons for this were the 
scovery of unjustified cheque payments, and the assembly's and technical staffs general 
ssatisfaction with the president's attitude of favoritism and nepotism. Also in the case of La 
orisima, nepotism caused severe political unrest among both members of the general 
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assembly and technical staff, which were not resolved when field activities for this study 
came to an end. 
A third observation on figure 6.1 is that also general managers are replaced quite 
frequently. In some cases, general managers are replaced because they themselves found 
better job opportunities. In other cases they were replaced because of their disappointing 
performance, or because of a salary request that could not be met. Also, in WUAs like 
Salvatierra, the position of general manager had become a political one. Since 1992, 
Salvatierra has had five general managers, of whom three during the second term of 
administration. All these general managers were hired due to political reasons, either because 
the person was politically closely related to the president, or because he was pushed forward 
by the opposition faction within the association as kind of exchange money for the re-election 
of the president. The Salvatierra case is also an example of how former (unpaid) leader 
positions are manipulated into (paid) management or staff positions. One of the complaints 
brought forward by several farmers and ditch tenders was that general managers hired by the 
president in Salvatierra were paid excessively high salaries8. 
A final observation on figure 6.1 is that only in the case of Cortázar, the position of 
president was alternated between private growers and ejidatarios. In Ixapuato and La Purísima 
ejidatario presidents were replaced by other ejidatarios during the election of the third 
administration while in Salvatierra all presidents so far have been ejidatarios. 
Strategy 2: expanding socio-economic and political networks 
Although the traditional CNA-users patron-client relationships are weakened, they are being 
replaced by new networks of leaders of WUAs, users, private international seed and agro-
chemical companies and local and state politicians. These actors play a role in setting the 
market prices for agricultural inputs, electricity and crop produce and it has become clear that 
many WUAs want to increase their stake in these networks. WUAs have become both 
powerful instruments and actors in the political and the economic arenas of negotiation. This 
makes the position of leader of a WUA a very desired one. To most leaders, becoming a 
president of a WUA brings an opportunity of further expanding their already existing 
networks, rather than starting one. Almost all leaders are elected mainly because they already 
possess several (sometimes up to 20!) positions in all kinds of local organizations like 
production cooperatives, unions, ejidos or political parties. Yet, one can see a clear distinction 
between how these leaders use their new position within the WUAs to further expand their 
own networks. At the risk of over-generalizing and simplifying, WUAs and their leaders can 
be classified by two types of organizations. 
The first type is the heavily politicized WUA, in which local party and ejido politics 
determine decision making processes and resource distribution, including water distribution. 
As is illustrated with the example in box 6.1, leaders of this type of WUAs use their positions 
mainly as spring boards for their personal political ambitions by linking into all kinds of local 
political networks and often by using funds of WUAs to buy votes and loyalty, or by offering 
(relatives of) political friends well paid staff positions within the WUA. 
The second type of WUA is politicized in a different way. Rather than building networks 
around local (municipality, ejidos, etc) political networks, leaders of this group of WUAs are 
more market-oriented. Decision making and resource distribution are determined by cost 
efficiency and the aim to commercialize agriculture. An important" strategy followed to 
accomplish this aim is through networking in order to gain access to (international 
commercial agricultural enterprises, farmer cooperations, farmer unions and higher-level 
(regional, national) politicians and as a result obtain better prices. Generally, these leaders 
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have gained considerable experience with commercial and often export-oriented farming and 
ran large farms themselves. As a result, they do not need the WUA for their own direct 
financial benefit. Interviews with this type of leaders and their staff as well as daily 
observations on how they handle WUA affairs, clearly indicate that they often invest 
considerable amounts of their own money and time. They also keep a very strict and 
tninsparent system of financial administration in order to avoid any possible accusation on 
reit-seeking attitudes9. Yet, although these leaders claim to invest in these networks mainly 
for the benefit of the WUAs, their own farming activities will of course also benefit from 
expanding these networks as it guarantees them first hand access to, for instance, lower prices 
for agro-chemical inputs and participation in externally funded system improvement projects. 
Examples of these business oriented leaders are the presidents of WUAs like Cortázar 
and Valle. These two leaders also played major roles in the establishment of the LRS, which 
aims at more cost-effective and quality-wise better management of the main canal than used 
to be the case under CNA management. They also promote the idea of creating commercial 
trade companies parallel to a group of interested WUAs 1 0 . The idea here is that these 
companies would help to reduce the cost of agricultural inputs to farmers by buying these 
inputs in bulk and selling them to the members of the WUAs that make part of these 
companies. Similarly, they would aim at receiving better prices for their products by storing 
their produce in new store houses run by these companies. 
Probably more important than possessing the position of president of a WUA, is the 
presidents' membership of the hydraulic committee. Membership of the hydraulic committee 
provides these presidents with real opportunities to expand their socio-economic and political 
networks. They can use their official relationship with CNA and other state representatives 
ncit only to gain access to resources from all kinds of externally funded system improvement 
programs, but also to actual decision making on how these resources are distributed. By 
silting on the hydraulic committee, presidents of WUAs do not only have more direct access 
to resources that are channeled through CNA (like the funds of most system improvement 
programs) but also to powerful regional and national politicians. Leaders of Cortázar and 
Valle paid regular visits to the Secretary of Agriculture of the State of Guanajuato as well as 
to the governor of Guanajuato 1 1. This was to discuss the establishment of the LRS, to try to 
increase the level of crop subsidies, or to negotiate the percentage that users and WUAs had to 
contribute to system improvement programs that were paid by and via the government (see 
section 9.5 for an overview of these programs). 
For WUA leaders one way of expanding their socio-economic and (often political) 
networks is by trying to become involved in the provision of services that are not necessarily 
related to improving water management. Most WUAs in ARLID have now started to assume 
responsibilities for providing non-irrigation related services to their users which before the 
neo-liberal reforms used to be delivered by State agencies (see sections 3.2 and 3.3). Table 6.4 
gives an overview of the types of non-irrigation services that WUAs currently provide to their 
members. 
WUAs do not only fulfill their regular tasks related to O&M, admmistration, fee 
collection and system improvements, but have also become active in providing and 
fasiliteting access to information and training on these aspects of system management. In 
addition, they play an active and important role as mediators between users and CNA. 
Piirticularly as members of the hydraulic committee they are in the position to channel 
ccmplaints and suggestions for improvements to CNA. Furthermore, they negotiate with 
CNA the seasonal fee levels and irrigation plans and try to reach agreements on these, which 
in the short run are favorable for their users . 
The provision of non-irrigation services is very diverse in its nature. In the cases of legal 
assistance, the service is largely limited to providing and updating information on water 
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rights. Similarly, most WUAs provide users with or facilitate access to information on current 
market prices, seeds and new agricultural methods. Occasionally, WUAs themselves provide 
training and technical assistance on irrigation methods; in other cases they organize 
workshops in which experiences with running system improvement programs and IMT are 
discussed. However, all these training programs and workshops primarily focus on the user 
representatives to the general assembly as well as to the associations technical staff, thereby 
excluding common water users. 
Table 6.4 Provision of non-irrigation services by WUAs to water users in ARLID 
Type of service Description 
Legal up-dating WUA bylaws and define user representation 
maintaining and updating list of members (and hence define those 
who have legal access to water) 
monitor water user concessions of the WUA 
inform users about REPDA 
inform users on how to get a concession for private wells 
hire a lawyer for conflict resolution 
Agricultural extension advise users on what crop they can best grow (given market, water 
availability and expected diseases) 
inform users about current market prices, seed varieties, new agro-
chemical products, etc 
organize information meetings with enterprises that sell agro-
chemical products and seeds 
Provision of inputs provision of seeds and agro-chemical inputs (through parallel 
organization) 
Agricultural finance try to negotiate better prices or subsidies for agricultural produce 
(with State and federal government agencies) 
if requested, advise private well users on current market prices for 
traded water 
inform users about credit programs of banks and government 
provide individual informal credit in order to help users to get access 
to system improvement programs (very rarely) 
hand-out statements on actual cropping patterns of individual users, 
which they can use to get access to PROCAMP crop-subsidies 
Training and technical 
assistance 
organize own small training programs on water use (for user 
representatives) 
co-organize workshops to discuss current problems and impacts of 
IMT 
facilitate access to training programs organized by CNA, IMT A, 
SAGAR and others (on water use, minimal and zero tillage, etc) 
inform individual users on methods for fertigation 
rent out equipment and staff for laser leveling of individual plots 
Some leaders of WUAs are trying to further improve both the economic position of then-
water users and their own positions by filling institutional voids in the provision of support 
services, which were a result of the dismantling of previous state services. With support from 
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their economic and political networks, these leaders proved to be able to increasingly control 
the provision of agricultural support services other than O&M. Two examples illustrate this. 
The first example is the provision of agricultural inputs. With the dismantling of state 
subsidies for agro-chemical inputs and seeds and with the abolishment of state controlled 
credit institutions, farmers have been left in an institutional vacuum as far as access to cheap 
praductive resources are concerned. As is noted by Appendini (1996), the new set of 
inütitutions such as the productive programs of Programa Nacional de Solidaridad 
(PRONASOL) and PROCAMPO do not fill this vacuum. As a result, farmers are faced with a 
significant increase in costs. In addition, with the restructuring of rural credit institutions, only 
the financially solvent farmers have retained access to credit, which has accelerated social and 
economic differentiation (ibid.; Myhre 1996; de Janvry et al. 1996). Although by law civil 
ncn-profit organizations like WUAs cannot be involved in the trading and distribution of 
agricultural inputs, some user associations in ARLID have started to respond to these price 
ulereases by creating parallel organization that help users to have access to better prices. Jaral, 
Irapuato, Corralejo, Valle, Cortázar, Salamanca and Abasólo have already started to sell agro-
chemicals and seeds at lower bulk prices. So far, Valle WUA has been most progressive in 
this respect by serving approximately one thousand users, not only with inputs but also by 
reiting out to farmers equipment for laser leveling of irrigation fields. Jaral and Corralejo 
follow with approximately hundred farmers that they each served in 1996. Although these 
numbers are still relatively low, it shows the intention of the WUAs to have a greater stake in 
fadlitating access to better prices and services. As was noted in chapter 4, this intention was 
ore of the driving forces of WUA leaders for wanting to establish the LRS. Although none of 
the WUAs have yet started to construct their own storehouses for grains, several associations 
pliy with the idea to bulk store the produce of their members and establish contracts with 
ccmmercial enterprises to sell the produce at favorable market prices. 
The second example of WUA's attempts to gain control over agrarian production is their 
offer to facilitate farmers' access to PROCAMPO acreage based crop subsidies (see section 
3.4). To have access to PROCAMPO subsidies, farmers need to prove how many hectares of 
grains they have actually sown. As all WUAs keep close records of fee payments (and hence 
of the hectares irrigated), they can easily provide users with written statements on a farmer's 
crapping pattern. All WUAs in ARLID have started to hand out these statements free of 
charge1 . The WUAs spend quite some time on administrative handling (for checking the 
crapping patterns and making computer print outs), but they claim they do this for farmers' 
benefits only. Also, they say they 'sell' this service to improve and maintain good 
relationships with their water users. Yet, this service also benefits the WUAs directly in two 
ways. 
First, some WUAs like Cortázar have put conditions on handing out the statements. 
Fiirmers will only receive the written statement on current, and if needed previous, cropping 
patterns if they have settled all their outstanding irrigation fees (if any). In this way the 
association has created an effective means to better control and guarantee its own revenue 
from irrigation. As the income from PROCAMPO (which is approximately 400 pesos per 
hectare, depending on the crop) generally exceeds the dues, farmers accept this condition and 
pressure on the part of the WUA. 
Second, historically the allocation of crop subsidies are characterized by a high extent of 
vote catching from the rural poor. Several studies on the effectiveness of PROCAMPO point 
toward an continuation of this tradition. For instance, Barta (1996) states that during the 
election year of 1994, PROCAMPO was transformed into an overt rural vote-catcher1 . By 
giving WUAs control over farmers' access to PROCAMPO aid, the potential for political 
clientism has also been created within the associations. 
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6.4 Mechanisms that weaken political accountability 
Having dealt with some mechanisms that helped leaders to maintain control over decision 
making and political accountability, below an analysis is given on how political 
accountability can be weakened by employment strategies and conflict resolution, 
respectively. A third way of counter-balancing the negative effects of political accountability, 
is by linking control over decision-making within the WUA more closely to financial 
accountability. This issue will be further dealt with in chapter 7. 
Counter productive employment strategies 
A direct consequence of management transfer is the change in staffing, as all the staff 
responsible for managing canals—the distributary canals and those below—are now directly 
hired by the WUAs. Staff responsible for main system and dam management continue to be 
hired by CNA in Celaya. In general, the managers of the WUAs are responsible for daily 
O&M, although they receive guidelines from the board of delegates. In ARLID, WUAs were 
very reluctant to hire ditch tenders and other technical staff who had been made redundant by 
CNA as a result of IMT. The respondents mentioned four reasons that explain this: 
• WUAs wanted to reduce the number of technical staff to become more cost-effective. 
Whereas CNA generally assigned one ditch tender per module section (approximately 
500 ha), most WUAs decided to hire only one ditch tender for every two sections. In all 
cases, the increase in service area is compensated by having ditch tenders make use of 
motor bikes or small trucks to run the canals; 
• Under CNA, the agency had difficulties in controlling the performance of ditch tenders, 
often resulting in poor delivery of O&M services and rent-seeking behavior. WUAs made 
a strong case for not having to re-hire these staff; 
• WUAs wanted to hire their 'own people,' which in some cases led to hiring relatively 
young ditch tenders, who were well-trained but who lacked experience. In other cases this 
strategy led to favoritism and nepotism, and hiring of poorly trained relatives or other 
persons who were socially and politically closely related to the leaders of the WUA (for 
an example, see box 6.1) 
• The positions of CNA staff used to be heavily protected by labor unions that were closely 
controlled by the ruling PRI party. This made it difficult to lay off staff that had proved to 
perform poorly or to ask field staff to work during off-duty hours in cases of emergency 
or during work peaks in the irrigation season. In order to avoid these problems, WUAs 
only wanted to hire staff that (in the words of a WUA leader) were "not union minded" 
(sindicalista). 
Table 6.5 shows that in ARLID CNA staff levels were reduced from 273 in 1992 to 116 in 
1996, a reduction of almost 60 percent. This means a considerable saving for the government. 
The remaking 116 CNA staff are responsible for the dams and the two main canals only. 
During the time of this study, CNA was still staffing its unit offices within the district, leading 
to hiring a large number of staff that were basically doing nothing. For instance, in 1996 CNA 
was still hiring 12 staff for its field office in Cortázar. This is a very high number, given the 
fact that the main duty of this staff was to deliver water to the Antonio Coria main canal in 
accordance with the weekly delivery schedules and to check whether the gates along this 
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canal were properly set (see chapter 5). Frequent visits to this office showed that most staff 
tried to kill their time by sitting behind their empty desks, reading their newspapers. 
Tiible 6.5 Staff levels before and after transfer in the Alto Rio Lerma irrigation district 
before IMT (8/1992) after IMT (8/1996) 
CNA CNA WUAs Total 
3 11 14 
70 94 164 
19 46 65 
15 41 56 
2 0 2 
7 0 7 
116 192 308 
4 Governance (hired heads and managers) 
Operation 155 
Maintenance 81 
Administration 30 
Monitoring and evaluation 3 
Other 0 
Total 273 
Cmal irrigation area (ha) 85,118 85,118 
A rea per staff member (ha) 312 276 
This relatively large number of remaining CNA personnel explains why total staff 
mimbers (CNA plus WUAs) have increased by 13 percent after transfer. Especially the 
WUAs feel that an unspecified percentage of these CNA staff are residual personnel that for 
political and labor-union-related reasons remain within the agency with no specific tasks. As 
wis noted earlier, this has been one of the major reasons why the WUAs wanted to create the 
LRS. As a consequence, it is expected that soon CNA's staff in the district will be further 
repuced to 30 persons or less, down from 273 staff in 1992, and 116 staff in 1996. 
Although most WUAs succeeded in considerably reducing salary costs by hiring fewer 
biit generally highly motivated and well trained staff, they introduced several new 
employment policies that often proved to be counter productive. The most problematic policy 
that is followed by all WUAs is to hire most technical staff only on a temporary basis. 
Particularly ditch tenders are only hired during the two irrigation sub-seasons, i.e. from early 
D xember until the end of May. In addition, they are often told to take a compulsory and 
unpaid "rest" (descanso) in between the two sub-season. Similarly, when irrigation activities 
are reduced as a result of droughts they can be told to leave without notice. This policy has 
proved to be problematic in two ways. First, it is difficult to keep staff motivated without 
providing them a certain level of security that they can remain within the job. Many ditch 
tenders are continuously looking for more permanent job opportunities, even if these jobs pay 
less. Secondly, and as a consequence of the previous point, all WUAs suffer from high staff 
turnover resulting in farmers complaining about having to frequently work with inexperienced 
new staff that are not familiar with the area. In addition, the WUAs have to continuously 
invest in training new staff and supervising them. 
Another problematic policy that is followed by some WUAs is to have the ditch tenders 
p iy for transport costs associated with running the canals. In these cases ditch tenders have to 
use their own motorbikes and have to pay for fuel out of their own pockets. Generally their 
base salary is a bit higher compared to those ditch tenders that work for WUAs that do pay for 
all transport costs. But naturally ditch tenders try to save on transport costs by running the 
canals less frequently or by not traveling to remote tail-end areas. In other cases, ditch tenders 
arid other staff are compensated through a complex system of gratifications. As this system is 
far from transparent, it leaves plenty of room for rent-seeking attitudes and favoritism. In 
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some WUAs this has resulted in excessively high salaries for "befriended" staff (see table 7.5 
in the next chapter) and unrest among staff. 
CAM's role in conflict resolution between leaders and users 
The second way in which the reproduction of political accountability is challenged is by 
putting pressure on the leadership by both users and CNA. An effective way for users to 
challenge their leaders is by explicitly asking CNA to mediate in conflict resolution. 
The conventional view is that IMT has led to Mexican government withdrawal from 
controlling water management. Although officially the role of the CNA below the main canals 
has ceased to exist, from daily field observations and press reports it is learned that the agency 
continues to play a role in setting the fee levels (chapter 7), in developing and monitoring 
seasonal irrigation and maintenance plans (chapter 5), as well as in channeling access to 
externally funded system improvement programs (chapter 9). Another important role that 
CNA continues to play is as a mediator in conflict resolution within the WUAs. 
Before discussing CNA's role in solving problems within WUAs, a brief overview of 
mechanisms of conflict resolution at other levels within the district are briefly presented 
below. The first level where conflicts might take place is between individual farmers. Most 
irrigation related conflicts between farmers deal with irrigation plot boundaries and stealing of 
water by others during the official irrigation turn of a farmer. In most cases these conflicts are 
resolved between the concerned parties. Occasionally ditch tenders, general managers or 
leaders of the WUAs, and even CNA officials, are asked to mediate. In other cases local 
caciques (moral, social or political leaders) or presidents of ejido assemblies might intervene. 
Severe conflicts over plot boundaries are rarely taken to State courts given the high financial 
and social costs involved. 
A second type of conflicts occur between individual users and CNA or WUAs. These 
conflicts generally deal with defaulting on fee payment or on cleaning requirements 1 5, with 
stealing water, or with damaging irrigation facilities by the water user. In all these cases 
leaders and general managers from WUAs and sometimes CNA officials first talk directly to 
the farmer to try to solve the problem. Generally these management organizations can refer to 
the WUA's bylaws and O&M regulations to show the farmer his rights and obligations as a 
member of the WUA. In some cases CNA and WUAs seek the help of local political or moral 
leaders to convince the farmer about his responsibilities. As neither CNA nor the WUAs have 
legal powers to directly impose fines on defaulters 1 6, help from other federal, state or 
municipality authorities can be sought as well, but this has rarely taken place. For extremely 
difficult cases, WUAs in ARLED have started to hire a lawyer jointly. The role of this lawyer 
is not so much to defend the associations in court but rather to mediate between the user and 
the WUA by explaining to both parties what according to the bylaws and O&M regulations of 
the WUAs the rights and responsibilities are. 
Conflicts between users and CNA or WUA staff and leaders can also start if users feel 
that they are disfavored by CNA or the WUAs. Conflicts over rent-seeking attitudes of ditch 
tenders or other WUA and agency staff are still quite common. Similarly, farmers sometimes 
have conflicts with ditch tenders over untimely or inadequate delivery of irrigation services. 
Under former CNA management it was hard to solve these problems as field staff were hardly 
made accountable to higher agency staff. Moreover, their positions were heavily protected by 
labor unions. Although, these type of conflicts between users and staff continue to take place, 
effective control by the WUA board and representatives of the general assembly, as well as 
the WUAs' loose labor policies, make it much easier to lay off staff who have proved to 
perform poorly or that are corrupt (see the examples in box 6.1) 
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In ARLID real conflicts between WUAs and CNA have not occurred during the time of 
this study. However, examples from other districts in Mexico show how difficult it is for 
Wl JAs to take CNA to court if they feel that they do not receive their irrigation concessions or 
other irrigation services that they have a legal right to 1 7 . Instead of going through the 
politically difficult trajectory of taking the agency to court, WUAs from the La Begofla 
irrigation district (which like ARLID is also managed by the CNA district office in Celaya) 
have frequently taken over the CNA district office in Celaya to express their dissatisfaction, 
for instance with the irrigation plan or imposed restrictions to release water from the dam 
duiing the drought period in 1997-98 1 8. In ARLID, these kind of disagreements over, for 
instance, the fee levels, the irrigation plan, priority setting in CNA's maintenance program, or 
the allocation of funds from external programs, are openly discussed during the meetings of 
the hydraulic committee 1 9 and other public gatherings like workshops and seminars. Unlike in 
La Begofla, these disagreements have never led to conflicts that required external mediation 
by courts nor to be solved through pressure mechanisms such as strikes or taking over of the 
local CNA office. 
Box 6.2 Contested bylaws: an example from Salvatierra 
WUA 
By the end of 1996, the board of Salvatierra WUA decided to 
change its bylaws, amongst others to allow for 16 instead of 8 
srivate growers representatives in the general assembly. The 
•oup that disagreed with the president's general policy and 
larticularly with his attempt to be re-elected (see box 6.1) saw the 
lodifications of the bylaws as a nice opportunity to gain more 
lower over decision making processes within the WUA by 
hanging the system of representation. Their suggestion was to 
ave the ejidos represented in proportion to the size of their 
yidos. In this way larger ejidos would have more representatives 
:han smaller ejidos. This would be in contrast with the current 
ystem in which, irrespective of its size, each ejido has one 
epresentative (plus one replacement). 
The first meeting to discuss these modifications was cancelled 
Decause of the lack of a quorum of 50 percent. Ten days later, the 
iresident suddenly called for a second meeting. Although only 35 
ercent of the assembly members could attend, the president 
ecided to continue with the meeting. However, the issue of 
epresentation was hardly discussed. The main reason was that 
he person who was heading the group of farmers that supported 
he idea of representation proportional to the size of the ejido 
ould not attend. It soon appeared that the mayor of Salvatierra 
own (who is the brother of the WUA president) had called this 
erson away from the meeting. As a town councilor of the PRD 
ipposition party he could be called to meetings by the mayor, 
ome farmers said that this action was clearly orchestrated by the 
president of the WUA. Although he was replaced by someone 
:lse to be the spokesman during the WUA meeting, the WUA 
president simply did away with the arguments by saying that the 
group of farmers that seek to change the system of representation, 
should submit their arguments on paper. He did not allow the 
issue to be further discussed during the meeting and a decision on 
it was never taken. 
Whereas disagreements 
between WUAs and CNA 
could always be solved 
through discussion and 
negotiation, conflicts 
between factions within 
individual WUAs 
frequently demand 
mediation by CNA. As was 
noted in chapter 4, conflict 
resolution within WUAs is 
officially regulated through 
both the bylaws and the 
O&M regulations of the 
WUA and the district 2 0. 
Yet, not all conflicts can be 
solved by simply following 
these laws and regulations. 
First, the daily 
interpretation and local 
transformation of these 
laws and regulations leave 
plenty of room for conflicts 
to be unsolved. Second, in 
some cases factions or 
individual users within the 
WUA explicitly ask CNA, 
and sometimes other 
external people, to mediate 
in conflicts, even if the 
rules for conflict resolution 
are clearly enough defined 
to solve problems within 
the organizational 
boundaries of the WUAs 
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themselves. In general, three types of conflicts were observed for which mediation by CNA 
was sought. 
The first type of conflicts deals with the election of leaders. As the example in box 6.1 
showed, the official regulation that leaders cannot be re-elected can be easily lifted under 
political pressure and manipulation. Although CNA decided to step in between the two 
factions that were fighting for the presidency of the WUA, it could only observe and report on 
the meetings. Its role was limited to checking whether the election were held with sufficient 
quorum, and whether those farmers that wanted to vote had been actually been elected as user 
representatives and as such were also registered in the user list of the WUA. However, as an 
external observer, CNA officials could not prevent the president from being re-elected. 
The second type of conflicts that needed mediation by CNA deals with contesting the 
meaning of user representative to the general assembly. The example in box 6.2 shows that in 
some WUAs farmers try to gain more control over decision nialring processes in the general 
assembly by changing the definition of user representative. Rather than electing one user 
representative per ejido, proportional representation according to the ejido size (in terms of 
hectares, number of ejido members, or both) is favored by some farmers. The example also 
shows how easy it is for the ruling WUA leader to manipulate the decision on user 
representation in his favor by using his political networks to push his opponent out. Also in 
this example CNA officials, as well as a lawyer, were invited to attend the meetings that dealt 
with the intended modification of the bylaws, but their roles were marginalized to answering 
technical and legal oriented questions. 
A third type of conflicts within WUAs deals with farmer's dissatisfaction with the 
leadership of the WUA. Several causes of farmers' dissatisfaction have already been 
discussed in this chapter and include financial mismanagement and corruption, nepotism and 
other forms of favoritism on the part of the president. In the case of Irapuato, representatives 
of the general assembly were able to vote the president and the treasurer out. When these two 
persons refused to step down, other leaders and farmers that had pushed the replacement of 
the two board members called upon the CNA head of the district to mediate. Although this 
CNA official did not have the authority to force new elections, his moral position as a State 
representative helped to replace the entire board. 
6.5 Conclusions 
Members of the new WUAs consider equity in user representation in the general assemblies 
to be crucial for the legitimization and proper functioning of these associations. A popular 
assumption on the Mexican IMT program is that powerful private growers will de facto take 
control over decision making processes. The results from ARLID do not fully support this 
assumption. De jure, ejidatarios still posses approximately 60 percent of all leader positions. 
This is clearly the result of the way the new institutional arrangements for irrigation 
management were implemented: building on an already existing strong institutional 
organization of user groups (ejidos and organizations for private growers) and the definition 
of bylaws of the WUAs that foresee in user representation of both groups. However, there are 
clear signals that de facto private growers control powerful decision making entities such as 
theLRS. 
One of the strengths of the Mexican IMT program is that it allows for local modifications 
of the policy implementation strategies, including the way user representation is organized. 
However, at the same time this could also be one of its weaknesses, because it allows for 
ample political manipulation of decision making arrangements by politically powerful leaders. 
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Some WUAs have started to argue that user representation to the general assemblies should 
be organized differently. However, the arguments and strategies used by leaders and user 
representatives who advocate these modifications are not very transparent and could lead to 
over-representation of economically and politically powerful farmers, at the cost of other 
users. 
A major weakness of the current arrangement of user representation to the general 
assemblies of local service organizations, is the almost non-existent flow of information to the 
other recipients of irrigation and non-irrigation services. Common (non-representative or 
leader) users are hardly aware of both the decision making and election processes. Nor are 
they adequately informed about the results of these processes. As a consequence, users 
complain about the lack of information on the content and timing of irrigation service 
delivery. As a result, it is difficult for the constituencies of the user representatives to make 
thesie representatives accountable for the way user concerns and ideas are being brought 
forward in the meetings and decision making processes. In practice, this implies that "user 
participation" in decision making over the provision of services does not go beyond the 
members of the executive boards, general assemblies, LRS and the hydraulic committee. 
Another concern of the current arrangements of user representation is that clear 
mechanisms that help to prevent the re-election of leaders do not exist; not even if these 
leaders have used their positions for personal financial and political gains. Although the 
bylaws of the WUAs mention that leaders cannot be re-elected, remobilization of leaders to 
other or even the same positions do frequently occur. Mechanisms of favoritism, nepotism 
and political or moral persuasion of user representatives and even technical staff make it very 
difficult for common users to make these leaders step down. On the other hand, there also 
exist some positive mechanisms that help users who disagree with these policies of re-
mobilization and re-election of leaders to signal out their dissatisfaction. The most powerful 
of these mechanisms is the paying of service fees, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Although it is very difficult for users to fully default on paying service fees, users have been 
successful in forcing leaders to change their staffing policy (i.e. practices of favoritism and 
nepotism) by simply refusing to except an increase in the level of service fees. 
Finally, there exists a genuine concern on the part of the Mexican irrigation bureaucracy 
the involvement of WUAs in the provision of non-irrigation services might shift their 
attention away from delivering adequate O&M services, as some leaders will find the 
provision of this type of services more lucrative, both financially and politically. Although so 
far field observations in ARLED have not supported these concerns, it is important to closely 
monitor whether indeed the provision of non-O&M services by WUAs does not negatively 
affect their main responsibility, i.e. the provision of irrigation services. 
that 
Notes 
Parts of this chapter are drawn from Kloezen (2000). 
Mechanisms of political accountability also exist at levels beyond the boundaries of WUA-user 
relationships. Examples of these include accountability between local CNA staff and CNA staff at 
higher levels of the irrigation bureaucracy; or between higher CNA bureaucratic levels and 
regional or national politicians. Although I am fully aware of the importance of these higher 
levels of political accountability mechanisms for the understanding of construction and 
reproduction of irrigation institutions, these were beyond the scope of this study (see section 1.7). 
In some cases this process was facilitated by the Ejido Land Rights Certification Program 
(PROCEDE) which aimed at formalizing the tenure of former ejido land in order to better 
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regulate the privatization of ejido land (Article 27 of the Constitution) under the coordination of 
the Agrarian Attorney General's office (Procuraduría Agraria). PROCEDE initially won support 
from the farmers as it would legitimate already existing practices of selling and renting ejido land 
and improve access to credit and other agricultural support services (Goldring 1996b). However, 
its execution was heavily delayed, partially because of disputes over land boundaries and farmers' 
resistance to fully privatize ejido land (Nuijten 1995). In addition, overburdened field staff from 
the Procuraduría Agraria have used an arsenal of threats and pressure tactics to force ejidatarios 
to vote to join PROCEDE, which further stimulated fanners' resistance to become officially 
registered (Baitenmann 1998). As a result, PROCEDE has helped little to speed up the updating 
of lists of water users. 
4. For the many definitions and conceptions of equity in the context of irrigation management, 
reference is made to contributions in Boelens and Dávila (1998). 
5. Occasionally, outsiders are invited to present new products like seeds or agro-chemicals, to 
provide short training programs or to present results of ongoing studies or other activities within 
the module area. 
6. For case studies on female participation in the context of irrigated agriculture in Mexico see Brunt 
(1992), Villareal (1994), Monsalvo-Velázquez (1997), Ahlers (1999) and Vera-Delgado (1999). 
In addition to not being listened to once they are elected to the general assembly, a more 
structural problem for the involvement of female users in WUAs, is that very few women are 
legally recognized as property owners and hence are not considered to be eligible for membership 
of the WUA. In order to become a member of the WUA (and hence to be potentially elected as a 
representative) one has to be a legal land owner. In general, less than 20 percent of all land titles 
are registered in the name of women. As a result, the number of women that are elected are user 
representatives in the general assemblies of WUAs is insignificant. Ahlers (1999) reports that in 
the case of the Lagunera irrigation district, only 2 percent of all user representatives are women. 
Moreover, from this group most women are widows, who generally informally transfer their right 
to exert their membership to male relatives such as their sons (Vera-Delgado 1999). Although 
most women lack formal membership of WUAs, one has to be careful to conclude that women 
have no influence on decision making processes related to access to and control over irrigation. 
As is observed by Zwarteveen (1997), as backstage actors women are sometimes involved in 
WUA matters in non-formal ways. 
7. Several people to whom I mentioned this high percentage of farmers' awareness that the WUAs 
are now managing the system were skeptical as they assumed that few farmers would have know 
that CNA has transferred responsibilities to the new WUAs. But the explanation is simple: in 
ARLID all farmers have to come to the WUA office to pay their fees prior to receiving any water. 
All WUAs in ARLID have done a very good job in showing the world who they are, generally by 
painting the name "Civil Association of Agricultural Producers of Water Users Association so or 
so") in big letters on the walls and gates of their offices. This is hard to miss for anyone who 
visits these offices for the first time. Also inside the offices, poster presentations of assembly 
meetings and social gatherings, pictures of proud fanner leaders, paintings and slogans make 
anyone who enters the office aware of the fact that the place is run by a farmer association rather 
than by a government agency. Finally, the receipt of the fee payment clearly mentions that the fee 
has been paid to a WUA. Of course, the fact that virtually all farmers know that responsibilities 
for O&M (including fee collection) has been assumed by their own user association does not 
necessarily imply that they also know how the WUA functions or what their institutional and 
financial relationships are with government agencies. 
8. For instance, a general manager in Salvatierra was paid almost twice the salary of a general 
manager in Cortázar WUA and only slightly less than the CNA head (Chief Engineer) of the 
district. 
9. I have several first hand experiences with this. For instance, the board, of Cortázar WUA had 
offered me free office space in the building of the association (which they had bought out of their 
own resources). The only condition to this generous offer, put forward by the then treasurer and 
later president, was that they would keep close track on all phone calls (which was easy as the 
bills were specified per call) and use of their photocopying machine. They insisted in presenting 
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me with an official bill for this every month. When I offered to leave them my furniture, motor 
bikes and some other items as a kind of payment, the president again insisted that we should 
specify these items in an official letter from the institute. When asked about this unexpected high 
level of administrative accuracy, the president explained that rumor had that some members of the 
general assembly farmers thought that I was paying him under the table. These, and many other 
incidences, show the effort this president took to be regarded as clean as possible. He also 
explained that for him (being a well to do large farmer) these kinds of petty payments, if any, 
would not be worth the loss in social status. 
Due to favorable tax regulations for WUAs (which are considered as non-profit civil 
associations), the Mexican law does not allow WUAs to become involved in profit-making 
activities. As a consequence, any kind of commercial trading that favor the members of the 
WUAs should be done by parallel organizations that are officially independent from the WUAs. 
In July 2000, this governor was elected at the first PAN president of Mexico (see also chapter 3, 
note 4). 
This, of course, does not necessarily mean that the outcome of these negotiations are favorable for 
the overall viability of system management. For instance, as will be demonstrated in chapter 7, 
the WUAs concurred with the farmers' wish to negotiate in the hydraulic committee a 
stabilization of fee levels. As a result, however, none of the WUAs were able to keep up with 
annual inflation rates, which have put these associations in financial jeopardy. 
Some WUAs ask 1 or 2 Mexican pesos for administrative handling and photo copies. 
According to Barta (1996), about 3.5 million rural families received PROCAMPO money from 
the PRI government on the eve of the elections. 
Before the start of the irrigation season, all users are obliged to clean the field ditches adjacent to 
all plots that they plan to irrigate. If done so, the farmer receives a chit from the ditch tender 
which mentions that the farmer has sufficiently cleaned his ditches. Only after receiving this chit 
the farmer can pay his fee prior to receiving his first irrigation turn. 
In case of unauthorized appropriation of water (for instance by illegal wells), damage to irrigation 
facilities and defaulting on fee payment or ditch cleaning, CNA has to make an official report and 
in some cases can also cut off the farmer from water supply by closing the well or canal 
structures. Fines can be made in the name of CNA, but CNA has to call on the help from other 
authorities to actually impose the fine (Articles 119 to 123 of the National Waters Law of 1992). 
WUAs lack any of these powers. 
See for instance the case mentioned in chapter 7, in which users from the Bajo Rio San Juan 
irrigation district in Taumalipas State are accusing CNA for depriving them of irrigation water 
from the Cuchillo dam in favor of water supply to a powerful industrialist in the City of 
Monterrey. 
Compared to ARLID, the relatively small irrigation district of La Begofia has shown many 
conflicts, not only between the four WUAs and CNA, but above all between the WUAs within 
the district. As far as I could judge from a distance (through local press reports and infrequent 
visits to some WUAs in this district), many of the conflicts between WUAs are rooted in several 
clashes between different political factions within the district. As a result, these WUAs could not 
come to agreements on their irrigation plans, for which they often (to my personal judgment, 
improperly) blamed the CNA district office in Celaya. 
See section 8.3 for an example of such a discussion on water trading between WUAs. 
The obligation to define O&M regulations at the levels of both the district and the WUA are 
clearly stipulated in the National Waters Law of 1992 (Articles 50 and 66) and its 1994 
Regulations (Articles 90,91 and 101). 
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Creating financial accountability and self-
sufficiency 
7.1 Introduction 
One of the main objectives of the Mexican IMT program was to establish financially sound 
mechanisms of cost-recovery and self-sufficiency. Advocates of neo-liberal financial-
institutional reforms propose the introduction of quasi-market incentives into the management 
of large-scale irrigation systems (e.g. Repetto 1986; Uphoffeí al. 1991; World Bank 1993; 
Rosegrant et al. 1995; Briscoe 1996; Saleth and Dinar 1999). Two concepts are central in the 
reasoning behind these policies: financial autonomy and financial accountability (see section 
1.3). In this chapter an analysis is made of the financial viability of the post-transfer 
institutional arrangements for irrigation management1. This is done by giving detailed 
accounts of practices and mechanisms of financial accountability, transparency, autonomy 
and rent-seeking. Furthermore, the chapter provides a detailed analysis of the impact of 
irrigation management transfer on both the financial self-sufficiency of the WUAs and the 
change in cost of water to farmers. 
2 Mechanisms of financial accountability 
PAYMENT OF IRRIGATION SERVICE FEES 
Both before and after management transfer, farmers were supposed to settle their fees prior to 
receiving their irrigation turn. Before transfer, farmers had to go to the CNA Unit offices to 
pay their irrigation fees. Interviews with CNA officials and farmers indicate that many 
farmers did not pay their fees for several reasons, including: the long distances that farmers 
had to travel to these offices; the long hours farmers had to wait in line to pay their fees; the 
extra unofficial transaction costs (bribes) farmers had to pay to the fee collectors; the practice 
of bribing the ditch tenders directly rather than paying the official fee; and, the lack of legal 
power that CNA had to sanction defaulters. 
After transfer, farmers pay the WUAs directly. Only 2 percent of the farmers surveyed 
said that payment has become more difficult after transfer. Forty percent reported that the 
p-ocess of paying has become much less cumbersome after transfer. The most important 
reasons for this, mentioned by farmers are the following. 
Shorter distances to travel, because of the establishment of more offices where farmers 
can make their payments. Many farmers complained that before transfer they had to travel 
much longer distances to make their payments to CNA 2. CNA used to have only a few offices 
within the district. Several farmers recalled that they never knew to which of the CNA offices 
they were supposed to go. A private farmer from Cortázar mentioned that he first was 
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supposed to travel to Irapuato to make his payments, then the office was changed to 
Salamanca, subsequently to Cortázar, and finally again to Salamanca. Also, many farmers 
remembered that frequently they had to get up between 3.00 a.m. and 5.00 a.m. to be sure to 
be at the office in time. Although these offices generally opened at 8.00 a.m. (until 1.00 p.m.), 
farmers made sure that they were at the office at 7.00 a.m. (and in some cases even at 5.00 
a.m.) to join the queue. Farmers mentioned that this was necessary as only a fixed number of 
fanners per day could make their payments. If you arrived too late, you had to come back the 
next day and start the same procedure all over again. 
At present, all eleven WUAs have their own offices where farmers can go to pay their 
dues 3. Farmer can come at any time they like during office hours, which is generally between 
8.00 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. As soon as a farmer knows when he wants to receive his irrigation 
turn, he can come to the office and pay for it. 
Improved service delivery by and reduction in unauthorized payments made to 
adniinistrative staff who collect the fees. Compared to the situation prior to transfer, farmers 
now report that they are more satisfied with the professional and personal attitude of the 
WUAs' fee collectors. Whereas farmers say that they had to regularly pay the CNA fee 
collectors a bribe (in addition to the official fee), they now say that current administrative 
staff of the WUAs do not ask for these extra-official payments. The three main reasons that 
explain the difference in attitudes between former CNA staff and current administrative staff 
that is hired by the WUAs are that: 1) WUA staff are hired and directly controlled by the 
users themselves, which stimulates better quality of the services that they deliver; 2) most 
administrative staff are well trained and have a good professional record; 3) as discussed 
below, all WUAs have started using computers, which helped to increase adniinistrative 
efficiency, transparency and flexibility in fee payments. 
FINANCIAL AUDITING AND TRANSPARENCY 
By assuming O&M responsibilities, WUAs also took over full responsibility for financial 
management. According to the O&M manual (which is a legal document attached to the 
concession title), any user association has to implement two mechanisms that help to control 
financial management. First, every year the WUAs should submit their O&M budgets to 
CNA. Although CNA does not posses the authority to reject the proposed budget, it does 
provide WUAs with strict guidelines and formats for developing these budgets 4. The most 
important guideline they give is that the WUAs should allocate 60 percent of their total 
budgets to maintenance, 25 percent to operations and 15 percent to administrative expenses 
(salaries included). From observations and interviews it was learned that most WUAs strictly 
follow these guidelines. But as will be demonstrated below, actual expenditures differ 
considerably from these planned allocations, without CNA taking measures to check this. 
Another requisite towards CNA is, that each month the WUAs should submit statements of 
their actual expenditures. In theory, this should provide CNA with information to check on 
the financial management of the WUAs. However, in reality this kind of control hardly takes 
place. 
A second financial control mechanism is the internal auditing, done first by the board of 
the WUA, and subsequently by the general assembly. Leaders and managers of all 11 WUAs 
indicated that this is more important than the external auditing done by CNA. In practice, 
almost weekly the president and the treasurer of the WUA check the accounts and payments 
made. In the case of Cortázar, for instance, every week the president asks the administrative 
staff to make print-outs of all the expenses and income of that particular week. Major 
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expenses always need the authorization and signature from the president and sometimes also 
from the treasurer. Although the president from Cortázar WUA visits the office only a couple 
of hours a week, technical and administrative staff have almost hourly telephone contact with 
him to discuss expenditures. 
The president and other board members are in turn controlled by the general assembly of 
farmer representatives. In theory they have the authority to turn down budget proposals. 
However, observations of assembly meetings learned that few farmers question these 
proposals and even fewer farmers provide suggestions for modifications. Similarly, at the end 
of the agricultural year, the board presents an overview of the total income and expenditures. 
However, assemblies of most WUAs take these statements for granted and only ask for some 
minor clarifications. As such, the assembly does not serve as a real check and balance 
mechanism but rather as an instrument to have the budgets formally approved5. Only in a few 
cases (like in Salvatierra in 1996 and in Irapuato in 1998) it was observed that several user 
representatives had serious doubts about the expenditures made. They questioned in public 
the general financial policy followed by the leaders. Some serious charges against the 
leadership of these WUAs were made. Some of these complaints even made it to the local 
press and included6: 
<> general misuse of WUA funds for personal benefits; 
" unjustified check payments; 
« lack of proper tax declarations; 
<» lack of transparency on various staff allowances and gratifications such as payments for 
over time, good performance and vacations; 
<» lack of control on special loan schemes for staff; 
<• lack of a complete inventory of assets owned by the WUA. 
These kind of accusations have invited several types of action and reaction on the part of 
the user representatives. In the cases observed in Salvatierra and Irapuato, user representatives 
asked higher CNA officials to step in as mediators in the conflict. In most cases the CNA 
head engineer for ARLID had been invited as an observer to the meetings in which these 
complaints were discussed. In other cases, also the CNA representative of the State of 
Guanajuato and even the Secretary of Agriculture in Guanajuato had to intervene and settle 
the conflict between those who supported the financial policy of the leaders and those who 
disagreed. However, in all cases the final decision was taken by the general assembly by 
means of vote. As was demonstrated in chapter 6, these votes are highly manipulated by 
political factions within the assembly. In the case of Salvatierra the result was that the 
president was re-elected, whereas in Irapuato the president had to step down. 
Another strategy that is followed by all WUAs is, that they decided to ask for an annual 
financial audit by external independent auditors. Also, WUAs have started to use computers, 
which dramatically facilitated the administrative and financial management by the 
associations. This has largely helped to increase the financial transparency of the WUAs. At 
any moment administrative staff of the WUAs can produce financial statements which show 
all the income and expenditure. Similarly, when farmers come to pay their fees, the staff that 
collects the fee as well as the farmer immediately see to how many irrigation turns the farmer 
is still entitled to, for many hectares, for which crops 7, for how many turns he has already 
paid, and consequently what his total dues to be settled are. At the same time, the farmer 
receives a computer print-out of the receipt which shows when the farmer is due to receive his 
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water and for which plots. The farmer needs to show this receipt to the ditch tender in the 
Box 7.1 Controlling bribing practices: three examples 
1. A common strategy of WUAs to control ditch tenders' bribing practices, is to frequently shift 
them to other sections of the module. In this way, WUAs try to prevent ditch tenders to 
establish close personal relationships with their users. During several occasions, it was 
observed that ditch tenders were shifted after users had complained about malpractices of the 
ditch tender, including asking for high bribes. In one occasion the ditch tender was the cousin 
of the former president of the WUA. This president was a well respected person and lived in 
the same module section where the ditch tender worked. Although farmers had complained 
about the ditch tender before, it was difficult to fire the man as long as his uncle was still in 
charge as a president. When a new president took office, the ditch tender still kept his job, but 
only until it was reported that he had had a fight with one of the farmers. The new president 
immediately took this as an opportunity to fire the ditch tender, and to hire someone who had 
no personal connections with farmers and leaders in the area where he had to run the canals. 
2. In another module, farmers complained heavily about the bribing practices of the supervisor of 
a group of six ditch tenders. Besides being a supervisor, he was also working as a common 
ditch tender, serving one of the module's section. Because of his excessive bribing practices, 
farmer representatives wanted the WUA leadership to fire this ditch tender cum supervisor. 
However, rather than firing the person (who had frequently shown his loyalty to the WUA's 
president), the board decided to take away his position as a supervisor as well as to shift him 
to another canal, where he had not yet established personal relationships with water users. 
3. Ditch tenders are not the only technical staff who take bribes. In one case, the president of a 
WUA came to know that the general managers of the module had illicitly handed out bogus 
receipts of fee payments to some befriended farmers. Farmers need to show these receipts to 
ditch tenders as a proof of payment. By using these bogus receipts farmers can receive an 
irrigation turn without having paid for one. As a reaction, the board took immediate action and 
fired the manager. Officially the manager had accepted a job offer outside the irrigation 
district, but everybody knew the reason why he had left. By letting the manager go, the board 
made a clear signal to the rest of the technical staff, indicating that they did not accept any 
rent-seeking practice. Yet, as the manager was the most experienced person in the module 
(who had worked with CNA for a long time in the same area), the WUA felt that they needed 
his skills and experience and requested him to come back. However, rather than re-offering 
him his former position as a manager, he could only return as a supervisor of the ditch tenders. 
He gratefully accepted this offer (showing that his other 'job offer' was not as serious as he 
wanted everyone to believe). By offering him this lower position, the board could still signal 
out that it does not accept any malpractices. This became ever more evident as the new 
manager was a well trained but very junior person, being half of the former manager's age (but 
yet his superior). 
field as an evidence that he has paid his irrigation turn. 
The use of computers was initiated by the WUAs themselves. Most WUAs hired private 
ICT-consultants, who developed and installed the required software. Some WUAs received 
computer training from CNA, but most associations sent their administrative staff to private 
courses. The WUAs use software not only for their financial administration and to keep 
record on fee payments, but also for maintaining information on irrigation plans, delivery 
schedules, cropping patterns and user registration. 
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These transparency mechanisms have positively affected farmers' confidence in the 
financial management of their WUAs. Table 7.1 shows that 56 percent of the respondents of 
the farmer survey says to have confidence in how the WUA is managed financially, whereas 
23 percent report not to have any confidence in how financial resources are managed, 
i^nswers to questions on financial management considerably vary across the four WUAs 
where the survey was held and confirm the above observations on lack of financial 
transparency in Salvatierra. Of all farmers surveyed in Salvatierra, only 13 percent said to 
have confidence in the financial management of the WUA, whereas 55 percent says not to 
trust how the association deals with financial matters. In comparison, 72 percent of the 
respondents in Cortázar, 89 percent in Valle and 67 percent of the farmers surveyed in 
Huanimaro responded as having confidence in their WUA's financial management. 
Table 7.1 Farmers confidence in the financial management of their WUAs 
Ejidatarios (n=90) Private growers (n=35) All (n=125) 
Farmer has confidence 57 56 56 
Farmer has no 24 18 23 
confidence 
Don't know 11 21 14 
No answer 8 6 7 
CONTROLLING RENT-SEEKING PRACTICES IN WATER DISTRIBUTION 
Financial accountability and transparency are largely determined by the extent to which 
practices of bribing irrigation staff are controlled. In irrigation it is important to distinguish 
between three forms of bribery at the local (i.e. irrigation district and below) level 8. The first 
form of bribery is a mechanism to control access to water, which manifests itself in patterns 
of water distribution that deviate from formal and planned patterns. 
A second form of bribery deals with mechanisms of appropriation of large sums of 
money. This kind of bribery normally manifests itself in design, rehabilitation and sometimes 
maintenance of irrigation infrastructure, in which often lucrative contracts are involved. 
The third form of bribery is related to getting access and control over political power. 
This type of bribing generally manifests itself in for instance WUA leaders manipulating 
water users to re-elect them. Also, sometimes it takes bribes to buy higher agency staff, 
politicians and other political influential persons that help leaders as well as the WUAs to get 
better access to all kinds of O&M and non-O&M services. This chapter only deals with the 
first form of bribing, i.e. the one in which bribing is used to try to structure water distribution 
practices9. Like in most other gravity irrigation systems in the world, farmers in ARLID 
occasionally make extra-official payments to ditch tenders and other technical staff in return 
for better services in irrigation deliveries. 
Both before and after management transfer, one can find three clearly distinct 
iistitutionalized types of practices of bribing ditch tenders. Whereas the first type of practice 
has hardly any impact on the patterns of water distribution, the second and third modes have. 
The first, and most common, practice is to pay ditch tenders a small tip. All farmers can report 
cn cases in which, in addition to the official irrigation service fee, small amounts are paid to 
have for instance a little more than the entitled area irrigated, or to have irrigation supplied at 
afferent times than programmed 1 0. These payments basically serve to establish and maintain 
the relationships between farmers and ditch tenders. They also help to better accommodate 
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the official irrigation schedule to the individual needs of farmers in terms of timeliness of 
deliveries. Farmers themselves hardly regard these payments as bribes (mordidas), but prefer 
to talk about tips (propinas)11. These payments are generally not more than the price of a cool 
dtink and hardly ever exceed 50 pesos (US$ 3.00). Although these payments are important to 
massage local relationships between users and irrigation staff, they do not influence common 
mechanisms of water delivery as described in chapter 5; water distribution in the observed 
canals is predominately determined by the official irrigation schedule and the practice of 
delivering the amount of water that is required by the farmer to irrigate the area that he has 
paid a water right for. The kind of bribing discussed here stimulates minor deviations from 
these schedules 1 2, but does not deprive other farmers from their official irrigation turns 1 3 . 
The second mode of bribing in connection to water distribution is less common but does 
have an impact on access to water by other farmers. In all four modules where farmers were 
interviewed on rent-seeking attitudes of ditch-tenders and other technical irrigation staff14, 
farmers reported on cases of private well owners (who are not entitled to use canal water) 
bribing ditch tenders to supply canal water to fields irrigated with wells. This would save the 
well owner considerable pumping costs. As these private well owners are often large land 
holders, the amount of extra land to be irrigated is considerable and therefore generally 
influence the availability of water for those farmers who are officially entitled to receive canal 
water. One of the present leaders of a WUA admitted that when the system was still managed 
by CNA he frequently bribed CNA ditch tenders to supply canal water to him with which he 
could irrigate more than one hundred hectares of his land. As these lands were officially 
registered as being fed by his private wells, he was not entitled to receive canal water. Yet, 
every season he paid the ditch tender thousands of pesos to receive this water. He also 
admitted that he never bothered to come to the CNA office to pay his dues for his lands under 
canal irrigation but instead preferred to pay the CNA ditch tender directly. As large volumes 
of water are involved here, it is almost impossible to also supply the scheduled volumes to 
those farmers that have a (paid) right to canal water, even with RWS values as high as 2.0 at 
the level of the distributary and tertiary canals (see chapter 5). 
Whereas the 'tipping' mode of bribing only involves a farmer and a ditch-tender, in the 
second mode of bribing also other technical staff can be involved. The last example in box 7.1 
illustrates that farmers sometimes can bribe the general manager of the WUA to illicitly hand 
out irrigation receipts to them. In other cases it was observed that both the ditch tender 
responsible for a certain section of the module and the supervisor of all ditch tenders within 
one module were involved in these practices. 
The third type of bribing practices that influence water distribution is much more indirect 
and hence more difficult to observe. It refers to the examples provided in chapter 6 on how 
WUA leaders manipulate and 'buy' farmers loyalty as a means to strengthen their positions 
within the association. As the example in the previous chapter shows, some leaders use their 
technical field staff (particularly ditch tenders and the chief of ditch tenders) to gain votes 
from the user representatives to the general assembly for their re-election. It has been 
observed that some of the ditch tenders who were afraid of losing their jobs showed their 
loyalty to these leaders, even though they disagreed with the irrigation policy followed by the 
leaders. The only mechanism a ditch tender has to buy. these votes from the user 
representatives, is to favor them and their constituencies with more water. Again, these 
practices are difficult to observe and their impacts on water distribution are even more 
difficult to measure. But numerous farmer reports in Salvatierra clearly .indicate that this kind 
of political bribery has influenced practices of favoritism in water distribution. Whereas in the 
first two types of practices of direct bribing in water distribution both parties have the 
opportunity to stay away from them, this third type is characterized by a high level of 
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extortion, where the leaders are able to force ditch tenders and users to express their political 
'loyalty' to them. In return for their loyalty ditch tenders can keep their jobs and users are not 
deprived of an irrigation service. 
How have these bribing practices changed as a result of management transfer? Sixty-nine 
percent of the farmers surveyed reported that the practice of bribing the ditch tenders in return 
for better irrigation delivery services has been reduced as a result of transfer. The reason for 
this is, that in comparison with the situation prior to transfer, distances between users and 
system managers are much shorter, which give users, their representatives and leaders more 
opportunities to control ditch tenders (see the examples in box 7.1). Two years of process 
monitoring and participatory observation in Cortázar and Salvatierra WUAs revealed that 
particularly in the case of Cortázar farmers come to the WUA office to complain about rent-
seeking attitudes of ditch tenders. Before transfer, farmers knew that CNA ditch tenders could 
hirdly be fired as they were backed up both by their agency and their unions. Moreover, for 
reasons explained above, individual farmers were very reluctant to go directly to the CNA 
office in Celaya and complain to engineers whom they hardly knew. 
After transfer, ditch tenders are directly hired by the WUAs and controlled by the leaders 
arid the assembly of the users. As many farmers know their representatives to the general 
aiisembly of the WUA (and in some cases also the president of the association) it is less 
difficult to complain about rent-seeking attitudes of ditch tenders. This has often resulted in 
ditch tenders being fired by the WUA leaders or being moved to other sections of the module. 
Also, the high turnover of ditch tenders and their frequent rotation over different sections 
within the module area help prevent the creation of patron-client relationships between ditch 
tenders and users. However, this does not mean that rent-seeking behavior has ceased to exist. 
Thirty percent of the farmers report that they continue to pay small tips to ditch tenders. At 
the same time, interviews with many farmers clearly indicate that practices of favoring large 
private growers with wells has dramatically been reduced. In addition to the accountability 
reason mentioned above, another important reason that explain why several of these large 
growers have ceased to bribe ditch tenders is that they themselves often have key positions in 
the new WUAs and feel that they should be a good example to their own constituencies. As 
was discussed in chapter 6, by becoming leaders of WUAs these farmers can gain personally, 
in terms of receiving social and political prestige, of getting access to new networks, and in 
some cases even of personal financial benefits. These leaders will not take the risk of losing 
their positions by paying relatively small sums of money to the staff they themselves hired. 
3 Financial self-sufficiency and autonomy 
major reason why farmers agreed to take on O&M responsibilities was that this would give 
them direct control over the revenue from fee collection. The new WUA leadership realized 
that to sustain the system, the first challenge was to improve the fee collection rate and to try 
tc at least maintain the level of the irrigation fee per hectare as was established by CNA 
during the years preceding management transfer. Collecting fees themselves became 
interesting for these WUAs as they would receive full control over their income, which meant 
high degree of financial autonomy. Although CNA provided advice on how to allocate the 
income of the WUAs to the different line items of the associations' budgets, the agency was 
not able to have full control on how the WUAs would spend their income. As a consequence, 
as: will be demonstrated in this section, WUAs were able to considerably deviate from the 
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proposed budget allocations, which sometimes resulted in spending the money more closely 
to actual needs but in other cases resulted in utter misuse of WUA funds. 
Also, CNA and the hydraulic committee can advise on what they perceive are 
sustainable fee levels, but the final decision on these levels is with the individual WUAs. This 
does not imply that CNA will unconditionally accept the fee level proposed by the hydraulic 
committee. The first reason why they are interested in preventing a decrease in the fee is that 
by law they should monitor whether the WUAs manage the mrrastructure in a financially 
viable way. This implies that the WUAs have to collect sufficient fees to at least cover actual 
O&M expenses. 
The second reason why CAN is interested in at least mamtaining fee levels (and 
guaranteeing financial self-sufficiency) is that recurrent O&M cost for the dams and the main 
system needs to be paid out of the fee collection by the WUAs as well 1 5 . At the start of the 
management transfer process, CNA determined which percentage of the total fee collection 
by the WUA had to be paid to the CNA district office. Interviews with leaders of the WUAs 
revealed that the associations were hardly involved in setting the level of these percentages. 
The percentages vary from module to module and range from approximately 11 percent of 
total collection in the case of Salvatierra to approximately 28 percent in the case of Valle. 
According to CNA, these differences reflect the relative use a module makes of the dams 
(which is of course equal for all WUAs) and main system infrastructure. Salvatierra, which 
has no main canals that are managed by CNA, would therefore pay a much lower percentage 
than for instance Cortázar, which uses more than 70 km of main canal. Yet, the differences 
cannot completely be correlated to the proportional use of main infrastructure. Some WUAs 
(and particularly Valle) started to realize that they were proportionally paying much more 
than others, which stimulated a discussion among the members of the hydraulic committee to 
change these percentages. 
In the beginning of the transfer process CNA wanted the WUAs to daily transfer the 
percentages of the daily fee collection to the CNA bank account in Celaya. Later, after WUAs 
had protested about the unacceptable administrative costs and work load that this implied, this 
rule was relaxed to weekly payments. 
Table 7.2 shows the development of the fee per hectare that a farmer pays every time the 
irrigation service is delivered, before and after transfer. To prepare farmers to paying fees that 
better reflect the actual O&M cost, two years before transfer, CNA increased the charge by 
approximately 400 percent. This explains the sudden increase observed in figure 7.1. After 
transfer the WUAs did not succeed in keeping pace with inflation rates, which explains the 
drop from approximately US$17 per hectare of irrigation services in 1993 to about US$8 in 
1996 1 6. Interviews with managers and leaders of several WUAs and CNA staff revealed that 
the actual fee levels are less than half of what they feel they should levy to manage the 
modules at optimum level. But they also realized that few farmers and their representatives 
would approve an increase. Although irrigation fees constitute less than 5 percent of the total 
production cost (see next section), farmers argued that they cannot carry yet another financial 
burden in addition to the high prices for agricultural inputs, which have increased 
considerably as a result of the agricultural price policies. Every season the hydraulic 
committee proposed an increase. However, for three years, until the summer of 1996, farmers 
were able to resist this. 
Figure 7.1 shows a similar decline in fees paid by farmers after correction for inflation. 
The fee dropped in terms of total cost per hectare per season, as well as a percentage of 
standardized gross value of production (SGVP, see below and Appendix 4 for a definition). 
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Figure 7.1 Seasonal irrigation fee (July 1994 US$) per hectare and as percentage of 
SGVP, ARLID winter seasons 1982-1997 
82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 
Winter seasons 
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Figure 7.2 Fee revenue (July 1994 US$) and average annual collection rate, ARLID 
1992-1996 
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Table 7.2 Historical development of the irrigation fee for canal irrigation in ART ID 
Year Season Fee Fee Fee per irrigation turn in terms of kg/ha of produce equivalent 
(Nominal pesos/ha 
per irrigation turn) 
(1994US$/ha 
per irrigation 
turn) 
Sorghum Wheat 
1983 winter 0.3 6.10 23 
summer 0.7 10.00 54 
1984 winter 0.7 7.69 28 
summer 0.7 6.00 24 
1985 winter 1.0 7.14 27 
summer 1.0 5.39 26 
1986 winter 1.4 5.63 23 
summer 1.4 3.64 19 
1987 winter 3.0 5.39 20 
summer 3.0 2.18 19 
1988 winter 10.0 7.26 30 
summer 10.0 6.60 34 
1989 winter 9.6 5.90 24 
summer 9.6 5.35 28 
1990 winter 42.0 20.64 76 
summer 42.0 18.48 127 
1991 winter 49.6 19.56 76 
summer 49.6 18.14 113 
1992 winter 49.6 16.86 81 
summer 49.6 16.16 127 
1993 winter 55.8 17.22 93 
summer 55.8 16.58 151 
1994 winter 55.8 16.10 93 
summer 55.8 15.62 140 
1995 winter 55.8 11.96 67 
summer 55.8 10.52 60 
1996 winter 55.8 8.77 29 
summer 64.0 9.30 74 
1997 winter 100.0 13.1 83 
Irrespective of the recent erosion of the per hectare-irrigation fee, for reasons explained 
above, the WUAs succeeded in dramatically increasing the overall collection rate. Table 7.3 
shows the development of both the self-sufficiency (actual collection over actual 
expenditure) 1 7 and the fee collection (actual collection over planned collection) rates. Clearly, 
one of the major impacts of management transfer in ARLID is the enormous improvement in 
self-sufficiency: from about 50 percent in the 3 years preceding transfer to over 120 percent in 
the post-transfer years. Data on planned fee collection for the pre-transfer period are not 
available, but data for the 4 years that follow transfer show an average collection rate of 120 
percent 1 8. 
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Table 73 Change in self-sufficiency and fee collection rate, ARLID 1989-1996 (in nominal pesos and constant July 1994 US dollars) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Actual O&M expenditure Planned fee collection Actual fee collection Self-Sufficiency 
Fee collection 
rate 
Pesos Pesos/ha July 1994 US$/ha Pesos Pesos/ha 
July 1994 
US$/ha Pesos Pesos/ha 
July 1994 
US$/ha % (7/1) % (7/4) 
1989 6,633,603 79 44 na na na 3,305,590 39 22 50 na 
1990 8,433,104 100 44 na na na 3,545,013 42 19 42 na 
1991 12,664,518 151 55 na na na 7,440,000 88 32 59 na 
1992 14,107,094 168 55 na na na na na na na na 
1993 12,514,641 149 44 13,018,285 155 46 16,086,021 191 57 129 124 
1994 14,669,207 174 49 16,066,900 191 53 18,280,700 217 61 125 114 
1995 15,758,926 187 35 13,958,243 166 31 17,164,590 204 38 109 123 
1996 15,596,666 185 26 16,300,483 194 28 19,876,120 236 34 127 122 
Note: na = not available. 
Table 7.4 Per hectare O&M expenditure and income (real pesos) and distribution of categories, Salvatierra and 
Cortázar WÜAs, 1993-1996 _ 
Salvatierra WUA Cortázar WUA 
Expenditures 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 
Total O&M cost (pesos/ha) 221 225 211 250 908 165 250 228 330 973 
System maintenance (%) 43 44 35 31 38 17 20 23 19 20 
System operation (%) 19 17 23 22 20 11 18 17 13 15 
Adrninistration (%) 14 15 17 17 16 16 15 14 14 15 
O&M of official wells (%) 12 11 10 16 12 13 14 15 26 18 
Depreciation of heavy machinery 
(%) 0 1 
1 3 1 7 6 5 8 7 
Fee payment to CNA (%) 12 10 11 11 11 33 24 25 19 24 
Others (%) 1 1 4 1 2 3 3 0 1 2 
Income 
Total income (pesos/ ha) 202 202 269 244 917 247 271 277 287 1,083 
Irrigation fees (%) 100 100 72 96 90 97 97 89 93 94 
Rent of machinery (%) 0 0 22 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Bank interest and others (%) 0 0 6 4 3 3 3 11 7 6 
Self-sufficiency 
Income - Expenditure (pesos/ha) -19 -23 58 -6 9 82 21 49 -43 110 
Note: US$1.00 (July 1994) = Pesos 3.5. 
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Figure 7.2 shows the difference between WUAs in revenue mobilized per hectare from 
irrigation fees. These revenues range from US$116 to US$205 per hectare for 4 years, with an 
average of US$182 per hectare (in constant 1994 dollars). The Acambaro module, because of 
its higher elevation and cooler climate, gets by with the provision of one less irrigation 
service and consequently collects less revenue from the fee. The figure also shows the 
historical decline in fee revenue as a consequence of the economic crisis that followed the 
December 1994 devaluation of the peso. Finally, the figure shows that most WUAs succeeded 
in maintaining a fee collection rate above 100 percent . 
COPING WITH INFLATION AND DROUGHT: FINANCIAL VIABILITY IN JEOPARDY 
Table 7.4 shows an example of how two WUAs have allocated their financial resources. A 
first observation is that these actual allocations considerably deviate from the budgeted 
allocations proposed by CNA. The proposed allocations of 60 percent to maintenance, 25 
percent to operations and 15 percent to administration is not followed at all. This suggests that 
the obligatory submission of planned budgets to CNA is merely an administrative exercise. It 
also suggests that CNA has de facto no control over the WUAs' expenditures. This is 
lupported by the opinion of the management of the 11 WUAs. When asked, they all admitted 
that CNA only plays a minor advisory role in this respect. As a result, all WUAs reported that 
they see it as a waste of time to strictly follow the rule set out in the O&M manual to submit 
yearly to CNA the proposed budget allocations and to submit monthly statements of actual 
expenses. 
Another observation is that in both WUAs real O&M expenditures have increased, 
particularly in Cortázar. This is mainly the consequence of high investments in rehabilitating 
the module's public deep tubewells (which are managed by the WUA) and the increase in 
energy costs for operating these wells 2 0 . Particularly in its first year of operation, Cortázar 
icceeded in keeping its costs low while achieving high revenue from fee collection. As a 
cpnsequence, the WUA immediately bought its own heavy machinery. The WUA succeeded 
maintaining this situation until 1996, when expenditures started exceeding the income of 
tljie association. 
From its creation in 1992 onwards, Salvatierra WUA has always had difficulties with 
balancing its income and expenditures, resulting in a total positive balance of only 9 pesos/ha 
over 4 years. Three reasons explain this fragile situation. First, Salvatierra has a large number 
of farmers with relatively small landholdings (see Appendix 1). This makes it necessary to 
employ a larger number of ditch tenders, increasing the overall salary costs. Second, much of 
the module's infrastructure is in disrepair, resulting in relatively higher maintenance costs 
(see table 7.4 and chapter 9). And third, the WUA is known for its internal political problems 
(see chapter 6), resulting in "favoritism" and nepotism in the WUA's staff employment policy 
and relatively high salary costs for administrative staff. Table 7.5 shows that in 1996 salary 
casts of administrative staff had increased to 30 percent of total salary costs, whereas the cost 
for operation staff (such as ditch tenders) had declined from approximately 60 percent in the 
two years after the association was started to less than 25 percent in 1996. The WUA was able 
to achieve this enormous reduction in the cost of ditch tenders by paying them less 
campensation and gratifications. However, most of this reduction was caused by the 
association's policy to only hire ditch tenders on temporary positions. As a result ditch 
tenders could be fired at end of each sub-season and sometimes even during the season. This 
policy caused a lot of unrest among the ditch tenders and many of them decided to look out 
for more secure and permanent positions, inducing a high turnover of field staff. 
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Many farmers in Salvatierra increasingly started to complain about this situation as they 
felt that the service that they received had considerably deteriorated as a result of the 
association's staff policy. For reasons already explained in chapter 6, they were not successful 
in replacing the leadership and hence had to look for other means to try to make the leaders 
more accountable. The most effective way they used to achieve this was to simply refuse to 
accept the proposed rise in irrigation fees from 56 pesos per hectare and irrigation delivery in 
1996 to 100 pesos in 1997, unless the leaders of the WUA would show a real commitment to 
both reduce salary costs and improve maintenance. Farmers were particularly concerned 
about the high costs of (what they perceived) unnecessary administrative staff, which they 
believed was the result of hiring too many friends of the president. Completely defaulting on 
fee payment would have been difficult to practice as in an arranged demand system like 
ARLID defaulters can be easily deprived of irrigation deliveries 2 1. However, by refusing to 
pay the fee increment farmers could signal their dissatisfaction with the leaders' salary policy 
and poor maintenance performance 2 2. As Salvatierra was the only WUA in the hydraulic 
committee that could not convince its members to accept the higher fee, it received high 
attention in the local press, which in addition put considerable moral pressure on the WUA's 
leadership. 
Table 7.5 The distribution of staff salary costs over administration, maintenance and 
system operation (as % of total salary cost per WUA) 
Cortázar WUA Salvatierra WUA 
Admin. Maintenance Operation Admin. Maintenance Operation 
1993 17 16 66 12 24 64 
1994 9 20 71 10 31 59 
1995 6 28 66 15 32 53 
1996 12 26 63 30 47 23 
The two examples of how WUAs manage their finances show that, over the first four 
years of their operations, the WUAs could maintain financial self-sufficiency. However, in 
1996 even a business-oriented WUA like Cortázar started to have difficulties maintaining its 
financial viability. All WUAs acknowledge that this situation could jeopardize their financial 
sustainability. By the end of 1996, all eleven WUAs started to rethink their financial 
situations, which resulted in two strategies. First, the WUAs decided to increase the fee to 
US$11 per hectare of irrigation services for the 1996-97 winter season. Although farmers 
again protested against such an increase, in one of the hydraulic committee meetings the 
WUAs decided that they should collectively be firm in their decision in order to be able to 
sustain themselves financially. Second, WUAs have pushed CNA to transfer O&M 
responsibilities for the main system to them. This resulted in the establishment of the LRS in 
February 1997 and a reduction in the average percentage of the fee paid to CNA, from 25 
percent to 9.5 percent of the total fees collected. 
As is demonstrated in table 7.4, a major weakness in the financial management systems 
of the 11 WUAs in ARLID is that the associations rely almost entirely on irrigation fees for 
their revenue. Moreover, fee revenue is totally dependent on the availability of water, as 
farmers are charged per number of irrigation services provided. This means that in dry years 
WUAs will not have sufficient income to maintain their regular staff or even keep their 
offices open. None of the 11 WUAs in ARLID maintain a contingency fund that could help 
them to overcome any kind of financial shortfall or to have a financial reserve for emergency 
repairs. When asked why such a fund was not kept, leaders of WUAs mentioned two reasons. 
First, annual inflation rates of more than 50 percent are not an incentive to save money. 
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Spcond, building a contingency fund is only possible by charging a flat fee on top of the fee 
x number of irrigation services provided. The current agreement between the WUAs and 
ANA says that the WUAs have to pay CNA a fixed percentage over all the fees they collect, 
including any extra fee. For this reason, WUAs are reluctant to charge a fee other than the per 
ctare of irrigation services fee. 
The lack of a contingency fund caused many problems during the 1997-98 winter season, 
vjhen the income of the WUAs was almost nil as a result of drought. As the dams were still 
empty at the start of the winter season, the hydraulic committee had to decide that no 
irrigation at all could be provided. Normally farmers receive four or five irrigation turns 
during the winter, which means that 80 percent of the WUAs' income has to come from fee 
collection during the winter. Because of the drought none of the WUAs had any income and 
hence had to make most of their staff redundant. Some WUAs decided to keep only one or 
two ditch tenders (out of 8 in for instance Cortazar), basically to operate the module's public 
deep tubewells and to monitor cropping patterns under private wells. Other WUAs, like 
Salvatierra, even had to close their offices as they could not pay their telephone and electricity 
bills. Only the WUA of Valle was able to keep all its ditch tenders and other technical staff 
ai> the WUA started to rent out their land leveling equipment to the users, for which they had 
trained their staff. This kept most of the staff working, in addition to raising some income out 
of the leveling service they provided. 
7.4 The cost of water to farmers 
The concern that the cost of water will rise with the privatization of management runs through 
1 dimensions of farmers' concern about change (Whiteford and Bernal 1996). Many 
participants in the international debate argue that the cost of private irrigation management 
(paid by farmers in the form of irrigation service fees) would be an excessive high financial 
burden to many small farmers. Although in general it is clear that fees have increased (table 
3), the cost of water as to the total value out of production or as a share of the total cost of 
production continue to be low in ARLID. Figure 7.1 indicates that the cost of irrigation to 
farmers has declined from almost 6 percent of the SGVP in the year of transfer to 2 percent in 
1996. In 1997 this percentage increased again to 5 percent as a result of both a nominal 
increase from 56 pesos to 100 pesos per hectare per delivery (see table 7.2) and a drop in the 
SpVP for wheat from US$2,022/ha in 1996 to US$l,069/ha in 1997 2 3 (see also chapter 9). 
Table 7.6 shows that a farmer's average net income is approximately 75 percent of the 
SGVP. Post-transfer data on the cost of water in relation to other production cost do not 
exist 2 4, but the table shows that in Cortazar after transfer the average cost of the water service 
ai; a percentage of total cost of production is only 6.3 percent 2 5. Furthermore, in all cases the 
cost of water is less than 3 percent of the gross agricultural income. Salvatierra shows similar 
results: the cost of the water service is around 8.2 percent of the total cost of production or 
less than 3 percent of the gross agricultural income. 
Compared to the winter season, SGVP values for the summer season are much lower, 
especially for surface irrigated fields in Salvatierra. The average net income as a ratio of the 
SGVP ranges from 53 percent to 74 percent. Owing to problems with weeds, Salvatierra 
farmers have higher expenses on hired labor and machinery. 
159 
Table 7.6 Average cost of irrigation tariff and pumping relative to agricultural costs and income for selected fields in Cortazar and 
Salvatierra modules, winter 1995-96 and summer 1996 
Cropped 
area Production cost (US$/ha) SGVP and NVP (US$/ha) 
Cost of water tariff or 
(ha) Hired labor Inputs Machinery 
Fee or 
Pumping Total Cost Ton/ha FG Price/mt SGVP NVP Total Costs SGVP NVP 
Winter 
Cortazar 
All (n=15) 4.9 40 295 161 33 530 7.2 253 1,821 1,290 6.3 1.8 2.6 
Surface n=ll) 4.5 47 296 165 34 542 7.1 255 1,814 1,272 6.3 1.9 2.7 
Wells (n=4) 5.8 22 294 151 31 499 7.4 248 1,838 1,339 6.3 1.7 2.3 
Salvatierra 
All (n=6) 3.0 38 189 154 34 415 6.3 284 1,795 1,381 8.2 1.9 2.5 
Surface (n=3) 2.3 47 188 146 35 415 4.1 330 1,341 926 8.4 2.6 3.8 
Wells (n=3) 3.7 29 190 162 33 415 8.6 262 2,250 1,835 8.1 1.5 1.8 
Summer 
Cortazar 
All (n=20) 5.0 24 204 75 37 340 9.1 133 1,210 871 10.8 3.0 4.2 
Surface (n=8) 4.0 19 204 69 9 301 9.1 128 1,168 866 3.1 0.8 1.1 
Wells (n=12) 5.8 28 204 79 55 365 9.0 137 1,230 865 15.1 4.5 6.4 
Salvatierra 
All (n=13) 2.4 91 267 154 22 534 9.1 135 1,228 694 4.2 1.8 3.2 
Surface (n=3) 2.3 70 256 99 9 435 6.2 149 923 488 2.1 1.0 1.9 
Wells (n=10) 2.5 97 270 173 24 564 10.1 130 1,315 751 4.3 1.8 3.2 
Note: FG Price = farm gate price; SGVP = standardized gross value of production; NVP = Net value of production 
Table 7.7 Cost and energy use of selected private and public deep tubewells in the Cortazar and Salvatierra modules 
Winter season 1995-96 Summer Season 1996 
Water use Energy use Energy cost Pumping cost Pumping cost Water use Energy use Energy cost Pumping cost Pumping cost 
nrVha m3/kWh US$/l,000kWh US$/ha US$/l,000m3 m3/ha m3/kWh US$/1,000 kWh US$/ha US$/l,000m3 
Private wells 9,460 6.5 16.88 24.57 2.60 6,210 7.5 22.08 18.28 2.94 
Cortazar (n=10) 
Public wells 6,160 6.0 16.88 17.33 2.81 11,460 7.0 22.08 36.15 3.15 
Cortazar (n=20) 
Private wells 10,893 6.6 16.88 27.86 2.56 4,079 5.1 22.08 17.69 4.34 
Salvatierra (n=10) 
Public wells 9,400 5.0 16.88 31.73 3.38 5,497 4.0 22.08 30.34 5.52 
Salvatierra (n= 21) 
Average 8,978 6.0 16.88 25.37 2.84 6,812 5.9 22.08 25.62 3.99 
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Similar to the winter season, the cost of water against total production cost is equally low 
in the summer season. The only exception is the cost of water for those Cortázar farmers who 
use water from wells. This is explained by the fact that three of the farmers sampled, who 
used to irrigate with canal water during the winter season, decided to buy water from well 
owners for their summer crop. These farmers paid up to US$85/ha for their water, compared 
to an average energy cost of US$18/ha (table 7.7). 
Although other inputs and services (like electricity supply) have increased considerably 
as the result of the liberalization reforms, the cost of water remained relatively low. Yet, 62 
percent of the farmers (or 63 percent of the ejidatarios and 58 percent of the private growers) 
report that they think that the cost of irrigation water is higher after transfer. 
Several farmers remembered that they had to pay an additional maintenance fee at the 
time when the system was still managed by CNA. Also under the current WUA management 
farmers sometimes have to pay a fee in addition to the regular fee per hectare per irrigation 
delivery. For instance, at the end of the 1995-96 winter season, Salvatierra WUA tried to levy 
an additional charge of approximately US$5 to cover its high maintenance costs. However, 
they had difficulties collecting the additional fee as they had no mechanism to force farmers 
to pay this fee. Only ten of the forty farmers surveyed in this module actually paid the 
additional maintenance fee. 
7.5 Conclusions 
There are clearly some first signals that point to financial arrangements that might jeopardize 
the existence of the WUAs in ARLED, despite the positive results in cost-recovery so far. 
There are several reasons to be concerned about the financial viability of the financial 
arrangements for providing irrigation and other services. 
First, the WUAs' inability to cope with annual inflation rates. Levels of irrigation fees are 
not automatically indexed for inflation, but instead are determined by negotiations between 
members of the hydraulic committee, the general assemblies and recipients of the services. 
Second, the income of the WUAs almost entirely depends on their revenue from irrigation 
service fees, which in turn depend on the availability of water. During periods of severe 
drought (as was the case in 1997-98), WUAs do not have income and have to let go their 
staff. None of the WUAs maintain contingency funds, from which they can continue to pay 
their staff and maintain their offices open during times of unexpected drops in revenue. Third, 
staff policies and staff salaries are highly determined by factors related to nepotism and 
favoritism. Moreover, staff can be made redundant at any time. This has highly frustrated 
most technical staff, who as a consequence look out for more secure job opportunities. As 
result, most WUAs are faced with the necessity to continuously train newly hired staff. 
These factors seriously challenge the viability of the WUAs. Yet, other factors explain 
how most associations in ARLID were able to establish financial systems that helped them to 
survive during the difficult initial years of their existence. 
Probably the most important financial component of the management transfer policy is 
that the WUAs could become financially autonomous. Although a certain percentage of the 
revenue from service fees had to be transferred to CNA to cover O&M costs associated with 
the management of the dams, headworks and main canals, the remaining revenue could stay 
within the WUAs. This has created a great feeling of financial responsibility among the 
leaders, representatives and users alike, and has provided users a mechanism to make the 
WUAs financially accountable 
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Improved financial transparency also helped the WUAs to become accountable 
financially. Financial transparency of revenue and expenses associated with the provision of 
irrigation services, was greatly improved as a result of the introduction of computers as well 
as of hiring well trained professional administrative staff. Furthermore, all WUAs have 
stilted to hire external auditors to check their books. Although financial malpractices on the 
part of leaders have not disappeared as a result of these changes, they were certainly reduced. 
The common practice of bribing technical staff and sometimes leaders has not come to an 
erid after the new financial arrangements were established, but it has clearly been reduced. 
The most important factor that explains this, is that technical staff is now directly hired by the 
service organization. Moreover, the new organizations were not forced to take over former 
agency staff with records of poor performance and rent-seeking attitudes. As a result, it has 
become easier to make the association accountable and as a consequence to make corrupt 
staff redundant. In addition, recipients of irrigation services have experienced that is had 
become easier to report malpractice of technical staff directly to the user representatives or 
leaders, and they have noticed several times that their complaints actually resulted in staff 
replacements. 
Notes 
Parts of this chapter are drawn from Kloezen (2000) and Kloezen et al (1997). 
For reason of clarity, the 'CNA' acronym is used here. However, it would have been more 
correct to use 'SARH/CNA' as most farmer reports on practices of cost recovery, financial 
management and bribing refer to the period before 1989 when the system was still managed by 
the SARH. Although CNA has been in charge since 1989 (first for the management of the entire 
system and since 1993 for main canal and dam management only), most farmers still mix CNA 
and SARH. Many farmers just talk about Recursos (Resources, i.e. the Ministry of Hydraulic 
Resources) when they refer to the irrigation agency in charge. Some other common terminology 
used by farmers to refer to the irrigation agency are: Secretaria (i.e. Department or Ministry), or 
'Los que venden el agua' ('Those who sell the water'). The latter terminology could also refer to 
the WUAs. 
Because of its size and its spread-out layout, Cortazar WUA has even two offices where farmers 
can make their payments: in the town of Cortazar and another small office in Salamanca. 
The O&M manual that is attached to the concession title dictates the methodology that the WUAs 
have to follow to determine the fee per hectare per irrigation delivery. This method first calculates 
the cost per m3 of water by dividing the total volume of available water per module with the total 
required O&M budget for these modules. Subsequently, it converts this into a cost per hectare by 
including the total planned water depth for that particular year. However, as is discussed in this 
chapter, the level of required budgets are hard to define and even more difficult to actually get 
approved by the assemblies of the WUAs. As a result, WUAs first calculate how many hectares 
they can irrigate and how many irrigation rums they can deliver given the volume of water 
available at the start of the season, and subsequently multiply these with the fee level (per hectare 
per irrigation delivery) that they feel they can collect. This gives them the total target budget. 
Every WUA has a oversight committee (which comprises members of the general assembly) that 
control and audit the board of directors. However, I never observed any major activity by these 
committees. 
See for instance: La Tribuna (January 11, March 11 and 15, 1996), El Sol del Bajio (17 
December 1995) mdA.M. (9 January 1996). 
The number of irrigation turns a farmer is entitled to is determined by the seasonal irrigation plan. 
The information on how many hectares a farmer is entitled to irrigate is derived from the list of 
registered water users (or WUA members). All WUAs are now in the process of updating this list. 
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8. Mooij (1992) provides a classification of three forms of corruption and bribery, which can be 
followed to describe bribing practices in irrigation as well. In the first form bribes are used to 
speed up or improve services that were supposed to be delivered anyway. Generally both parties 
involved are more or less equal in the sense that both can decide to refrain from bribing. In the 
second form, the person that should deliver the service is able to impose his or her will on the 
other. This form is often referred to as coercion or blackmail. Finally, a third form of bribing 
practices is related to misappropriation of money or commodities (food, building materials, etc). 
9. Rent seeking in practices other than water distribution also occurs, particularly in the fields of 
system maintenance and rehabilitation, where often external contractors are hired. Also in ARLID 
there are many rumors that bribing plays an important role in the granting of system improvement 
contracts. Examples of these include the granting of contracts under the "Efficient Use of Water 
and Electricity Program". Under this program private contractors are hired to upgrade existing 
pumps and to install small buried pipe systems. However, I have never had the opportunity to 
eye-witness these rent seeking practices myself, nor was I able to collect evidential empirical data 
that support these rumors. Trying to observe these practices outside the field of water distribution 
would have implied that I had to use rather different research methods (like following 
bureaucrats, private contractors, middlemen, politicians and their networks) than the ones I used 
to observe daily irrigation practices in the field (see section 1.7). 
10. This particularly happens when farmers grow crops that need more frequent deliveries than the 
number of required deliveries for wheat, maize and sorghum (which are the main crops). For 
instance, beans generally take 5 to7 irrigation deliveries instead of the 4 deliveries planned by the 
WUA. In many occasions farmers try to make deals with ditch tenders to increase the number of 
deliveries, albeit with less water per delivery. The ditch tender generally only reports the official 
4 deliveries that the farmer has paid for. In other cases, and particularly in Salvatierra, farmers 
negotiate with the ditch tender to "transfer" one of the four official deliveries of the winter season 
to the summer season, when normally only one deliver is officially scheduled (and paid for). 
Whether a ditch tender seeks to receive a bribe for these services depends a lot on the personal 
relationship between the farmer and the ditch tender. Also in some modules these practices are 
more common and tolerated by the WUA leadership. This is for instance the case in Salvatierra 
where the high percentage of non-standard crops and a high level of land fragmentation stimulate 
deviations between the official irrigation schedule and actual deliveries. 
11. The Mexican Spanish translation of a bribe is una mordida, which literally means 'a bite'. 
12. One could hypothesize that these local patterns of accommodations positively influence 
distribution and application efficiencies as irrigation supplied closer to the irrigation needs of the 
farmer. Particularly in the case of beans and vegetables (which require less irrigation but more 
frequent deliveries) the deviations from the planned schedule might result in situations where 
supplied volumes better met crop water requirements. Unfortunately I do not have sufficient data 
to support this hypothesis. The reason why I want to make this point here is, that often it is 
believed that deviations from official plans and schedules are an indication of poor irrigation 
performance. Yet, this argument disregards the fact that planned targets themselves can be poorly 
(i.e. unrealistic) defined and hardly ever reflect the irrigation requirements at the very micro level, 
such as the sub-distributaries in Salvatierra. 
13. The practice of bribing and corruption in water distribution is a popular subject for discussion 
among many irrigation engineers, irrigation policy makers and scholars who study water 
management (see for instance Repetto 1986). However, few researchers have studied and reported 
these practices in a systemized manner. Among the exceptions are Wade (1982 and 1988) and 
Ramamurthy (1995), who argue that bribery and corruption have become institutionalized and 
structuring mechanisms of getting access to canal water in many irrigation systems in South 
India. Also Mollinga's (1998) observations in a similar irrigation system in Karnataka confirm 
that bribes and corruption largely control the patterns of irrigation management, particularly when 
maintenance and construction are involved. However, unlike Wade and Ramamurthy, Mollinga 
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argues that farmers' bribing of Irrigation Department staff has hardly functioned as a mechanism 
to control water distribution within the canals. Mollinga's main conclusion in this respect is that 
water control is much more a political contestation of resource use, in which (political 
accountability) relationships between rich water users and politicians are more important than 
(financial or bribing) relationships between users and agency staff. Oorthuizen (1998) arrives at 
the same conclusions in his study on main system management in the Philippines. For accounts 
on bribing practices in irrigated agriculture in the Pakistani Punjab see Merrey (1983: 443-449). 
These four modules are: Salvatierra, Cortázar, Valle and Huanímaro. 
In ARLID, salaries of CNA district staff (located in Celaya) continue to be paid out of central 
funds. This means that payments to the CNA district office by the WUAs only cover operational 
costs such as materials, transport, casual laborers and administrative costs to run the CNA district 
office. I heard that in some other districts, also CNA district staff is paid out of the fee collection, 
but I was not in the position to verify this. Also important in this respect is to know that all 
payments from WUAs to the CNA district office remain with CNA in the same district. Examples 
from other countries show that in many cases fee collected are first transferred to the general state 
treasurer, thereby delinking the level of collection and the actual use of this collection by and for 
the managers and users of the particular system were the fees were collected. See Small and 
Carruthers (1991) for general theory on mechanisms of cost-recovery and financial autonomy in 
irrigation. For case studies, see for instance Kloezen 1995 and 1996 on financing participatory 
irrigation and lack of financial autonomy in Sri Lanka; and Svendsen (1993) and Oorthuizen and 
Kloezen (1995) on the impact of financial autonomy policies on irrigation performance in the 
Philippines. 
16!. In actual peso terms the fee level remained the same during this period. 
17. The actual O&M expenditures after 1992 do not include the cost of the staff still employed by 
CNA as these are all paid out of federal funds rather than out of the fees collected from fanners. 
18j. The planned fee collection is based on the planned acreage to be irrigated and the planned number 
of irrigations for a particular year, multiplied with the current per ha-irrigation tariff. Hence the 
collection rate does not necessarily reflect the required sum needed to manage the district 
optimally. Under this methodology any change in the number of irrigations actually delivered 
changes the collection rate. 
19j. This was possible because WUAs often could deliver more irrigation turns over and above the 
amount upon which the planned collection target was based. 
20!. Since the early 1990s, the Government of Mexico has been phasing out subsidies on energy. 
21. Cutting off defaulters from irrigation supply is much more difficult in supply driven systems (like 
most Asian paddy systems, ref. Mollinga 1998) where water is supplied more or less continuously 
to all canals and fields and where stealing of water is more institutionalized than in arranged 
demand type of systems like ARLID where water is delivered to individual farmers at pre-
arranged times. 
22j. This situation can be compared by the Taiwan case described by Moore (1989). Moore challenges 
what he calls the myth that hired technical staff of water user associations are obliged to perform 
well as their salaries depend financially on the willingness of users to pay for the level of service 
they receive from the associations. According to Moore, (at least in Taiwan) the facts run directly 
contrary to the myth, as the actual mechanisms for controlling management are more political and 
less democratic. Yet, Moore agrees that to some degree fee payment is used to stimulate 
managerial performance. Rather than complete defaulting on fee payments, Taiwanese farmers 
express their dissatisfaction with the service they receive by delaying the payment. For the 
associations, speed in fee collection is seen as one element in the formal grading system which 
directly affect salary increments and promotion. 
23. Mexican farm gate prices for basic food commodities like wheat and maize closely follow the 
trends in world market prices. Hence farmers are very vulnerable to frequent fluctuations in these 
world market prices. Furthermore, for most Mexican farmers farm gate prices have declined 
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dramatically since the 1980s, basically as a result of NAFTA and other trade liberalization (De 
Janvry et al. 1995 and De Janvry et al. 1996), leading to expected displacement from agriculture 
(Calva 1991; Levy and van Wijnbergen 1992; Robinson et al. 1991, all cited in De Janvry et al. 
1995). The graph below illustrates the fluctuation in wheat prices for farmers in ARLID. Real 
wheat prices were exceptionally high at 1,890 pesos/ton (or US$302/ton at constant 1994 dollars), 
but dropped to 1,200 pesos/ton (or US$158/ton, at constant 1994 dollars) in 1997. Finally, the 
trendline clearly points to a decline in constant farm gate prices between 1983 and 1997. 
Fluctuations in farm gate prices for wheat in ARLID, 1983-1997 
~ ~ 1 Y~ 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
year 
—A— Pesos/ton (real prices) -*-US$/ton (1994 constant prices) Trendline US$/ton 
24. I made several attempts to collect reliable time series data on the cost of production in the years 
preceding management transfer. However, detailed information that separate production costs for 
canal irrigation from production costs under well irrigation, or that separate production in ARLID 
from other forms of irrigation in the region can not be found. The only source of available 
information on costs of production of farmers in ARLID could be found in the local offices of 
FIRA (Fideicomisio Instituido en Relación a la Agricultura, a trust fund for agriculture 
constituted by five government funds for agriculture which rediscounts loans of farmers' credit 
unions on a subsidized basis). But as FIRA mainly aims at credit worthy large farmers, the costs 
of production of these farmers (who are often engaged in intensive export oriented production) 
was regarded not be representative of costs made by all farmers, including the small ones. For 
more information on the performance of FIRA and other credit programs see Covarrubias-Patiflo 
1996, Myhre 1996, Mackinlay and de la Fuente 1996, and Myhre 1998). 
25. The cost of water, related to wells includes both energy cost for pumping and seasonal 
maintenance, but excludes capital costs. 
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8 Introduction 
In this chapter the focus of analysis is shifted from IMT towards another market-oriented 
reform in the Mexican irrigation sector: the introduction of tradable water use rights and 
water marketing'. The chapter assesses how the new arrangement of providing WUAs with 
clear use concessions have affected the practice of water trading, both between individual 
water users and between WUAs. By doing so, the examples given in this chapter challenge 
the notion (popular among new-institutional economists and many policy makers) that water 
is used in a more optimal way if it is valued as an economic good. 
This chapter fills some of the empirical void on experiences with water marketing in 
Mexico. This is done by presenting a case on water trading between newly created WUAs in 
ARLID. Although water trades of both ground and canal water between individual farmers 
have occurred even before the Mexican National Water Law was implemented in 1992, as fin-
as could be observed, bulk trading of water between WUAs have only started after the law 
came into force and only occurs in a very limited number of districts. This chapter 
demonstrates how tradable water rights to WUAs are defined and what the practice is of water 
trading in this district. It evaluates to what extent the practice of water trading between the 
eleven WUAs in ARLID follow the assumptions on water markets as discussed in section 1.4. 
Water use concessions in ARLID 
WATER USE CONCESSIONS TO WUAS 
Perry et al. (1997), Colby (1988) and others see the existence of clearly defined water rights 
as one of the major preconditions for the introduction of market forces into the allocation of 
water. The National Water Law of 1992 and its 1994 Regulations clearly seek to define 
concessions for the use of national waters and State owned irrigation infrastructure, as well as 
their registration in REPDA (see chapter 4). Yet, introduction of new legislation does not 
necessarily mean that in practice these use rights are established and that registration takes 
place. To what extent have new water rights been introduced to the WUAs in ARLID? 
In 1992, at the time of irrigation management transfer, all eleven WUAs signed legal 
documents that gave them the status of civil associations as well as concessions that allowed 
them to use both water and infrastructure2. In ARLID each WUA has been entitled with a 
concession for a period of 20 years. These concessions are renewable. The most important 
annex to the concessions is a manual that describes regulations for O&M as well as for 
budgeting, cost recovery and financial administration3. 
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The concessions that were signed by the WUAs do not mention a fixed volume to which 
the association has a right, nor do they refer to REPDA. Instead, the concession follows the 
principle of pre-seasonal allocation of water between the WUAs. As explained in chapter 4, in 
this principle CNA is obliged to determine the volume available to the WUA at the start of 
each agricultural year. Subsequently, the hydraulic committee allocates the available storage 
proportional to the area under surface irrigation that is managed by the WUA. Hence, in 
ARLID volumetric concessions are effectively defined as a proportion of available storage. 
As a consequence, the volume that a WUA is entitled to varies from year to year. Generally 
the volume allocated at the start of the agricultural year holds for the entire year (i.e. for both 
winter and summer seasons). 
The hydraulic committee closely monitors whether the actual supply to a WUA does not 
exceed the allocated volume. In case a WUA is able to save water (i.e. using less than the 
allocated volume), the water can be used in three ways. First, in theory the WUA could save 
and 'store' non-used water for the next year. In practice this never happens as storing water in 
the reservoir would imply major evaporation and percolation losses and consequently would 
considerably reduce the net volume that can be used next year. Second, and most common in 
ARLID, is to adjust the irrigation plan for the summer season. At the end of the winter season 
(when approximately 75% of all water that had been concessioned for the entire year has been 
used), WUAs know how much water they have left for the one or two irrigation turns during 
the summer season. In case a WUA has used less water during the winter season than 
planned, 'saved' water can be used to either increase the number of irrigation turns during the 
summer, or increase the area to be irrigated, or both. Third, and most interesting for this 
chapter, allocated water that has not been used can be traded to other WUAs. 
At the end of the agricultural year, and before the start of the new winter season, the 
hydraulic committee examines which WUAs have exceeded their volumes. In these cases, the 
new proportional shares are reduced with the volumes exceeded in the previous year. 
Occasionally an additional volume is made available during the season. Although one would 
expect that the same principle of proportional allocation would be applied during the season, 
the examples in the next section of this chapter shows that rights to make use of this extra 
water can be negotiated, which shows that water rights related to in-season allocation are less 
clear. 
WATER USE CONCESSIONS TO INDIVIDUAL WATER USERS 
The individual rights of the users of canal water within irrigation districts are not clearly 
defined, neither in the law and its regulations nor in the concession documents of the WUAs. 
Each farmer within the irrigation district area who is officially registered in the list with users 
of a WUA is entitled to receive a share of the volume that has been allocated to the WUA of 
which the farmer is a member 4. Water use rights of individual users are subject to the 
decisions taken by the hydraulic committee concerning the number of irrigation turns and the 
area to be irrigated5. Once the WUA has received the volume in bulk, it should distribute the 
water among its users according to the annual irrigation plan made by the WUA. Following 
this plan, the WUA should deliver to the users the volume in accordance with the planned and 
required volume and time of delivery (see also section 5.4). Although the law stipulates that 
each WUA should define its own procedures on how to prioritize canal water distribution in 
times of water scarcity, none of the WUAs in ARLID ever finalized the formulation of these 
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procedures, although several attempts were made to pass drafts of the internal operational 
rubles and regulations through the assemblies of the WUAs (see chapters 4 and 6). 
If one follows the WUAs' operational target to supply a flat water depth to all users 
(irrespective of the crop they grow), one could argue that farmers are entitled to fixed 
volumetric rights. However, as was demonstrated in chapter 5, farmers receive varying 
volumes of water as in daily practice a water right is defined as the right to receive sufficient 
water (within the predetermined number of irrigations). 
Water rights to users of tubewells are more clearly defined than individual rights to canal 
wkter. In theory, each tubewell should have been concessioned with a maximum annual 
volume that may be drawn from the well. This volume is based on both the area served by the 
well and the assumed cropping pattern. However, in practice there are two problems that limit 
the implementation of these rights. First, issuing and recording concessions to the 16,500 
registered tubewells in the State of Guanajuato (Guerrero-Reynoso 1998) is a time consuming 
process 6. Second, once the concessions have issued, monitoring whether well users do exceed 
the concessioned volumes does not take place as a result of lack of staff within CNA. As a 
consequence, it is common practice to irrigate larger areas than authorized, which contributes 
to the alarming rate of over exploitation of the aquifers (see chapter 9). 
REGISTRATION OF CONCESSIONS 
According to the law, once they have been granted concessions of water use should be 
registered in REPDA. As usage of canal water is only concessioned to WUAs, individual 
users of canal water are not registered in REPDA. The REPDA manual that describes the 
procedures and formats for registration of rights to WUAs mentions that an "average annual 
volume" has to be recorded in the concession. Although an officially signed concession did 
not yet exist in 1997, the CNA district management for ARLID had prepared a draft 
concession, which mentions an annual average volume of 831.5 Mm/year (or 761.5 
MnrVyear when La Purísima module -which has its own reservoir- and Pastor Ortiz are 
excluded). Yet, it remains unclear what kind of water right the district can attach to these 
average volumes 7. 
Registration of user concessions is seen as one of the most important preconditions to 
secure water rights. Yet, interviews with CNA staff responsible for REPDA in early 1997 
showed that none of the concessions to the WUAs had officially been recorded yet 8. 
Furthermore, in general WUAs are poorly informed as well as confused about their rights and 
concessions. Interviews with leaders and managers of the 11 WUAs in ARLID showed that 
only three WUAs have an idea about the existence and general function of REPDA. Four 
WUAs know that in ARLID concessions are defined in terms of proportional share of 
available water in the reservoirs. Four other WUAs have no idea how their concessions are 
defined. One WUA believes that a concession is the average of the water available over the 
last five years while one WUA thinks it is the volume that they received last year. Only one 
WUA referred in general terms to the relationship between a concession and the actual dam 
storage. 
As far as registration of concessions to individual tubewells is concerned, an official of 
the CNA office in Celaya estimated that less than 25 percent of the existing private wells had 
oificially been concessioned and registered in REPDA. This leaves the majority of well 
o\mers without official entitlements. 
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These results show how poorly informed WUAs and individual users are about their 
water rights and the function of REPDA. Whereas WUAs still have some secure rights, lack 
of registration and poor information severely weakens the actual rights of individual users. 
Participation in water markets is limited to those who actually know what their rights 
concerning water trading are. Many farmers (and WUAs, see Ahlers et ah 1998) still believe 
that trading of water and water rights is an illegal practice. Generally only larger farmers who 
take part in various political networks and with sufficient political clout are informed about 
the latest legislative reforms. This creates unequal negotiation positions between for instance 
smaller fanners who wish to rent out some of their land and water to neighboring large 
farmers. 
CONCESSIONS VERSUS ACTUAL DELIVERIES TO WUAS 
Comparison between pre-seasonal proportional allocations (which define the concessions) 
and total actually delivered volumes during the season provides an indication on how 
effective concessions to WUAs have been implemented in ARLID. 
Table 8.1 Comparison between allocation and the actual supply to each WUA, ARLID 
1992-97 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
WUA Allocation Actual supply to each WUA as % of total supply Average 
actual / 
% of total 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 Average Allocation 
Water available % % % % % % 7/1 ( %) 
Acámbaro 8.4 6.6 6.3 6.3 6.6 7.7 6.7 80 
Salvatierra 16.4 19.2 16.5 17.4 19.3 16.2 17.7 108 
Jaral 6.2 5.5 6.7 6.0 6.6 7.0 6.4 103 
Valle 12.6 9.8 10.1 11.8 11.9 11.5 11.0 87 
Cortázar 17.5 17.7 17.4 16.8 17.6 16.7 17.2 96 
Salamanca 15.0 16.4 15.6 14.5 12.0 14.4 14.6 97 
Irapuato 5.9 4.3 5.1 5.7 6.2 6.3 5.5 93 
Abasólo and 
Corralejo 14.2 17.5 17.5 17.4 15.7 15.8 16.8 118 
Huanímaro 3.7 3.0 4.7 4.2 4.0 4.5 4.1 111 
Total1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 CV=14% 
Note ': the corresponding volumes for these years are 929 Mm3 (1992-93), 974 Mm3 (1993-94); 871 Mm3 
(1994-95); 755 Mm3 (1996-96); 675 Mm3/ (1996-97). The average total supply of these four years is 828 
MmVyear. 
Table 8.1 shows the difference between the concessioned allocation (which is defined as 
a percentage of total available storage, column 1) and the actual deliveries during the 
agricultural seasons 1992-93 to 1996-97 as a percentage of total deliveries to the district 
(columns 3 to 7). The highest difference between concessioned and actual deliveries is found 
in the case of Acâmbaro WUA, who received 20 percent less than is proportional water right. 
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Ttds is not the result of poor allocation by CNA but rather of its climate conditions, which 
miike that Acambaro requires less irrigation. Yet, it is entitled to its proportional share of 
available dam storage. As a consequence it can sell some of its concession to other WUAs. 
All the other modules stay within a 18 percent difference. As will be demonstrated below, 
sorne of this difference is due to the fact that WUAs sell parts of their rights to other WUAs. 
Proportional allocation between WUAs is not new to ARLID and was introduced decades 
before the new water law came into practice. Analyses of figure 8.1 shows that proportional 
allocation of available storage has slightly improved after 1992, when the new law facilitated 
the establishment of WUAs who assumed major roles in monitoring actual over concessioned 
deliveries. In the ten years before 1992, two modules stayed within the 5 percent difference; 
after 1992, this number increased to four modules. Before 1992, two modules showed a 
drference of more than 20 percent, while in the period 1992-1997 only one module showed 
more than 20 percent difference. Before 1992, the CV of the average differences was 16 
pejrcent while after 1992 this value reduced to 14 percent. 
The period since the introduction of the new water law might be too short to draw 
cohclusions on improvements in water allocation between WUAs, but analysis of the five 
years since the law suggests that CNA and the WUAs have succeeded in closely following the 
allocation rule. This is mainly the result of the fact that the WUAs use the hydraulic 
committee to frequently monitor actual distribution between WUAs against planned and 
concessioned allocation. 
Figure 8.1 The difference between allocation and actual supply, before and after 1992 
Actual supply is higher than concessioned allocation 
Actual supply is lower than concessioned allocation 
Acambaro Salvatierra Jaral Valle Cortázar Salamanca Irapuato Abasólo and Huanimaro 
Corralejo 
^Differencebefore 1992 (average 1982-91) •Difference after 1992 (average1992-97) 
THE NEED TO BETTER DEFINE WATER RIGHTS 
Lack of secure water rights is often seen as the most important factor to hamper the 
dejvelopment of water markets (Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994; Kemper 2001). Preliminary 
results of studies in ARLID and other Mexican district under various drought, tenure and 
cropping regimes show that under the new water law of 1992 entitlements of individual users 
continue to be poorly defined9, and that water trades between farmers have had a long history 
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and were hardly affected by the new law. While property rights for land have been clear and 
fixed since the amendment of Article 27 of the constitution, surface water rights are only 
specified at the level of the WUAs. All farmers that are officially registered as a land user 
within the irrigation district have water rights. Yet, individual water users of canal water 
depend for their water rights on the allocation decisions taken by the hydraulic committee as 
well as on the internal operational procedures developed by each WUA. A major problem is 
that, so far, none of the WUAs in ARLID has developed the procedures. Consequently, rules 
that define how water should be allocated during times of water scarcity do not exist. 
Although rights for well owners are more clearly defined in the concession to each well, 
few concessions have been actually issued, which leaves most well owners without clear 
rights. Furthermore, monitoring of existing concessions to well owners hardly takes place. 
Whereas individual water rights remain unclear, the new law is clearer on concessions to 
WUAs. This has facilitated water trade between WUAs in ARLID and it has provided these 
WUAs to be more actively involved in monitoring their annual concessions. Actual 
allocations closely follow these concessions as a result of the strong monitoring role that the 
WUAs play in the district's hydraulic committee. Having a hydraulic committee does not 
necessarily mean that WUAs play their decision making and monitoring role effectively. 
ARLID is known for the strong leadership of the majority of WUAs, which (among other 
examples) is demonstrated by the willingness of the WUAs to create the Limited 
Responsibility Society. This kind of leadership plays a crucial role in defining the relationship 
between CNA and the WUAs, particularly when both parties of interest meet in the hydraulic 
committee. 
In years of relative water abundance, the current way of defining the concessions appears 
to be effective. However, examples from other districts show that under conditions of severe 
drought or increasing competition between irrigation and industrial usage legal entitlements 
do not sufficiently guarantee that WUAs receive their proportional share. Johnson (1997) 
reports on a case in the state of Nuevo Leon where the city of Monterrey has diverted 
irrigation water to another dam to serve the needs of the city's powerful industrialists. Yet, 
these WUAs have legal concessions, as well as a 1952 agreement signed by the President 
stating that the water belongs to the irrigation district. Similar situations could happen in 
ARLID as well if CNA does not carefully discuss with the WUAs its plan to transfer 10 
MnrVyear from La Purisima dam to the historical town of Guanajuato, which desperately 
needs more water to meet its higher water demand from the tourist sector. Discussing and 
implementing such plans are only possible if concessions are more clearly defined and more 
effectively registered in REPDA. 
8.3 Water trades between WUAs 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRADING WATER 
In theory, trading of parts of the water concessions to WUAs can occur at different moments 
of the year. First, trading could take place at the start of the season, when all WUAs know in 
principle how much water they have available to be used during the entire agricultural year. 
As discussed before, this volume is a proportional share of available storage at the start of the 
season in October or early November. If from experience, or from the first indication of 
farmers on how much area they want to irrigate, it appears that the WUA does not need the 
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entire volume concessioned, it already could decide to sell some of its water to other WUAs. 
This could be the case with for instance Acambaro module, who owing to more favorable 
climate conditions, generally needs less water than the other WUAs and yet receives its full 
proportional share. As a result, occasionally it is able to trade out some water (see below). So 
far, none of the WUAs has ever traded out water before the start of the seasons. There are two 
reasons that explain this: a) it is difficult to assess the exact irrigation requirement at the start 
of the season, as WUAs do not know how much area farmers will actually grow and rain 
could be less than anticipated. A WUA does not want to take the risk to not be able to fulfill 
its irrigation commitments to its own users; and b) at the start of the season its is not clear 
which WUAs are interested in buying water. 
The second opportunity for trading water could be during the season. Although this could 
hajppen at any time during the season, the examples below show that water trading between 
WUAs only takes place at the end of the winter season, when the cropping pattern for the 
following summer season (which generally has only one or two irrigation turns) is defined. At 
the end of the winter season, a WUA knows whether actual total deliveries follow the planned 
deliveries and hence whether they have sufficient water for the last irrigation turn of the 
winter season or for the first turn of the summer season, or whether they will be short on 
water. The implication of the economic argument made in section 1.4, would be that trading 
water in between the summer season and winter season would increase the price of water 
because of higher opportunity costs at this time of the season (when water is felt to be scarce 
by some WUAs as failing to irrigate might mean a total crop failure) compared to the start of 
the season (when water is still abundant). Furthermore, for those WUAs who want to sell 
water, non-traded water is not a lost commodity (with the consequent low opportunity cost) as 
this water can be used to expand the irrigated area in the summer season, or to increase the 
number of irrigation turns during the summer, or both. 
NEGOTIATING WATER TRADES 
In order to understand the practice of water marketing between WUAs in ARLID, it is 
important to distinguish between trading of concessions for the entire duration of that 
concession, and trading (or renting) of a fraction of the concession for a period much shorter 
than the duration of the concession. In ARLID, so far only the latter type of trading has 
occurred 1 0. 
The first incident of water trading between WUAs took place at the start of the 1995 
summer season. In that year, Acámbaro sold water to Cortázar, Salvatierra and Huanímaro 
(table 8.2). Leaders of Salvatierra WUA complained that they wanted to buy the entire 
available volume from Acámbaro but that CNA intervened by arguing that also other 
prospective buyers should be given the opportunity to buy water from Acámbaro. 
The total volume of these trades was 22 Mm 3 . In 1995, prices were entirely negotiated 
beween the WUAs involved in the transaction, with -according to the WUAs themselves--
CNA only having to approve and register the transaction. Two WUAs indicated that CNA 
also helped to prevent that WUAs would sell their water for "excessively high prices", but 
they did not indicate what they perceived was a reasonable price. Interviews with managers of 
the: WUAs indicated that Cortázar paid a much lower price for the water than Salvatierra and 
Hranimaro because of higher opportunity costs to transport the water from Acámbaro to 
Salvatierra and Huanímaro (see also page 178). 
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Table 8.2 Water trading between Wl As in ARLJD: volumes and prices 
Season Seller Buyer Volume Bought as % Price 
(Mm 3) of total used 1 U S $ / 1,000 m 3 
Summer 1995 Acámbaro Cortázar 10.0 25% 0.40 
Acámbaro Salvatierra 10.0 2 1 % 0.93 
Acámbaro Huanímaro 2.0 23% 0.93 
Summer 1996 Acámbaro Salvatierra 8.0 36% 2.00 
Summer 1997 Acámbaro Abasólo 3.0 19% 3.44 
Acámbaro Huanímaro 2.0 86% 3.44 
Valle Salamanca 3.5 18% 3.50 
Valle Abasólo 1.0 6% 3.44 
Jaral Salamanca 0.45 2% 3.50 
Note': This is the share of the volume bought to the total volume used by the buying WUA for that 
particular summer season. 
The second occasion of water trades between WUAs occurred in 1996. In the irrigation 
plan for the 1995-96 agricultural season, four irrigation turns for the winter and one irrigation 
for the summer season were programmed. However, by the end of the 1996 winter season, 
some WUAs had fully used their assigned volume for the entire year and hence tried to buy 
water to be able to, at least, deliver water to those farmers who had already paid for their 
summer irrigation. Salvatierra, Cortazar, Valle and Huanimaro were among the WUAs that 
showed interest in buying water. Acambaro and Salamanca indicated that they wanted to sell 
water. Yet, the only WUA that actually bought water was Salvatierra, who paid US$ 
2.00/1,000 m 3 (table 8.2). This is twice the price the WUA paid in 1995. According to the 
WUAs and CNA, this price reflects better the O&M cost related to transporting the water to 
the users. Valle wanted to buy 10 Mm 3 from Salamanca, but thought that the price of 
US$1.07/1,000 m 3 was too high. Also Cortazar desperately wanted to buy water in order to be 
able to irrigate the 100 hectares that farmers had already paid an irrigation turn for. It had 
already started to negotiate buying water from private well owners (against pump operation 
cost) when rains set on and the necessity to buy water declined. Because of these rains, also 
Huanimaro did not have to buy water. 
Negotiations on water transactions for the summer 1997 season started in May. At that 
time the new LRS, which federates the 11 WUAs, had been created. This appeared to be 
important for the way negotiations on water allocation and trading between individual WUAs 
took place. First, the hydraulic committee, in which all WUAs and the new LRS participate, 
played a major role in discussing the volumes and prices of the transactions. Second, some 
WUAs used what they called "the required solidarity among the members of the LRS" as an 
argument, both to try to get access to the water that was going to be sold and to try to reduce 
the price. These two observations are illustrated by the negotiation that took place in the 
hydraulic committee meeting of May 1997. 
The objective of this meeting was to decide on how an additional volume of 42 Mm 3 had 
to be allocated between the WUAs. Because of unexpected heavy rains in March and April of 
1997, the reservoirs had filled up considerably and CNA decided to assign an extra volume to 
the district. This volume was additional to the assigned volume of 640 Mm 3 for the 1996-97 
irrigation season. At that time, the WUAs had already used 546.2 Mm 3 for the winter season, 
which meant that 93.8 Mm 3 of total assigned volume could still be used for the summer 
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season (column 1, table 8.3). With the additional 42 Mm 3 the WUAs had a total availability of 
124.8 Mm 3 of water for the summer season. 
The question, however, was how to allocate the additional volume. This appeared to be a 
problem as the WUAs of Salvatierra, Valle, Jaral and Cortázar had made an enormous effort 
to enforce their farmers and staff to strictly follow the irrigation plan with its area restrictions. 
Consequently, as is demonstrated in column 2 of table 8.3, these WUAs had 'saved' 20 to 26 
percent of their total annual assignment for the summer season. On the other hand, Abasólo 
and Huanimaro were less successful in following their own irrigation restrictions and, with 
one more irrigation turn committed, had already exceeded their entire annual volume. Three 
of the four WUAs of the first group (Valle, Cortázar and Salvatierra) argued that they should 
be rewarded for the fact that they succeeded in forcing their water user members to strictly 
follow the irrigation plan to save water, and therefore should have the first right to the 
additional volume. The second group accepted the argument that they failed to strictly follow 
the irrigation plan, but argued that now with the new LRS users have to declare their 
solidarity with each other and therefore allow all WUAs to have equal access to the additional 
volume. By means of paying a fine for their slack management, they offered to pay a higher 
price for the water. This plea for solidarity was particularly addressed to the presidents of 
Valle and Cortázar (who are both among the group of WUAs that saved water) as they had 
just been elected as the president and treasurer of the LRS. 
As is dictated by the water law, CNA also participated in the meeting. However, it was 
observed that the negotiation took place among the WUAs themselves, particularly between 
the two groups mentioned above. Three CNA representatives were present in the meeting: (1) 
the chief engineer of the district, who hardly played a role during the meeting and did not 
arjme against or in favor of any of the WUAs; (2), the district's head of operation, who 
presented the current information on dam storage, volumes supplied to each WUA so far as 
well as three different options or scenarios for allocating the extra water; and (3), the assistant 
manager in charge of CNA Guanajuato, who played the most active role by trying to 
moderate the discussion and separate arguments for and against the three options presented 
below. 
Columns 3, 4 and 5 of table 8.3 show the three different options for assigning the extra 
water between the WUAs that were discussed during the meeting. In the first option, the 
additional volume is allocated strictly proportional between the WUAs (following the 
percentages given in column 1, table 8.1). Although neither the water law nor the district's 
own operation rules define the principles of in-season allocation of additional water, this 
option would strictly follow the pre-seasonal allocation (and concession) principle. Those 
WUAs that had already exceeded their assigned annual volume would receive their 
proportional share of the additional volume, minus the volume that they had already 
exceeded. This would imply that Abasólo would receive less than it needed and Huanimaro 
would not receive any water at all. 
The second option looks strictly at the planned irrigation requirement for the summer 
season of each WUAs and allocates the additional volume in such a way that all WUAs would 
have enough water to meet these requirements. This would mean that those WUAs who had 
saved water (as was planned in the annual irrigation plan) for their summer crop would not 
receive water at all, and that those who had not followed the irrigation plan (and even 
exceeded it) would receive most of the additional volume. The third option closely follows 
the first option, but also re-allocates the volume that was deducted from those WUAs who had 
exceeded their annual volume. 
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In was clear that Salvatierra, Valle, Cortázar, and to a lesser extent Jaral, could not accept 
the second option as, according to their arguments, their users would not accept to be 
punished for the fact that they strictly followed the irrigation plan with its restricted areas. 
The discussion on these three options took several hours. Although the presidents of 
Valle, Cortázar and Salvatierra clearly argued for the first option, they did not want to play it 
too hard as all three were also key members of the board of the new LRS (the president, 
treasurer and secretary, respectively). Not only did these long discussions annoy the 
presidents of the WUAs, but the CNA representatives as well. When the discussion seemed to 
have reached a deadlock, the CNA assistant manager in charge proposed to close the meeting 
so that the WUAs could further deliberate on the allocation of the additional volume among 
themselves. At this point of the discussion CNA had nothing to lose as it had already shown 
its good-will towards the users by allocating an additional volume of water. However, 
presidents from both groups strongly objected to this idea and argued that CNA, being a 
member of the hydraulic committee, should share the responsibility for the final decision of 
the meeting. 
After five hours of negotiation, the majority of the WUAs chose the third option, as that 
would make full use of the additional volume as well as satisfy both groups. Yet, those WUAs 
who received little or no water at all felt that they could not leave the meeting without having 
acquired some water for their users. At this point, CNA suggested that those WUAs who had 
saved water could consider whether they would sell some of this water to WUAs who needed 
more water. Acámbaro, Salvatierra, Jaral, Valle and Cortázar decided that they were able to 
sell the volumes mentioned in column 6 of table 8.3. Column 7 shows which WUAs were 
interested in buying water. Although interested, Huanimaro could not buy water as it had 
already exceeded its annual concession by eight percent. Also, as it is a small module at the 
tail-end of the district, it was considered that any potential volume the WUA could buy would 
be so small that it would not even reach the farmers because of conveyance losses along its 
way to the module. 
There was very little discussion on the price of the additional volume assigned by CNA, 
nor on the price of the extra water that the WUAs would re-allocate or sell among each other. 
CNA suggested that the WUAs would pay US$0.26/1,000 m 3 . Those WUAs who sell some of 
the additional water would be paid the same price. As this price was so low compared to 
prices paid in previous years (table 8.2), it was regarded as a symbolic price and none of the 
WUAs found it worth discussing. 
Shortly after the allocation of the extra water had been decided upon, the WUAs again 
started to negotiate water trades. Acámbaro, Valle and Jaral sold water. As table 8.2 shows, 
Abasólo, Huanimaro and Salamanca bought water. Again, the hydraulic committee meeting 
was the arena where negotiations took place. This time the negotiation concentrated more on 
the price of the traded volume. Unlike 1995, and to a lesser extent 1996, WUAs that could 
sell water now argued that the price should better reflect the opportunity cost of carrying the 
water to the users. Or in other words, the price should better reflect the income that a WUA 
would receive if it had sold the same volume of water to its individual users. However, the 
question that was discussed was whether the price should reflect the cost of water to farmers 
of the WUAs that sells or that of the farmers of the WUA that buys the water. 
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Table S3 Negotiated allocation of an extra volume and agreed plan for water sales at the start of the 1997 summer season 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
WUA Volume left over for Extra volume assigned by CNA Volume to be Volume that Total volume assigned 
summer option 1 option 2 option 3 sold by WUA WUA can buy to WUA (1+5+7-6) 
Mm 3 % of annual plan (Mm 3) (Mm 3) (Mm 3) (Mm 3) (Mm 3) (Mm 3) 
Acámbaro 8.7 17 3.2 2.8 3.5 1.5 0.0 10.7 
Salvatierra 26.6 26 6.3 0.0 7.0 1.9 0.0 31.6 
Jaral 9.1 24 2.4 0.0 2.7 1.0 0.0 10.7 
Valle 19.3 24 4.9 0.0 5.4 2.7 0.0 22.1 
Cortázar 21.3 20 6.7 0.5 7.4 1.5 0.0 27.2 
Salamanca 4.1 5 5.7 14.6 6.4 0.0 3.6 14.1 
Irapuato 4.7 13 2.2 2.7 2.5 0.0 1.5 8.7 
Abasólo 0.0 -5 5.1 16.5 5.6 0.0 3.2 8.8 
Huanímaro 0.0 -8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Corralejo 0.0 1 0.4 1.1 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.8 
Total 93.8 36.9 38.2 41.0 8.6 8.6 134.8 
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Three options were discussed. In the first option, the WUA that sells charges a price 
similar to what its own users would have to pay for the same volume. In the second option, the 
WUA that sells would receive the price that farmers of the WUA that buys normally pay. The 
third option follows the first one, but deducts their O&M costs for managing the volume that 
they sell. The difference between the first and second option is particular of interest for Valle, 
the most important seller in this case. As will be demonstrated in chapter 9, of all the WUAs in 
ARLID, Valle has the lowest RWS values 1 1. Also, whereas other modules use a planned gross 
irrigation depth of approximately 350 mm for the first irrigation turn in the summer, Valle 
programs an irrigation depth of 250 mm. Yet, the irrigation fee per hectare is approximately 
the same across the modules. This means that Valle WUA charges its farmers a relatively high 
fee per unit of water supplied: US$ 5.30/1,000 m 3 , against for instance US$3.45/1,000 m 3 in 
the case of Abasolo WUA. 
The hydraulic committee decided that the second option, which follows the fee paid by 
farmers of the WUA that buys, was the best. The price required by Valle was considered to be 
too high. Valle accepted this argument. Although hard to prove, the fact that the president of 
Valle WUA is also the president of the new LRS might have played a role in accepting this 
unfavorable trade for Valle. 
APPROPRIATE INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOW TRANSACTION COSTS 
According to Moore (1989) and Livingston (1995) the physical nature of water alone violates a 
number of economic conditions, which consequently may hinder the development of water 
markets. Delivery of irrigation is inefficient because there might be losses that are not 
accounted for and that may cause third party effects. In most irrigation districts it is difficult to 
deliver constant and predetermined volumes. Furthermore, there is often an interdependence 
between surface and groundwater that cannot be controlled. 
These arguments certainly hold for water transfers over long distances to a large number 
of individual users, or when water is to be transported out of the system in the case of for 
instance rural-to-urban transfers (Rosen and Sexton 1993) or interstate transfers (Booker and 
Young 1994) which all imply very high transaction costs. However, water trades between 
WUAs in ARLID are hardly hindered by these conditions. Generally, traded volumes are 
delivered within the period and in addition to normal deliveries, using the same infrastructure. 
This means that no extra transaction costs are involved in transporting traded water. 
Furthermore, water is traded as a bulk to the WUA. The volume bought has to be delivered at 
the intake point of the module. As a consequence, conveyance losses between the reservoirs 
and the module intakes are not accounted for. Problems with conveyance losses only occur if a 
tail-end WUA like Huanimaro wants to buy water, while no other water deliveries take place 
at the same time. In those cases the hydraulic committee normally decides not to approve the 
transfer as much more water has to be released from the reservoir in order to guarantee that the 
WUA receives the water it has bought from another WUA. 
Water measurement devices are found at the intakes of each module, which makes daily 
monitoring of actual deliveries and water transfers easy. As the water law does not account for 
the obligation to maintain certain levels of return flows to other users within the district, 
traded volumes are defined in terms of full consumptive use. As a consequence, no additional 
devices are needed to measure return flows. 
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SUMMING UP: ALLOCATED, ASSIGNED, TRADED AND ACTUAL SUPPLIES 
In the cases described above four different concepts of water supplies were discussed: 
allocated, assigned, traded and actual supplies. By means of summing up the above 
observations, the four concepts are briefly explained again and compared. Allocated volumes 
are the water rights of each WUA defined as the right to the proportional share of available 
dam storage. This right is a percentage based on the number of hectares with a right to canal 
water (see table 5.1). These percentages are fixed and do not change over the years unless the 
official command area of a WUA is expanded. 
The second concept used here is that of assigned volumes. This refers to the volumes that 
are actually assigned to the WUAs by the hydraulic committee at the start of each agricultural 
year. Assigned volumes are based on the actual available storage and closely follow the 
proportional allocation percentages. Assigned and allocated volumes deviate in those cases 
where exceeded volumes in the previous year are deducted from the proportional volumetric 
share. Deviations can also occur as a result of water trading or when extra water has been 
made available from the dams during the season. Finally, the concept of actual supplies refers 
to those volumes that were actually measured and diverted to the WUAs. 
A successful implementation of new water rights is partially determined by the possibility 
and practice of closely monitoring the actual volumes of supplied and traded water over 
allocated and assigned volumes. Table 8.4 compares these volumes for the 1996-97 
agricultural year. The first observation on this table is that at the start of the season the 
hydraulic committee closely follows the formal rule of proportional allocation of available 
storage: the percentages of allocations (column 1) are the same as the shares of actually 
assigned volumes (column 3) 1 2 . Once this first assignment has been made, the volumes are 
corrected for volumes that were exceeded during the previous agricultural year (column 4). 
Finally, the actual total assignment might change as a result of both water trading and when 
extra water becomes available during the season (column 5, see also table 8.3). The total 
volume assigned (columns 6 and 7) can now be compared with the volumes that were actually 
supplied or diverted to the WUAs. Although most WUAs received actual volumes that are 
close to total assigned volumes (with an average of 106%, meaning that on the average actual 
supplies exceed assigned supplies by 6 percent, and a CV value of 11.6 percent), particular 
Jaril, Abasolo-Corralejo and Huanimaro received more water than they were entitled to. As 
discussed above, this is mainly the result of these WUAs failing to follow their irrigation plan, 
which for 1996-97 winter season were based on restrictions in areas that could be irrigated. As 
a consequence, Huanimaro WUA could not receive any of the additional water that CNA 
wanted to assign to the WUAs in May 1997 (see table 8.3), nor the 2 Mm 3 of water that they 
bought from Acambaro WUA (see table 8.2). 
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Table 8.4 Comparison between allocated, assigned and actually supplied volumes during the 1996-97 agricultural year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Allocation Assigned volume by Exceeded Extra volume assigned Total volume Total actual Actual supply / 
(% of total 
available 
Hydraulic corrirnittee 
in Nov 97 
in 1995-96 
(MCM) 
and traded in May 
1997 
assigned supply total assigned 
storage) (Mm 3) (%) (Mm 3) (Mm 3) (%) (Mm 3) (%) (%) 
Acámbaro 8.4 53.649 8.3 1.326 2.000 54.323 8.3 52.327 7.7 96 
Salvatierra 16.4 105.434 16.4 3.511 5.100 107.023 16.3 109.104 16.2 102 
Jaral 6.2 40.129 6.2 2.478 1.600 39.251 6.0 47.489 7.0 121 
Valle 12.6 82.171 12.8 1.746 2.700 83.125 12.7 77.366 11.5 93 
Cortázar 17.5 112.354 17.5 6.339 5.900 111.915 17.1 112.731 16.7 101 
Salamanca 15.0 96.206 15.0 5.008 10.000 101.198 15.4 96.968 14.4 96 
Irapuato 5.9 37.970 5.9 0.735 4.000 41.235 6.3 42.321 6.3 103 
Abasólo & 14.2 91.195 14.2 6.620 9.500 94.075 14.3 106.474 15.8 113 
Corralejo 
Huanímaro 3.7 23.864 3.7 0.133 0.0 23.731 3.6 30.571 4.5 129 
Total 642.972 27.896 40.800 655.876 675.351 
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4 Water marketing between individual farmers 
Individual users in ARLID were engaged in farmer to farmer water trading long before the 
water law of 1992 and other neo-liberal reforms that sought to encourage trading were 
implemented (see sections 3.3 and 3.4). However, the new law has legalized the practice of 
water trading. Yet, few farmers are aware of this legal change and still believe that trading 
water is illicit. 
Compared to districts like Lagunera, Bajo San Juan and Bajo Río Bravo (Ahlers et al. 
1998), water trading between individual farmers plays a relatively small role in ARLID. The 
reason for this is that, as was demonstrated in chapter 5, farmers have relatively good access 
to adequate surface water. Two types of farmer-to-farmer trade take place. Under the first 
type of arrangements, a farmer rents or leases land from another farmer with the right to 
irrigate that land 1 3 . This can be land that is irrigated by canal water, by wells, or by both. 
Generally, this type of arrangement is only applied for one or two seasons. The type of 
payment varies from a flat rent per hectare or irrigation to a share of the produce. Sometimes 
large farmers rent land from ejidatarios or small private growers for longer periods of time. 
Reliable secondary data on the extent of this type of arrangement do not exist. One 
sdurce (no author, no date) estimates that 30% of the irrigated area is leased every year at a 
rate of US$286/ha/year 1 4. The farmer survey done for this study (n=125) reveals that 8 
percent of the area irrigated by the sampled ejidatarios is rented while 20 percent of the land 
irrigated by private growers is rented. Of the sample, 9 percent of the ejidatarios rent all or 
pert of the land he or she irrigates while 31 percent of the private growers rent all or part of 
their irrigated land. 
The second form of farmer-to-farmer water trade in ARLID is the selling of water by 
thbse who have a well to those who do not have a well. Trading of canal water separated from 
the land hardly occurs in ARLID 1 5 . Compared to the first type of arrangements, this type of 
water renting is not related to renting out the right to cultivate the land as well. During the 
winter of 1995-96, 17 ejidatarios (19% of this category in the survey) and 4 private growers 
(11%) bought water either from a WUA (public deep tubewells) or from private well owners. 
This water is extra to the volume they receive from the canals or from what they pump from 
their own wells. For two-thirds of the farmers who follow this arrangement, the water price is 
set as a share of the produce. This share ranges from 15 to 30 percent of the produce, 
depending on the actual pumping costs and whether or not labor costs for operating the pump 
ar d pump maintenance and repairs are included. 
The value of traded water 
PRICES PAID BY WUAS 
In the previous section some examples of prices of water transactions between WUAs were 
discussed. In this section, these prices are compared to the price that individual farmers pay 
for their water. This comparison only serves as an indication of the value of traded water. 
However, as water prices for individual farmers and prices for water traded between WUAs 
are set at different times during the agricultural season (and hence in theory would have 
different opportunity costs as the level of water scarcity changes during the season) full 
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comparison between the two is flawed. In theory, the value of water might change during the 
agricultural season when water becomes more scarce or abundant as a result of both changing 
water availability and water requirements 1 6. For instance, at the start of the season, when 
water availability is still high, opportunity costs for irrigation use within the district might be 
lower than at the end of the season when availability is low and when water scarcity may 
result in complete crop failure. On the other hand, one could argue that the price of traded 
water can be low in cases when "redundant" water (i.e. that part of the assigned volume that is 
not used) is lost to the WUA if it is not used. Although all these theoretical considerations 
could play a role in setting the price level of traded water, in practice this hardly occurs in 
ARLID. The main reason for this is that, as was demonstrated above, the total assigned 
volumes for a given year is corrected for exceeded and used volumes in the previous year 1 7 . 
As a result, opportunity costs of irrigation water do not change dramatically during the 
season, which makes comparison between prices paid by farmers at the start of the season and 
prices paid by WUAs at the end of the season (when water is traded) possible. 
Figure 8.2 shows the price of water, both per hectare irrigated per year (with five 
deliveries: four in the winter and one in the summer) and per m 3 of irrigation actually 
supplied in the years 1982-1997. As can be observed from this figure, the fee per m 3 of 
irrigation supplied closely followed the per hectare fee. Irrigation fees increased by 400 
percent in 1989-90 in order to prepare farmers to paying higher fees once O&M 
responsibilities were transferred to them (see also chapter 7). However, owing to the financial 
crisis of December 1994, which was followed by an annual inflation rate of 50 percent in 
1995, WUAs were not able to maintain the same fee level. Although the nominal fee 
remained the same between 1992 and 1996, and even doubled in 1997, in constant dollar 
terms fees dropped from US$85/ha/year in 1992 to US$45/ha/year in 1996 and is back again 
at US$58/ha/year in 1997. 
Irrigation fees for 1995, 1996 and 1997 were US$3.61/1,000 m 3 , US$3.26/1,000 m 3 and 
US$ 3.98/1,000 m 3 , respectively 1 8. Comparison of these fee levels with prices paid for traded 
water between WUAs (table 8.2), shows that in 1995 and 1996 WUAs were selling their 
water to other WUAs for prices much lower than the price they would have received if they 
had sold the same volume to their own users. Although the difference in net income would 
have been slightly lower, given that the WUA who sells water saves on O&M transactions 
costs related to delivering water to the fields. 
Although important to those farmers who directly benefit from the additional volumes 
bought by their WUA, the magnitude of water trading between WUAs is relatively small 
compared to the total amount water distributed and used within the district. Yet, during the 
summer irrigation season some WUAs depend almost entirely on traded volumes for their 
total delivery (e.g. Huanimaro for 86%, see table 8.2). However, in general the contribution of 
traded water to total water use in the summer averages approximately 30 percent. The share 
of traded water of all the water used in both the winter and the summer season is less than five 
percent. 
The main reason why some WUAs occasionally want to buy additional water is that they 
need to deliver irrigation water to those farmers who have already paid for their turns. 
Particularly at the end of the winter irrigation season, many WUAs have already used their 
entire yearly concession. This means that they cannot satisfy farmers who have not yet 
received all the irrigation turns they have paid for. WUAs are very concerned about meeting 
these commitments because they realize that failing to do so would jeopardize their credibility 
among their constituencies. This is particularly important if one considers that the WUAs 
were established only in 1992 under circumstances of complete lack of accountability 
between the managing agency and the users. Results from the farmer survey (n=125) show 
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that 63 percent of the users are satisfied with system operation by the WUAs; only 20 percent 
fqels that CNA used to manage the system better than the present WUAs. 
Figure 8.2 The price of water per hectare irrigated and per m 3 of irrigation supplied, 
agricultural years 1982-1997 (July 1994 US$) 
120 7.00 
82 /83 8 3 / 8 4 84 /85 8 5 / 8 6 86 / 87 87 /88 8 8 / 8 9 8 9 / 9 0 90/91 9 1 / 9 2 92 /93 9 3 / 9 4 9 4 / 9 5 9 5 / 9 6 9 6 / 9 7 
-Irrigation fee/ha/year -Irrigation fee/ 1,000 m3 
PRICES OF TRADED WATER PAID BY INDIVIDUAL USERS 
CNA is not at all involved in setting the price of water traded between individual farmers. 
Also the role of the WUAs is limited. When asked, leaders and managers of seven WUAs 
mentioned that they give advice on what they regard is a reasonable price, but only if farmers 
explicitly ask for it. In practice few farmers ask the WUA to intervene in the price setting 
negotiation process. 
Results from the farmer survey (n=125) show that the average price paid for traded water 
by individual farmers is US$22.40/ha/delivery for ejidatarios and US$32.70/ha/delivery for 
private growers. These prices range from US$6.70/ha/delivery to US$75/ha/delivery 
depending on the total pumping hours. Generally ejidatarios bought two irrigation deliveries 
(average total cost of US$52 per hectare per season), while private growers bought four 
irrigations (average of US$130 per hectare per season). Table 8.5 shows the corresponding 
prices per unit of water and as percentages of both the SGVP and the common surface water 
fee. The price of sold groundwater is three to four times higher than the price of surface water 
per hectare irrigated (see figure 8.2). Compared to the actual pumping costs, the price of 
traded groundwater is also three to four times higher, which suggests that farmers who sell 
water benefit financially. The actual pumping prices mentioned in table 8.5 include electricity 
consumption as well as maintenance, but exclude the cost of labor that is sometimes hired by 
a pump owner to operate and guard the pump. According to Carmona-Quiroz (1998), who did 
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a study on water trading in Cortázar module during the winter 1997-98 irrigation season, 60 
percent of the sellers include these labor costs in their price, while 25 percent also include the 
cost of repairs. Yet, the water price is much higher than the actual total cost of operating a 
well, which suggests that unlike the WUAs, individual farmers trade their water against 
market prices. This contradicts with the general statement by many farmers that they do not 
want to gain financially from water trades and only cover actual costs. Table 8.6 shows how 
farmers perceive the cost of traded water. The majority feels that the prices of traded water 
have remain more or less the same, while 36 percent believes that those prices have increased. 
Water price Actual pumping costs 3 
US$/ha/irrigation turn 22-- 3 3 8 
US$/ha/season 5 2 - 130 32 
US$/1000 m 3 9 - 14 3.3 
% SGVP/ha 3 -- 6 2 
% of per irrigation surface water fee 260--390 95 
Note ": these costs include energy consumption and pump maintenance. See also tables 7.6 and 7.7 for 
further details on pumping costs. 
During the summer of 1996, 15 ejidatarios (17% of this category) and 4 private growers 
(11%) bought water from other farmers. The average prices paid per hectare per irrigation 
were US$19.90 and US$32.70 for ejidatarios and private growers, respectively. The average 
total costs per ha per season were US$27.50 and US$58, respectively. 
Table 8.6 Cost of buying water from other farmers, before and after 1992 (%) 
Ejidatarios Private growers All farmers 
Higher after 1992 44 13 36 
Lower after 1992 5 0 2 
Same 54 87 63 
There are several reasons why individual farmers want to buy water from farmers with 
wells. First, sometimes farmers with access to only canal water want to buy an extra irrigation 
when they feel that the authorized number of irrigation turns does not meet crop requirements. 
Second, sometimes farmers own a well with a low pumping capacity. Yet, having access to 
groundwater officially exclude them of using canal water (although, as is shown in section 
5.6, there are several ways of still getting access to canal water), which encourages these 
farmers to buy extra water from a nearby farmer with a well. Third, occasionally the dams 
remain closed as a result of drought. This was the case during for instance the 1997-98 winter 
season. Carmona-Quiróz (1998) observed that out of the 72 farmers with surface water rights 
whom she interviewed, 44 (61%) decided to buy water from well owners, while 28 farmers 
(39%) decided not to grow any crop at all. Of these 44 farmers, 38 had also bought water 
during the previous winter season of 1996-97, which was a year with normal canal water 
availability. This implies that the severe drought during 1997-98 had only a minor impact on 
the increase of water trading in Cortázar module. 
Carmona-Quiróz also asked sellers to mention the reason why they sold their water to 
other farmers. One of the reasons mentioned was that well owners want to meet the number of 
hectares for which the well was concessioned. According to some farmers, not irrigating the 
number of hectares that are mentioned in the concession could imply that the farmer would 
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lose this concession. On the other hand, one could argue that this is only a theoretical 
possibility as few wells have been concessioned yet and even fewer wells are actually 
monitored by CNA. Another reason why well owners sell water is that they try to help out 
other farmers, particularly if they are relatives. A third reason mentioned by the farmers 
interviewed by Carmona-Quir6z is that of reciprocity: "this time I will help you out as next 
time I might need your help". Finally, as has been demonstrated above, sellers financially 
gain from water trades. 
MARKET PRICING 
As discussed in section 1.4, Briscoe (1996) and others argue that the advantage of allowing 
market forces in the allocation of water is that water will be treated as an economic good: 
water is priced at its marginal cost and used until the marginal cost is equal to marginal 
benefits. However, Young (1986) and Perry et al. (1997) state that economic benefit-cost 
approaches are limited as water is also a social and a political good, which makes it difficult 
to price water at its marginal cost. According to Colby (1988) and others, water transfers 
between buyers and sellers can only be satisfied if the seller receives a price that covers any 
costs he has incurred in transferring the water; if the buyer expects returns from the purchase 
to exceed all costs; and, if the buyer views a market purchase of water as an economically 
aitractive method of obtaining water. Yet, prices paid by WUAs for water bought from other 
WUAs in ARLID vary widely from year to year and across associations and are generally 
lower than the price a WUA would receive if it would sell the same amount of water to its 
own individual members. The examples presented above suggest that the setting of prices for 
traded water do not always follow economic market mechanisms. There are three reasons that 
explain this. 
First, there is little competition in the water market in ARLID. So far, the only actors 
involved in water trading are the eleven WUAs. One of the most important reason for this 
lack of competition is that buyers and sellers belong to the same organizations, whose main 
objectives are to jointly manage the district: the hydraulic committee and the Limited 
Responsibility Society. As a consequence, volumes and prices are heavily determined by the 
relationships between the WUAs within these organizations (see chapter 6). The price that is 
paid and the opportunity to allocate water to higher value uses are considered less important 
than the social and political arguments that WUAs use to maintain the level of solidarity in 
order to be able to effectively negotiate with CNA and other agencies in the public and 
private sector. WUAs do not seek to receive the highest price for the water they sell, but they 
have started to argue that the price for traded water should now follow the price paid by 
individual farmers and hence better reflect the opportunity costs of water. Although these 
opportunity costs might change during the season as a result of changing water availability 
and irrigation requirements, the fact that redundant water at the end of the inter sub-season is 
not lost to the WUAs helps to flatten out the variation in opportunity costs. 
Second, traded volumes, and hence the income out of these trades, are relatively small. 
Given the relatively small revenue from water trades between WUAs compared to revenue 
from normal water sales to individual farmers, none of the WUAs is prepared to argue for 
higher prices for traded water if this would disturb relationships with other WUAs. 
Third, as is argued by Small and Carruthers (1991), relative abundance of water limits the 
development of market forces in water allocation and water pricing. Although ARLID 
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occasionally suffers from severe drought, generally water availability is sufficient to meet 
irrigation requirements for large parts of the command area (see chapters 5 and 9). 
8.6 Conclusions 
The introduction of the water law of 1992 has had major consequences for the process of 
allocating water in ARLID. Although the law has had little impact on the development of 
water trades between individual farmers, it clearly has made possible and induced the 
establishment of WUAs, who were allowed to bulk trade water among themselves. The law 
also foresaw in the creation of a hydraulic committee at the district level in which these 
WUAs participate in important decision making processes concerning water allocation, price 
setting and traded volumes. Although in theory the latter form of trade could take place in any 
Mexican irrigation district, so far the ARLID case is one of the few examples. As Mexican 
irrigation districts vary widely in terms of technical and institutional conditions and 
arrangements, it is hard to generalize the experience from an unique case to all districts, let 
alone to other countries. Yet, it might be useful to summarize the conditions that explain why 
WUAs in ARLID were able to successfully develop a system of reallocating parts of their 
yearly water concessions through a water market. 
First, the new water law clearly allowed WUAs to trade part of their concessions. 
Although there is still some misconception about the definition of the concession each WUA 
has, in ARLID it is widely perceived that legal certainty of titles has somewhat increased. 
Furthermore, all WUAs understand and have supported the law's provision to allow water 
trades. One of the most important factors that explain why ARLID is among the very few 
districts that have actually taken this new opportunity to trade their water, is the relationship 
between these WUAs and the CNA district office. Unlike in some other Mexican districts, the 
CNA district office in ARLID monitors but does not impose or fully control water 
distribution practices. Likewise, CNA in ARLID allows the WUAs to participate in decision 
making at the level of the hydraulic committee, which also decides on price setting and the to 
be traded volumes of water. In other words, the new water law shapes the conditions for 
trading, but it has proved to be important that CNA provides local buyers and sellers with 
sufficient flexibility to negotiate and set their own terms and conditions for trading water. 
Third, water marketing between WUAs in ARLID does not entail excessive and 
additional transaction costs involved in transporting water from the WUAs that sells to the 
one that buys, nor does it impose externalities on other water users. Fourth, both sellers and 
buyers can expect returns from the water trade. However, unlike what is sometimes assumed 
in economic literature, economic returns from water purchases to other WUAs are regarded as 
less important than social and political returns. As is demonstrated in chapter 6, most WUAs 
in ARLID have strong leaders but the political and commercial interests of these leaders vary 
widely. These differences in interest were also observed in this chapter. For WUAs that sell 
water it is politically important that they occasionally lend each other assistance with 
additional access to water as they all form part of two institutions that determine the 
performance and sustainability of all WUAs. These are the hydraulic committee in which 
WUAs together try to negotiate with CNA the yearly concessions, prices and irrigation 
schedules; and the Limited Responsibility Society in which all WUAs tried to reduce the role 
of CNA in main system management. These two organizations are clearly seen as effective 
examples of scaling-up the institutional capacity that each WUA has started to build up within 
their own organizations. For the WUA that buys water it is important to have additional 
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access to water if at the end of the season it appears that ^sufficient water is left from the 
yearly concession it was granted. Not delivering water to farmers who had already paid for 
their turns would severely jeopardize the credibility and accountability that the WUAs have 
tried to create in their short history of existence since 1992. 
f%tes 
Parts of this chapter are drawn from Kloezen (1999). 
The deeds are signed by the elected members of board of the WUAs as well as by 4 members of a 
committee that oversees the board. This latter committee includes a representative of the State of 
Guanajuato and one from CNA. The notarial deeds stipulate the bylaws of the WUA, which 
include, among others, the form of representation of ejidatarios and private growers in the 
general assembly and a number of committees, the rights and obligations of the WUA (especially 
with respect to O&M and cost-recovery and those towards CNA), its committees and its 
individual members or users and the form of sanctions. 
Five documents are attached to and form legal part of the concession: 1) a map that shows the 
location of the module within the district; 2) an inventory of the infrastructure of which the right 
of use has been concessioned; 3) a list with all the users in the area governed by the WUA that 
have the right to receive water from the WUA; 4) the notarial deed that legalizes the WUA; and 
5) a manual that describes regulations for O&M as well as for budgeting, cost recovery and 
financial administration. 
Ley de Aguas Nacionales, article 67. 
Generally, the principle of proportional allocation between WUAs of available flow or storage is 
followed in most Mexican irrigation districts. However, once the WUA has been allocated this 
volume, further allocation to individual users within the area managed by the WUA varies from 
district to district. Whereas in ARLID all farmers are in principle entitled to the same number of 
irrigation turns and the same water depth per turn (irrespective of the crop they grow), in some 
other district differentiated allocation rules for different crops are more common. For examples, 
see Ahlers et al. (1998) and Rymshaw et dl. (1998). 
It is commonly known that the actual number of wells in the State of Guanajuato is much higher 
than the officially registered number and will probably exceed 22,000 wells. 
According to article 42 of the Regulations to the National Waters Law, the concession based on 
the average annual volume does not guarantee that the grantee actually receives this volume as it 
continues to be subject to water availability at the start of the agricultural year (which in the case 
of ARLID starts in October). 
The only concessions that had been recorded were those granted to private well owners. 
9| This is documented by Ahlers et al. (1998). 
10. The REPDA administrator who I interviewed estimated that less than 1 percent of the 'perpetual' 
groundwater concessions have been sold to other users and that virtually all of these cases 
concern farmers who sold their land with the appurtenant water concession to the land. Sales of 
permanent water rights that are separate from land are even more uncommon. Sirnilar 
observations were made by Bauer (1997), Hearne (1995) and Rios-Brehm and Quiroz (1995) on 
Chile, which is often assumed to be an active market of sales and transfers of water rights. Bauer 
lists a number of factors that help explain why trading in Chile is so limited. These factors 
include: inadequacy of geography and infrastructure to redistribute water; the continuing 
uncertainty of many titles; uncoordinated systems of record-keeping; insufficient protection of 
third parties; the cultural and symbolic importance of water in a semi-arid country; and, relatively 
low prices ("the value of the water is much higher than its price"). See also Young (1986) and 
Thompson (1993) for a more theoretical explanation of factors that limit transfer of water rights. 
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11. The main reason for this is that a relatively great proportion of the canal network in Valle is lined 
as a result of a World Bank assisted rehabilitation program (PRODEP, see chapter 9). 
12. The minor differences between allocation and assigned volumetric shares for Acámbaro and Valle 
are the result of rounding off numbers. 
13. I came across one example in which a farmer sells his (surface) irrigation right to another farmer 
to be used to irrigate the land of the farmer that buys the water. This arrangement, however, is 
common in for instance the Bajo Rio San Juan and Bajo Río Bravo irrigation districts (see Ahlers 
etal. 1998). 
14. It is not made clear whether this includes the irrigation fee of approximately US$60/year (1994 
dollars). Generally, the farmer who rents the land pays the fee. 
15. Trading of surface water separated from land does occur in other districts. See for instance Ahlers 
et ál. (1998) and Fortis-Hernández and Ahlers (1999). 
16. Thanks to Gerardo van Halsema for pointing this observation out to me. 
17. Although in theory possible, to my knowledge cases of correcting the annual volumetric 
assignment for unused water during the previous years do not exist. CNA and WUAs realize that 
owing to high evaporation rates from the reservoirs it does not make sense to store water for a 
couple of months when irrigation does not take place. Instead, WUAs try to use their full 
assignment by either trading out some water, or by adjusting the irrigation plan for the (short) 
summer irrigation sub-season, or both. 
18. To compare: one source (author unknown) estimates the price of urban and industrial water in 
the same area at a rate of US$95/1,000 m3. 
188 
9 The impact of IMT on irrigation performance 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters an analysis was made of the processes and mechanisms that shape 
pDst-UVIT irrigation management in ARLID. This chapter returns to the official policy 
objectives of the IMT program and assesses its impact on irrigation performance, including: 
cianges in water distribution, ground water use, system maintenance and improvement, land 
acid water productivity, and the provision by WUAs of a series of non-O&M related services 
to farmers'. By applying the comparative indicators that were described in section 1.6, it is 
monstrated whether or not a clear change in levels of performance can be observed after 
IMT. As such it tests the assumption (e.g. Espinosa de Leon and Trava-Manzanilla 1992; 
Corriz et al. 1996) and claim (e.g. Palacios-Vélez 1994c and 1999; Groenfeldt and Sun 1997) 
that IMT in Mexico will and has resulted in improvements in irrigation performance. 
As was discussed in section 1.6, comparative indicators help to describe changes in 
brformance levels over time, before and after IMT. So far, IWMI has applied a standardized 
set of comparative indicators to assess the impact of IMT (or similar participatory irrigation 
management programs) in a number of countries, including Mexico 2. These indicators rely on 
the availability and reliability of (secondary) time series data. A common difficulty with this 
type of data is that they are generally aggregated at higher system levels. Also in the case of 
ARLID, these data were only available at the levels of the individual modules and for the 
entire district. Consequently, most of the data presented in this chapter focus on these levels. 
As time series data at lower system levels (e.g. sections or selected canals within a 
niodule area) were not available, an attempt was made to capture users' and irrigation 
officials' opinions on the impacts of the IMT program by conducting both semi-structured 
open ended interviews and a farm survey (see section 1.7). 
2 impact on water distribution and use 
In general, IMT has not resulted in major changes in the way seasonal planning is done. At 
t i e district level, the hydraulic committee adopted the same planning method used by CNA 
prior to IMT. Also, WUAs continue to follow the irrigation scheduling methodologies 
established by CNA before transfer. Whether irrigation management transfer has led to 
fferent actual uses of the water is discussed below. 
CHAPTER 9 
RESERVOIR MANAGEMENT AND IRRIGATION INTENSITY 
The first indication of changing patterns of actual water use at the district level is the 
relationship between available water at the beginning of the agricultural year and the area that 
is irrigated with this water. Figure 9.1 shows the relationship between irrigation intensity and 
dam storage at ARLID for the period 1982-97. This relationship highlights how annual 
storage management has changed as a result of management transfer. The cropping intensity 
refers to the total area irrigated for the two annual seasons during a particular year. The graph 
indicates that if dam storage at the beginning of the season exceeds 1,100 Mm 3 , the cropping 
intensity response curve is rather flat, with an average cropping intensity of 137 percent. For 
several reasons this flat response has not changed after IMT. Before IMT, CNA tried to keep 
water in storage (and as a result the area actually irrigated decreased) to avoid running out of 
water at the end of the season and as a consequence loose their credibility to the users. After 
IMT water users exerted much pressure on the WUAs and consequently on the hydraulic 
committee and CNA to increase the number of times irrigation services are provided for the 
winter season. In this way, farmers tried to guarantee a good wheat crop at the cost of 
growing sorghum or maize, which needed only one irrigation turn during the wet summer 
season. As a consequence, although the first few years that followed IMT have had a 
relatively higher storage, cropping intensities have not increased. 
Figure 9.1 Irrigation intensity versus dam storage, ARLID 1982-1996 
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Similarly, also figure 9.2 indicates that no impact in the total area irrigated can be 
attributed to the IMT program. The total irrigated area depends on annual rainfall of a 
particular year, which affects dam storage and hence dam management policies for the year 
that follows. While the graph shows an increasing trend in area irrigated after transfer, given 
the area fluctuations in previous years, and the very low values of the winter seasons of 
1982/1983,1987/1988, and 1989/1990, no further impacts can be attributed to IMT. 
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Figure 9.2 Total irrigated area per season and annual rainfall, ARLID agricultural 
years 1982-1997 
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CHANGES IN WATER USE 
One of the official objectives of the IMT program was to encourage farmers to use water 
more efficiently. In the case of ARLID this implied that less water should be used per hectare 
irrigated. As was demonstrated in chapter 5, RWS values at the level of the intakes of the 
modules exceed 2.0 by far. This is an indication of a high level of oversupply of surface water 
fcr irrigation. Figure 9.3 shows the change in water depths applied to land actually irrigated. 
T ie average application of water was reduced only slightly after transfer: for the winter crop 
from 1,285 mm before IMT to 1,227 mm after IMT, which is a reduction of less than five 
percent. A similar marginal change can be observed for the summer crop: from an average of 
4 | 5 mm before IMT to an average of 430 mm after IMT. 
Similarly, figure 9.4 shows that at the district level the average of the RWS values is 2.8 
ftjr the pre-DVLT period and 2.6 for the post-IMT period. This suggests that there is no 
discernible difference between pre- and post-transfer situation. However, the graph shows a 
clear downward trend after 1993, with 1997 having the lowest value (2.3) of the recorded 
period. The figure also provides an interesting comparison between Cortázar and Salvatierra 
WUAs. 
While Cortázar generally follows the district values (averaging 2.8 and 2.3 for the pre 
a id post IMT periods, respectively) and shows a slight reduction after IMT, Salvatierra has 
considerably higher values. Moreover, the average pre-transfer RWS value of 3.4 is much 
lcwer than the average post-transfer value of 4.8, indicating that after transfer Salvatierra is 
applying more water per unit of land irrigated. This is reflected in the low cropping intensity 
(the percentage of the command area that is actually irrigated) in Salvatierra: an historical 
average of 42 percent for the winter season, against 56 percent for the entire district and 62 
percent for Cortázar module. 
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Figure 9.3 Applied irrigation depths (per unit of land actually irrigated), ARLTJ) 
summer and winter sub-seasons 1982-1997 
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Figure 9.4 Relative water supply (RWS) values, ARLID and Cortázar and Salvatierra 
modules, winter sub-seasons 1983-97 
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Among the reasons that explain why Salvatierra concentrates its water on less area, are 
the difficulty the WUA has to distribute water to its more than 6,000 users (25 percent of the 
total users in the district, while it occupies 14 percent of the district area) as well as its 
irjJrastructure in condition of severe disrepair. One of the strategies that the WUA has chosen 
to cope with these conditions is to guarantee sufficient water supply to less area. As discussed 
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below, another reason that explains the high RWS values in Salvatierra is the high diversity in 
crops that have lower crop requirements than wheat. Yet the WUA schedules and delivers, 
irrigation as if all crops require the same volume of water as wheat. 
Figure 9.5 shows that for the entire district there is a better match between the planned 
and reported values at the field level from 1994 onwards. Detailed comparison of actual flows 
measured for this study with the ditch tenders' flow reports affirms the observation of some 
WUA leaders and CNA staff that inexperienced ditch tenders have difficulties assessing the 
volumes they supply to the farmers. 
Firiure 9.5 Planned, reported, and measured RWS values, ARLID winter crop 1983-
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The WUAs advise about, but do not have control over cropping patterns. As the planned 
irrigation depths are calculated on the basis of water requirements of the major crop (resulting 
in rather flat planned-RWS curves, see figure 9.5), any deviation from cultivating the main 
crop will result in a further mismatch between the actual water demand and the amount 
supplied. This system of seasonal irrigation scheduling has significant implications for WUAs 
whose cropping pattern deviates from the main crop. This is the case in the Salvatierra 
module. Since 1992, the area grown under beans has become more and more important at the 
cost of the main crop, wheat (figure 9.6). Even so, the WUA continues to make its irrigation 
scheduling as if the entire area were under wheat. Since bean and vegetables require less 
water than wheat, the RWS values increased dramatically (figure 9.7), without the WUA 
addressing adequately to this situation. The WUA attempted to correct this situation in the 
last three years of the field study. 
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Figure 9.6 The change in cropping pattern in the Salvatierra module, winter crop 1985-
1997 
85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 
Figure 9.7 Planned, reported, and measured RWS values, Salvatierra module, winter 
crop 1985-1997 
H 1 h-
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For the case of Cortázar module, figure 9.8 shows a downward course in RWS values 
after IMT had been introduced. This can be explained by the continuous efforts of the 
leadership in Cortázar to verify the volumes supplied, improve the performance of ditch 
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tenders by training them and firing those that perform poorly (see box 7.1), and by making 
physical improvements to the canal and drainage networks (see the example in box 9.3). 
Figjire 9.8 Planned, reported, and measured RWS, Cortazar module, winter crop 1985-
1997 
1 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 '—I 1 h 
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FARMERS' AND WUAS' OPINION ON CHANGES IN SYSTEM OPERATION SERVICES 
Pre-transfer data on water distribution between farmers within modules do not exist. 
Therefore, a "before and after" comparison of system operation services cannot be made. The 
data on water distribution under post-transfer conditions presented in chapter 5 show that in 
the sampled study area there is no clear bias towards head- or tail-end farmers and that all 
fanners receive sufficient water to meet crop requirements. 
Results from the farmer survey (n=125) on farmers' opinion on changes in system 
operation are summarized in table 9.1. Thirty-six percent of the farmers perceive that water 
adequacy at the field level has improved as a result of transfer while 23 percent report that it 
has become worse. Data presented in Appendix 7.1 show that there is hardly any difference in 
waler adequacy between farmers located in the head-end, middle, or tail-end reaches of the 
canals. This supports the detailed one year observations in selected canals (see chapter 5) that 
farmers generally receive sufficient water irrespective of their location along the canals. 
The answers related to timeliness of water distribution and farmers' access to the ditch 
tender show similar results. Thirty percent of all respondents say that timeliness has 
improved, while 22 percent think that the post-transfer situation has become worse. As to the 
location of the farmers, 33 percent of the tail-end farmers sees a real improvement, while 48 
percent of the head-end farmers think that timeliness of water delivery was equally good 
before and after IMT (Appendix 7.2). 
Tliirty-four percent of the respondents feel that distribution among farmers has improved 
while 15 percent say that water distribution was better organized before transfer. Farmers in 
the middle reaches and in the tail-end areas of the canals are more positive about these 
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improvements than head-end fanners, who say that generally distribution was good both 
before and after IMT (Appendix 7.3). 
These farmers' opinions support the observation made earlier, that IMT has not resulted 
in major changes in system operations. 
Table 9.1 Farmers' opinion on the change in system operation as a result of IMT (%) 
Water adequacy at Timeliness of ,. Access to ^efT* , , . j i* distribution ... . . , provided by field level water delivery . ditch tender . J among farmers ditch tender 
Poor before and after IMT 2 2 8 4 2 
Poor before, good after IMT 36 30 34 31 40 
Good before and after IMT 26 34 31 32 32 
Good before, poor after IMT 23 22 15 20 14 
Other8 13 12 12 13 12 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Note"Other" includes 'don't know,' 'no response,' and 'not applicable because respondent only uses 
a private well.' 
The only service that has shown considerable improvement, is the one provided by the 
ditch tender: the way he attends to farmers' requests, the way he solves problems with water 
distribution between farmers, and the decrease in the level of bribery. Most farmers report 
that in particular the attitude of ditch tenders towards users has improved: forty percent sees a 
clear improvement in task performance of the ditch tenders, while only 14 percent say that 
previous CNA ditch tenders were more service oriented than the current ditch tenders hired 
by the WUAs. Particularly farmers in the head-end and middle reaches see improvements, 
whereas almost half of the farmers located in the tail-end areas see no difference between the 
services provided before and after transfer (Appendix 7.4). 
The most important concern of those farmers who complain about the services provided 
by ditch tenders is that the number of ditch tenders per WUA has decreased by half after 
transfer. As a result, these farmers perceive that ditch tenders now have to service an area that 
is too large to operate effectively. On the other hand, unlike former CNA ditch tenders, all 
WUA ditch tenders now use a motorbike and in some cases even a small truck. This has 
helped them to move more easily and faster between the sections of the module. 
Another complaint frequently expressed by several users is that ditch tenders are too 
frequently rotated between module sections. As was discussed in chapter 6, WUAs 
deliberately move ditch tenders as part of their strategies to limit the development of social 
and political relationships between users and ditch tenders as well as to control rent-seeking 
attitudes of ditch tenders. 
Figure 9.9 shows that 24 percent of all farmer said that inadequate infrastructure was the 
main cause to poor system operation before transfer. This problem is particularly noted by 
farmers in the middle reaches of the canals (35%). The majority of farmers (35%) say that 
after management transfer they experience no problems with system operations. Lack of 
timeliness (13%) and insufficient water supply (13%) are seen as the main problem. Only 11 
percent of all respondents say that inadequate infrastructure continues to be the main factor 
that hampers water supply and distribution. 
Finally, 83 percent of the farmers believe that the WUAs should continue to be 
responsible for operation of the main and secondary systems while CNA should continue to 
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be responsible for dam operations. This shows the relatively high trust that farmers have in 
system operation by the associations compared to operation by the agency. 
Figure 9.9 Farmers' opinion on the main problems related to system operation, before 
an<^  after transfer, in the head, middle and tail end areas 
60 
Before transfer 0Head • Middle I Tail 
Inadequate No problems Not applicable TimeEness Distribution Drainage Adequacy Ditchtende Water quaEty 
Nb problems Not applicable TimeBness Adequacy Inadequate Drainage Ditchtende Water quaEly 
SUMMING UP 
In summary, analyses of reservoir management, water allocation between modules, and water 
use by the WUAs indicate that there has been very little impact on water management and use 
as a result of irrigation management transfer in ARLID. This is because water allocation and 
irrigation scheduling practices have not changed since the WUAs took over these tasks from 
CNA. On the other hand, observations of meetings and discussions with WUAs and the LRS 
suggest that WUAs are becoming more and more concerned about the relatively high water 
usage. This has become very apparent since some WUAs had to start buying water from other 
WUAs and even from private well owners (see chapter 8). After taking office, the new 
president of the recently established LRS publicly stated that looking for better ways to use 
and conserve water would be one of the major priorities of the federation. 
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9.3 Impact on groundwater use 
OVER-EXPLOITATION OF THE AQUIFERS 
The State of Guanajuato has a high concentration of deep tubewells. Approximately 20 
percent of all wells in Mexico can be found in Guanajuato. Groundwater is available through 
18 different aquifers, three of which are relevant to ARLID: Valle de Acámbaro, Zona Presa 
Solís, and Irapuato-Valle Santiago. The total area underlain by these three aquifers is 277,200 
hectares, which includes the district under study, with an annual recharge of 500 MnrVyear. 
Groundwater table fluctuations in the state are monitored by CNA and point towards an 
annual overexploitation of the aquifers of 829 MnrVyear, with 117 MnrVyear corresponding 
to the ARLID-related aquifers (Muñoz 1996). These values correspond to overexploitation of 
the aquifer at the rate of 40 percent and 20 percent for the state and the district, respectively. 
As is illustrated in boxes 9.1 and 9.2, there are several categories of wells, which are 
managed under rather distinct institutional arrangements. The most important distinction 
made in ARLID is the one between the approximately 1,540 privately owned deep tubewells 
and the 175 so called 'public deep tubewells3. The first type of wells are privately owned and 
managed by (groups of) farmers (both ejidatarios and private growers). Before transfer, the 
second type of wells were managed by CNA, but they were transferred to the WUAs. Farmers 
who make use of public wells pay an irrigation fee to the associations to cover their O&M 
costs. These fees are generally twice as high as the fee paid for the use of canal water as 
O&M costs are considerably higher and water delivery is more secure. 
Generally, WUAs exclude irrigation areas that have access to private and public wells 
from canal water service, although there is no provision in the Water Act to that effect. 
However, in practice many well users make use of the canal network to transport the water 
they pump to their fields (see also section 5.6). This practice has increased after transfer. Prior 
to transfer the CNA-operated public wells were only used to supplement surface water in 
times of water stress. Currently, users within the areas assigned to public wells are supposed 
to use pumped water only. However, for almost all these areas, water users have to make use 
of the canal network to transport their water 4. As a result, farmers mix canal water and 
pumped water, which has made the management of canal water more difficult. This situation 
has sometimes led to cases in which farmers apply more water to their fields than the 
máximum discharge capacity of the pump, meaning that canal water users receive less than 
their official entitlement. On the other hand, farmers report that unauthorized use of canal 
water by owners of private wells has decreased since transfer as the WUAs have more control 
over the ditch tenders who sometimes allow these practices in turn for some financial 
gratuities from well owners (see also chapters 6 and 7). 
Figure 9.10 illustrates seasonal and total volume pumped by private wells within ARLID 
for the period 1982 to 1996. The volumes pumped during the dry winter season are higher 
than those during the summer season. The increase in volume pumped since 1983 can be 
explained by the relatively dry years of the early 1980s and by a new program to grant 
concessions to new wells started in 1982. The reduction in volume pumped that followed this 
period can be explained by the dramatic fall of the static water table, which by 1996 was 2 to 
5 meters per year (Muñoz 1996, Scott and Garcés-Restrepo 1999). Although new concessions 
are not granted anymore, a program to upgrade existing pumps and wells started in 1995. 
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ox 9.1 Public deep tubewells and their management arrangements 
efore transfer public deep tubewells were managed by CNA, who used these well to supplement 
mal water in times of water scarcity. As a consequence, these wells were almost always located 
n the bank of a main canal or large distributary. The type size of these wells is 8 inches (with an 
rerage discharge of 601/s), but public wells of 6 inches do also exist. 
With the transfer of canal infrastructure to the WUAs in 1992, also these public wells were 
ansferred to the WUAs. Contrary to CNA management of these wells, based on the pump 
ipacity and the expected cropping pattern in the fields that neighbor these wells, the WUAs 
ssigned areas to each of the public wells. Fanners within these areas are supposed to use public 
ell water only, for which they have to pay the association a service fee (per hectare and per 
rigation delivery). The level of these fees differ from module to module but are generally twice 
te price of the service fee paid for the use of canal water. 
One of the major problems that WUAs face with the management of these wells is the 
tfraordinary high maintenance cost. In addition, in comparison with the fee level also the cost of 
peration rose unproportionally as a result of the subsidy cuts for energy. After a few years of 
peration under the above mentioned arrangements, some WUAs started to introduce strategies to 
y to reduce the O&M costs associated with management of their public wells. The first strategy 
3 p l i e d was to try to entirely transfer the ownership (and hence the full financial responsibility for 
»&M) to groups of farmers. However, so far few fanner groups have accepted this as they doubt 
hether they can manage the wells in a financially viable way. 
The second strategy followed by some WUAs is to change the fee system. In some cases this 
leant that the WUA considerably raised the level of the fee. In other cases, the WUA decided to 
nly pay for regular O&M costs whereas the costs of any additional maintenance or repair would 
ave to be shared between the users and the associations. One such cost is the replacement of 
ansformers of the pumps, which are frequently stolen. Other WUAs decided to differentiate 
etween their public wells and relate the fee to the actual O&M costs of each of the wells. Finally, 
hereas the above arrangements still follow the payment per water delivery, some WUAs 
iscussed the possibility to levy a flat annual per hectare fee, irrespective of the number of 
eliveries the users of the public well would receive. 
A third strategy that all WUAs followed was to try to get access to funds from the Program 
n Efficient Use of Water and Energy. This program seeks to upgrade the pumping efficiencies of 
'ells (both private and public) as well as to reduce conveyance loss by introducing buried pipe 
/stems. Activities under this program are co-funded by the Federal Government (50%), the State 
f Guanajuato (25%) and the beneficiaries (25%). However, given the high number of applicants 
oth within and outside the irrigation district, few public wells actually received this type of 
ssistance. 
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Figure 9.10 also provides information on the estimated annual recharge for the entire 
ee aquifers that serve the district as well as the estimated annual recharge for those parts of 
se aquifers that underlie ARLID 5, being 500 Mm 3/year and 205 Mm /year, respectively, 
mparison between these recharge levels with the total volumes pumped points to 
sexploitation of the aquifer. The graph shows that the withdrawal during the winter season 
lost exceeds the annual recharge to the district. This means that for the remainder of the 
ir the district mines groundwater at the cost of aquifer users outside the district area. This 
ds to high competition with domestic and industrial users in urban areas near the district. 
Contrary to popular belief among CNA managers involved in ARLID, cropping patterns 
areas irrigated by wells have not changed as a result of transfer or other agricultural 
brms. Figure 9.11 shows that there has been hardly any change in RWS values for the 
iter season. This continues to be around 2.25, which again indicates the alarming high level 
excessive groundwater use. 6 Fluctuations in values for both the first and second summer 
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Box 9.2 Private deep tubewell groups and their arrangements 
In addition to individual farmers that own their private deep tubewells, some private well are 
jointly owned by groups of farmers. This is particularly the case in modules like Salvatierra, where 
the relatively small land holdings and disperse distribution of plots do not allow for financially 
viable management of wells for individual farmers and small plots. 
These well-groups range in size from four members to over twenty members. Sometimes 
these groups entirely comprise members from the same ejido or family, but in many cases group 
membership is determined by the plots that can physically be irrigated by a particular well. Groups 
that have members from different ejidos or in which ejidatarios and private growers share a well 
are also common. 
Membership rules, water rights and cost-sharing arrangements of these groups are closely 
related but vary from group to group. In most cases members have communally invested in the 
sinking and development of a well. Normally these investment are proportional to land, but not 
necessarily so. Also, rights to pumped water are commonly proportional to land, but cases in 
which members all have equal rights to a fixed number of pumping hours or volume do also exist. 
Membership of these groups is further characterized by the fact they have the right to exclude 
other users. Generally, these groups do not allow other farmers to enter (as this would imply that 
the pump capacity is exceeded) unless one of the members has left the group. In the later case the 
group will decide on the payment the new farmer has to made to become a member. Normally the 
level of this entry-fee is related to the capital investment made by the group. 
In addition to sharing the cost of capital investment, group members also share recurrent 
O&M costs. Here a wide set of arrangements exist. In some cases members pay a fixed fee per 
hectare and per irrigation delivery, similar to the arrangements for users of public wells. In other 
cases members pay a rate per pumping hour. Occasionally groups have not developed a system of 
pre-fixed rates, but members share the electricity bills once they arrive and share costs of 
maintenance whenever they occur. Only a few groups maintain a small emergency fund, from 
which they can pay major repairs and other contingency costs. 
crops are explained by the fact that well users generally try to avoid the risk of late onset of 
rainfall and start pumping as soon as possible. This leads to high RWS values in years with 
normal to high rainfall. 
The lack of impact on groundwater use as a result of transfer is something that could have 
been expected. The transfer program primarily affects the administration of facilities and 
resources related to the use of surface water. Yet, the question remains whether the WUAs 
can play a role at all in controlling groundwater mining. Managers of the modules complain 
about their lack of control over private well owners. These owners are also those who use the 
canal network and surface water without paying for it. Although CNA remains the entity 
responsible for controlling the aquifers, WUAs could play a more powerful role than they 
have done so far in monitoring the exploitation of groundwater 
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Figure 9.10 Seasonal and total volumes pumped by private wells in relation to aquifer 
repharge, ARLID agricultural years 1982-1996 
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Figure 9.11 Seasonal actual RWS values for private wells, ARLID agricultural years 
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9.4 Impact on system maintenance 
IMPACT ON MAINTENANCE AND PRIORITY SETTING 
In the three years preceding transfer (1989-1991), 48 percent of O&M expenditures by CNA 
went to maintenance of the dams, and main and secondary canal infrastructures. The average 
maintenance expenditure per hectare was US$24/ha/year (July 1994 dollars). After transfer, 
maintenance costs have been shared between CNA and the WUAs. CNA pays for 
maintenance of the dams, the five main diversion structures, and main canals and drains. The 
WUAs pay for maintenance of all secondary canals, irrigation canals, and drains. After 
transfer, 63 percent of the total O&M expenditures went to maintenance, which was an 
increase by 15 percent compared to pre-transfer years. After transfer, 82 percent of the total 
maintenance budget has been spent within the modules, while 18 percent has been spent for 
maintenance of the dams and the main system. Also in the 3 years after transfer, the average 
cost of maintenance was US$24/ha/year (July 1994 dollars). This suggests that the level of 
maintenance investment has remained the same 7. 
One problem with the above comparison of expenditures before and after transfer is that 
it conceals an important impact: the higher quality of maintenance services provided 
following transfer (Svendsen 1996). The constant US$24/ha/year expenditure level could 
mean that no real improvements have occurred; it could also mean that the WUAs use their 
staff and machinery more efficiently. The total number of staff responsible for maintenance 
decreased from 81 before transfer to 65 after transfer, with 19 staff still being employed by 
CNA and 46 by the WUAs (see table 6.4). This would suggest that after transfer the same 
level of maintenance is achieved with fewer staff. 
Another approach is to compare actual quantities of maintenance work before and after 
transfer. Figure 9.12 shows such a comparison for the example of total desilting work done by 
CNA and the WUAs. The figure clearly points towards two shifts in priority setting between 
CNA and the WUAs. First, there has been a tremendous increase in total volume of desilting 
done in primary and secondary canals and drains after transfer: 438,581 nrVyear (average of 
1982-1992) compared to 1,257,421 nrVyear (average of 1993-1996). The figure shows that 
CNA had virtually stopped desilting the main canals after 1993, although officially it was still 
under CNA's responsibility. Secondly, the figure demonstrates that the WUAs have been 
particularly concerned with cleaning the drains, including the main drains that still fall under 
CNA's responsibility. 
These observations suggest that not only is there an increase in volume of work done, but 
also that maintenance work has shifted proportionately more towards lower system levels— 
the secondary canals and the drains—and away from main canals. There are several reasons 
that explain why CNA first mainly focused on maintaining the main system and subsequently 
after transfer completely failed to comply with its tasks to maintain the main system. The first 
reason is that before transfer the CNA district office almost entirely depended on central 
federal funding. The financial self-sufficiency rates during the years that preceded transfer 
only averaged 50 percent (see table 7.3). This means that the office virtually had no control 
over their own funds. In this situation it is hard to execute all the required O&M tasks and it is 
clear that only the most important maintenance tasks could be done. As failing to maintain the 
main system would affect all farmers, it is understandable that main canal maintenance was 
CNA's first priority under the given budget constraints. 
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Figure 9.12 Desilting of canals and drains by CNA and the WUAs, ARLBO 1984-1996 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
The second reason why prior to transfer CNA mainly focused on maintaining the main 
system at the cost of cleaning secondary canals and drains, is that their machines were not 
suitable to clean the smaller secondary canals and drains. CNA lacked the modern light-
weight equipment needed to excavate smaller canals. Moreover, most of this machinery was 
already in a condition of severe disrepair and the office they did not have sufficient funds for 
major repairs or replacements. Thirdly, as is also observed by Sijbrandij and van der Zaag 
(1993) in the case of the Autlan-El Grullo irrigation system in Western-Mexico, before 
transfer there was a complete lack of accountability of the CNA's maintenance department to 
i:s users. Unlike the current situation with the WUAs, there were no clear mechanisms and 
procedures to channel farmer reports and complaints on (lack of) maintenance to the CNA 
office other than through complaining on an ad hoc basis. With this lack of accountability, 
technical staff of the maintenance department were never confronted by their own 
performance. 
Although these reasons explain why CNA focused on main canal maintenance before 
management transfer took place, they do not explain why CNA hardly complied with its 
obligation to clean the main canals after 1993 (figure 9.12). The first reason for this was that 
with IMT the CNA office in Celaya lost even more control over financial resources. As was 
explained in chapter 7, CNA received approximately 20 percent of the WUAs' revenue from 
f se. The remaining funds were directly used by the WUAs. CNA needed almost all of their 
hcome from the WUAs to cover their own recurrent O&M costs associated with the 
management of the dams and the main system. During these years CNA had to spend a 
cisproportional amount to clean the dams and to control the increasing problem with weed 
growth in Lake Yuriria. The second reason why CNA could hardly comply with its task to 
clean the main canal was that they had officially concessioned the use of almost all of its 
machinery to the WUAs. As a result, CNA frequently had to borrow machinery from the 
WUAs. Moreover, in many cases CNA had to hire external contractors for most of the main 
system maintenance. Finally, WUAs were very much aware of the necessity to keep the main 
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canal in a good condition. As they saw that CNA was not meeting its obligation to clean the 
main canals, WUAs like Cortázar, Salamanca and Irapuato decided to start cleaning parts of 
the main canals themselves, using their own machinery, staff and funds. By doing so, they 
experienced that they could do a better maintenance job than CNA. This experience proved to 
be important when the WUAs started to negotiate with CNA for the creation of the LRS in 
1997, aimed at taking over from CNA complete responsibilities for both operation and 
maintenance of the main canal system. 
The problem with the above discussed approaches to compare expenditures and volumes 
of maintenance works is that they do not measure the impact of these observed changes in 
maintenance on the ability of the system to transport and control water (Svendsen 1996). 
Unfortunately, accurate and reliable data on the physical condition of the system before 
transfer are not available. As a consequence, a before and after comparison in this respect is 
not possible 8. 
Interviews with system managers and farmers also reveal how they perceive maintenance 
work has affected system performance. WUA field staff and managers alike report that 
farmers were very dissatisfied with the level of maintenance done by CNA before transfer, 
especially at the level of the drains. Several respondents said that this dissatisfaction was an 
important argument for them to take over O&M responsibilities from CNA in 1992. They felt 
that they could do a much better maintenance job, particularly at the levels of the secondary 
canals and the drains. Some of these canals and drains had not be cleaned for more than 10 
years. This explains why the WUAs felt an obligation to meet their commitment to the users 
to first clean the drains as soon as possible after transfer. However, some CNA staff (while 
acknowledging the enormous increase in volume of desilting done by the WUAs) felt that 
most of the desilting done (especially in the drains) was redundant. According to them, this 
has led to over-excavation of some canals and hence has had no positive impact on the 
hydraulic performance of the system. Some WUA leaders and managers supported this 
perception. Yet, they believed that farmers liked to see the canals and drains to be cleaned, 
which explains why they have pressured the WUAs to do so. WUA leaders and managers 
justified their high investment in desilting by using this as a way to gain managerial 
credibility among the users and to show them that the WUA leaders and managers are 
accountable to users' requests for better system maintenance. 
FARMERS' OPINION ON MAINTENANCE 
Table 9.2 shows the results of the farmer survey on how farmers perceive EMT has affected 
system maintenance. More than 70 percent of the farmers reported that the condition of 
irrigation network has been good after transfer, while 64 percent of the ejidatarios and 47 
percent of the private growers felt that the condition has improved after transfer. With respect 
to the drainage network, 54 percent of the ejidatarios and 38 percent of the private growers 
believed that the condition has improved as a result of transfer. Only 11 percent of the farmers 
reported that there were no major maintenance problems before transfer. Fifty-five percent 
perceived there were no such problems after transfer. These percentages show the high level 
of satisfaction about current maintenance work done by the WUAs. 
Before transfer, lack of cleaning of secondary canals (26% of all respondents of the 
farmer survey) and drains (21%) were seen as the main problems related to maintenance. 
Figure 9.13 shows that particularly head-end farmers were complaining about the lack of 
cleaning in secondary canal. Although poor maintenance in head-end reaches would also have 
affected tail-end enders, most tail-end farmers were used to clean their own reaches any way. 
In fact, they were often not even aware that cleaning should have been done by CNA. 
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Table 9.2 Farmers' opinion on the change in maintenance service as a result of IMT 
Ejidatarios (n=90) Private growers (n=35) 
Condition of the 
irrigation network 
(%) 
Condition of the 
Drainage network 
(%) 
Condition of the 
irrigation network 
(%) 
Condition of the 
drainage network 
(%) 
7 3 6 0 
64 54 47 38 
11 33 24 41 
9 1 6 9 
9 9 17 12 
100 100 100 100 
Vifor before and after IMT 
P4or before, good after IMT 
Gi»od before and after IMT 
Gt>od before, poor after IMT 
Other" 
Total 
Nate 
private 
:"Other" includes 'don't know,' 'no response,' and 'not applicable because respondent only uses a 
well' 
Fibure 9.13 Farmers' opinion on the main problems related to system maintenance, 
before and after transfer 
Field inlets Pnfir^ m f r B f t f m c t r r p B 
Forty-four percent of all respondents report that after transfer there are no serious 
maintenance related problems. Only twelve percent of the farmers still complain about the 
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lack of maintenance in secondary canals while less then 10 percent still sees poor 
maintenance of the drains as a major problem. Furthermore, unlike the situation before 
transfer, after transfer there is no clear head-tail-end bias in farmers' opinion on maintenance 
problems (figure 9.13). This indicates that the WUAs are doing an equally good maintenance 
job in all canal reaches. 
COMPARISON ACROSS WUAs 
Comparison of maintenance levels among the 11 WUAs shows the variation in the way 
WUAs deal with system deterioration. Figure 9.14 shows that WUAs desilt their canals 
approximately once every three years (135% in 4 years). Some WUAs do this every 2 years, 
while others have cleaned only 60 percent or less of their network during the 4 years after 
transfer. 
Similarly, figure 9.15 shows the variation in maintenance levels per module. The figure 
shows a striking decline in total maintenance expenditures per hectare from head-end to tail-
end WUAs. The two exceptions are Cortazar and Salamanca WUAs, which make more use of 
the two main canals than any of the other WUAs (see also figure 2.2). Although not their 
responsibility, both WUAs invested heavily in maintaining these main canals in addition to 
their assigned reaches, to guarantee reliable supply to their secondary canals. The decline in 
expenditures from head to tail cannot be explained by different levels of fee collection rates 
(see figure 7.2), nor by the fact that these WUAs have less problems with siltation since they 
are further away from the dams. Comparison of module data indicates that tail-end modules 
are relatively smaller and have relatively less infrastructure to maintain: on average, 40 
meters of canal and drainage network per hectare for the six head-end modules versus 30 
meters per hectare for the 5 tail-end modules. Furthermore, data show that some of these 
WUAs spent relatively more on operational and energy costs as some pump water directly 
from the river Lerma. 
Figure 9.14 Percentage of canal network desilted by the WUAs, ARI.1D 1993-1996 
200 T 
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Figure 9.15 Comparison of maintenance expenditures (July 1994 US$) per hectare by 
modules, ARLID 1993-1996 
wr 
V// • 
9.5 Impact on system improvement programs 
The general belief among fanners in ARLID was that IMT should have been accompanied by 
an intensive system rehabilitation and modernization program under the World Bank and 
I titer-American Development Bank assisted Irrigation and Drainage Sector Project loan 
(Gorriz et al. 1995). However, in ARLID no system modernization or rehabilitation activities 
took place as part of the IMT project9. Some minor rehabilitation and system improvement 
activities were initiated only a few years after these Bank assisted projects were completed. 
These activities include four externally funded programs to which some of the WUAs in 
ARLID had access: PRODEP, Efficient Use of Water and Energy, Fertigation, and a more 
rxen t program on System Improvement and Rehabilitation. 
PRODEP 
Of all these programs, PRODEP (Programa de Desarrollo Parcelario) is probably the most 
important in terms of both total funding and number of beneficiaries1 0. The program was 
initiated by SAGAR (Ministry of Agriculture) with World Bank assistance and aims at on-
f arm improvements by providing WUAs with laser equipment for land leveling, trucks and 
buried pipe systems for public deep wells that are managed by the WUAs. 
So far, the WUAs of Jaral, Irapuato and Valle have participated, while at the end of 1997 
assistance to other associations (including La Purisima and Cortazar) was committed. The 
activities are financed through a match fund, in which the government (50%) and the WUAs 
(50%) share the costs. Generally, the WUAs ask the direct beneficiaries (users) to contribute 
financially. For instance, Jaral WUA asked its users to pay 100 pesos per hectare to cover the 
cost of those activities that benefit all users. So far, they have collected more than 520,000 
pesos from their users, which is approximately 15 percent of the total of 3.5 million pesos 
involved in PRODEP activities in Jaral. In addition, direct beneficiaries of for instance new 
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buried pipe systems pay an extra contribution. The WUAs of Valle and Jaral and started to 
sell land leveling services (by using the PRODEP laser equipment) to those users who are 
interested. So far, they have only charged rates at actual cost prices. 
Efficient Use of Water and Energy 
Another important program that aims at the improvement of efficiencies at the farm level is 
the Efficient Use of Water and Energy program (Uso Eficiente del Agua y de la Energía 
Eléctrica). The program includes incentives for capital investments to improve pumping 
equipment, construction of pressurized systems and land leveling (CNA 1993, De la Cruz and 
Peña 1994). Unlike PRODEP, this program does not exclusively focus on WUAs and users 
within irrigation districts. Individual well owners and well users outside the districts 
outnumber the beneficiaries within the districts. Beneficiaries include both individual users 
and WUAs (for their public deep tubewells). The program is a co-financed between the 
federal government and the direct beneficiaries. Many farmers and all WUAs have applied to 
take part in the program. 
A major problem with the execution of the program is that government funds have been 
released much slower than expected, resulting in long waiting lists and tremendous delays in 
selecting beneficiaries, testing pumps, and implementing the actual technical improvements. 
As more farmers and WUAs have applied for this kind of technical assistance that program 
funds allow, a lottery system (por sorteo) is used to 'select' potential candidates. However, it 
is not clear to what extent selection really takes place through this lottery system. Some users 
and WUAs have complained that there is some degree of favoritism involved as well. 
Although WUAs and individual users compete for the same funds, all WUAs in ARLID 
have started to help their users to fill out their application forms in order to facilitate access to 
the program. Once potential candidates are selected, program staff pay visits to the sites to 
check whether the well also meets the technical criteria (such as poor electromechanical 
efficiency of pumping equipment, pumping height, low application efficiencies) for getting 
upgraded 1 1. 
In addition to their complaint of favoritism in the selection of potential beneficiaries, 
leaders of WUAs particularly complained about the lack of control they had on the selection 
of external contractors who would execute the improvement works. This selection was 
entirely done by CNA, without consulting the beneficiaries first. As a result, users were very 
concerned that possibilities of rent-seeking on the part of CNA staff would become a more 
important criteria that the quality and cost-effectiveness of the work delivered by these 
contractors. Although these suspicions on rent-seeking could not be confirmed by empirical 
data from interviews or other sources, field observations in Salvatierra and Cortázar and 
inspection of several pumping installation and buried pipe systems that were installed by the 
selected contractor in these modules learned that numerous design and construction errors 
were made and that in many cases inferior materials were used 1 2 . 
By the end of 1997 approximately 40 (out of 175) public deep tubewells had been 
upgraded, serving about 1,500 hectares or 400 farmers. The level of subsidy received ranged 
from US$ 7,500 to US$ 11,000 per well. It is not clear how many individual farmers had 
access to funds from this program 1 3. 
Fertigation Program 
A third activity that mainly focused at field level improvements is the fertigation program 
(Programa de Ferti-irrigación). This is part of much wider package of technical and financial 
support under the Alianza Para el Campo program that was started in 1994 to boost the 
'modernization' of Mexican agriculture and to compensate for the loss in income as a result 
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of ihe neoliberal reforms. According to SAGAR (1997) a total amount of 57.9 million pesos 
(around 8 million dollars) was spent on fertigation in 1997 for the entire State of Guanajuato, 
berefiting more than 12,000 hectares (i.e. US$ 640/ha). The total number of beneficiaries in 
ARLID is unknown, but information from the 11 WUAs reveal for instance that in the module 
of: aral six wells were equipped with fertigation, serving 52 users, in Cortázar 14 wells and in 
Coixalejo four wells. 
System Rehabilitation and Modernization Program 
the four system improvement programs mentioned here, the activities under the program 
System Rehabilitation and Modernization of Irrigation Districts (Programa de 
Rehabilitación y Modernización de Distritos de Riego) are the only ones that really focus at 
improvement works of irrigation infrastructure at the module and district levels. These 
activities include rehabilitation of canals, drains and service roads as well as the construction 
anc installation of 'modern' water control and measuring devices. 
The program was initiated in 1986, but the first agreement to actually start activities 
under this program was signed between CNA and the National Association of Water Users 
(AlWR) in October 1996 . In ARLID, the first rehabilitation works were started no earlier 
thai by the end of 1997. The program is co-financed by the Federal Government (i.e. CNA, 
50%), the State Government (25%) and the beneficiaries (25%). Potential beneficiaries that 
can apply for program funds are the WUAs and the LRSs. Applications for funds and 
activities are analyzed and can be approved by the technical committee which mainly 
comprises representatives from CNA and ANUR. 
Once applications have been approved, the works are technically and financially 
supervised and executed by the regional or State offices of CNA. This means that CNA plays 
an important role, both in granting the application for funds (and hence the kind of 
rehabilitation works that will actually take place) and in controlling all project funds. In most 
casss the actual works will be done by external firms, who will have to compete for the 
contracts. Both CNA and those WUAs that directly benefit from the works decide to which 
firri the contract will be granted. Prices, quality of the work and reputation of the firm are the 
most important official selection criteria, but according to some leaders of WUAs factors like 
favDritism and nepotism are hard to avoid in the Mexican context of doing business. 
However, generally these leaders prefer this system above the selection procedure used in for 
instance the Efficient Use of Water and Energy Program, where the eventual beneficiaries are 
not involved in the selection of the firms that install pumping equipment and pressurized 
systems in the farmers' own fields. 
As program activities started only after most of the field observations for this thesis were 
completed, a complete overview of the kind activities that were approved for ARLID cannot 
ncluded here. Yet, among the activities that were started before the end of this study were 
rehabilitation of the Irapuato main canal, the installation of pressurized pipe systems for 
public deep tubewells in Cortázar and Valle, and a small pilot project on water distribution in 
a secondary canal using a pressurized pipe system (see box 9.3). The rehabilitation of the 
canal in Irapuato aimed at the construction of the right slope of the canal bed. At the time 
wh;n the canal was built, it was constructed with a reverse-slope, which meant that less water 
could reach the tail-end area of the module than needed. With help of funds from the 
rehabilitation program reconstruction works were started at the end of the 1997-98 winter 
season. The total contribution from the farmers was planned at approximately US$ 43,000 (or 
US$ 13.5/ha). 
As these four programs were started a few years after management transfer had taken 
place, one would have expected that the actual activities that were approved would better 
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reflect the farmers' ideas on how to improve water distribution and use at all levels of the 
system. Furthermore, as problems with water distribution and use are very local specific, one 
would have expected a high diversity on the kind of (new) technologies that were introduced 
as a result of these programs. However, among all these programs one find surprisingly little 
variety in technologies. 
All approved activities either aimed at improving water distribution and application 
efficiencies by introducing standard packages of new technologies (pressurized buried pipe 
systems, land leveling, fertigation, measuring devices), or at reconstructing and upgrading 
existing designs, using conventional technologies (electromechanical pumping efficiencies, 
lining, improving bed-slopes). The main reason that explains this, is that most of these works 
were either initiated or had to be approved by government agencies, with very little 
involvement from the direct beneficiaries. In most of these cases farmers only had the option 
to apply or to not apply for already pre-selected packages of technologies. In addition, in the 
case of the Efficient Use of Water and Energy and the Fertigation programs, farmers did not 
have control over the ultimate design, construction and installation of the technologies as 
even the contracting firms were selected by the agencies. Similarly, although its direct 
beneficiaries had more control over the selection of consultant firms that were hired to do the 
works), also beneficiaries of the Rehabilitation and Modernization program had no control 
over how the funds were going to be spent. 
From the point of view of the users the choice for standardized and conventional 
technological solutions that mainly aim at reducing conveyance and application losses is not 
necessarily a problem. Interviews with technical staff and leaders show that they share a 
common concern on the high levels of water usage (which are confirmed by the high RWS 
values that were measured) particularly at the field and distributary levels. On the other hand, 
it was noticed several times that leaders and managers of WUAs were interested in improving 
water distribution between and within the distributaries of their module areas, by introducing 
division structures that would help ditch tenders to distribute the water with a higher level of 
accuracy (actual over planned distribution). In addition, they expressed a high preference for 
using more and better measuring devices at the level of the intakes of main distributaries. 
They realized that the ditch tenders' rough estimations of flows that are released into the 
larger distributaries can lead to the kind of discrepancies between planned and actual flows as 
reported in section 5.5. As they treat water more and more as an economic commodity (see 
chapter 8), that can either be traded to other WUAs, or be used to increase the irrigation 
intensity, or both, they feel that better measuring devices would serve them tremendously 1 5. 
However, no new measuring devices were installed under these programs. 
Only one example could be observed of a WUA requesting and gaining approval to test 
its own ideas on how to improve distribution efficiencies and a new system of secondary 
canal water distribution under the System Rehabilitation and Modernization Program. This 
case is illustrated in box 9.3 and concerns a pilot project in the first (head-end) distributary of 
Cortazar module. The idea of this project was initiated by both the general manager of the 
Cortazar WUA and the 112 users of this particularly distributary, who suffered from both 
irregular and insufficient water delivery. The idea was approved under the condition that the 
direct beneficiaries along the distributary would contribute 12.5 percent of the total cost, 
while the WUAs (i.e. including all the other users in Cortazar) would bear an additional 12.5 
percent. The remaining funding would come from Federal Government (50%) and State 
Government (25%) subsidies. In addition, the direct users would have to pay 200 pesos per 
hectare per irrigation delivery, compared to approximately 100 pesos for the regular canal 
irrigation service fee. 
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Box 9 3 WUA initiated system rehabilitation: an example from Cortázar 
Unlike the other 51 distributaries in Cortázar, the first distributary does not take water from the 
Coria canal main canal. Instead, it takes water from the Toro de Lomo headworks. Next to the 
main gate that serves the entire Coria canal, this first distributary has its own small and fully 
adjustable slide-gate. As this gate was constructed after completion of the main gate, its 
distributary is locally still called 'New Gate' (toma nueva). Since the time of construction, the 112 
farmers who try to irrigate their 138 hectares along this distributary have suffered from two 
problems. First, the relatively small 'new gate' is constructed at a too high level. As a 
consequence, when the water level of the river at the Toro de Lomo headworks is low, the 
distributary cannot take in water. As the water level fluctuates, farmers never know whether they 
will actually receive the scheduled deliveries. Second, and partly as a result of the first problem, 
water flows in this distributary do not meet the planned target flows, which results in water 
shortages particularly in the tail-end area of the distributary. 
In order to resolve this problem, the general manager and the president of the WUA, together with 
the users of the distributary, developed the idea to submit a proposal on rehabilitation of this 
distributary to the System Rehabilitation and Modernization Program. The idea was to not only 
aim at solving the reliability and adequacy problems mentioned above, but also to use this project 
as a test case to see whether conveyance losses within the distributary could be reduced. If 
successful, the experiment in this distributary could serve as an example to improve other 
distributaries that suffered from similar problems of reliability, adequacy and high conveyance 
losses. According to the president of the WUA, this project would help to convince both other 
water users and external funding agencies to financially contribute and invest in similar projects 
once the funds from the Rehabilitation and Modernization program had come to an end. The WUA 
E i s k e d the direct beneficiaries to show their confidence in the project by contributing 12.5 percent 
of the total construction cost as well as by committing themselves to pay a water fee which was 
twice as high as the regular fee paid by farmers who use canal water. 
n r h e WUA invited several firms to submit proposals and ideas. A firm from the neighboring State 
of Michoacán was selected as it had the most favorable price and could still guarantee good quality 
work. The design itself was basically developed by the general manager of the WUA, in frequent 
consultation with the users and the president. All these stakeholders liked the idea as it could meet 
the three objectives. The design was as follows. Instead of using the original intake at the head-
works, the distributary would now receive water by pumping it directly from the Coria main canal. 
In that case it would have the same reliability as the other distributaries: as soon as the Coria canal 
runs water, accessibility would be guaranteed, irrespective of the water level. To avoid problems 
with total pump break-downs, two pumps with a pumping capacity of 60 1/s were installed. The 
double irrigation fee would be sufficient to pay for the additional pumping cost. Rather than 
pumping into the existing open canal, water would now be distributed via a buried pipe system 
using 12", 10" and 8" pipes. The two advantages of this system would be that conveyance losses 
would be reduced considerably and that a new and simple way of water rotation could be 
introduced, particularly to guarantee water delivery to the tail-end area of the distributary. The 
system pipe would have 12 outlets, e a c h having a capacity of 40 1/s. Three farmers could irrigate 
simultaneously to meet the full capacity of 120 1/s of the two pumps. Rotation would be scheduled 
following the same principles of requesting and paying turns as the ones used for farmers along the 
other distributaries (see chapter 3). 
The system was still under construction when the field observations for this study were ended, so 
unfortunately information on its actual performance and whether it received a follow up in other 
distributaries is not available. 
211 
CHAPTER 9 
9.6 Land and water productivity 
COMPARISON OF PRODUCTIVITY OVER TIME 
To assess the impact of the IMT program on the agricultural and economic productivity of 
ARLJD, change in crop yields (ton/ha), water productivity (kg/m 3), standardized gross value 
of production (SGVP) per unit of water supplied and consumed, and the SGVP per irrigated 
cropped area and command are analyzed (for definitions see Appendix 4). 
Figure 9.16 shows the development in yields for both the major winter crops and the 
wheat equivalent of all crops grown. The figure shows an upward course for wheat and barley 
yields: an average yield of the wheat equivalent of 5.9 ton/ha, with a CV of 13.2%, but with a 
R 2 as low as 0.19. The average yield of the wheat equivalent was 5.6 ton/ha (CV = 13.7%; R 2 
= 0.03) in the recorded years preceding transfer, against 6.5 ton/ha (CV = 4%; R 2 = 0.23) in 
the four years after transfer. However, the line with years before transfer (1982-1991) is 
heavily distorted by the dramatically low wheat and barley yields in the winter 1988-89 
season. Eliminating this year produces an average wheat equivalent yield of 5.7 ton/ha (CV = 
10.1%; R 2 = 0.01). The low R 2 values do not warrant the general belief among CNA staff that 
IMT has resulted in better yields. As transfer did not take place until the end of 1992, the 
recovery that was started after 1988 cannot be attributed to the transfer process alone as it 
could (though not studied for this thesis) also be the result of better crop varieties and 
cropping practices. At the same time, it can also be argued that the period since IMT has not 
shown yield declines, which can (given the increase in the cost of agricultural inputs) be 
considered as a positive achievement. 
Figure 9.16 Average yields for major crops, ARLID, winter seasons 1982-1997 
82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 
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Before we arrive at presenting the economic productivity indicators discussed in 1.6 and 
4. first another more commonly used agricultural indicator is applied: water 
„ (kg/m 3 of water) for the wheat equivalent crop. In figure 9.17 a distinction is 
between productivity per m 3 of water supplied (gross irrigation depths) and per m 3 of 
consumed (i.e. CROPWAT water requirements). 
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Figure 9.17 Water productivity for wheat equivalent, ARLED winter seasons 1982-1997 
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The years after transfer show a slightly upward course for the water productivity per m 
water supplied (CV = 16.6%; R 2 = 0.81), against a rather flat line for the years preceding 
(after elimination of the dramatic poor year of 1988): CV = 11.6% and R 2 = 0.01. 
might suggest that farmers use water more efficiently, leading to higher values water 
However, these results are a combination of both lower irrigation depths (see 
9.3) and increasing yields (figure 9.16) and as such cannot be attributed to the transfer 
alone. 
As was discussed at length in chapters 1 and 4, one of the aims of market-oriented 
such as IMT was to encourage farmers to use water more economically. In order 
assess whether the IMT program in ARLED has achieved this aim, the comparative 
economic productivity indicators (see section 1.7 and Appendix 4) were applied in Cortázar 
Salvatierra modules. 
Figure 9.18 shows the change in SGVP per unit of land and water for the case of 
Coitazar module. The average equivalent wheat yields for the reported period is 6.1 ton/ha. 
Standardized gross values of production per unit of land cropped range between 950 US$/ha 
2,100 US$/ha (with an average of US$ 1,300 per hectare; CV = 23%), whereas the output 
unit of command of irrigable area range from 66 US$/ha to 1,720 US$/ha (average US$ 
; CV = 55%). In comparison to irrigation districts in, for instance, north-east Mexico 
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(Rymshaw 1998) and 25 other systems studied by IWMI world wide (Molden et al. 1998; 
Sakthivadivel et al. 1999), these returns to land cropped are medium to high, while the returns 
to unit of command are medium to low. The output per unit of water supplied range from 0.06 
US$/m 3 to 0.14 US$/m 3 (average of 0.11 US$/m 3 ) , which compared to the other systems is 
low. The output per unit of water consumed closely follows the trends in output per unit of 
land cropped and ranged from 0.18 US$/m 3 to 0.41 US$/m 3 (average of 0.27 USS/m 3), which 
is relatively high. 
Figure 9.18 Standardized gross value of production (SGVP) per unit of land and water, 
Cortazar module, winter seasons 1985-1997 
2,500 i r 0.50 
Figure 9.19 shows the outputs per unit of land and water in Salvatierra module. The 
average equivalent wheat yield is 6.4 ton/ha, which is slightly higher than in Cortazar. The 
SGVP per unit of land cropped range between 1,100 US$/ha and 2,200 US$/ha (with an 
average of US$ 1,450; CV =19%) and are also higher than in Cortazar, basically as a result of 
a higher percentage of high value crops like beans and vegetables. However, the output per 
unit of command of irrigable area range from 72 US$/ha and 1,014 US$/ha (average US$ 
580; CV = 52%), which is much lower than in Cortazar (and among the five lowest values in 
the set presented by Molden et al. 1998 and Sakthivadivel et al. 1999) and reflects the low 
cropping intensities in Salvatierra. Although more water is applied to the crop, the higher 
returns to land make that the output per unit of water supplied are still similar to Cortazar, 
ranging from 0.06 US$/m 3 to 0.19 US$/m 3 (average of 0.10 US$/m 3 ) . 
The output per unit of water consumed by the crop ranges from 0.28 US$/m 3 to 0.47 
US$/m 3, which is high compared to Cortazar. The high outputs per m 3 of water consumed 
combined with the high RWS values and low crop intensities indicate that in theory 
Salvatierra farmers could crop more land by applying less water per hectare irrigated and 
hence increasing their productivity of the water supplied to their fields. 
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Figure 9.19 Standardized gross value of production (SGVP) per unit of land and water, 
Salvatierra module, winter seasons 1985-1997 
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9.7| Provision of non-irrigation services 
As Was discussed in section 6.3, some WUAs have started to fill in the institutional void in 
the provision of agricultural services to farmers. This void was created after the dismantling 
of various State agencies and banks during the neo-liberal reforms of the late 1980s and early 
1993s (see chapter 3). In addition to providing O&M services, WUAs have become 
particularly involved in activities that aim to reduce the cost of production to water users. 
Table 9.3 summarizes to what extent water users make use of WUAs as a source of gaining 
access to some non-O&M services. 
One of the most ambitious strategies that these WUAs follow is to establish new 
organizations parallel to the WUAs that are involved in trading agro-chemical inputs and 
seeds. As is shown in table 9.3, after IMT seven percent of the respondents have started to 
buy their agro-chemical inputs through the WUAs. Private companies continue to be most 
impartant source of these inputs, both before and after IMT. Whereas official rural credit 
institutions and banks like BANRURAL used to be an important source of inputs (in 
combination with formal credits), especially for ejidatarios16, only ten percent of all farmers 
still receive their inputs through credit programs of these banks. Another remarkable figure in 
this table is the relatively high percentage of farmers that report not to use these agro-
chemical inputs. Although the reasons for this were not studied in detail, two factors might 
explain this development. The most obvious (and most reported) reason is that, as a result of 
prio; liberalization programs, agro-chemicals have simply become too expensive for users to 
buy. One would expect that farmers' abstention from using inputs for this reason result in 
yield reductions. However, the data presented in the previous section of this chapter do not 
indicate these reductions 1 7. Other farmers report that they have stopped using agro-chemical 
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inputs as they have recently shifted to practices of zero or minimum tillage. ARLID is an 
irrigation districts with a relatively high number of farmers who practise these tillage 
methods. This is clearly the result of a rather progressive training program given by a training 
center near Jaral. Many farmers have attended these programs, often after the WUAs have 
facilitated access to them. 
Table 9 3 Percentage of farmers (n=125) who receive agro-chemical inputs, credit and 
technical assistance from WUAs and other sources, before and after IMT 
Source Agro-chemical inputs Credit Technical assistance 
before after before after Before after 
WUAs 0 7 0 0 0 3 
Other farmers 13 17 1 4 0 0 
Private companies 46 44 0 0 0 1 
Banks 31 10 46 11 8 1 
SAGAR/SARH 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Cooperatives 6 6 1 0 0 1 
Other sources 0 1 2 1 2 1 
Don't use 2 15 48 84 87 93 
No answer 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Probably the most dramatic impact of the neoliberal reforms so far, has been the farmers' 
problems with gaining access to credit. Table 9.3 clearly shows that after IMT (however not 
as a result of it, but rather of the change in credit policy of BANRURAL) only 16 percent of 
the farmers still have access to credit in comparison to 51 percent before the start of the IMT 
program in 1992. Although some WUAs (like Salvatierra) occasionally provide small credits 
to their users if this helps them to get access to government sponsored system improvement 
programs, none of the farmers surveyed reported to make use of such credit facilities. 
Although WUAs do not play a role in filling the credit gap that was created as a result of the 
reforms, they do play a role in facilitating farmers to gain access to still existing state subsidy 
programs like PROCAMPO and as such indirectly assist farmers financially. 
As for technical assistance (including agricultural extension), three percent of all farmers 
report to use the WUAs as the main source of assistance. However, compared to the 93 
percent of farmers who say not to receive any assistance or extension, this percentage is 
relatively insignificant. 
9.8 Conclusions 
The following summarizes the main impacts of the IMT program on the O&M performance at 
ARLID. 
Water use 
Farmers' increased involvement in system O&M has not led to major improvements in 
operational performance. Although the hydraulic committee has become an important 
institution in which users participate in planning the use of and control over the water source, 
there is no evidence that transfer has resulted in significant improvements in the way water is 
allocated and distributed. With the exception of some WUAs like Cortazar, generally WUAs 
have so far followed the same allocation and distribution principles and practices as used by 
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CMA. As a result, RWS values at all levels continue to be high. Similarly, no changes in the 
area irrigated or cropping patterns can be attributed to transfer. 
Farmers' increased involvement in decision making and control has increased operational 
accountability. The farmer survey shows that the majority of farmers perceive that the quality 
of system operations has either remained the same or has improved. Individual users still feel 
that they do not receive relevant information on the approved irrigation plan (which defines 
the number of irrigation a farmer can receive) in time. This suggests that the arrangement of 
user representation in the general assemblies of the WUAs does not guarantee an 
improvement in the quality of the services that are provided. On the other hand, most 
respondents are very positive about the changes they observed in the attitude of both 
operational staff (particularly ditch tenders) and administrative staff. This is clearly the result 
of greater control of the users over WUA technical and administrative staff. 
Unlike individual users, leaders and most technical staff of WUAs are provided with 
adequate and very up to date climatological and hydrological information that help to better 
decide on their irrigation plans and schedules. The most important reason for this is the 
leaders' active participation in the hydraulic committee. In this committee, leaders not only 
have better access to the information that is provided to them by CNA, but also actively 
control decision making processes based on this information. 
One of the problems that most WUAs face is the high turnover in technical staff. As a 
result, there is an almost continuous need for training of new staff, as well as upgrading the 
skills of existing staff. Although CNA and IMTA provided the new WUAs with ample 
technical training during the initial stages of the IMT program, most WUAs now feel that 
CN fA and other organizations could play a more active role. 
As the transfer program mainly aimed at improving the use of surface irrigation, it was 
not expected that major changes in groundwater use would occur as a result of transfer. Yet, it 
is apparent that the alarming level of overexploitation of aquifers by well owners in ARLID is 
not being reduced. Although CNA will continue to be the authorizing institution that controls 
the aquifers, IMT has resulted in a considerable reduction in the role and mandate of CNA in 
the State of Guanajuato. As a consequence, it will become more and more difficult for CNA 
to adequately monitor aquifers. WUAs do not seem to have the interest, nor the legal power to 
assume that role. 
Maintenance 
One of the most positive impacts of the IMT program in ARLID has been the considerable 
improvement in maintenance services, especially at lower system levels. Other improvements 
include: the purchase of modern machinery by the WUAs; a moderate increase in the 
proportion of the total O&M budget spent on maintenance; and maintaining the level of 
maintenance expenditures per hectare in constant dollar terms, or doubling this level in real 
peso terms. These improvements are clearly acknowledged by the farmers surveyed. 
Compared to the delivery of operation services, individual water users are more positive 
about the provision of services in the fields of maintenance and system improvements. Unlike 
the pre-transfer situation, users can now daily observe that WUAs actively try to maintain the 
irrigation canals and drains. Although it is too early to observe any impacts of the tremendous 
increase in maintenance activities on actual water distribution, the WUAs active role in 
maintenance has certainly helped to build up credibility of WUAs in the first few years after 
the transfer program was implemented. 
Whereas individual users are positive about the changes in maintenance and system 
improvements, WUAs still complain about the lack of support from CNA. Although CNA 
wants the WUAs to spend 60 percent of their O&M budgets on maintenance, they do not 
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provide the associations with adequate methodologies that help them to better set priorities 
within their maintenance programs. Nor are the maintenance programs monitored in an 
adequate way. Furthermore, as water distribution between and within the secondary canals 
also depend on the level of maintenance service in the main canal system, WUAs complain 
heavily about the deterioration of maintenance in the main canals done by CNA. Finally, 
although most WUAs appreciate the active role that CNA plays in helping WUAs to get 
access to externally funded system improvement programs, they feel that they have too little 
control over the way these funds are used. 
Soon after transfer in 1992, CNA stopped cleaning the main canals as well, which caused 
much concern among the WUAs and eventually led to the WUAs taking over responsibility 
for managing the main system as well as the distributary subsystem. While it is apparent that 
the amount of maintenance work has increased since transfer and has helped the WUAs to 
increase their credibility, it is not clear what this has meant for the physical capability of the 
system to transport water to farms. 
Land and water productivity 
The data that is presented in this chapter does not provide convincing evidence that there has 
been a marked effect of the transfer program on agricultural and economic productivity. 
Although fluctuations can be observed, even after transfer, it is believed that these are related 
to other recent developments in the agriculture sector such as the dismantling of credit and 
subsidy systems, input price policies, and, most of all, price changes in the world commodity 
markets. 
Non-irrigation related services 
As was noted earlier, the introduction of new institutional arrangements for irrigation 
management did not come on its own but was accompanied by several other institutional 
reforms. Interviews with leaders, staff and farmers of WUAs clearly indicate that both the 
providers and receivers of support services are far more concerned about the dismantling of 
former government services other than those related to O&M. Farmers mention particularly 
the difficulties they have with having access to cheap inputs and credit. Most WUAs in 
ARLID have picked up this concern and have started to try to provide some of those services 
through their associations. However, there are legal as well as financial limitations to further 
develop these initiatives, which explain why so far few farmers were able to actually make 
use of these service. Moreover, there exists a genuine concern on the part of the Mexican 
irrigation bureaucracy that the involvement of WUAs in the provision of non-irrigation 
services might shift their attention away from delivering adequate O&M services, as some 
leaders will find this the provision of this type of services more lucrative, both financially and 
politically. Although so far field observations in ARLID have not supported these concerns, it 
is important to closely monitor whether indeed the provision of non-irrigation services by 
WUAs does not negatively affect their main responsibility, i.e. the provision of irrigation 
services. 
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Notes 
Parts of this chapter are drawn from Kloezen et al. (1997). 
For the IMT impact assessment studies in Mexico, see Kloezen et al. (1997) for ARLID, Levine 
et al. (1998) for Lagunera irrigation district, and Rymshaw (1998) for the Bajo Rio Bravo and 
Bajo Río San Juan irrigation districts. Whereas the former two studies focused particularly on 
changes in performance as a result of IMT, the latter study focuses more on the impact of sudden 
droughts. Other IWMI studies in which comparative indicators were used to assess the impact of 
IMT and PIM programs in other countries include Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo (1996 and 
1998) on Colombia; Kloezen (1995 and 1996) and Samad and Vermillion (1999) on Sri Lanka; 
and Vermillion et al. (2000) on Indonesia. 
The Spanish term used for these wells is 'pozo oficial', which literally means 'official well'. Here 
'official' refers to State owned and managed and not to 'officially registered', as some people 
believe. As these wells were transferred to the WUAs in 1992, they ceased to be 'publicly' 
managed. In order to both avoid confusion and to clearly distinguish these wells from privately 
owned wells, I prefer to use the English translation of 'public well'. Here 'publicly managed' 
refers to CNA during the time before management transfer and to the WUAs for the period after 
transfer. 
For instance, out of the 21 public tubedeep wells that are managed by the WUA in Salvatierra, 10 
pump directly in one of the main canals of the module, whereas the remaining wells discharge 
into one or more field ditches. 
The two levels indicated in the graph are based on data collected by the CNA district office in 
Cejaya. Although annual recharge will vary as a consequence of changes in annual rainfall 
patterns, reliable historical data on this variation are not available. 
There are no data on how much of this excess water recharges the aquifer. 
Expressing expenses in dollar terms only masks the improvements made by the WUAs under 
conditions of the economic crisis that followed the devaluation of the peso in 1994. In constant 
pesos terms, maintenance expenditures have increased from 56 pesos/ha in the pre-transfer years 
to 108 pesos/ha in the post-transfer years, which is an increase of 93 percent. 
CNA and the WUAs only maintain a rough estimate of the condition of the infrastructure. The 
table below shows how CNA has rated the condition of both the main canals (maintained by 
CNA) and the secondary canals (maintained by the WUAs). However, it is not clear what kind of 
criteria they used to make this condition assessment. Moreover, the fairly positive condition 
assessment of the main canal compared to the one of secondary canals is not consistent with the 
results demonstrated in figure 9.14. A possible reason for this might be that the condition 
assessment is based on the construction materials of the canals, where concrete lined canals (as in 
Acámbaro and Purísima) rate higher than earthen canals (as in Salvatierra) irrespective of their 
actual maintenance condition. 
CNA's own system condition assessment rating for ARLID 
Condition of the main Condition of the secondary 
canal infrastructure canal infrastructure 
Acámbaro Very good Very good 
Salvatierra Fair Poor 
Jaral Good Good 
Valle Good Fair 
Cortázar Good Good 
Salamanca Good Fair 
Irapuato Poor Fair 
Abasólo Good Good 
Huanímaro Good Good 
Corralejo Good (does not exist) 
La Purísima Very good Very good 
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9. It is not clear to what extent these system modernization programs have been implemented nation 
wide. However, observations (not only from ARLID but also from short visits made to irrigation 
districts of Lagunera, Bajo Rio Bravo and Bajo Río San Juan) show that very few activities have 
taken place in this respect. 
10. Ramos-Valdés et al. (1999) report that between 1996 and 1999 78.5 million US dollars were 
invested in this program (including a planned investment of 24.4 million USD for 1999). 
11. Technical criteria also determined the level of subsidy and kind of assistance that the 
beneficiaries of the Efficient Use of Water and Energy program could receive. Farmers with 
pumps at less than 40 percent efficiency received 50 percent of the capital expenditure to upgrade 
their wells and pumping equipment to a maximum of US$ 30,000. Those with efficiencies higher 
than 40 percent would receive 50 percent of the costs involved in the construction of small (field) 
storage reservoirs, land leveling and pressurized systems (up to 30,000 dollars). And those who 
wanted to improve both their pumping and irrigation systems could receive a subsidy for up to 50 
percent of the actual costs to a maximum of US$ 45,000 (De la Cruz and Peña 1994). 
12. I am grateful to Ian Makin (IWMI) and Gez Cornish (HR-Wallingford), who once accompanied 
me on a field trip and showed me several of these design and construction errors. 
13. The program has office space in the CNA district office in Celaya, although it works more or less 
independently from this office. Here, I had several interviews with the people responsible for the 
selection of candidates and execution of the program in the entire State of Guanajuato. 
Unfortunately, they could not provide me with reliable data on the progress of the program (such 
as the planned and actual number of beneficiaries, both within and outside ARLID), but they 
clearly indicated that because of lack of available funds the program was seriously delayed. 
14. Ramos-Valdés et al. (1999) report that between 1997 and 1999 71.9 million US dollars were 
invested in this program (including a planned investment of 29.96 million USD for 1999). This 
number equals a nation wide average investment of approximately 23 US$/ha if one assumes that 
all the 3.1 million hectare under the IMT program benefited equally. Unfortunately the authors do 
not mention how many hectares actually benefited from the System Rehabilitation and 
Modernization Program. 
15. Several WUAs in ARLID have approached me to either request whether they could use our 
digital flow probes and data loggers, or to provide them with information on US firm that could 
sell this equipment directly to them. Their interest for using these devices was twofold. First, as 
explained in the main text, they want to have more control over how much water they actually 
deliver to some of the main distributaries. Second, they want to have an instrument to cross-check 
the volume that is delivered to them by CNA at the module intake. As explained in section 5.2, 
measuring devices are only installed at the heads of the modules, while distribution within the 
modules is entirely based on flow estimates made by the ditch tenders. 
16. Before IMT, thirty-six percent of the ejidatarios and 19 percent of the private growers surveyed 
(n=125) made use of banks to get access to inputs. After IMT, these numbers were 11 and 7 
percent, respectively. This shows the greater dependency of ejidatarios on State programs. 
17. Moreover, as was argued before, from a methodological point of view changes in yields are very 
hard to attribute to one single factor and are generally the result of a wider package of changes 
that were introduced at the same time, such as changes in cost of production, provision of 
irrigation services, seed varieties, and availability of credit. 
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10 
0 Discussion and conclusions 
1 Introduction 
Worldwide market-oriented irrigation reforms, and IMT in particular, are very much in 
vogue. Yet, as was discussed in chapter 1, discussions on the pro's and con's of these reforms 
generally ideologically driven and are hardly ever supported by empirical evidence. 
Detailed analysis of the way these programs were implemented, and the way managers and 
users cope with the daily problems in irrigation management that evolve as a result of these 
programs, remained undocumented. This lack of empirical evidence on the viability and 
impacts of institutional arrangements that were introduced as part of pro-market reforms in 
irrigation, provided the justification for this study. In addition, this study aimed at exploring 
methods to assess impacts of institutional interventions like IMT and water markets. 
This chapter first summarizes the key empirical findings on the viability and impacts of 
IMT and water marketing in ARLID. Subsequently, it revisits some of the conceptual and 
methodological considerations in studying the viability of institutional arrangements for local 
water management under market-oriented conditions. These reviews are followed by some 
considerations and recommendations for changing the policy agenda on institutional 
interventions in the irrigation sector. This chapter concludes with some ideas on how to re-
direct the research on institutional interventions and their impacts on integrated water 
management. 
10.2 Viability and impacts of new institutional arrangements: 
empirical findings 
Do formal institutional arrangements matter? 
Much of the international policy and research interests in IMT is narrowed down to 
formulating and implementing design principles for institutional arrangements. The 
formulation of the IMT program in Mexico is a typical example of what one could call 
'institutional engineering": a top-down policy approach for designing and implementing 
institutional principles for local water management. In ARLID this manifested itself for 
instance in CNA drafting and dictating contracts, bylaws, rules and regulations. Although 
there was not substantial room for the new WUAs and other interest groups to become 
actively involved in drafting and modifying these model documents, they were still supposed 
to work with them. Future members of WUAs were basically informed about the program and 
subsequently were asked to organize themselves into WUAs. Being convinced that 
formulation and implementation of new institutional arrangements could only be successful if 
a bottom-up approach had been followed, this study was started with the assumption that the 
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new WUAs in ARLID would not be able to internalize the new arrangements into their 
practices of water management. However, this study has shown that there is a paradox as to 
whether institutional designs matter or not. 
This study has shown that indeed for ARLID these formal institutional design principles 
and guidelines do not matter. Despite all the effort that CNA put in formulating and 
implementing technical and institutional guidelines and directives for system O&M and WUA 
management, these proposed rules have proved to be of little significance for actual 
stracturing of irrigation management activities in the context of new institutional 
arrangements. In general, and this follows the observations by Zaag (1992) and Long (2001), 
local irrigation managers and users attempt to solve problems pragmatically and strategically 
by creating institutional flexibility and room for negotiation and not through following formal 
rules. Yet, when the first reports on politicized WUAs came to the notice of CNA, their 
immediate reaction was to regulate political opportunistic behavior on the part of WUA 
leaders by imposing new WUA bylaws that should regulate the election of leaders (Palacios-
Vélez 1999). 
Yet, the paradox of this study lies in the observation that acts, directives and O&M 
regulations do matter. Users certainly did not perceive these new principles and arrangements 
as mere paper designs that could be simply disregarded. Although the formal guidelines, 
documents and regulations were by no means simply adopted and interpreted in the way the 
policy designers have had in mind, leaders and managers of WUAs did take them seriously. 
This has two reasons. First, because they did help to structure the organization of the tasks 
and O&M responsibilities of the new WUAs. Second, they helped the WUAs to use them 
strategically as a resource to negotiate flexibility in the way the new institutional principles 
and arrangements were going to be applied and transformed by both the WUAs and local 
CNA staff. Rather than using them as prescriptive dictates on how to manage irrigation, the 
new principles and arrangements served as a strategic starting point for the WUAs for 
negotiating irrigation fee levels, water marketing, mode of user representation, maintenance 
programs and re-distribution of O&M responsibilities between the WUAs and CNA after 
IMT had started. 
This paradox shows how interventions for institutional reforms should be approached as a 
process around envisaged structure rather than as an instruction. As will be discussed below, 
the mixture and articulation of formal new institutional arrangements and existing informal 
arrangements for managing water, funds and other resources shaped the creation of 
accountability mechanisms that influenced the viability of the new institutions. 
Mechanisms that influence institutional viability 
The bylaws, rules and O&M manuals used in ARLID included basically all institutional 
design principles that are suggested by Ostrom (1992) and Tang (1992) to create viable 
institutions for irrigation management (see section 1.3). For instance, membership inclusions, 
user representation, water rights, conflict resolution and other principles were well being dealt 
with. However, these design principles could as such not guarantee the viability of the new 
institutions in ARLID. This was influenced by other factors and mechanisms, both internal 
and external to the new institutions. 
This thesis has shown that the process in which new and old actors together "practice" 
and modify institutional arrangements is more important than implementing institutional 
design principles that form these arrangements. The process of together practicing, molding, 
re-negotiating and modifying new institutional arrangements have helped WUA leaders, their 
members, and irrigation managers of both CNA and the WUAs to collectively re-define and 
222 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
re-establish mechanisms of operational, financial and political accountability. Some of these 
mechanisms have clearly helped to strengthen the organizations, while others have weakened 
WUAs and in some cases put them in jeopardy of existence. The most important mechanisms 
that strengthen or weaken the new institutions are summarized below. 
1. Supporting institutional and constitutional reforms 
An important precondition for JMT and water markets to work in ARLJD, was that they were 
linked to similar pro-market institutions in the wider economy. Simply designing and 
establishing new WUAs, and asking them to take on O&M and financial responsibility would 
certainly not have worked if these new WUAs in ARLID would not have been imbedded and 
be supported by and framed around constitutional revisions of land (Article 27) and water 
acts. These revisions gave the new WUAs concessions for the use of water and government 
owr ed irrigation infrastructure. They also formed the institutional foundation for the WUAs 
to become financially autonomous. Similarly, formal manifestations of these revisions, such 
as the PROCEDE land titling program, helped WUAs to organize their membership and the 
representation of ejidatarios and private growers in the new WUAs. Hence, introduction of 
IMT and water markets in ARLID was an example of a clever mixture of institutional 
intei-ventions that mutually supported each other. 
2. Earning operational accountability: credibility, flexibility and transparency 
To a great extent the viability of the irrigation institutions in ARLID is related to how the 
relationship between the local CNA office in Celaya and the new WUAs has provided room 
to jointly create operational accountability. The case of IMT in ARLID shows that 
accountability is not a mechanism that can be introduced by implementing and dictating new 
institutional arrangements. Instead, it has to be worked on to become effective. Effective 
accountability is something that has to be earned through a continuous process of negotiation. 
This study shows that three factors are important preconditions for earning accountability: 
credibility, transparency and institutional flexibility. 
One of the strengths of the new irrigation institutions in ARLID is that both CNA and the 
WUAs have created sufficient institutional room and time to jointly work on creating and 
earning accountability. An important reason why CNA Celaya was able to become 
accountable during the later stages of IMT, was that already during the implementation stage 
of IMT, CNA had effectively seeded the process of earning accountability. This was done in 
the following ways. 
• CNA kept their word on the conditions of IMT in terms of (among others): co-
management and co-responsibility during the first 6 months of IMT; the handover of 
heavy machines; and, none of the former agency staff had to be taken over by the WUAs. 
Keeping their word certainly helped to make CNA credible towards the WUAs. On the 
other hand, CNA did lose quite some credibility as they did not keep their word on the 
kind of system improvement works that they had promised the new WUAs to arrive as 
part of the DV1T program; 
• Rather than imposing and prescribing the new arrangements that were drafted by CNA at 
higher bureaucratic levels, local CNA staff in ARLID operated quite flexibly with the new 
formal rules, regulations and O&M manuals. This has two reasons. As will be discussed 
below, the high levels of RWS values allowed both CNA and the new WUAs to continue 
the practice of administering water distribution, rather than managing water distribution. 
As a consequence, there was no felt necessity to apply and control stricter water 
management rules. Second, the practice of administering water also helped the CNA staff 
in Celaya to continue to be responsive to its management in CNA central offices (e.g. by 
monthly sending in their planned and reported performance figures). Being 
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administratively responsive towards higher bureaucratic levels, allowed local CNA staff 
to be flexible with the new institutional arrangements towards the new WUAs; 
• Negotiations between WUAs and CNA over the conditions of operational arrangements 
for water allocation, water distribution, maintenance, system improvements and water 
marketing primarily took place in the hydraulic committee in which all WUAs 
participated. Although this committee is presided over by CNA, the local agency earned 
credibility from the WUAs as they effectively supported the committee to become an 
arena of negotiation for all kinds of O&M issues, rather than resisting or controlling the 
committee. Furthermore, CNA was prepared to share their experiences and information on 
water management issues with the WUAs in a transparent and accessible way. 
• On those issues where CNA had difficulties in earning credibility (e.g. providing 
maintenance services for the main system and system improvements) they did not resist 
the WUAs' initiative to take over further responsibilities from CNA. Again, CNA gave 
the WUAs and their new federation (LRS) the room to build their own arrangements, 
which resulted in dramatically changing practices of maintenance; 
• On the other hand, the factor that particularly weakened the process of creating 
operational accountability was CNA's poor performance in providing clarity and 
transparency about the volumetric water concessions (especially in times of water 
scarcity), and registration and monitoring of (both collective and individual) water rights 
in REPDA. 
Also in the case of the new WUAs factors such as credibility, flexibility and transparency 
were important preconditions for starting to create accountability of the WUAs towards their 
members. Particularly Cortázar WUA's good performance in system maintenance, financial 
transparency and professional support from the administrative staff at the office has made the 
organization credible. Although farmers could not directly see the effects of increased 
maintenance on water delivery to their fields, they were very satisfied that for the first time in 
two decades they could see that the WUA took the farmers' request for improved 
maintenance seriously. Credibility among Cortázar farmers also increased after they observed 
that the leaders of the WUAs were prepared to fire ditch tenders and even higher management 
staff who had proved to practice rent-seeking in distributing water and in allowing illicit 
access to water. 
However, the extent to which the WUAs have become operationally accountable varies 
considerably among the WUAs. The reason for this is that WUAs like Salvatierra have started 
to mix up operational and financial accountability with political accountability. Critical 
factors that encourage this mixing up of accountability are lack of both transparency and 
credibility as well as the lack of probity and supportive attitude on part of the WUA's 
leadership. 
3. Being committed and engaged to sharing responsibility and authority 
A crucial factor that allowed and induced the process of attaining credibility, stimulating 
transparency and creating institutional flexibility in ARLE), was the supportive and 
responsive attitude of the local CNA staff. This was particularly the case of the chief engineer 
of ARLID. This manifested itself for instance in the way this engineer supported the 
hydraulic committee and the LRS, or in his non-paternalistic way of being responsive to 
farmers' requests to mediate in their conflicts with WUA leaders. 
Similarly, the joint process of earning accountability between CNA and the WUAs, would 
never have worked out without ambitious leaders like the ones from Cortázar and Valle 
WUAs, who were willing and strategically able to put their past negative sentiments about 
CNA aside and allow local CNA staff to prove their willingness to collaborate. 
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This study has shown that it takes a handful of committed people, like the above 
mentioned chief engineer and leaders of WTJAs such as Cortázar and Valle, to start to carry 
t i e process of 'entrenching' new institutional arrangements in others' people's minds and 
behaviors. In the end, it needs probity, commitment and engagement of actors to get the work 
done. Before IMT these actors practiced irrigation management in a clear line of bureaucratic 
herarchy, with CNA being the one that commanded. Also under IMT, CNA staff in Celaya 
could have chosen to maintain this attitude, trying to impose formal arrangements. However, 
the WUAs in ARLID were fortunate that the local CNA management was committed to 
jointly create room for co-management and new institutional relationships. 
As actors and the way they behave are unique, it is important to realize that the above 
findings on ARLID can by no means be generalized for all Mexican irrigation district where 
institutional interventions take place. In his study on El Grullo irrigation district, Zaag (1992) 
observed that CNA engineers dictated the agenda of the irrigation commission, and 
monopolized information, resulting in discussions that had nothing to do with daily irrigation 
practices in the field. 
4„ Creating financial accountability: signaling out poor performance and favoritism 
Cost-recovery by farmers and allowing the WUAs to be financially autonomous have helped 
the new WUAs to strengthen mechanisms of financial accountability in the following ways. 
The high fee collection rates on part of the WUAs helped them to create room for negotiating 
the reformulation of important institutional arrangements such as the percentages of total 
revenue that had to be paid to CNA, the level of water pricing, and the conditions and prices 
for water trading. 
Similarly, the high level of cost-recovery by the WUAs put the CNA-Celaya office in a 
comfortable position as it met completely with the administrative goals of CNA central office 
in Mexico. As long as the administrative and financiáis goals set by CNA central office in 
Mexico City were met, CNA-Celaya could allow the new WUAs to practice and re-shape 
their own financial arrangements. To the WUAs this flexible attitude on the part of the local 
CNA office was a clear signal that they were taken seriously and that they were provided 
sufficient institutional flexibility to create their own ways of coping with daily management 
issues. 
Financial accountability from the WUAs towards their users is strengthened by financial 
transparency. Cortazar's effort to openly share their financial statements and to hire external 
auditors clearly helped to build credibility and trust among their users. Similarly, their 
commitment to fire ditch tenders and other WUA staff that had proved to take bribes from 
users, also showed users that the WUA's leadership was responsive to farmers' complaints 
about rent-seeking practices. 
Where the case of Cortázar has demonstrated how transparency can help to strengthen 
financial accountability on part of the WUAs, the case of Salvatierra has shown how lack of 
transparency and probity can weaken financial accountability. Evidence of manipulation of 
financial data, making illicit cheque payments, paying high salaries to befriended (but 
incapable) management staff, and openly allowing bribing practices gave rise to complete 
loss of financial credibility. 
The example of Salvatierra also shows how lack of financial transparency and the 
consequent weak financial accountability mechanism is compensated by another financial 
mechanism that has forced the leadership of Salvatierra WUA to become more accountable. 
Although farmers from Salvatierra could never completely default from paying irrigation fees, 
they effectively used their refusal to pay higher fees as means to signal to the leaders their 
dissatisfaction with the WUA's policy of employing too many well paid management staff 
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that were loyal to the WUA president's political aspirations. Similarly, they used this refusal 
to signal their dissatisfaction with the WUAs' maintenance policy. 
5. Scaling up institutional capacity: reproduction of political accountability 
The example of local shaping of institutional arrangements through the creation of operational 
and financial accountability mechanisms in ARLID, has shown how this can effectively 
encourage the scaling up of institutional capacity. When the WUAs were started, leaders and 
other WUA members had no idea about the functioning and the consequences of these WUAs 
for the control over water management in ARLID. As a result of the process of jointly 
creating operational and financial accountability, CNA, WUAs and individual water users 
realized that they were able to create their own institutional capacity for controlling decision 
making in irrigated agriculture. 
Soon after their first experiences with creating institutional capacity for the WUAs, some 
WUA leaders started to scale up this capacity to higher institutional levels. Examples of this 
include the WUAs' increasingly important role in the hydraulic committee, and their success 
in establishing the federation of WUAs (LRS) to take over from CNA the control for main 
system maintenance. When the field work for this study was ended, leaders of the LRS and 
some other WUAs started to discuss the possibility of scaling up institutional capacity to the 
level of the entire basin through collaborating with WUAs of other districts, e.g. to jointly 
control decision making over water allocation within the entire basin. 
Similarly, leaders of the LRS and of WUAs such as Cortázar, Valle and Salamanca have 
started to scale up institutional capacity to gain more control over other aspects of irrigated 
agricultural production. This is done by establishing side-line organizations for marketing 
inputs and produce, and by compensating the dismantling of previous institutional 
government services, such as handing out PROCAMPO statements. As a result, WUAs in 
ARLID now have also started to become important actors themselves as part of new 
institutions. A genuine danger here is, that new WUAs gain control over major parts of the 
agricultural production in ARLID, making water users institutionally too dependent on the 
WUAs. Although the scaling up of institutional capacity has certainly helped the WUAs to 
build up credibility among their members, it also bears the danger of increasing nepotism and 
political favoritism in it as it opens up opportunities for the new WUA leaders to extend their 
commercial and political networks. This requires check-and-balance mechanisms to control 
political accountability within these organizations. In this respect, particularly the experience 
with Salvatierra WUA has pointed to mechanisms that negatively influenced the institutional 
viability of the new institutions in ARLID. 
The most important observation in this respect is the ease with which leaders of WUAs 
can reproduce and strengthen their control over decision making processes through the re-
election and remobilization of WUA leaders. Although the de jure distribution of farmers 
representation in the boards and general assemblies of WUAs is well organized, evidence 
from WUAs such as Salvatierra demonstrate that the defacto control can remain in the hands 
of the same leaders. The two most important factors that support this kind of reproduction of 
control by these leaders, are favoritism and the expansion of networks and institutional 
capacity as described above. 
Examples from Salvatierra and la Purísima WUAs also show that users have developed 
mechanisms that help to signal out and to some extent also balance the reproduction of 
control in the hands of leaders. The first mechanism used here shows similarities with the case 
studied by Moore (1989) in Taiwan: water users use their refusal to pay incremental fees as a 
signal of dissatisfaction with the leaders' employment (i.e. favoritism) and management 
policies. A second mechanism is the opportunity that particularly users in Salvatierra have 
taken to call for CNA and lawyers to mediate in conflicts between users and their WUA 
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loaders. Rather than trying to ignore CNA as the former paternalistic and bureaucratic agency, 
under LMT farmers still strategically call for agency staff to monitor and regulate the financial 
and political externalities that emerged as a result of transfer of management responsibilities 
to WUAs. 
6. Matching institutions with irrigation technology 
This study has shown that the design of the irrigation inirastructure influences the institutional 
capacity needed for operating and maintaining the system. 
ARLID is designed and operated to deliver water on demand to individual fields scattered 
ever a large number of distributaries (which consequently all need to carry water 
continuously). As a consequence, there is a need for a high number of ditch tenders that have 
to run the canals in order to open and close gates of distributaries, field canals and individual 
plots. Similarly, this system of delivery on demand causes daily changes in volumes of water 
that have to be taken in by distributaries and field canals. This requires daily adjustments of 
t i e gates. Both factors influence the organizational requirement needed to operate the system: 
i: takes organizing, employing and training a high number of committed and qualified ditch 
tenders to make such an irrigation system work. As was demonstrated with the example of 
Salvatierra, some WUAs lack the institutional capacity to meet these organizational 
requirements. 
Vice versa, the institutional design of water management in ARLID also demands 
hysical characteristics of the infrastructure that could help these institutions to work. For 
instance, one of the institutional components chosen as part of the new institutional 
rrangements is to build in mechanisms of financial sustainability through charging users a 
olumetric fee per hectare irrigated. This requires continuous monitoring of actual water 
eliveries to the fields. However, as was demonstrated in chapter 5, ditch tenders hardly 
easure volumes. In addition to the reason related to the reproduction of administrative 
accountability mentioned above, another reason why ditch tenders report scheduled rather 
an actually measured volumes, is that the irrigation infrastructure does not allow for 
easurements at individual plots. One way to solve this problem is to better match irrigation 
lechnology and institutional design, for instance to install simple measurement devices at the 
ntakes of the distributaries (rather than at tertiary canal or plot levels) and at the same time 
Introduce a system of volumetric charging at the level of distributaries rather than at 
ndividual plot level. 
This study has also demonstrated how the quality of the infrastructure influences 
nstitutional requirements. In addition to the high level of land fragmentation in Salvatierra, 
lso the poor condition of the irrigation canals and structures (and the consequent difficult 
ater distribution) in this module contributed to the need to employ a relatively high number 
f ditch tenders. Similarly, the CNA office in Celaya lacked the institutional capacity to 
aintain and improve the main canal and its structures in ARLID. Lack of professional staff 
d CNA's earlier difficulties to recover fees from the users, were among the reasons that 
xplained this institutional incapacity. Whether the new federation of WUAs (LRS) will be 
ible to better maintain the main canal system, will depend in large on their capacity to employ 
nd train staff for maintenance, as well as on their institutional capacity to jointly develop 
arrangements to allocate costs and benefits of improved maintenance among the WUAs. 
7. Linking institutions with water availability 
This study has demonstrated that the viability of the new irrigation institutions in ARLID is 
highly dependent on water availability. The associations in ARLID rely almost entirely on 
irrigation fees for their revenue. The amount of revenue is related to the number of irrigation 
deliveries that can be sold to the farmers. As a consequence, in years of low water availability 
227 
CHAPTER 10 
and hence no irrigation deliveries, the WUAs will not have sufficient income to survive 
financially. As a result, during the dry year of 1997-98 some WUAs such as Salvatierra had to 
fire staff and close their offices. These experiences emphasize the need for creating a 
contingency fund. This, however, is hampered by high annual inflation rates. Other WUAs, 
such as Valle, could survive this dry year as they started to generate revenue from side-line 
businesses such as the renting of land leveling equipment. 
Is water treated as an economic good? 
This study has shown that market-oriented irrigation reforms have only partly stimulated 
water users to treat water as an economic good. This means that economic valuing of water by 
individual users, cost-recovery and water pricing, the process of fee setting, and water 
marketing are only in part determined by mechanisms of rational choice and economic 
maximization. As is illustrated by the three examples below, the use costs and opportunity 
costs of water continued to be determined by administrative and socio-political processes of 
decision making as well. 
Cost and value of water. The cost (i.e. price) of water to farmers has increased as a result of 
IMT. Yet, unlike general belief this increase has not been dramatic. Certainly compared to 
other costs of production, the price of water is relatively low. As a result, farmers did not 
change their irrigation practices in an attempt to use water more efficiently, nor did they re-
allocate their water use to economically more beneficial export crops. Rather than maximizing 
net economic returns per m 3 of water, farmers are more concerned about maximizing net 
returns to overall (water, inputs, etc) crop investments per hectare. The cost of water plays a 
relatively little role in this respect. 
Although the cost of water is low, farmers in ARLID are aware of the value of water. 
However, they perceive water as a productive agent rather than a cost. As was discussed at 
length in chapter 5, farmers apply high levels of RWS to avoid the risk of crop failure. Rather 
than spreading water more thinly over a larger area, they prefer to maximize returns per 
hectare cropped. In the context of diminishing crop subsidies and dismantled state credit and 
insurance systems, and consequently the high production investments farmers make, they 
cannot risk any crop failure. As such, market-oriented policies other than increased water 
pricing have had a much greater effect on the way farmers value water. Even with prices of 
water much higher than those that are paid currently, farmers will prefer to apply large 
volumes of water as they feel that this would guarantee them economic returns to high 
investments in other inputs. This is also reflected in the high prices farmers are willing to pay 
tubewell owners for additional water that need to safeguard their investments during dry 
seasons when canal water is hardly available. 
Cost-recovery, water pricing and fee setting. IMT has resulted in a dramatic increase in cost-
recovery rates by WUAs and in a consequent high level of financial self-sufficiency of 
ARLID. In that sense, the establishment of WUAs in ARLID has been very instrumental to 
achieving the government goal of reducing public investments in systems like ARLID. So, in 
this respect IMT has been beneficial to CNA. 
To the WUAs and users, cost-recovery and water pricing have proved to be useful 
mechanisms to make CNA and the WUAs accountable. As was discussed above, this has 
helped the WUAs to negotiate greater room for financial autonomy with CNA as well as to 
negotiate the fee level. However, unlike general economic assumptions, in ARLID full cost-
recovery and financial autonomy have not provided incentives to price water at its 
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opportunity cost. This is even the case in ARLLD, where the presumed (Saleth 2001) 
necessary technical conditions (e.g. water measuring devices) and supportive institutions (e.g. 
water rights; financially autonomous WUAs; regulatory agency) were by and large in place. 
What then are the reasons why water pricing did not reflect the scarcity value of water, or did 
not equalize opportunity costs? 
Water pricing and setting of irrigation fee levels were the result of both administrative 
directives on the part of CNA and of negotiations between WUAs and CNA in meetings of 
ths hydraulic committee. These negotiations were fed by strategies other than those related to 
economic maximization, and included: creating solidarity and equity among WUAs, whose 
main concern was to stay together in the LRS; and, creating trust and credibility among the 
users, and hence trying to keep prices as low as possible. As a result, although not subsidized 
by CNA, irrigation fees were held low and did not keep pace with other economic 
developments such as the dramatic increase in annual inflation rates that followed the 
economic crisis of 1994. 
To farmers the political and social meaning of irrigation fees is often more important than 
the economic one. As was demonstrated with the example of Salvatierra, the reason why 
farmers refused to pay higher fees, was to signal their dissatisfaction with the WUA rather 
than to attempt to reduce the cost of water. 
Water marketing and opportunity costs. Also in the case of water marketing, water is hardly 
treated as an economic good. According to Kemper (2001), water markets and the consequent 
re-allocation of water on higher-valued uses, will emerge when institutional arrangements 
such as tradable water use rights, appropriate infrastructure and transaction mechanisms are in 
place. Although ARLID meets these arrangements, water trading is still limited and certainly 
not organized around economic principles such as pricing traded water at opportunity cost 
levels. 
As was demonstrated in chapter 8, prices paid for traded water are generally much lower 
than prices paid by farmers for water that is allocated under regular arrangements. This is 
even the case during the summer irrigation season, when some WUAs depend almost entirely 
on traded volumes for their total water delivery. This suggests that the opportunity cost of 
water should have increased. Yet, prices of traded water are very low. In ARLID, the most 
important factor that explains this, is the WUAs' willingness to build up solidarity within the 
hydraulic committee. This has particularly become important after all WUAs were federated 
into a LRS to jointly negotiate with CNA the taking over of responsibilities for main system 
maintenance. Although both buying and selling WUAs do include economic considerations 
on opportunity costs in their negotiations over prices and volumes of traded water, prices are 
eventually determined by socio-political factors rather than economic ones. 
Similarly, also prices that individual farmers need to pay for water that is traded between 
V/UAs are kept low. Rather than trying to sell water at its highest possible price, WUAs 
prefer to sell water at a low price. The reason is that even when a WUA has used all of its 
cancessioned volume, it sometimes can still buy and deliver water to those farmers who had 
already paid for an irrigation delivery. WUAs do not want to default on these farmers as they 
are afraid that this might hamper the credibility that they have earned among the users. 
These findings show that to farmers and WUAs market oriented incentives such as the 
(use and opportunity) cost of water have hardly encouraged users to treat water more 
efficiently. To individual producers in irrigated agriculture neoliberal reforms such as the 
diminishing of crop subsidies and credit, as well as the constitutional revision which 
encourages land markets, have had more effect on their economic positions than IMT and the 
introduction of water marketing. 
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Although economic efficiency in water use has proved to be a minor factor in irrigation 
management under market oriented arrangements of IMT and water marketing, these policies 
have provided opportunities to create room for negotiating new institutional arrangements for 
local water managements. These have particularly resulted in improved mechanisms of 
financial accountability between the new management organizations and the users. Yet, it 
does not necessarily need market-oriented policies such as IMT to establish the same. 
However, the government needed policies such as LMT for achieving their neoliberal aim to 
reduce public expenditures in irrigated agriculture. 
Impact of IMT and water markets on irrigation performance 
Much of this thesis deals with assessing the impact of IMT and water marketing on local 
irrigation performance. Chapters 5 and 9 provide detailed analysis of these impacts, which 
can be summarized as follows. 
Water use. Farmers' increased involvement in system O&M through IMT has not led 
to major improvements in operational performance. With the exception of some WUAs like 
Cortázar, generally WUAs have so far followed the same allocation, distribution and 
reporting practices as used by CNA prior to IMT. By continuing the practice of reporting 
water deliveries close to planned targets, rather than actual deliveries, the water management 
regime continues to be one that can be characterized as "water administration" as it complies 
with the bureaucratic practices and requirements that they were used to before IMT. In that 
sense, one can conclude that effective mechanisms to support operational accountability that 
complies more with actual institutional requirements have not been introduced as a result of 
IMT. Instead, as far as system operations are concerned, mechanisms of administrative 
accountability (see next section) have been reproduced. 
As a result of the continuation of administrative accountability, operational accountability 
is neglected: reporting administratively desired levels of water deliveries are considered to be 
more important than negotiated actual deliveries. As a result, RWS values at all levels also 
continue to be high. Particular in Salvatierra, RWS values were extremely high during the 
first years after IMT. This indicates that the new WUA was not able to deal with the module's 
high level of land fragmentation; nor to match its water distribution regime with the poor 
quality of its infrastructure, or vice versa. Although it is hard to correlate this kind of over-
usage of water to the quality of the WUA management, the political unrest and high level of 
favoritism in the employment of well paid WUA staff would certainly not have helped to 
bring RWS values in Salvatierra more in line with the district's average. 
As was discussed in chapter 5, these high RWS values at all system levels also explain 
why clearly observed spatial differences in the distribution of water hardly affects the access 
of farmers to water. Preferential access, however, does exist in the case of some large farmers, 
friends of WUA leaders, and particular by farmers (small and large) who also have access to 
well water. As was described in detail in chapter 6, a main mechanism to illicitly get access to 
water is through bribing ditch tenders and in some cases management staff of WUAs. This 
practice already existed before IMT and as such has not changed. However, the establishment 
of WUAs, and particularly the election of some leaders, has brought another mechanism of 
getting access to water to the light. As the case of Salvatierra has shown, favoritism can 
dramatically influence the water management regime. This brings us back to the question of 
how to deal with checking mechanisms of political accountability discussed above. 
Some initial studies point out that high levels of RWS in surface irrigation are necessary 
to reduce the dramatic decline of the groundwater table (Scott and Garcés-Restrepo 1999). As 
the transfer program mainly aimed at improving the use of surface irrigation, it was not 
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expected that major changes in groundwater use would occur as a result of transfer. Yet, it is 
apparent that the alarming level of overexploitation of aquifers by well owners in ARLJD is 
net being reduced. Although CNA will continue to be the authorizing institution that controls 
th ; aquifers, transfer has resulted in a considerable reduction in the role and mandate of CNA 
in the State of Guanajuato. As a consequence, it will become more and more difficult for 
CNA to adequately monitor aquifers. WUAs do not seem to have the interest, nor the legal 
authority to assume that role. 
Maintenance. One of the most positive impacts of the IMT program in ARLID has been 
ths considerable improvement in maintenance services, especially at lower system levels and 
in the case of drainage canals. Whereas individual users are positive about the changes in 
maintenance and system improvements, WUAs still complain about the lack of support from 
CNA at the main system level. This has stimulated the WUAs to found the LRS, which has 
taken over from CNA the responsibility for maintaining the main canal system. Furthermore, 
it is not clear what the impact of increased maintenance has been on the performance of water 
delivery at all levels of the systems. However, as was explained above increased maintenance 
certainly helped to build credibility and accountability of the WUAs' management towards 
their members. 
Productivity. The findings presented in chapter 9 do not provide convincing evidence that 
there has been any effect of the transfer program on agricultural and economic productivity. 
Although fluctuations can be observed, even after transfer, it is believed that these are related 
to other recent developments in the agriculture sector such as the dismantling of credit and 
subsidy systems, input price policies, and, most of all, price changes in the world commodity 
markets. 
These findings might disappoint policy makers as they do not reflect the general belief of 
many irrigation policy makers and researchers that IMT and water marketing will have major 
impacts on irrigation performance. However, it is still important to realize how in ARLID 
IMT and water marketing have affected irrigation arrangements, practices and management 
strategies. These have helped most WUAs to gain more control over decision making for 
local water management. 
0.3 A conceptual and methodological revisit 
Some conceptual considerations and lessons 
Need for a more integrated approach to study irrigation institutions 
Most IMT studies referred to in this thesis use neo-institutional approaches and economic 
parameters to describe changes and trends as a result of intervention programs. As was argued 
section 1.3, a complementary and more extended approach is needed to analyze the 
practices, strategies and interactions of local irrigation managers and users involved in IMT. 
Rather than applying and testing institutional design principles for irrigation institutions (e.g. 
C strom 1992; Vermillion and Sagadoy 1999), this study has shown that an extended approach 
also useful to analyze the mechanisms and processes that influence the viability of 
institutions. 
This study shows that ideas on the institutional requirements for use of irrigation 
technology should be further conceptualized and be added to the general notion of the 
Wageningen school that irrigation is a sociotechnical phenomenon. Similarly, this study 
shows that conceptual frameworks used for analyzing institutions are limited in their 
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understanding on how technology, water scarcity and environmental conditions shape the 
viability of institutions. 
This study has also shown that the formulation, implementation and working of 
institutions should be viewed at as a continuous process of reformulation and negotiation of 
institutional arrangements. Rather than focussing on the description of the manifestations of 
institutions (such as design principles, bylaws, rules and regulations), analyzing processes and 
mechanisms help to explain why institutions work the way they worked. By observing 
practices, strategies and interactions between all actors involved in constructing, 
implementing and applying new institutional arrangements, it can be explained why and how 
these arrangements are adopted and transformed. It also shows that institutional arrangements 
are a mixture of formal prescriptive arrangements, existing arrangements and newly 
negotiated arrangements. This explains why new institutions, once they are implemented, 
manifest themselves as being contingent rather than static structures. 
The recognition that both existing and new institutions are the result of a process of 
continuous negotiation, and consequently contingent, is an important one. It requires the 
application of a set of conceptual tools other than the ones more commonly used in the 
perspective institutional design models and rational choice approaches (see section 1.3). Of 
these concepts, accountability was central to this thesis. Its applicability will be briefly 
discussed below. 
Different forms of accountability 
Three forms of accountability were introduced in section 1.3: operational, financial, and 
political. Operational and financial accountability are concepts that have proved to be easy to 
apply. The reason for this is that both concepts refer to monitoring and controlling the liability 
of irrigation managers and leaders to show that there has been efficient management and 
adherence to agreed upon O&M targets and use of funds, respectively. Both O&M service 
levels and use of funds can relatively easy be defined, understood and monitored in a 
transparent way. The concept of political accountability, though useful, has proved to be more 
difficult to apply. 'Service levels' related to control over decision making processes, election 
of leaders, equitable access to water and resources are difficult to capture in agreements that 
can be monitored and controlled. Still, an important lesson that can be drawn from this 
research is that political accountability cannot be disregarded as it dramatically influences the 
way key actors cope with new institutions. 
In irrigation literature, notions of operational accountability and financially accountability 
are often taken together, mixed and referred to as if they were similar concepts. This is 
particularly the case in those studies that link cost-recovery and financial autonomy to levels 
of O&M services in the situation where the latter depends on the former (e.g. Svendsen 1993, 
Oorthuizen and Kloezen 1995). This thesis has demonstrated that indeed operational 
accountability and financial accountability are related in the sense that success in cost-
recovery was used to re-negotiate O&M service levels as well as to signal dissatisfaction with 
O&M service levels. Yet, this thesis also shows that is it useful to separate different forms of 
accountability for three reasons. 
First, separation of different forms of accountability pointed to liability of service 
providers that go beyond those related to O&M services. As was discussed at length in 
chapter 1, much of the literature on irrigation reforms takes a rather deterministic and 
instrumentalist approach in planning institutionalized change. Particularly in the case of IMT, 
water marketing and other 'less state more market' policies, successes and failures are 
measured against changed levels in financial and O&M performance. Although useful, this 
approach is limited in the sense that it perceives accountability (in general terms) to be 
exclusively led by considerations of financial efficiency and by cost-related water use, and 
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little more. Yet, this thesis has shown that the viability of new irrigation institutions are also 
influenced by the way the providers of irrigation services meet 'targets' other than those 
merely related to cost-recovery and O&M performance. A conceptually clear separation 
between operational and financial accountability, has helped to also make important 
observations on the way irrigation managers and leaders show liability for the way they create 
more transparency, and how they cope with rent-seeking behavior. Similarly, applying the 
concept of political accountability also facilitated to study mechanisms other than those 
related to efficient management of funds, water and resources, but yet important for 
understanding the viability of irrigation institutions. 
The second reason why it has proved to be useful to separate three forms of 
accountability is that this has helped to unravel in what way providers of irrigation services 
are accountable, or not. Rather than concluding that IMT or water marketing has helped to 
make irrigation managers and WUA leaders more accountable for achieving O&M 
peiformance targets, it can be made explicit how these accountability mechanisms work, and 
how they do not work. 
Separation of different forms of accountability also led to observations of a fourth form 
of accountability, which only came to my notion through detailed observations on the other 
forms of accountability. This fourth form is what earlier in this chapter was referred to as 
administrative accountability. The example of irrigation management staff (both from CNA 
ami the WUAs) reporting planned volumes rather than actually measured volumes, suggest 
that they are less concerned about efficient water use (operational accountability), nor about 
delivering volumes that a user has paid for (financial accountability). Instead, all irrigation 
managers, from WUA ditch tenders up to the level of the CNA district engineers seemed to be 
predominately concerned about showing their liability for achieving administrative targets. 
These actions do not only encompass producing and submitting data that adhere to targets and 
budgets at the level of the irrigation agency. Administrative accountability also includes the 
commitment of the local CNA engineers to steering and fulfilling policies and programs while 
also allowing institutional flexibility for WUAs to develop effectively. 
The fact that the four forms of accountability can, but do not necessarily, refer to 
achieving similar sets of targets, brings us the third reason why they should be studied both 
separately and in relation to each other. The 'marriage' between operational and financial 
accountability in most irrigation literature, implicitly implies that all providers of irrigation 
seivices aim at achieving similar targets and goals, i.e. thus related to cost-efficient use of 
scarce resources such as water. However, as Du Gay (2000) has convincingly argued, private 
and public agencies hardly ever share the same interests, targets and management ethos. Yet, 
particularly in the field of IMT debates, public and private organizations are considered to be 
mutually exchangeable. This ignores the differences in management values these entities 
have. As a result, it also ignores the fact that in the context of public-private co-management, 
these different organizations can have competing management values and targets. As a 
consequence, also the way they aim to be accountable can be different and competing. An 
exclusive emphasis on private (or more market) values as efficiency, economy and 
effectiveness in irrigation management and hence the exclusive focus on operational and 
financial accountability, can have serious implications for the degree to which administrative 
and political accountability can be secured. Certainly in the context of IMT and other forms of 
joint agency-farmer management in irrigation, further conceptualization of different forms of 
accountability is needed, as well as on how they are related. This would help to show how 
different organizations (and different levels within these organizations) negotiate different 
sets of targets, norms and values to which they want to adhere. Whether these targets, norms 
and values compete with each other, or enforce each other will to a great extent determine the 
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viability of new institutions in which both private and public agencies are supposed to be 
accountable for achieving improvements in irrigation management. 
Finally, this study was also started with the recognition that accountability has to be 
earned through processes of negotiation. This study has shown that accountability cannot be 
just installed as part of a set of new institutional arrangements. Rather, these arrangements are 
contingent. The notion of contingent institutional arrangements emphasizes that arrangements 
by process are more important than arrangements by recommended design to allow for local 
transformations of proposed design principles. As was demonstrated in the empirical 
discussion above, factors that help to explain the viability of contingent institutional 
arrangements include: room to create and earn institutional flexibility to modify 
arrangements; time and institutional room to earn credibility; probity and committed attitudes 
towards institutional change on the part of key actors involved in intervention processes; and 
transparency in flows of information. 
Treating water as an economic good 
Concepts such as use costs, opportunity costs, value of water, water pricing, financial 
accountability, financial autonomy have proved to be useful, particularly to describe to what 
extent government and management goals have been achieved or not. However, these 
concepts are limited in the sense that they do not recognize strategies other than the ones 
related to economic maximization and rational choice. An important conceptual recognition is 
that cost-recovery, financial autonomy, water pricing and water marketing are socio-political 
constructs as well. This helps to understand why irrigation managers and users often do not 
follow economic incentives to treat water as an economic good. Even when all technical 
(infrastructure; measuring devices) and institutional arrangements (water rights; regulatory 
agency; cost-recovery; financial autonomy) are in place to support water pricing at 
opportunity cost levels or to support water marketing, water users (buyers and sellers) still 
might value water far below its opportunity cost. 
Assessing impacts of institutional interventions: some methodological lessons 
Validity of comparative indicators 
This study has shown that application of comparative indicators is a useful tool to measure 
and describe the trends in changes that have occurred as a result of the type of market-
oriented interventions that were discussed in this thesis. However, these indicators are not 
enough by themselves. The nature of these indicators are clearly economic input and output 
oriented. This makes them useful for assessing directions of effects of institutional 
interventions whose goals follow a similar economic orientation. However, their usefulness is 
limited to assess impacts other than economic ones, such as changes in equity, livelihood, 
health and environmental hazards. 
Policy makers and interveners of IMT and water markets clearly were aiming at 
improving the economic performance of the irrigation sector in Mexico: less public 
expenditures, higher cost-recovery, higher economic outputs per unit of water and land, and 
more 'efficient' use of available scare water resources. Particularly the SGVP per unit of land 
cropped and per unit of water delivered proved to be useful for testing the assumptions behind 
these policy goals. They helped to test the assumption of policy makers that farmers will use 
water more economically as a result of market forces. Calculation of outputs per ha of 
command and per m 3 of water consumed require a considerable extra research investment, 
and were only useful to compare with outputs per ha cropped and per m 3 of water delivered, 
respectively. This comparison supported the general observations that were made during the 
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field stay, that farmers prefer to maximize outputs per unit of land cropped, rather than 
spreading water more thinly or maximizing outputs per unit of water. 
The main problem, however, with the productivity oriented indicators is, that they do not 
clearly help to assess the impact of a single policy like IMT on land and water productivity. 
The most important reason for this is a simple one: IMT is only one out of a range of market-
oriented policies that were implemented since the early 1990s. As such, changes in trend-
lines, if any, cannot be fully correlated to IMT. However, the validity of these indicators for 
thifi thesis is still that they helped to demythologize the general belief among many people 
involved in the formulation and implementation of IMT in Mexico, that this policy has had 
positive impacts on land and water productivity. However, given the investment needed to 
generate these indicators (see Appendix 8), their usefulness on a large scale for policy impact 
assessments remains questionable. 
The RWS indicator is the one that was most used in this thesis. Application of this 
indicator proved very useful for two reasons. First, unlike the more commonly used indicator 
of "efficiency", RWS has no normative connotation, meaning that high values do not 
necessarily reflect poor performance (see the discussion in section 5.8). This makes it a 
powerful indicator to describe changes, rather than to normatively judge changes in water 
management. Second, when compared to planned and reported values, the measured RWS 
values proved to be a good indicator of internal operations as well. Using one type of 
indicators for both comparative assessment and internal assessment is important to arrive at 
the kind of standardization of indicators that irrigation researchers and managers are looking 
for (Bos etal. 1994). 
The validity of the financial indicators for assessing the impact of IMT on financial 
peiformance of irrigation districts is self-evident, as they exactly generate the type of 
infarmation wanted by policy interveners and irrigation managers alike. However, the 
problem that arises here is more related to the meaning and accessibility of the secondary data 
that are needed to calculate the financial indicators. This is discussed below (see also 
Appendix 8). 
Applicability of comparative indicators 
One of the methodological assumptions tested in this study was that comparative indicators 
for assessing impacts of institutional interventions are less time and resource consuming than 
the application of internal operations indicators, which most irrigation researchers still prefer 
to use (also for the assessment of impacts of interventions). This would make these indicators, 
it was assumed, appealing to policy makers, interveners and managers of irrigation systems. 
Appendix 8 gives a detailed evaluation of the methodological problems and constraints 
that were encountered while collecting and processing the data needed for applying both 
methods. Compared to the application of internal operations indicators (which generally 
recuires daily measurements at different system levels), the application of comparative 
indicators is less time and resource consuming. However, the large size of the system, the 
several system levels, the diversity in crops, irrigation technologies and seasons explain why 
collecting, verifying, and processing the basic data for comparative indicators were more 
complex and time-consuming than anticipated. 
Generation of comparative data relies on availability and quality of secondary data. This 
study has shown that simultaneously applying comparative and internal operation indicators, 
was useful to both cross-check the quality of secondary data and to deconstruct the meaning 
of these data. As was demonstrated in detail in chapter 5, reported data (aggregated from 
inc.ividual plots to entire modules) do not necessarily reflect actual deliveries, but rather 
match planned deliveries. Only as a result of our daily and intensive measurement program 
and observations of irrigation practices at several levels within the system, the real meaning 
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of the reported data that were collected from the CNA office came to light. Most research 
programs, however, do not allow for such an investment in time and resources and will no 
doubt start using official reported data that can be found at the district office. 
Collection of financial data pointed to a similar problem. It took months to really grasp 
the meaning and quality of the data that were collected at several levels. Compatibility of data 
sets proved to be the most problematic one. This is highly related to the number of 
institutional changes within the agency and the consequent change in data entry formats. 
Choosing several WUAs within one system 
The idea behind selecting Cortázar and Salvatierra as the two main units for this study was 
that this would show the diversity in ways farmers and local irrigation managers cope within a 
framework of similar and new institutional frameworks, such as IMT, and under similar 
physical, environmental and managerial conditions of the district. Was this a wise choice and 
what lessons can be drawn from this? 
• The empirical material of this thesis shows the diversity observed between the two 
WUAs, which appeared to be too wide to make a clear comparative study possible. 
Although both WUAs operated in the same institutional and environmental context, there 
were simply too many characteristics that were unique to each of these two WUAs. The 
high level of land fragmentation and the high number of small holdings (including private 
growers) in the case of Salvatierra; a WUA leader in Cortázar with more than 20 years of 
commercial farming experience in the United States; to name just a few; 
• Yet, there has been a major advantage of making daily observations in two WUAs that 
differ so much. It certainly helped to better challenge the kind of generalizations that had 
become so common in the Mexican debate on IMT. Had this research be done only in 
Cortázar, it certainly would have arrived to similar kind of uncritical and unconditional 
positive conclusions on IMT discussed in section 1.2. Instead, the selection of two entirely 
different WUAs showed the high level of diversity in strategies to cope with building and 
strengthening their institutions; 
• Doing research in two different WUAs has helped to clearly flag out mechanisms of the 
modes of accountability, that otherwise would have remained unobserved. For example, 
only by observing general assembly meetings in two different WUAs, the different 
mechanisms that influence financial and political accountability emerged. Similarly, the 
idea of creating accountability through allowing institutional flexibility in the 
arrangements for maintenance would not have become so apparent without the 
opportunity to observe how CNA and the WUAs of Salvatierra and Cortázar used such 
different strategies and styles of interactions in the process of creating accountability 
within the same institutional framework of one irrigation district. 
10.4 Some implications for market-oriented policies in irrigation 
Market-oriented reforms need IMT, not necessarily vice versa 
Chapter 3 shows how IMT and water market polices were shaped by a number of other 
privatization, deregulation, liberalization and political democratization movements that were 
started in the early 1980s. Many of the water-minded technocrats involved in these 
movements have become key-actors in re-organizing the administration of water related 
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government responsibilities (by creating CNA), and subsequently implementing the DVIT 
program. In this light it is important to realize that the Mexican government has used IMT and 
tin; introduction of water markets as logical instruments to achieving these wider political 
economic goals. This may sound obvious, but it contrasts with some of the support to IMT on 
the part of advocates of participatory irrigation management (e.g. Groenfeldt and Sun 1997), 
who seem to narrow down their focus to participation as a goal in itself, without placing this 
in a wider political-economic and policy context. 
There are three problems with this narrow focus on DVIT or participatory irrigation 
management. First, 'participation' has a positive connotation, and few people would argue 
against greater farmer involvement in irrigation. However, the populistic and uncritical use of 
the concept of participatory irrigation management becomes problematic if it does not invite 
policy makers and interveners that advocate participatory management to make the economic 
and political agenda that are attached to participation explicit. Is farmer participation 
promoted from the point of view of inducing greater farmer's control in decision making and 
policy formulation, or are the reasons more instrumentalist in the sense that participation is 
sepn as a tool to achieve improved irrigation management? 
The second problem with the narrow focus on IMT and participatory irrigation 
management, is that it directs the eye away from the policy context in which farmer 
involvement is encouraged. Indeed, in the case of Mexico, DVIT and water markets are clearly 
designed and implemented along market-oriented lines. However, not in all cases is the 
promotion of farmer participation in the local irrigation management geared towards neo-
iniititutional issues of cost-recovery and utility maximization in irrigation. Hence, the 
international and rather deterrninistic attention for DMT policies as the market-oriented policy 
in irrigation does not help to really understand why and how these policies were designed and 
implemented, and the kind of effects they have on farmers' positions and irrigation 
performance at the local level. What helps, however, is to recognize that IMT does not 
necessary need market-oriented reforms. However, the kind of market-oriented reforms as 
they were envisaged by the Salinas and subsequent administrations and the international loan 
agencies by whom these administrations were supported, do need IMT-like programs to be 
successful in achieving their wider political economic goals. 
The third problem with stressing the perceived need for farmer involvement in irrigation 
tob much is closely related to the one described above. The overwhelming attention for 
faimer participation, generally through the establishment of WUAs, leaves little room for 
discussing, analyzing and restructuring the other end of the institutional chain, where at least a 
part of the problem with ineffective institutional arrangements are located: the irrigation 
bureaucracies. It is striking how little academic and policy attention is paid on the processes 
of institutional change within these bureaucracies. In most cases of IMT, the scale and mode 
of farmer participation is predominately designed by irrigation agencies. However, so far little 
has been documented on these institutional design processes within the bureaucracies, nor on 
the political and institutional implications of farmer participation for these bureaucracies. 
Mexican IMT as a policy model for similar programs worldwide? 
The Mexican DVIT program includes all the ingredients to classify it as a typical institutional 
blue-print model: it follows a top-down and bureaucratic approach; its implementation is 
centrally organized; it was initiated and formulated by a very small and selected group of 
government officials and international representatives of loan agencies; there was very little 
room for farmer involvement at the stage of policy design, nor for public discussion; future 
leaders and farmers of WUAs were taken by surprise when they learnt about the program; it 
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was very prescriptive in the sense that it used detailed manuals that dictate rules and 
regulations; and, it has been implemented speedily at a wide scale rather than using a long-
term process and learning approach at a much smaller scale. 
These blue-print models have been heavily criticized since the 1970s. Yet, as was 
described in chapter 1, worldwide the Mexican LMT model is regarded as an example of how 
IMT could be implemented. Although the scale and speed of the program will certainly be 
appealing to policy makers in other countries, the question remains whether the Mexican 
model is applicable for countries as diverse as Turkey, India or Pakistan. 
In order to answer this question, one should take a look at the characteristics of this 
model and evaluate to what extent these can be translated to conditions outside of Mexico. 
No reform without political commitment 
Probably the most important characteristic and lesson that can be drawn from the Mexican 
model of market-oriented irrigation reforms are that they were designed and implemented 
with the full commitment at the highest political (presidential) and administrative (senior 
irrigation bureaucrats) levels. As discussed above, the reason for this support was that these 
politicians and bureaucrats realized that they needed EvIT-like programs to achieve their 
wider set of neo-liberal and pro-market reforms. At the same time, they were supported by 
international loan agencies that envisaged the same kind of reforms as these would help 
Mexico, for instance, to join NAFTA. This kind of support clearly helped to face out any kind 
of resistance from the labor unions within the agency. This in turn helped the future WUAs to 
negotiate that none of the former agency staff (particularly ditch tenders that had proved to be 
corrupt) had to be taken over by the WUAs. Instead, they were made redundant and WUAs 
started to hire their own staff. 
Supported by and part of constitutional reforms 
An important feature of the Mexican irrigation reforms, is that it was clear to both 
implementers of the IMT model and the farmers that had to adopt IMT that these reforms did 
not come on their own. Rather, they realized that it was part of a wide range of similar 
reforms, of which the constitutional revision of Article 27 of the Agrarian Law and the 
revision of the Water Act were the most important ones as they totally reshuffled the way 
control over land and water rights would be organized. IMT could never haven been 
introduced without these other reforms and constitutional revisions. In many countries 
revisions that support the re-distribution of land water rights along market lines as well as 
devolution of authority and management control meet a lot (of political) resistance (see e..g. 
Kloezen 1995 and 1996 on Sri Lanka). Unlike these countries, Mexican political leaders were 
very consistent in their ways to push these reforms as a package of interventions that are 
closely interdependent. When farmers were confronted with the idea of IMT, they realized 
that it was already too late to effectively resist IMT as such. Although this might be appealing 
to policy makers and interveners, the experiences reported in this thesis show that farmers 
will only adopt and carry the reforms -irrespective of how effectively they have been 
introduced- if sufficient credibility, transparency and institutional flexibility are created by 
local managers and farmers to reshape the new arrangements that have come with the reforms. 
The fact that IMT and water markets were manifestations of much more radical and 
enduring reforms like the two constitutional revisions made farmers realize that the 
establishment of new WUAs framed around these legal revisions was a policy that was going 
to last. 
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Safeguarding equity: building on existing institutions 
third important characteristic deals with the way the Mexican government has used the 
existing institutional mfrastructure as a vehicle to promote and implement IMT. Rather than 
drawing new institutional lines for the organization of WUAs, the design, promotion, 
implementation of LMT were clearly built on existing institutions: the ejidos and the 
organization of private growers. By institutional design, both groups had to be represented in 
the new WUAs; ejido meetings were used to promote IMT; and representatives of both 
groups were appointed to start implementing the program. This thesis has shown that in the 
case of market-oriented irrigation reforms in ARLID, ejidatarios were generally still able to 
use existing institutions to safeguard their socio-economic position in the new institutions for 
local water management. As long as WUAs are able to build in mechanisms that prevent 
WUA leaders from using their positions for further political and economic aspirations through 
nepotism and favoritism, there is no reason to suspect that the new institutional arrangements 
fo:- water management by themselves will induce further socio-economic differentiation 
between private growers and ejidatarios. 
However, although IMT was built on existing institutions of ejidos and organizations of 
private growers, there is a growing concern that at the same time the wide package of 
constitutional and market-oriented reforms will dismantle these institutions. In general the 
constitutional changes have been received with a lot of concern on the part of socially and 
politically engaged scholars (see e.g. Cornelius and Myhre 1998, De Grammont 1996a and 
1996b, and Randall 1996). They are particularly concerned about the effects of the revision of 
Article 27, which makes it possible to trade ejido land. This will totally reshuffle the 
organization of agrarian production, particularly in irrigated areas. This might cause 
increasing social and economic disparities between ejidatarios and private growers. As was 
noted earlier, the package of institutional reforms was overwhelming, leaving little room for 
negotiating equity issues such as the redistribution and marketing of land rights. 
Creating financial autonomy and financial accountability 
The Mexican government realized that the only way to boost cost-recovery in irrigation and at 
the same time provide (financial) incentives to improve irrigation performance, was to give 
the newly established WUAs a certain level of financial autonomy. As many farmers were 
disappointed by the levels of O&M services provided by the agency prior to IMT, they were 
eager to take on the financial responsibility to manage these funds and use them to improve 
the quality of irrigation services. The example of ARLID has shown that permitting financial 
autonomy is an important precondition for creating mechanisms of financial accountability. 
However, financial autonomy and financial accountability only function if mechanisms that 
prevent favoritism and mere political and economic abuse by WUA leaders are worked on as 
well. 
Institutional irrigation reforms and technological modernization 
There is a relationship between the physical lay-out, water supply and management regime of 
the irrigation system and its organizational and institutional requirements-for-use. Yet, under 
the new institutional arrangements neither water users nor CNA have started to introduce or 
facilitate system improvement works that would be more compatible with the institutional 
capacity of the new WUAs. 
As was discussed in chapter 4, the World Bank loan for system improvement works had 
no)t fully arrived. However, other funds for system improvement works were generated and 
technologies have started to be introduced into the irrigation districts (see section 9.5). 
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Unfortunately, these technologies comprise standard packages of techniques that basically 
aim at improving water use efficiencies at the field and lateral levels rather than irrigation 
technologies that better meet the management objective and organizational capacity of the 
new WUAs. 
This example of a mismatch between institutional reforms and technological 
modernization interventions is not an exception. Rather than being introduced simultaneously, 
often institutional interventions such as IMT follow investment policies for modernizing 
irrigation infrastructure. Examples from e.g. Pakistan (Halsema, forthcoming) and Indonesia 
(Brans, forthcoming) show that the call for technical modernization have a better reception on 
the part of loan agencies and national governments than the call for institutional 
transformation. Brans (ibid.) even reports how a program, which initially aimed at 
institutional strengthening, was transformed into a construction program. Although initially 
farmers contributed to discussing the type of construction needed, soon the discussion on 
construction was controlled by the agency, resulting in permanent headworks that the WUAs 
had no need for. 
These examples demonstrate that technical and institutional components of these 
"integrated" modernization programs are often clearly separated in two ways. Not only does 
the introduced technology not match with the organizational capacity of the WUAs, it also 
does not match with the institutional capacity of the irrigation agency to construct, operate 
and maintain the new technologies. 
This kind of mismatches between modernized irrigation technology and institutional 
interventions in irrigation certainly call for more in-depth synthesis of two issues. First, how 
are technology and institutional requirements-for-use related? Second, how are 
modernization policies and institutional intervention policies ideologically and politically 
constructed, and how are these policies related? 
Rather than confronting WUAs with new technologies, which maybe they cannot manage 
financially and organizationally, loan agencies, CNA and similar agencies worldwide could 
play an important role in helping the new WUAs to get access to investment and system 
improvement funds. These funds could be spent on technologies that better match with 
existing institutional arrangements and practices for managing irrigation technologies. 
Whether these technologies are fully automated control structures, or more simple 
technologies is then a choice that WUAs themselves will have more control over. As a 
consequence, the chance that these technologies are adopted, co-financed and maintained by 
the WUAs is expected to be much higher. 
Is there still a role for irrigation agencies? 
Some authors estimate that by 1997 approximately 5,000 out of more than 7,000 CNA staff 
had been released (Svendsen et dl. 1997). As was discussed in chapter 4, the new WUAs were 
not obliged to take over agency staff that had been made redundant. Instead, the WUAs 
started to hire their own staff. The sized-down agency realized that they had to undergo major 
restructuring and that consequently a new mandate and other roles had to be sought. CNA-
Celaya felt it was going to face a difficult time to find and internalize these new roles. By 
1998, when field work for this thesis had come to an end, the local CNA office had not yet 
fully changed its new mandate and roles. Yet, the contours of these new mandate and roles 
were becoming more and more visible and provided the following ideas on the future of 
CNA, and possibly similar agencies in other countries. 
First, the agency could play an important role in managing water at the level of the entire 
basin. As was demonstrated in chapter 2, there are clearly problems in terms of sustainable 
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and equitable water allocation within the basin. The primary institutional mandate of CNA 
could be to clearly define, give out and monitor water rights and concessions at the basin. It 
could also play an important role in facilitating the process of scaling-up of irrigation 
management organizations and federations at the basin level. This could be similar to how it 
has institutionally facilitated the creation of the hydraulic committee and the federation of 
WUAs at the district level. 
Second, rather than dealing with daily O&M issues, CNA could play a more active role in 
guaranteeing, establishing and monitoring the institutional pre-conditions for the functioning 
of viable WUAs. These pre-conditions include clearer water rights and concessions; 
facilitating technical and administrative training for WUAs staff; facilitating access to system 
improvement and rehabilitation funds; and, stimulating the creation of contingency or sink 
funds to make the existence of WUAs less dependent on revenue from irrigation fees, 
especially during years of water scarcity. 
Third, the primary focus of CNA (and many similar agencies worldwide) has always 
been on both surface water and water quantity. However, as was demonstrated in chapter 5, 
the environmental threat for the near future is not so much the availability of surface water 
(although major concerns exist here too), but rather the dramatic over-exploitation of ground 
water as well as severe problems with water quality. Much of the future role of agencies like 
CNA could be found in the institutional (legal, financial en organizational) restracturing of 
the monitoring and safeguarding of groundwater and high water quality. 
Fourth, local agency offices (such as the CNA office in Celaya) contain an enormous 
pool of historical knowledge about the environmental, physical and institutional aspects of the 
irrigation district and levels above as well as managerial experience and technical expertise. 
Generally, this type of knowledge, experience and expertise in the hand of agencies is more 
stable and better organized than in the hands of new WUAs. The reason for this is (as was 
demonstrated in chapter 6) the high turnover of leaders and management staff of the WUAs. 
As such, irrigation agencies could play an important role in safeguarding the "institutional 
memory" of the irrigation district. 
The above, and other, new roles cannot be internalized overnight, but take a long process. 
The four most important factors that shape this process are: 1) the political willingness to 
actually transform irrigation bureaucracies to better adhere to their new mandates and roles; 2) 
the willingness to invest in training remaining staff on their new roles and the commitment to 
;re new staff; 3) the capacity to change bureaucratic and administration-oriented 
management values towards values of co-management based on mutual respect and sharing of 
similar management targets (and hence accountability forms) between agencies and WUAs. 
0.5 Research items and orientation on institutional interventions 
in water management 
Previous sections of this chapter have already indicated the need for integrated and 
interdisciplinary research on issues of institutional interventions in irrigation. Some of these 
is sues include: linking institutional reforms in irrigation to political and other processes in the 
ider economy; studying processes of institutional transformation within the irrigation 
bureaucracies; and studying institutional viability in relation to technology, water scarcity and 
environmental sustainability. Rather than further discussing these and other research items, I 
prefer to end this chapter by directing the attention to a more strategic discussion on 
orientations for developing research capacity for universities and international research 
institutes. 
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Shift away from irrigation management towards integrated water management in basins 
For more than three decades now, the primary unit of analysis has been the irrigation system, 
or lower system levels (canals, tertiary units fields, and so forth). The challenges that most 
irrigation agencies, organizations and social movements concerned with issues of water 
management now face are related to a wide range of issues that go beyond the physical and 
institutional boundaries of single irrigation systems. Some of the issues and challenges 
include: water rights and concessions between the different users and uses are unequally 
dispersed over vast areas; water scarcity and competition over water between agriculture, 
industry and tourism is becoming more and more a problem; negotiating access to funding for 
system improvement works and water saving technologies needs the scaling-up of 
institutional capacity; and, issues of conjunctive water use and environmental impacts and 
sustainability of irrigated agriculture affect interests of third parties outside the irrigation 
system. Other examples can be easily added. 
For all these issues, a more logical and politically more strategic unit of analysis would 
be the water basin. Rather than focusing on irrigation management within irrigation systems, 
more emphasis could be given to integrated water management at the level of water basins. 
Examples from ARLED illustrate this. In order to solve their problems with unclear water 
rights, WUAs in ARLID and their LRS realize that they have to start building institutional 
relationships with their colleague WUAs in other districts within the basin as their access to 
water is also determined by water allocation policies between irrigation districts. Similarly, 
the qualification of RWS levels and economic outputs per unit of land or water in ARLID 
cannot be delinked from qualifications in similar and often hydrological connected districts 
elsewhere in the basin. The assumed over-exploitation of surface water within the district 
cannot be analyzed without a clear understanding of the relation between surface water use 
and recharge of aquifers, which generally underlie more than one irrigation district. 
Creating local institutional research memory 
This thesis has shown that studying institutional interventions and their impacts implies 
studying processes of constructing, transforming and adopting new arrangements. This takes 
time. Unfortunately, research policies of universities and international research institutes 
hardly make it possible to observe processes and changes over longer periods of time. 
Generally they depend on funding agencies with short research and policy horizons. As a 
result, universities and institutes tend to frequently shift their research attention to issues and 
locations that suit these funding agencies best. Although understandable, these frequent shifts 
undermine the development of local institutional research memory needed to test and 
understand new ideas and concepts in an intensive way. Also, they have to do research in the 
context of a globalizing world and with globalized research agendas. These globalized 
research agendas tend to include extensive, quantitative and comparative studies during a 
short period of time, rather than intensive, qualitative case studies over longer periods of time. 
Universities, research institutes and their local collaborators invest heavily in developing 
research capacity. They have an enormous impact on encouraging the development of local 
research capacity. The challenge that universities and research institutes face is that they need 
to work out new research strategies. Ideally, these strategies should support intensive local 
research, encourage the development of local research capacity, and help to develop local 
institutional research memory. 
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Epilogue: changing pillows for a headache? 
Several years ago, I studied the implementation and the impacts of irrigation management 
transfer and participatory water management in Sri Lanka. Similar to the case of Mexico 
described in this thesis, the reception of IMT ranged from positive and enthusiastic to 
negative and skeptical. Some authors concluded that the institutional reforms in Sri Lanka had 
been partial, and consequently the benefits were also partial, thereby implying that full 
transfer of management responsibilities would result into full benefits (Samad and Vermillion 
1999). A Sri Lankan politician whom I cited in my studies was less positive when he stated 
that: charging irrigation fees from farmers and encouraging greater farmers' involvement in 
managing irrigation system is nothing more than "changing pillows for a headache" (Kloezen 
1S)95 and 1996). 
While doing my research in Mexico, I often recalled those words and wondered whether 
ariy Mexican politician would conclude the same after reading this thesis. My guess is that he 
would not. He would probably conclude that the changes in ARLID have been radical and 
that they have not yet engendered the effects on irrigation performance that most people had 
hoped. He would probably also share my concern about the viability of the new institutions, 
the context of further liberalization of land and water markets. Yet, unlike his colleague in 
Siji Lanka, he would probably see that the irrigation reforms in Mexico were supported by a 
mix of policies and laws, and more importantly that the engagement of local interveners and 
users in ARLID had allowed for a flexible interpretation of the new institutional 
arrangements. 
The case of ARLID has demonstrated that within the socio-economic and political 
cdntext of Mexican agrarian change, there at least is a potential for creating new irrigation 
institutions that do go beyond changing pillows for a headache. 
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Appendices 
Salient features of the 11 modules in the Alto Rio Lerma irrigation district 
Example of a Q-h rating curve, established for point 2 in distributary canal B 
in Cortazar 
Sample frame for the farm survey in the Alto Rio Lerma irrigation district 
Performance indicators defined 
Basic data set for the irrigation district and the Cortazar and Salvatierra modules, 
winter 1995-96 and summer 1996 
Fluctuation of water levels in the head-end reach of distributary canal B, 
Cortazar module, 3 r d irrigation turn 
Fluctuation of water levels in the middle reach of distributary canal A, 
Cortazar module, 3 r d irrigation turn 
3| Fluctuation of water levels in the tail-end reach of distributary canal B, 
Cortazar module, 2 n d irrigation turn 
Farmers' opinion about adequacy of canal water supply, before and after IMT 
Farmers' opinion about timeliness of canal water supply, before and after IMT 
Farmers' opinion about fairness of water distribution, before and after IMT 
Farmers' opinion about the over-all service provided by the ditch tenders, before 
and after IMT 
Evaluation of data collection procedures 
245 
Area (ha) Number Number of users Area by irrigation source (ha) Irrigation network (km) Drainage network (km) 
Ejido Private Total of ejidos Ejido Private Total Surface Public Private Total Main Secondary Total Main Secondary Total 
Module sector growers sector growers weOs wells canals canals drains drains 
Acambaro 6.545 2.304 8.849 23 1.622 308 1.930 6.727 257 1.724 8.708 43 101 144 28 96 123 
Salvatierra 13.561 2.336 15.897 44 5.082 972 6.054 12.775 565 2.753 16.093 116 120 236 42 176 218 
Jaral 3.236 3.453 6.689 16 1.062 401 1.463 4.381 371 1.992 6.744 60 73 134 12 80 92 
Valle 7.359 6.319 13.678 31 1.773 536 2.309 7.990 778 3.955 12.723 31 162 193 52 83 135 
Cortazar 9.781 8.668 18.448 35 2.169 993 3.162 10.934 1.964 5.796 18.694 75 238 312 23 85 108 
Salamanca 5.165 8.992 14.157 37 1.178 1.534 2.712 12.109 573 3.426 16.108 61 174 235 10 91 101 
Irapuato 4.078 4.312 8.331 19 984 285 1.269 4.810 688 3.090 8.588 18 102 120 18 43 61 
Abasólo 5.229 11.136 16.365 38 1.164 1.259 2.423 10.911 1.152 3.390 15.453 28 141 169 33 39 72 
Huanimaro 2.261 1.470 3.731 18 611 229 840 2.802 430 491 3.723 20 20 40 15 41 56 
Corralejo 1.219 297 1.516 5 264 11 275 653 643 217 1.513 12 0 12 0 1 1 
La Purísima 3.437 982 4.419 15 936 118 1.054 3.605 0 820 4.425 11 52 63 27 27 54 
Total 61.871 50.269 112.140 281 16.845 6.646 23.491 77.697 7.421 27.654 112.772 475 1.183 1.658 260 761 1.021 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 2: Example of a Q-h rating curve, established for point 2 in distributary canal B 
in Cortazar 
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 
H(m) 
measurement points rating curve 
Appendix 3: Sample frame for the farm survey in the Alto Rio Lerma irrigation district 
Ejidatarios Private 
growers 
Total 
Group 1, Valle 
(with Acambaro and Purísima) 
Group 2, Salvatierra 
(with Jaral) 
Group 3, Cortazar 
(with Salamanca, Abasólo, 
and Irapuato) 
Group 4, Huanimaro 
(with Corralejo) 
23 
33 
29 
7 
21 
28 
40 
50 
Total 90 35 125 
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Appendix 4: Performance indicators defined 
Total water supply (irrigation + Total rainfall) 
Relative Water Supply = 
Total crop demand at field level 
where, the denominator includes consumptive use, non-beneficial E T , losses to drains, and net 
flow to groundwater. It is an non-dimensional parameter. The consumptive use calculation is 
standardized by using FAO's CROPWAT method. See also Levine (1982 and 1999). 
„ , .. . . i S „ , Irrigation supply Relative Irrigation Supply 
Irrigation demand at field level 
where, the denominator equals the crop demand, less effective rainfall. 
„ . Capacity to deliver at (sub) system head Water Delivery Capacity = — - — — — 
Peak consumptive demand 
_ _ „ Standardized gross value of production 
Production Per Cropped Area(US$/ha) = 
Irrigated cropped area 
where, 'standardized' refers to the process of obtaining the gross value of production (GVP) 
following a three-step process: i) select a base crop—typically the internationally traded crop 
covering the largest area—and convert all yields to 'equivalent' on the basis of the specific crop 
yield multiplied by the ratio of the specific crop price to the base crop, at farm gate; ii) multiply 
the equivalent yields by the percentage area under each crop to give the production equivalent per 
hectare of total cropped area for each crop and add them up; iii) multiply the production 
equivalent per hectare by the world market price of the base crop to obtain the standardized GVP. 
n n « , r , * . Standardized gross value of production 
Production Per Unit Command (US$/ha) = - — 
Command area 
_ 3 Standardized gross value of production Production Per Unit Irrigation Supply (US$/m ) = 
Diverted irrigation supply 
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„ , , . „ . , . „ „ , „ 3 Standardized gross value of production 
Production Per Unit of Water Consumed (US$/mJ ) = 
Volume of water consumed 
where, the denominator includes ET, non-beneficial ET, and losses to sinks. This indicator 
measures the contribution of the irrigation activity to the economy related to the consumption of 
the increasingly scarce water resource. Under conditions where the water resource is not 
necessarily scarce, the indicator is useful to judge whether there is enough water that can be 
utilized downstream or transferred somewhere else. 
Gross „ „ Standardized gross value of production Return on Investment (%) = 
Cost of irrigation infrastructure 
whers, the cost of the distribution system refers to the estimated current cost of construction for 
an equivalent delivery system. 
Water charges Financial Self - Sufficiency (%) = -— 
Cost of O & M 
where, water charges include potential revenues from all types of fees related to the water 
service; and the O&M costs are based on the accounts of either the agency or WUA, whichever is 
appropriate. Where farmers themselves undertake individual or collective O&M, the costs 
should be identified and quantified. 
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Appendix 5: Basic data set for the irrigation distríct and the Cortázar and Salvatierra 
modules, winter 1995-96 and summer 1996 
Alto Rio Lerma Cortázar Salvatierra 
Área supplied by irrigation district module module 
Gross Command Area (ha) 
Surface irrigation 77,697 10,934 12,775 
Public wells 7,421 1,964 565 
Surface irrigation plus public wells 85,118 12,898 13,340 
Prívate wells 27,654 5,796 2,753 
Cropping Intensity (%) 
Surface and Public Wells 
Winter 1995-96 70 81 50 
Summer 1996 60 71 54 
Prívate Wells 
Winter 1995-96 75 89 23 
Summer 1996 90 83 130 
Main Crop (% of total cropped) 
Surface and Public Wells 
Winter 1995-96 Wheat (92%) Wheat (94%) Wheat (68%) 
Summer 1996 Sorghum (81%) S p § J j m M a i z ( 3 9 % ) 
Prívate Wells 
Winter 1995-96 Wheat (62%) Wheat (54%) Wheat (70%) 
Summer 1996 Sorghum (82%) ^ ¡ 4 % , ™ Maiz(53%) 
Production (ton/ha) 
Surface and Public Wells 
Wheat equivalent, winter 1995-96 6.7 7.4 6.6 
Sorghum equivalent, summer 1996 9.8 8.8 11.9 
Prívate Wells 
Wheat equivalent, winter 1995-96 8.9 11.1 7.2 
Sorghum equivalent, summer 1996 9.6 10.7 9.6 
Gross Irrigation Supply (x 1,000 m3) 
Surface 
Winter 1995-96 667,440 106,123 123,651 
Summer 1996 139,236 26,743 22,227 
Prívate Wells 
Winter 1995-96 191,370 42,156 5,182 
Summer 1996 111,002 22,584 24,624 
Continue next page 
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nued from appendix 5 
Tota 
Effev 
Tota 
Effe( 
Rainfall (mm) 
.Winter 1994-95 54 53 51 
:tive, Winter 1994-95 44 42 41 
, Summer 1995 683 724 670 
:tive, Summer 1995 510 523 506 
Winl 
Sum 
Evaporation (mm) 
er 1995-96 929 1,068 822 
merl996 1,098 1,262 893 
Surfe 
Winf 
Sum 
Privt 
Winl 
Sum 
CROPWAT Water Requirement (mm) 
ice and Public Wells 
er 1995-96 500 511 428 
n e r l 9 9 6 497 546 501 
ite Wells 
er 1995-96 467 411 412 
n e r l 9 9 6 507 536 526 
Farrr 
Farrr 
Wor 
Wor 
Sales Prices (USS/ton) 
i Gate Price, Wheat Winter 1995-96 247 245 247 
i Gate Price, Sorghum Summer 1996 120 120 120 
d Market Price, Wheat Winter 1995-96 262 262 262 
d Market, Sorghum Summer 1996 105 105 105 
Note 
irrigs 
*: The overlap of winter and summer cropping in Salvatierra explains why the reported actual 
ted area under wells for the summer season exceeds the gross command area. 
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Appendix 6.1: Fluctuation of water level in the head-end reach of distributary canal B, 
Cortazar module, 3 r d irrigation turn (28/2 - 7/3 1997) 
(Ul) \ 3 A 3 \ J3JBA\ 
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120,12.00 _ 
120,18.00 " 
13/3.00.00 : 
13/3,06.00 . 
13/3,12.00 : 
13/3,18.00 : 
143,00.00 : 
140,06.00 ; 
143,1Z0O : 
1*3,18.00 ; 
15/3,00.00 : 
15/3,06.00 : 
15/3 1Z00 : 
15/318.00 : 
16/3 00.00 : 
16/3 06.00 : 
16/312.00 : 
1673 18.00 : 
17/3 00.00 : 
17/3 06.00 : 
17/312.00 : 
17/318.00 " 
18/3 00.00 ^ 
18/3 06.00 ; 
is/312.00 ; 
18018.00 : 
190 00.00 : 
o 
19/3 06.00 : 
19/312.00 : 
19/318.00 : 
20000.00 : and ti 
20/3 06.00 : 
and ti 
20/3 12.00 ; 
2OO18.00 : 
g 21/300.00 : 
21/306.00 ; 
21/3 1Z00 ; 
21/318.00 : 
22000.00 ; 
2 2 0 06.00 : 
2273 12.00 : 
22018 .00 : 
23/3 00.00 : 
23/3 06.00 ; 
23/3 12.00 : 
23/318.00 ; 
2 4 3 00.00 ; 
2 4 0 06.00 : 
24312 .00 : 
24318 .00 : 
25/3 00.00 : 
25/3 06.00 ; 
23/3 12.00 : 
25/3 18.00 : 
2 6 0 00.00 : 
2673 06.00 ; 
2673 12.00 : 
2673 18.00 : 
27/3 00.00 : 
27/3 06.00 : 
27012 .00 : 
27018 .00 : 
28/3 00.00 -
water level (m) 
(¿661 £/8Z ~ £/Zl) n-mj uopBSuji p j £ 'ampooi JBZBpoa 
' V IBnea ^icjnqujsjp jo xpnai ajppiui aq; m pAai J9;BM jo uojjBnpnia:^ xrpniddv 
S30IQN3ddV 
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Appendix 7.1: Farmers' opinion about adequacy of canal water supply, before and after 
I M l 
Better after IMT 'mmmmmmmm 
Worde after IMT 
Both adequate 
Both 
Not applicable* 
Note 
IMT 
inadequate 
J 
V///////////////A 
HHead 
• Middle 
• Tail 
0 5 10 15 2 0 25 3 0 
% of responses 
not applicable, because farmer only irrigates with own private well. 
35 4 0 4 5 5 0 
Appendix 7.2: Farmers' opinion about timeliness of canal water supply, before and after 
Betted after IMT 
Worsi; after IMT 
Both timely 
Boih untimely 
Nol applicable 
HHead 
• Middle 
• Tail 
10 15 20 25 30 
% of responses 
35 40 45 50 
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Appendix 7.3: Farmers' opinion about fairness of water distribution, before and after EVIT 
Better after IMT 
1 
Worse after IMT 
J 
Both fair 
Both unfair 
Not applicable 
• Head 
• Middle 
HTail 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
% of responses 
50 
Appendix 7.4: Farmers' opinion about the over-all service provided by the ditch-tender, 
before and after IMT 
Better after IMT 
T 
Worse after IMT 
Both bad service 
Both good service 
Not applicable 
10 15 20 25 30 
% of responses 
HHead 
• Middle 
• Tail 
35 40 45 50 
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visits 
Often 
Appendix 8: Evaluation of data collection procedures 
This appendix provides an evaluation of the data collection procedures that were used to obtain 
the performance results. It provides a comparison between the time and resources needed for 
calculating comparative indicators to the effort needed to measure the limited set of selected 
internal operational indicators. 
Comparative indicators. 
The comparative indicators rely heavily on the availability of secondary data. Once contacts and 
good working relationships with CNA and the WUAs were established, we were provided with 
full and unconditional access to the requested data. As CNA and most WUAs use computers to 
enter and process their data, often, computerized data files could be copied and used. Yet, data 
collections took more time than the one month anticipated. There are several reasons that explain 
this. 
For the purpose of cross-checking and control of data quality, where possible, module-level 
data were aggregated and compared with system-level data. In a large system like ARLJD, 
visiting the 11 modules took a logistical and time-consuming effort. Moreover, often module-
level data were not yet entered completely at the time of our visit, and new visits had to be made. 
It took CNA and the WUAs months to process their seasonal data. As a consequence, many 
had to be made to try to update the data required for this study, 
modules used different formats to enter their data, which made it difficult to compare 
module data and aggregate module-level data to district-level data. 
In a complex system like ARLID total volumes supplied to the modules had to be calculated 
by adding daily water measurements taken at a large number of control points. This was a time-
consiming process. 
Yields and farm gate prices varied from module to module and needed to be cross-checked 
with data from other sources. Converting cropping patterns and yields of more than 30 crops to a 
base equivalent crop at several system levels, for two annual seasons, and for both surface 
irrigation and wells, required the development and management of extensive and rather 
complicated Excel databases. This was particularly the case for the time series data used in 
chapters 5 and 9, for which data had to be collected from 11 WUAs. 
Given the differences in climate across the district, climatic data from several stations had to 
be collected. Visits to more than 10 stations were made to check the quality of the collection 
procedure used by the stations. Because of the poor quality of the equipment used or awkward 
location of the station, several weather stations were rejected. Also, the remaining stations 
appeared to have considerable data gaps. 
Sometimes, historical data were difficult to find, mainly as a result of the three 
administrative changes that the Ministry of Agriculture and CNA underwent over the last 10 
As a result, archives and files were lost or data formats had changed frequently, which 
historical comparisons difficult. 
Collection of financial data proved to be time-consuming because it took time to understand, 
interpret and cross-check the different items and monetary flows presented in the books. In 
on, financial years and agricultural years did not correspond. 
Development and modification of the spreadsheets and entering and processing the data took 
approximately 2 weeks. Data collection and checking took about 3 months for both the researcher 
and his assistant. A secretary was hired and trained to enter the data, on which approximately 1 
years 
made 
additi 
257 
APPENDICES 
258 
month was spent. In theory, most of the data could have been obtained at the district level 
(collected and aggregated by CNA). However, it was felt that for the purpose of cross-checking 
and quality control, data should be collected as much as possible at the primary source. This has 
improved the reliability of the data presented in this study. 
Internal operational indicators. 
In comparison to the comparative indicators, data collection procedures for applying operational 
indicators are more complex and time- and resource-consuming. A distinction must be made 
between data required for applying internal operational indicators at the module and district 
levels, and applying indicators at the level of selected canals and fields. 
For the former purpose, in addition to the data required for the comparative indicators, 
secondary data on dam storage, dam releases, and volumetric concessions, as well as data on 
planned and reported values were collected. Basically the same problems as described above 
were encountered. An additional month was estimated to be needed to collect and process the 
planned and reported values. 
Together with my two field assistants, I worked full-time for more than a year to collect 
primary data and make measurements to apply operational indicators at the level of selected 
canals and fields. In addition, the work in Salvatierra was supported by an M.Sc. student, while in 
Cortázar a part-time assistant engineer was hired to take the staff gauge readings twice daily and 
to provide assistance with the calibration of the gauges. Calibration of the staff gauges installed 
by us proved to be the most time-consuming activity. In addition, much time was spent on 
visiting the selected fields and taking several flow measurements per field, per irrigation. 
Calibrating selected wells, measuring flows from wells, taking energy consumption readings, as 
well as applying the farmer survey to obtain crop budgets, production costs, and cost of water 
appeared to be a relatively easy activity. Five more months were spent on entering, cleaning, and 
processing primary data. 
Presentation of research process and results. 
During the data collection process, frequent visits were made to CNA to discuss the data 
collected. This proved to be an excellent way to verify our preliminary interpretation of the data, 
encounter new questions, and request additional data. Several informal meetings were held with 
management, staff, and farmers of the two selected modules to discuss the same. In addition, I 
was given the opportunity to attend several hydraulic committee meetings, in which the research 
progress was discussed with representatives of other modules as well. Finally, three reports with 
preliminary result were presented at more formal occasions, such as workshops and seminars. 
This provided good opportunities to get feedback from a much wider audience, including system 
managers, policy makers, and researchers. 
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Summary 
During the past decade, many countries throughout the world have attempted to improve their generally 
poor performance record of agency-managed irrigation systems by designing and implementing 
institutional policy programs. This thesis analyses the institutional viability and the local impact on 
irrigation performance of two such institutional intervention programs. This is done in the context of the 
Alto Rio Lerma irrigation district (ARLID), a large-scale irrigation system with a command area of more 
than 112,000 hectares located in the State of Guanajuato, Central Mexico. The central notion that runs 
through this study is the recognition that new institutional arrangements do not necessarily follow 
instil ntional design principles and top-down directives from policy makers and government interveners, 
but lather are created in a process of local negotiation between water users, farmer leaders and irrigation 
managers. This requires detailed observations on local practices, strategies and interactions on how users, 
leaders and managers cope with building and transforming irrigation institutions. 
The first intervention program analyzed in this thesis aims to transfer management responsibilities 
from the irrigation agency (CNA) to local newly established water user organizations (WUAs) and to 
make them responsible for cost-recovery. The neoliberal belief behind this program is that greater farmer 
involvement in irrigation management and financing would eventually lead to a reduction in public 
investments in irrigated agriculture as well as to higher levels of irrigation performance. The second 
institutional intervention program that is analyzed in this thesis deals with the introduction of water 
markets, aiming at re-allocating water use to uses of higher economic value. Both intervention programs 
clearly embark on the 'less state, more market' approach to design and implement institutional 
arrangements for more use and cost-effective management of scarce resources such as water and funds. 
The central theme of this thesis is to study how water users and local water managers deal with the 
problems that result from these interventions and arrangements. 
In 1992, ARLID was one of the first of Mexican districts were irrigation management transfer (IMT) 
was introduced. The Mexican IMT program is worldwide considered to be the most successful and 
ambitious institutional programs in its kind, both because of its scale and the speed with which the policy 
was designed and implemented. The claims on the successes of these and similar programs are generally 
ideologically driven, and empirical evidence to support the policy claim that these institutional 
inteiventions have achieved these goals remain largely undocumented. This thesis fills some of this 
empirical void. 
This thesis comprises ten chapters. After the conceptual and methodological introduction in chapter 
one, two contextual chapters follow. Chapter 2 introduces the research site, and chapter 3 presents the 
political economic history and context in which the institutional interventions took place. Chapters 4 to 9 
provide the empirical data from the intensive case study in ARLID. Chapter 10 evaluates the main 
empirical, conceptual and methodological findings and discusses possible implications for policy and 
research orientations. 
The first chapter provides a review of the conceptual approaches and methodologies used to study 
the viability of new institutional arrangements in the context of market-oriented reforms. This thesis 
explores the kind of conditions, processes and mechanisms that help to create viable institutions. These 
mechanisms do not only refer to institutional and economic relationships, but also to the relationship 
between institutions, and water scarcity and irrigation technology. In that sense the thesis follows the 
notian that irrigation technology is a sociotechnical phenomenon, with institutional requirements for use. 
A key concept used for analyzing the viability of new irrigation institutions is accountability. This 
study shows that four forms of accountability can be separated: operational, financial, political and 
administrative accountability. Studying these forms of accountability (and the relationship between them ) 
demonstrates that practices and strategies of decision making in water management are only partly 
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influenced by rational choice and (economic) incentives for utility maximization. They are also 
influenced by socio-political factors. 
The methodological concern of this thesis is to develop a set of tools and indicators that help to 
assess the impacts of institutional interventions, both in terms of changes in irrigation performance levels, 
and in qualitative terms of processes of institutional viability. Two sets of performance indicators are 
presented. The first set comprises indicators that measure actual performance against set performance 
targets. The second set compares performance levels over time and across different system levels. The 
field work for this thesis comprised a wide set of methods and research techniques, ranging from 
intensive observations of practices and strategies for coping with the new institutional arrangements, to 
daily measurements of water flows in two selected WUA areas and several canals and fields in the 
irrigation district. Field research took place during the period from early 1995 to mid-1998. 
Chapter 2 provides background information on the location, history, water availability and layout 
of ARLID. It also introduces the two main groups of farmers that now jointly are organized in the new 
WUA: ejidatarios and private growers. It shows how these two groups have historically and 
economically been separated for almost 70 years. The chapter also provides a brief description of the 
Cortázar and Salvatierra module areas, their canals and WUAs that were selected for the intensive case 
study. 
Two important notions form the basis of the chapter 3, in which a detailed description of the 
historical and political economic context of IMT and water marketing is given. The first notion is that the 
legitimization for institutional interventions should be viewed in the political economic context of 
privatizing the Mexican country-side through dramatic constitutional revisions in the way distribution of 
land and water rights are organized. These reforms and revisions were started in the 1980 as a result of 
both a political and an economic crisis and were accompanied by wave of programs on the liberalization, 
decentralization and technocratization of the economy. Institutional intervention programs like the 
Mexican IMT program do not come on their own, but are preceded, accompanied and followed by other 
intervention programs that share the same neoliberal legitimization for restructuring the political and 
economic control over resources. The second notion is that to achieve the economic goals of these 
neolibral programs, the Salinas and subsequent administrations needed intervention policies such as IMT 
and water marketing as these would help to recover costs from the users. However, to improve greater 
involvement of farmers in water management, neoliberal programs are not a necessity. 
Chapter 4 shows how IMT and water markets were implemented, both at the national level and in 
ARLID. The IMT program is a typical example of institutional engineering, comprising detailed 
prescriptions on institutional design and a top-down approach for implementing these designs. Yet, 
farmers and local managers do not fully disregard these proposed arrangements. Rather than using them 
as prescriptive dictates, the new principles and arrangements served as a strategic starting point for the 
WUAs for negotiating irrigation fee levels, water marketing, mode of user representation, maintenance 
programs, and redistribution of O&M responsibilities between the WUAs and CNA. Local recipients 
have partly adopted and accommodated the new institutional arrangements. The IMT program allowed 
local irrigation managers, new leaders of WUAs and farmers to jointly create room and institutional 
flexibility to alter the proposed arrangements. This was made possible mainly because from the initial 
stage of implementation, CNA officials in ARLID have shown to users that they are credible and willing 
to share knowledge and information in a transparent way. Credibility, transparency, institutional 
flexibility and probity were among the most important factors to explain how operational accountability 
from CNA to WUAs, and from WUAs to water users, was earned in a continuous process of negotiating 
institutional arrangements. Furthermore, given the wider set of market-oriented reforms and constitutional 
revisions that farmers had become familiar with, they realized that they could hardly resist IMT. 
Chapter 5 provides a detailed analysis of practices, results and operational accountability for local 
water management. It demonstrates that official post-transfer arrangements for O&M in ARLID do not 
always reflect actual irrigation practices. As result, outputs of these practices in terms of relative water 
supply and land and water productivity remained unchanged after IMT. The main reason for this is the 
conflict in forms of accountability, which could not be resolved under the new institutional arrangements. 
Rather than adhering to new principles of using water as an economic good, farmers and local managers 
adhered to pre-IMT arrangements and practices of distributing water. Daily measurements of water flows 
and observation of irrigation practices revealed that ditch tenders (who are now employed by the WUAs) 
generally report planned water deliveries rather than actually supplied volumes. In that sense, they 
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continued the practice of being administratively accountable to both users and CNA. This runs counter to 
the idea of encouraging efficient water use through water pricing and cost-recovery and hence being both 
finantially and operationally accountable. Comparison of water use per hectare or per m3 of water across 
the 11 module areas in ARLID, shows that although water is the limiting factor in ARLID, the irrigation 
management strategy chosen by farmers is to maximize returns per hectare rather than increasing returns 
per m3 of water. As a result, water deliveries per hectare of irrigated land are generally very high. The 
chapler also provides some evidence that existing irrigation technology and water management regimes 
do not always match with the institutional capacity of the new WUAs to operate the system. The chapter 
also explores some ideas of approaching issues of relative water scarcity in the context of conjunctive use 
and it a wider setting of the entire water basin. 
Chapter 6 gives a detailed account of how practices, processes and mechanisms of user 
representation, leadership election and conflict resolution affect political accountability and institutional 
viability. Detailed analysis of election procedures and processes over a period of two WUA 
administrations demonstrate that the de jure distribution of farmer representation in the boards and 
assemblies of WUAs is well organized. However, the de facto control over decision making remains in 
the hands of a few farmer leaders. These leaders have developed several strategies to reproduce this 
control. These include political coercion to become re-elected; favoritism in the employment of board 
members and irrigation staff; corruption; and extending economic and political networks. Particularly in 
the ciise of Salvatierra WUA, these strategies have caused that accountability was hardly created. Farmers 
use tvo strategies in their trying to counter-balance these mechanisms that weaken accountability. First, 
they refuse to pay higher fees to signal their dissatisfaction with the WUA's management policies. 
Second, they call for CNA to resolve disputes over illicit payments and the performance of the WUA 
leadership. 
'.in chapter 7 an analysis is made of how mechanisms of financial accountability influence the 
institutional viability of the post-transfer institutional arrangements for irrigation management. WUAs in 
ARLID succeeded to boost cost-recovery and to become financially autonomous. In that sense IMT has 
been very instrumental to achieving the government goal of reducing public investments in irrigation. 
However, improved cost-recovery and financial autonomy have also helped WUAs to create room for 
negoiating the reformulation of important institutional arrangements such as the percentages of total 
revenue that had to be paid to CNA; the level of water pricing; and the conditions and prices for water 
trading. Financial transparency, the use of computers and external auditing helped the WUAs to become 
financially accountable to fee payers. Moreover, particularly in the case of Cortázar, leaders showed that 
they were credible when they started to use revenues from fee payments to dramatically improve canal 
maintenance. They also showed their willingness to fire irrigation staff that had proved to be corrupt. Yet, 
financial viability is threatened in two ways. First, as a result of lack of political accountability (such as in 
the cise of Salvatierra). Second, because of the WUAs' total dependency on water availability to generate 
income. 
In chapter 8 the focus of analysis is shifted towards issues of water marketing. WUAs in ARLID 
indeed have used the now legal opportunity to market water with other WUAs within the district. 
How;ver, unlike the common belief among neoliberal advocates of water marketing, trading is not used 
to price water at opportunity cost levels. Rather, the process of water marketing is used to create solidarity 
among the WUAs. This solidarity is needed to be able to work together in the new federation of WUAs, 
whicii has opted to take over from CNA maintenance responsibilities for the main canal system. Water 
trading is also used by WUAs to show their members that they are credible in the sense that they will try 
to deliver water at any time; even when they have to buy it from other WUAs during times of water 
scarcity. As a result, prices of traded water are generally lower than water prices paid for normal water 
deliveries during times of sufficient water availability. 
Chapter 9 returns to the official objectives of the IMT program and assesses the program's impact on 
water management. By applying a set of comparative indicators, it is shown that the result of IMT and 
water marketing in terms of changes in performance levels are disappointing. With the exception of 
improvements in cost-recovery and maintenance, there is no evidence that water is used more efficiently 
or that IMT has resulted in higher levels of productivity per hectare or per m3 of water. 
Chapter 10 first provides a full synthesis of the empirical findings discussed above. It subsequently 
revisits some of the conceptual and methodological tools used for this study. This shows that the 
conceptual notion of social requirements for use of irrigation technology should be further elaborated to 
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institutional requirements for use. An important notion in this respect is that institutional arrangements 
are a mixture of formal prescriptive arrangements, existing arrangements and newly negotiated 
arrangements. Existing and new institutions are the result of a continuous process of creating, negotiating, 
earning, and maintaining accountability. This explains why institutions manifest themselves as being 
contingent rather than proposed static structures that follow designed institutional principles. 
A revisit of the accountability concept shows that it is useful to separate different forms of 
accountability. This separation helps to analyze accountability mechanisms that go beyond those related 
to providing mere O&M services or cost-recovery; it also helps to unravel in what way providers of 
services are accountable, or not; and it helps to recognize in what way different forms of accountability 
can compete with each other. This is particularly of interest in the case of joint WUA-agency 
management of irrigation system, where different organizations can have competing management values 
and targets, and hence try to be accountable in different ways. 
The methodological revisit on the different sets of impact assessment tools shows that comparative 
indicators are useful to assess changes over time as a result from institutional interventions. Yet, they are 
limited in the sense that they exclusively focus on economic and productivity output oriented results. 
Furthermore, applying these indicators was more time and resource consuming than assumed. The reason 
for this are the complexity and amount of secondary data needed as well as the difficult process it takes to 
deconstruct the meaning of these data. 
This study has several implications for market-oriented policies, both in and outside of Mexico. 
Because of its unique political economic and constitutional context, the 'Mexican IMT model' cannot 
simply be copied to other countries where similar attempts of planned institutional changes are underway. 
Particularly the fact that IMT and water marketing in Mexico were supported by political commitment at 
the highest levels and by dramatic constitutional revisions and other agrarian reforms, explains why the 
new institutional arrangements for water management could be speedily implemented on such a wide 
scale. This study also suggests that institutional 'modernization' programs (such as IMT and water 
marketing) and physical modernization programs in irrigation should be better matched. Although 
physical improvement programs are often used to sell institutional reforms (and the consequent burden) to 
water users, they hardly ever are matched in such a sense that the proposed new technology matches with 
the proposed new institutional arrangements to use this technology. 
Chapter 10 ends with a discussion on why to orient research on institutional interventions in water 
management to the level of entire water basin rather than irrigation systems. Also, irrespective that 
universities and international research institutes need to do research in the context of a globalizing world 
and with globalized research agendas, a plea is made to not shift too frequently to doing extensive, 
quantitative and comparative studies during a short period of time. Understanding institutional change 
processes and their impacts at the local level requires intensive and qualitative case studies over longer 
periods of time. Only in this way collaboration with local research partners can fully develop, resulting in 
the level of creation of institutional research memory that is needed for this understanding. 
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"CONTANDO" EL AGUA 
Viabilidad institucional e impactos de las intervenciones 
orientadas al mercado en el riego, en el centro de México 
Durante la última década, muchos países a través del mundo han intentado mejorar el 
desempeño generalmente pobre del riego manejado por agencias gubernamentales diseñando 
ejecutando programas de políticas institucionales. Esta tesis analiza la viabilidad 
iristitucional y el impacto local sobre el desempeño del riego de dos de tales programas de 
intervención institucional. Esto se hace en el contexto del Distrito de Riego Alto Río Lerma 
(DRARL), un sistema de riego de gran escala con un área dominada de más de 112.000 
hectáreas localizado en el Estado de Guanajuato, en el centro de México. La idea central en 
que se basa este estudio es el reconocimiento de que los nuevos arreglos institucionales no 
necesariamente siguen los principios de diseño institucional y las directivas de "arriba hacia 
abajo" de los forjadores de políticas e interventores gubernamentales, sino mas bien son 
creados en un proceso de negociación local entre los usuarios del agua, líderes campesinos y 
gerentes del riego. Esto requiere de observaciones detalladas sobre prácticas locales, y 
estrategias e interacciones en como usuarios, líderes y gerentes enfrentan la creación y la 
transformación de instituciones del riego. 
El primer programa de intervención analizado en esta tesis está dirigido a transferir las 
responsabilidades del manejo desde la agencia del riego (CNA) hasta asociaciones locales de 
usuarios del agua (AUA) recientemente establecidas y hacerlas responsables por la 
recuperación de costos. La creencia neo-liberal detrás de este programa es que el mayor 
involucramiento de los usuarios en el manejo del agua y su financiación eventualmente 
llevaría a la reducción de las inversiones públicas en la agricultura bajo riego así como a 
niveles superiores del desempeño del riego. El segundo programa de intervención 
institucional que es analizado en esta tesis concierne a la introducción de mercados del agua, 
dirigidos a la reasignación del uso del agua a usos de mayor valor económico. Ambos 
programas de intervención claramente se embarcan en un enfoque de "menor estado, mayor 
mercado" para diseñar y ejecutar arreglos institucionales para mayor uso y manejo efectivo de 
escasos recursos tales como agua y dinero. El tema central de esta tesis es para estudiar como 
les usuarios del agua y los gerentes locales del agua tratan los problemas que resultan de estas 
intervenciones y arreglos. 
En 1992, el DRARL fue uno de los primeros distritos Mexicanos donde la transferencia 
del manejo del riego (TMR) fue introducida. El programa Mexicano de TMR es considerado 
mundialmente el más exitoso y ambicioso programa institucional de este tipo, tanto por su 
tamaño como por la velocidad con que la política fue diseñada y ejecutada. Los clamores de 
éxito de este y programas similares son generalmente ideológicamente impulsados, y la 
evidencia empírica para apoyar la política que dice que estas intervenciones institucionales 
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han alcanzado estas metas permanece ampliamente indocumentada. Esta tesis llena algo de 
este vacío empírico. 
Esta tesis comprende diez capítulos. Después de la introducción metodológica y 
conceptual en el capítulo uno, siguen dos capítulos con el contexto. El capítulo dos introduce 
el sitio de investigación, y el capítulo tres presenta la historia de la política económica dentro 
de la cual tuvo lugar la intervención institucional. Los capítulos del cuatro al nueve presentan 
los datos empíricos de un estudio de caso intensivo en DRARL. El capítulo diez evalúa los 
resultados conceptuales, metodológicos y empíricos principales, y discute las posibles 
implicaciones para orientaciones de políticas e investigación. 
El primer capítulo presenta una revisión de los enfoques conceptuales utilizados para 
estudiar la viabilidad de los nuevos arreglos institucionales en el contexto de reformas con 
orientación de mercados. Esta tesis explora los tipos de condiciones, procesos y mecanismos 
que ayudan a crear instituciones viables. Estos mecanismos no solamente se refieren a las 
relaciones económicas e institucionales, sino también a las relaciones entre instituciones, y la 
escasez del agua y la tecnología del riego. En ese sentido sigue la noción de que la tecnología 
del riego es un fenómeno socio-técnico, con requerimientos institucionales para su utilización. 
Un concepto clave utilizado para analizar la viabilidad de las nuevas instituciones del 
riego es el de la rendición de cuentas. Este estudio muestra que cuatro clases de rendición de 
cuentas pueden ser separadas: operacional, financiera, política y adrninistrativa. Estudiando 
estas formas de rendición de cuentas (y la relación entre ellas) demuestra que las prácticas y 
estrategias en la toma de decisiones del manejo del agua están solo parcialmente influenciadas 
por alternativas racionales y por incentivos para la maximización del uso de los recursos. 
También están influenciados por factores socio-políticos. 
La preocupación metodológica de esta tesis es desarrollar un juego de herramientas e 
indicadores que ayuden a estimar el impacto de las intervenciones institucionales, tanto en 
términos de cambio en los niveles de desempeño del riego, como en términos cualitativos de 
los procesos y viabilidad institucional. Se presentan dos juegos de indicadores de desempeño. 
El primer juego contiene indicadores que miden el desempeño real comparado con metas de 
desempeño. El segundo juego compara los niveles de desempeño a través del tiempo y a 
diferentes niveles del sistema. El trabajo de campo para esta tesis comprende un amplio 
conjunto de métodos y técnicas de investigación, que van desde observaciones intensivas de 
las prácticas y estrategias para enfrentar los nuevos arreglos institucionales, hasta mediciones 
diarias de los gastos de agua en dos áreas seleccionadas de AUA y varios canales y parcelas 
del distrito de riego. La investigación de campo se llevó a cabo en el período desde el 
comienzo de 1995 hasta la mitad de 1998. 
El capítulo dos contiene los antecedentes sobre la localización, historia, disponibilidad 
del agua y la configuración del DRARL. También introduce a los dos grupos de agricultores 
principales que ahora conjuntamente se han organizado en las nuevas AUA: ejidatarios y 
pequeños propietarios. Muestra como estos dos grupos han estado separados históricamente y 
económicamente casi 70 años. Este capítulo también presenta una corta descripción de las 
áreas de los módulos Cortázar y Salvatierra, sus canales y las AUA que fueron seleccionadas 
para el estudio de caso intensivo. 
Dos conceptos principales forman la base del capítulo tres, en el cual una descripción 
detallada del contexto histórico y político-económico de la TMR y los mercados del agua 
están dados. La primera noción es que la legitimación de las intervenciones institucionales 
debe ser vista en el contexto económico-político de la privatización del área rural Mexicana 
por medio de revisiones constitucionales dramáticas en la forma en que la distribución de los 
derechos de agua y tierra está organizada. Estas reformas y revisiones empezaron en los 1980 
como resultados de una crisis tanto política como económica y estuvieron acompañados por 
una ola de programas sobre la liberalización, descentralización y tecnocratización de la 
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economía. Los programas de intervención institucional como el programa Mexicano de la 
TMR no vienen solo, sino precedido, acompañado y seguido por otros programas de 
intervención que comparten la misma legitimación neo-liberal para la reestructuración del 
control económico y político sobre los recursos. La segunda noción es que para alcanzar las 
m;tas económicas de estos programas neo-liberales, la administración de Salinas de Gortari 
(y la subsiguiente) necesitó políticas de intervención tales como la TMR y los mercados de 
agua pues estos ayudarían a la recuperación de los costos incurridos por los usuarios. Sin 
embargo, el involucramiento de los agricultores en el manejo del agua no necesariamente 
necesita de programas neo-liberales. 
El capítulo cuatro muestra como la TMR y los mercados del agua fueron ejecutados, 
to al nivel nacional como en el DRARL. El programa de TMR es un ejemplo típico de re-
inkeniería institucional, conteniendo prescripciones detalladas sobre diseño institucional y un 
enfoque de "arriba hacia abajo" para implementar estos diseños. Aun así, agricultores y 
gerentes locales no desechan totalmente estos arreglos propuestos. En vez de usarlos como 
dictados prescriptivos los nuevos principios y arreglos sirvieron como un punto estratégico de 
partida para las AUA negociar los niveles de las tarifas de riego, mercados del agua, los 
modos de representación de los usuarios, programas de conservación, y redistribución de las 
responsabilidades de la O&M entre las AUA y la CNA. Los receptores locales han 
parcialmente adoptado y acomodado estos nuevos arreglos institucionales. El programa de 
TMR permitió a los gerentes locales de riego, a los nuevos líderes de las AUA a los 
agricultores crear conjuntamente espacios y flexibilidad institucional para alterar los arreglos 
propuestos. Esto fue posible más que todo por que desde la etapa inicial de la ejecución, los 
oficiales de la CNA en el DRARL han dejado ver a los usuarios que ellos son confiables y 
que están dispuestos a compartir información y conocimientos en una forma transparente. 
Credibilidad, transparencia, flexibilidad institucional y probidad estaban entre los factores 
mis importantes para explicar como la responsabilidad operacional desde la CNA a la AUA, 
y de la AUA a los usuarios del agua fue alcanzada en un proceso continuado de negociación 
de los arreglos institucionales. Mas aún, dado el amplio conjunto de reformas con orientación 
de mercado y revisiones constitucionales con los cuales los agricultores se han familiarizado, 
estos se dieron cuenta de que difícilmente podrían resistirse a la TMR. 
El capítulo cinco presenta análisis detallados de prácticas, resultados y responsabilidades 
operacionales para el manejo local del agua. Muestra que los arreglos oficiales post-
tntnsferencia para O&M en DRARL no siempre reflejan las prácticas de riego actuales. Como 
resultado, los logros de estas prácticas en términos de la disponibilidad relativa del agua 
(DRA) y la productividad de la tierra y el agua permanecieron inalterados después de la TMR. 
La razón principal para esto es el conflicto entre las formas de rendición de cuentas, que no 
pudieron ser resueltas bajo estos nuevos arreglos institucionales. En vez de adherirse a los 
nuevos principios de tratar el agua como un bien económico, los campesinos y gerentes 
lósales se adhirieron a los arreglos y prácticas de distribución del agua pre-TMR. Mediciones 
diarias de los gastos y la observación de las prácticas de riego revelaron que los canaleras 
(quienes son ahora empleados por las AUA) generalmente reportan los suministros de agua 
planeados en vez de los volúmenes reales suministrados. En ese sentido, ellos continuaron 
ccn la práctica de ser responsables administrativamente tanto a los usuarios como a la CNA. 
Esto va en contra de la idea de alentar el uso eficiente del agua con base en el precio del agua 
y la recuperación de costos y por lo tanto ser responsables tanto financiera como 
operacionalmente. Comparaciones del uso del agua por hectárea o por m 3 a lo largo de las 
ársas de los once módulos en DRARL, muestran que a pesar de ser el agua el factor limitante 
en el DRARL, la estrategia del manejo del riego escogida por los campesinos es el maximizar 
los ingresos por hectárea, en vez de aumentar los ingresos por m 3 . Como resultado, la entrega 
de agua por hectárea regada es generalmente muy alta. Este capítulo también provee 
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evidencia de que la tecnología de riego y los regímenes del manejo del agua existente no 
siempre concuerda con la capacidad institucional de las nuevas AUA para operar el sistema. 
El capítulo también explora algunas ideas sobre maneras de abordar la escasez relativa del 
agua en el contexto de su uso conjunto dentro de un enfoque más amplio que abarca toda la 
cuenca hidrográfica. 
El capítulo seis detalla como las prácticas, procesos y mecanismos de la representación 
de los usuarios, las elecciones de los líderes y la resolución de conflictos afectan la 
responsabilidad política y la viabilidad institucional. Análisis detallados de los procesos y 
procedimientos de elecciones, abarcando un periodo de dos administraciones de las AUA, 
demuestran que la distribución de jure de la representación de los campesinos en las juntas y 
asambleas de las AUA está bien organizada. Sin embargo, el control de facto sobre la toma de 
decisiones permanece en las manos de unos pocos líderes campesinos. Estos líderes han 
desarrollado varias estrategias para replicar este control. Estas incluyen coerción política para 
ser reelegidos; favoritismo en el empleo de miembros de la junta y personal del riego; 
corrupción; y la extensión de redes económicas y políticas. Particularmente, en el caso de la 
AUA de Salvatierra, estas estrategias han ocasionado que la rendición de cuentas escasamente 
haya sido creada. Los agricultores usan dos estrategias en tratar de balancear los mecanismos 
que debilitan la rendición de cuentas. Primero, el rehusarse a pagar tarifas más altas a fin de 
dar a conocer su insatisfacción con las políticas de manejo de las AUA. Secundo, el empezar 
a llamar a la CNA para que resuelva las disputas sobre liderazgo de las AUA y pagos ilícitos. 
El capítulo siete hace un análisis de como los mecanismos de responsabilidad financiera 
influyen en la viabilidad de los arreglos institucionales post-transferencia en el manejo del 
riego. Las AUA en DRARL fueron exitosas en mejorar la recuperación de costos y en 
establecerse financieramente autónomas. En ese sentido, la TMR ha sido importante en 
alcanzar la meta del gobierno de reducir las inversiones públicas en el riego. Sin embargo, 
también han ayudado a las AUA a crear espacios para negociar la formulación de importantes 
arreglos institucionales tales como el porcentaje de los ingresos totales que debían pagarse a 
la CNA; el nivel de los precios del agua; y las condiciones del mercadeo del agua y los 
precios del agua mercadeado. Transparencia financiera, el uso de computadoras y auditorias 
externas ayudaron a las AUA a rendir cuentas financieramente a los que pagaban tarifas. Más 
aún, especialmente en el caso de Cortázar, los líderes mostraron que ellos eran confiables 
cuando empezaron a utilizar los ingresos derivados de los pagos de las tarifas para mejorar 
dramáticamente la conservación de canales y drenes. Ellos también mostraron su disposición 
para despedir a personal de riego que fuera corrupto. Sin embargo, la viabilidad financiera es 
amenazada en dos formas. Primero, como resultado de una falta de responsabilidad política 
(como es el caso de Salvatierra). Segundo, debido a la total dependencia de las AUA en la 
disponibilidad del agua para generar ingresos. 
En el capítulo ocho el foco de análisis es dirigido hacia temas del mercado del agua. Las 
AUA en DRARL de hecho han utilizado la ahora oportunidad legal de mercadear el agua con 
otras AUA dentro del distrito. Sin embargo, al contrario de la creencia común entre los neo-
liberales partidarios de los mercados del agua, el mercadeo no es utilizado para establecer el 
precio del agua al nivel del costo de oportunidad. Más bien, el proceso del mercadeo de agua 
es usado para crear solidaridad entre las AUA. Esta solidaridad se necesita para poder ser 
capaces de trabajar juntos en la nueva federación de AUA, que ha optado por tomar de la 
CNA la responsabilidad de la conservación de la red de canales principales del distrito. El 
mercadeo del agua es también utilizado por las AUA para mostrar a sus miembros que ellos 
son confiables en el sentido que tratarán de entregar el agua en cualquier momento; aún 
cuando ellos tengan que comprarla a otras AUA en tiempos de escasez del agua. Como 
resultado, los precios del agua negociada son generalmente menores que los precios del agua 
pagados por entregas normales en tiempos de disponibilidad abundante. 
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El capítulo nueve regresa al objetivo oficial del programa de la TMR y determina el 
inpacto del programa en el manejo del agua. Utilizando un conjunto de indicadores 
comparativos se muestra que los resultados de la TMR y de los mercados del agua en 
láminos de cambio en los niveles de desempeño son decepcionantes. Con la excepción en 
mejoras en la recuperación de costos y la conservación de la red de canales y drenes, no hay 
evidencia de que el agua sea usada más eficientemente o que la TMR haya resultado en 
niveles más altos de productividad por hectárea o por m 3 de agua. 
El capítulo diez provee primero una síntesis completa de los resultados empíricos, 
discutidos arriba. Subsecuentemente revisa las herramientas conceptuales y metodológicas 
utilizadas en este estudio. Se muestra que el concepto sobre requerimientos sociales para el 
uso de tecnología del riego debe ser ampliado más allá hasta incluir los requerimientos 
institucionales para su uso. Una noción importante a este respecto es que los arreglos 
institucionales son una mezcla de arreglos prescriptivos formales, arreglos existentes y 
arreglos recientemente negociados. Las instituciones existentes y las nuevas son el resultado 
de un proceso continuado de crear, negociar y mantener responsabilidades. Esto explica por 
qv e las instituciones se manifiestan ellas mismas como siendo fortuitas en vez de estructuras 
estáticas que siguen principios institucionales pre-diseñados. 
Una revisión de los conceptos de la rendición de cuentas muestra que es útil separar las 
diferentes formas de esta rendición de cuentas. Esta separación ayuda a analizar los 
mecanismos de responsabilidad que van mas allá de aquellos relacionados en proporcionar 
simplemente servicios de O&M o recuperación de costos; también ayuda a aclarar de que 
minera los proveedores de servicios son responsables o no; y ayuda a reconocer en que 
minera las diferentes formas de rendición de cuentas pueden competir entre sí. Esto es de 
particular interés en el caso del manejo conjunto, AUA-agencia, de los sistemas de riego, 
donde diferentes organizaciones pueden tener valores y metas de manejo que compiten entre 
sí. y por lo tanto tratan de rendir cuentas en diferente manera. 
Una revisión metodológica de los diferentes conjuntos de herramientas para analizar los 
impactos muestra que los indicadores comparativos son útiles para determinar cambios en el 
tiempo como resultados de intervenciones institucionales. Sin embargo, están limitados en el 
sentido de que ellos se enfocan exclusivamente en resultados orientados a logros económicos 
y de producción. Más aún, la aplicación de estos indicadores tomó más tiempo y recursos de 
los esperados. La razón para ello es la complejidad y cantidad de datos secundarios requeridos 
así como el difícil proceso que conlleva analizar el sentido de esta información. 
Este estudio tiene varias implicaciones sobre políticas orientadas al mercado, tanto dentro 
como fuera de México. Debido a su peculiar contexto político-económico y constitucional, el 
modelo de TMR mexicano no simplemente puede ser copiado a otros países donde intentos 
similares de cambios en la planeación institucional están en marcha. Particularmente el hecho 
de; que la TMR y los mercados del agua en México fueron apoyados por un compromiso 
político al más alto nivel y por dramáticas revisiones constitucionales y de otras reformas 
agrarias, explica por qué los nuevos arreglos institucionales para el manejo del agua pudieron 
ser ejecutados rápidamente a tan amplia escala. El estudio también sugiere que los programas 
de "modernización" institucional (tales como la TMR y el mercado del agua) y los programas 
de: modernización física del riego deben acoplarse mejor. A pesar de que los programas de 
mejoras físicas son usados a menudo para vender reformas institucionales (y sus consecuentes 
inconveniencias) a usuarios del agua, rara vez se compaginan en el sentido que la nueva 
tecnología propuesta concuerde con los nuevos arreglos institucionales propuestos para usar 
esa tecnología. 
El capítulo diez termina en una discusión sobre por que orientar la investigación sobre 
intervenciones institucionales en el manejo del agua en el ámbito de la cuenca hidrográfica 
completa, en vez de a nivel del sistema de riego. También, independientemente de que las 
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universidades e institutos internacionales de investigación necesitan adelantar investigación 
en el contexto de un mundo y agendas de investigación globalizadas, se hace un llamado a no 
emprender muy frecuentemente estudios extensivos, cuantitativos y comparativos en cortos 
períodos de tiempo. Entendiendo los procesos de cambio institucional y sus impactos al nivel 
local, requiere estudios de caso extensivos y cualitativos sobre períodos relativamente largos. 
Solamente de esta manera la colaboración con compañeros de investigación locales puede ser 
plenamente desarrollada, resultando en la creación de una memoria institucional de 
investigación al nivel que se necesita para este entendimiento. 
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WATER"AFREKENEN" 
De institutionele levensvatbaarheid en effecten 
van marktgerichte irrigatie-interventies in Centraal Mexico 
W ereldwijd hebben in de afgelopen tien jaar veel landen geprobeerd het slechte functioneren 
VEin de door de overheid beheerde irrigatiestelsels te verbeteren. Dit gebeurde onder andere 
door middel van het ontwerpen en uitvoeren van institutionele beleidsprogramma's. De 
institutionele levensvatbaarheid van twee dergelijke interventieprogramma's wordt in dit 
proefschrift geanalyseerd. Tevens worden hun lokale effecten op het functioneren van een 
irrigatiestelsel bestudeerd. Dit wordt gedaan binnen de context van het Alto Rio Lerma 
irrigatiedistrict (ARLID) met een waterbeheergebied van meer dan 112.000 hectaren, 
gesitueerd in de Staat Guanajuato in Centraal Mexico. Als een rode draad door dit onderzoek 
loopt de erkenning dat nieuwe institutionele maatregelen niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
institutionele ontwerpprincipes en top-down instructies van beleidsmakers en -uitvoerders 
volgen, maar veeleer gecreëerd worden in een lokaal onderhandelingsproces tussen 
watergebruikers, boerenleiders en irrigatiebeheerders. Dit vereist gedetailleerde observaties 
van lokale praktijken en interacties tussen gebruikers, leiders en waterbeheerders en hun 
strategieën voor het creëren en omvormen van irrigatie-instituties. 
Het eerste interventieprogramma dat in dit proefschrift geanalyseerd wordt heeft als doel 
beheerverantwoordelijkheden over te dragen van de irrigatiedienst (het CNA) naar pas 
opgerichte lokale watergebruikersorganisaties (WGO's) en deze tevens verantwoordelijk te 
maken voor de kostendekking van beheer en onderhoud van irrigatiestelsels. De neoliberale 
gedachte achter dit programma is dat een toegenomen betrokkenheid van boeren in het 
beheren en financieren van irrigatiestelsels uiteindelijk zal leiden tot een verlaging van 
publieke investeringen in de geïfrigeerde landbouw alsmede tot een verbeterd functioneren 
ven irrigatiestelsels. Het tweede institutionele interventieprogramma dat in dit proefschrift 
geanalyseerd wordt heeft betrekking op de introductie van watermarkten. Deze heeft als doel 
om het watergebruik zodanig te herverdelen dat dit leidt tot een gebruik met een hogere 
economische waarde. Beide interventieprogramma's zijn duidelijk geïnitieerd vanuit een 
benadering die 'minder overheid, maar meer markt' voorstaat voor het ontwerpen en 
implementeren van institutionele maatregelen om te komen tot een meer gebruiks- en 
kostenefficiënt beheer van schaarse bronnen als water en geld. Hoe gebruikers en lokale 
waterbeheerders omgaan met de problemen die het gevolg zijn van deze interventies en 
maatregelen staat centraal in dit proefschrift. 
In 1992 was ARLID een van de eerste Mexicaanse irrigatiedistricten waar overdracht van 
irrigatiebeheer (OIB) werd geïntroduceerd. Het Mexicaanse OIB programma wordt 
wereldwijd gezien als het meest succesvolle en ambitieuze in zijn soort, zowel vanwege de 
schaal als vanwege de snelheid waarmee het beleid was geformuleerd en uitgevoerd. De 
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succesclaim van deze en vergelijkbare programma's is over het algemeen ideologisch van 
aard. Empirisch bewijs voor de claim dat deze institutionele interventies de beleids-
doelstellingen hebben bereikt, blijft vooralsnog grotendeels ongedocumenteerd. Dit proef-
schrift vult voor een deel dit empirische vacuüm. 
Het proefschrift bevat tien hoofdstukken. Na een conceptuele en methodologische 
inleiding in hoofdstuk 1 volgen twee contextuele hoofdstukken. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de 
onderzoekslocatie geïntroduceerd, terwijl in hoofdstuk 3 de politiek-economische geschie-
denis en context waarbinnen de institutionele interventies hebben plaatsgevonden worden 
gepresenteerd. In de hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 9 worden de empirische gegevens uit de 
intensieve casusstudie die in ARLED verricht is gepresenteerd. In hoofdstuk 10 worden de 
belangrijkste empirische, conceptuele en methodologische bevindingen geëvalueerd en 
worden mogelijke implicaties van het onderzoek op beleids- en onderzoeksrichtingen 
besproken. 
In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt een overzicht gegeven van de conceptuele benaderingen en 
methodes die gebruikt zijn om de levensvatbaarheid van nieuwe institutionele maatregelen in 
de context van marktgerichte hervormingen te bestuderen. In dit proefschrift worden de 
randvoorwaarden, processen en mechanismen die bijdragen tot het creëren van levensvatbare 
instituties verkend. Deze mechanismen verwijzen niet alleen naar institutionele en 
economische verhoudingen, maar ook naar relaties tussen deze instituties enerzijds en 
waterschaarste en irrigatietechnologie anderzijds. Het proefschrift gaat er daarbij vanuit dat 
irrigatietechnologie een sociaaltechnisch fenomeen is met institutionele gebruikseisen. 
Een sleutelbegrip voor het analyseren van de levensvatbaarheid van irrigatie-instituties is 
die van het geven van rekenschap (accountability). Dit onderzoek laat zien dat vier vormen 
van rekenschap onderscheiden kunnen worden: operationeel, financieel, politiek en ambtelijk. 
Door deze vormen van rekenschap (en hun onderlinge relatie) te bestuderen, kan worden 
aangetoond dat de praktijk en de strategieën om te komen tot besluitvorming in waterbeheer 
slechts ten dele beïnvloed worden door rationele keuzen en (economische) prikkels voor 
gebruiksmaximalisatie. Ze worden ook beïnvloed door sociaal-politieke factoren. 
De methodologische aandacht van dit proefschrift gaat uit naar de ontwikkeling van een 
groep instrumenten en indicatoren waarmee de effecten van institutionele interventies bepaald 
kunnen worden, zowel in termen van verandering in het functioneringsniveau (performance 
levels) van irrigatiestelsels, als in kwalitatieve termen van institutionele levensvatbaarheids-
processen. Twee groepen van functioneringsindicatoren worden gepresenteerd. De eerste 
groep bevat indicatoren waarmee het daadwerkelijke functioneren wordt gemeten in relatie tot 
voorgeschreven functioneringsdoelstellingen. Met de tweede groep indicatoren worden 
functioneringsniveaus door de tijd en met andere systeemniveaus onderling vergeleken. Voor 
het veldwerk zijn een scala aan methodes en onderzoekstechnieken gebruikt, variërend van 
intensieve observaties van praktijken en strategieën die gebruikt worden voor het omgaan met 
nieuwe institutionele maatregelen, tot het dagelijks meten van waterstromen en volumes in 
twee geselecteerde WGO-gebieden en enkele kanalen en velden binnen het irrigatiedistrict. 
Het veldwerk heeft van begin 1995 tot halverwege 1998 plaatsgevonden. 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt informatie gegeven over de locatie, de geschiedenis, de beschik-
baarheid van water en het fysische ontwerp van ARLID. Daarnaast worden de twee groepen 
van boeren die nu gezamenlijk binnen de nieuwe WGO's zijn georganiseerd geïntroduceerd: 
de ejidatarios en particuliere landbouwers. Het laat zien hoe deze twee groepen gedurende 
bijna 70 jaar historisch en economisch gescheiden zijn geweest. In het hoofdstuk wordt ook 
een korte beschrijving gegeven van de twee voor de intensieve casusstudie geselecteerde 
WGO-gebieden, met hun kanalen en hun organisaties. 
Twee uitgangspunten vormen de basis van hoofdstuk 3, waarin een gedetailleerde 
beschrijving wordt gegeven van de historische en politiek-economische context van OIB en 
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hei; vermarkten van water. Het eerste uitgangspunt is dat de legitimatie voor institutionele 
interventies bekeken zou moeten worden in het licht van de politiek-economische context van 
de privatisering van het Mexicaanse platteland. Deze privatisering kwam tot stand middels 
een drastische constitutionele herziening van de wijze waarop land- en waterrechten zijn 
verdeeld. Deze hervormingen en herzieningen kwamen in de jaren 80 op gang als een gevolg 
van zowel een politieke als een economische crisis. Ze werden begeleid door een golf van 
programma's die zich richtten op de liberalisering, decentralisering en technocratisering van 
de economie. Institutionele interventieprogramma's, zoals het Mexicaanse OD3 programma, 
komen niet vanzelf maar worden vooraf gegaan, begeleid en gevolgd door andere 
interventieprogramma's die dezelfde neoliberale legitimatie hanteren voor het willen 
herstructureren van de politieke en economische controle over (natuurlijke en financiële) 
hulpbronnen. Het tweede uitgangspunt is dat de Salinas (en de daarop volgende) regering een 
interventiebeleid zoals OIB en het vermarkten van water nodig had om de economische 
doelstellingen van hun neoliberale programma's te bereiken. Dit beleid zou helpen om de 
kosten op de gebruikers te verhalen. Neoliberale programma's zijn echter niet per se 
noodzakelijk om meer betrokkenheid van de boeren in waterbeheer te kunnen bewerk-
stelligen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien hoe het beleid van OIB en het vermarkten van water werden 
geïmplementeerd, zowel nationaal als op het niveau van ARLID. Het OIB programma is een 
typisch voorbeeld van institutioneel ontwerpen. Dit programma bestaat uit zowel 
gedetailleerde voorschriften over hoe het institutionele ontwerp eruit moet zien als uit een 
top-down benadering voor het uitvoeren van deze ontwerpen. Toch hebben boeren en lokale 
waterbeheerders deze voorgestelde maatregelen niet volledig naast zich neergelegd. In plaats 
van ze als voorgeschreven instructies te gebruiken, hebben de WGO's deze nieuwe principes 
en maatregelen gebruikt als een strategisch vertrekpunt voor hun onderhandelingen over 
onder andere de hoogte van de irrigatietarieven, het vermarkten van water, de wijze van 
vertegenwoordiging door gebruikers, de onderhoudprogramma's, en de herverdeling van 
verantwoordelijken voor beheer en onderhoud tussen WGO's en het CNA. De nieuwe 
institutionele maatregelen zijn gedeeltelijk door de lokale ontvangers geadopteerd en op hun 
situatie aangepast. Het OIB programma stond toe dat lokale irrigatiebeheerders, nieuwe 
leiders van WGO's en boeren gezamenlijk ruimte en institutionele flexibiliteit konden creëren 
om de voorgestelde maatregelen aan te kunnen passen. Dit werd hoofdzakelijk mogelijk 
gemaakt door CNA-fimctionarissen in ARLID, die vanaf het begin van de uitvoering van OIB 
aan gebruikers lieten zien dat zij geloofwaardig waren en tevens bereid om hun kennis en 
informatie op een transparante manier met de boeren te delen. Tijdens het onderhandelings-
proces over de vorming van institutionele maatregelen zijn geloofwaardigheid, transparantie, 
institutionele flexibiliteit en eerlijkheid bepalend geweest voor operationeel rekenschap 
(operational accountability) tussen zowel het CNA en de WGO's als tussen de WGO's en de 
watergebruikers. Gezien het brede scala aan marktgerichte hervormingen en constitutionele 
herzieningen waarmee de boeren inmiddels bekend waren geworden, realiseerden zij zich dat 
zij nauwelijks weerstand zouden kunnen bieden aan OIB. 
Hoofdstuk 5 geeft een gedetailleerde analyse van de praktijken, de resultaten en van de 
mechanismen van het verlenen van operationeel rekenschap binnen lokaal waterbeheer. Het 
laat zien dat in ARLID na beheeroverdracht de officiële maatregelen voor beheer en 
onderhoud niet altijd overeenstemden met de daadwerkelijke irrigatiepraktijk. Het gevolg 
hiervan was dat de resultaten van deze praktijk in termen van relatieve watertoedeling (RWS) 
en land- en waterproductiveit ook na OIB onveranderd bleven. Het conflict tussen de 
verschillende vormen van het afleggen van rekenschap was hiervan de belangrijkste oorzaak. 
Dit kon niet opgelost worden binnen het palet van nieuwe institutionele maatregelen. In plaats 
van vast te houden aan het nieuwe principe om water te gebruiken als ware het een 
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economisch goed, hielden boeren en lokale waterbeheerders vast aan het verdelen en 
gebruiken van water zoals dit reeds gebeurde onder de maatregelen van vóór de 
beheeroverdracht. Het dagelijks meten van waterstromen en volumes, alsmede de dagelijkse 
observaties van irrigatiepraktijken hebben laten zien dat waterverdelers (die nu rechtstreeks in 
dienst zijn van de WGO's) over het algemeen de geplande in plaats van de daadwerkelijke 
volumes van watertoedeling rapporteren aan de WGO's. Op deze wijze zetten zij de praktijk 
van het afleggen van ambtelijk rekenschap {administrative accountability) aan zowel 
gebruikers als CNA voort. Dit strookt niet met het idee dat efficiënt watergebruik 
gestimuleerd wordt door gebruikers te laten betalen voor het water (waarmee financieel en 
operationeel rekenschap afgedwongen zou worden). De vergelijking van de productiviteit per 
hectare of per m 3 water tussen de 11 WGO-gebieden binnen ARLID laat zien dat ondanks dat 
water de limiterende factor is, de door de boeren gekozen waterbeheerstrategie gericht was op 
het maximaliseren van de opbrengst per hectare in plaats van verhogen van de opbrengst per 
m 3 water. Dit had als gevolg dat de waterverstrekkingen per geïrrigeerde hectare over het 
algemeen erg hoog waren. In dit hoofdstuk wordt ook het bewijs geleverd dat de bestaande 
irrigatietechnologie en het waterbeheerregiem niet altijd aansluiten bij de institutionele 
capaciteit van de nieuwe WGO's om het stelsel te beheren. Het hoofdstuk verkent ook enkele 
ideeën over hoe kwesties met betrekking tot relatieve waterschaarste in de context van zowel 
gelijktijdig grond- en oppervlaktewatergebruik als het gehele stroomgebied benaderd kunnen 
worden. 
Hoofdstuk 6 geeft een uitgebreid verslag van de praktijk, de processen en de 
mechanismen van gebruikersvertegenwoordiging, de verkiezingen van WGO-leiders en van 
conflictoplossing, en hoe deze de politieke rekenschap en de institutionele levensvatbaarheid 
van instituties beïnvloeden. Een gedetailleerde analyse van verkiezingsprocedures en 
processen gedurende twee zittingsperiodes van WGO's laat zien dat de de jure verdeling van 
boerenvertegenwoordiging in het bestuur en de vergadering van de WGO's goed 
georganiseerd was. Echter, de de facto controle over besluitvorming bleef in handen van 
enkele boerenleiders. Deze leiders hebben verschillenden strategieën ontwikkeld om deze 
controle te reproduceren. Deze omvatten onder andere het uitoefenen van politieke dwang om 
herkozen te worden, corruptie, en het uitbreiden van economische en politieke netwerken. 
Vooral in het geval van WGO Salvatierra hebben deze strategieën er toe bijgedragen dat 
mechanismen voor het afleggen van rekenschap nauwelijks gecreëerd zijn. Watergebuikers 
hanteren twee belangrijke strategieën in hun poging om tegenwicht te vormen tegen afnemend 
rekenschap. Ten eerste weigeren ze de hogere watertarieven te betalen. Hiermee geven ze een 
signaal af over hun onvrede met het managementbeleid van de WGO's. Ten tweede vragen ze 
het CNA hen te helpen met het oplossen van conflicten die ontstaan zijn als gevolg van zowel 
onrechtmatige betalingen als het slechte functioneren van WGO-leiders. 
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt een analyse gemaakt van hoe na beheeroverdracht mechanismen 
van het afleggen van financiële rekenschap de institutionele levensvatbaarheid van de 
maatregelen ten behoeve van irrigatiebeheer beïnvloeden. WGO's in ARLID zijn er in 
geslaagd om de kosten van waterbeheer veel meer op de gebruikers te verhalen en om 
financieel autonoom te worden. Vanuit dat oogpunt is OIB zeer instrumenteel gebleken voor 
het bereiken van de overheidsdoelstelling om publieke investeringen in de irrigatiesector te 
verminderen. Echter, het beter verhalen van de kosten op de gebruiker en het tot stand 
brengen van financiële autonomie hebben er ook toe bijgedragen dat de WGO's ruimte 
konden creëren om de herziening van belangrijke maatregelen verder uit te onderhandelen. 
Dit betrof onder andere het percentage van het totale inkomen van een WGO dat aan het CNA 
betaald moest worden, de hoogte van de watertarieven, en de voorwaarden voor het mogen 
handelen in water en de prijzen die voor dit water betaald moesten worden. Financiële 
transparantie, het gebruik van computers en het inhuren van externe accountants hebben er toe 
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bijgedragen dat de WGO's financieel rekenschap konden afleggen naar gebruikers die voor 
hun water betaald hadden. Vooral in het geval van WGO Cortázar hebben leiders bovendien 
laten zien dat ze geloofwaardig waren door het inkomen uit watertarieven te gebruiken voor 
ht:t aanzienlijk verbeteren van de staat van onderhoud van de kanalen. Ze hebben ook laten 
zisn bereid te zijn irrigatierunctionarissen te ontslaan toen bleek dat deze corrupt waren. Toch 
wordt de financiële levensvatbaarheid van de WGO's op twee manieren bedreigd. Op de 
eerste plaats is dit een gevolg van het gebrek aan politieke verantwoording (zoals in het geval 
v£un Salvatierra). In de tweede plaats komt dit voort uit een volkomen afhankelijkheid van de 
beschikbaarheid van water voor het genereren van inkomen voor de WGO. 
In hoofdstuk 8 verschuift de aandacht naar de analyse van het vermarkten van water. 
WGO's in ARLID hebben daadwerkelijk de nu legale mogelijkheid aangegrepen om water te 
vermarkten aan andere WGO's binnen hetzelfde irrigatiedistrict. Echter, in tegenstelling tot de 
gebruikelijke opvatting van neoliberale voorstanders van watermarkten, zien de WGO's het 
hiindelen in water niet als een mogelijkheid om de waterprijs op het niveau van opportunity 
kosten te krijgen. In plaats daarvan wordt het proces van het vermarkten van water gebruikt 
om solidariteit tussen de WGO's te creëren. Deze solidariteit is noodzakelijk om te kunnen 
samenwerken in de nieuwe federatie van WGO's, die er voor gekozen heeft om de 
víírantwoordelijkheden voor het onderhoud van het hoofdkanaal van het CNA over te nemen. 
WGO's gebruiken waterhandel ook om aan hun leden te laten zien dat ze geloofwaardig zijn 
door te trachten te allen tijde water te leveren, zelfs indien ze gedurende perioden van 
waterschaarste water moeten kopen van andere WGO's. Als een gevolg hiervan zijn de 
prijzen van verhandeld water over het algemeen lager dan de prijs die betaald moet worden 
voor normale waterverstrekkingen gedurende periodes met voldoende waterbeschikbaarheid. 
In hoofdstuk 9 wordt teruggekeerd naar de officiële doelstellingen van het OD3 
programma. Dit gebeurt door de effecten van dit programma op het waterbeheer te bekijken. 
Met behulp van vergelijkende indicatoren wordt aangetoond dat de effecten van OIB en het 
vermarkten van water op het functioneren van het waterbeheer teleurstellend zijn. Met 
uitzondering van verbeteringen in het verhalen van de kosten op de gebruikers en in het 
onderhoud van het stelsel is er geen bewijs dat OIB geresulteerd heeft in efficiënter 
watergebruik noch in productiviteitsstijgingen per hectare of per m 3 water. 
Hoofdstuk 10 geeft eerst een volledige synthese van de hierboven besproken empirische 
bevindingen. Vervolgens worden enkele conceptuele begrippen en methodologische middelen 
die gebruikt zijn tijdens dit onderzoek opnieuw onder de loep genomen. Dit laat zien dat het 
conceptuele uitgangspunt van sociale gebruikseisen voor irrigatietechnologie verder 
ontwikkeld zou moeten worden tot het begrip van institutionele gebruikseisen. Een 
belangrijke constatering hierbij is dat institutionele maatregelen een verzameling zijn van 
formele voorschriften, van bestaande maatregelen en van opnieuw onderhandelde maat-
regelen. Bestaande en nieuwe instituties zijn het resultaat van een continu proces waarin het 
afleggen van rekenschap gecreëerd, onderhandeld, verdiend en onderhouden wordt. Dit 
verklaart waarom instituties 'toevallig' {contingent) lijken in plaats van voorbedachte 
statische structuren gebaseerd op institutionele ontwerpprincipes. 
Het opnieuw bekijken van het begrip rekenschap (accountability) laat zien dat het zinvol 
is om verschillende vormen van rekenschap te onderscheiden. Naast het analyseren van 
rekenschapmechanismen die betrekking hebben op het enkel leveren van beheer- en 
onderhoudsdiensten, of op het verhalen van kosten op gebruikers, helpt het maken van dit 
onderscheid juist ook andere mechanismen van rekenschap te analyseren. Het helpt ook bij 
het ontrafelen van de wijzen waarop dienstenleveranciers al dan niet rekenschap afleggen. 
Tevens helpt het om te laten zien op wat voor manier verschillende vormen van rekenschap 
añeggen elkaar kunnen beconcurreren. Dit is vooral van belang in het geval van gezamenlijk 
beheer van irrigatiestelsels door WGO's en overheidsdiensten. Omdat deze organisaties 
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verschillende waarden en doelen kunnen hebben zullen zij op verschillende manieren trachten 
rekenschap af te leggen. 
Een evaluatie van de verschillende groepen methoden voor het bepalen van effecten van 
institutionele interventies laat zien dat de vergelijkende indicatoren bruikbaar zijn voor het 
bepalen van veranderingen die het gevolg zijn van deze interventies. Hun bruikbaarheid wordt 
echter beperkt door het feit dat ze zich met name richten op het meten van veranderingen in 
productiviteit en op economische effecten. Bovendien bleek het toepassen van deze 
indicatoren meer tijd en middelen te vergen dan was aangenomen. De reden hiervan moet 
gezocht worden in de complexiteit en de hoeveelheid van de benodigde secundaire data 
alsmede in het moeilijke proces van het ontsluiten van de betekenis van deze data. 
Dit onderzoek heeft verschillende implicaties voor marktgericht beleid in zowel Mexico 
als daarbuiten. Vanwege zijn unieke politiek-economische en constitutionele context is het 
niet mogelijk om het 'Mexicaanse OIB model' zomaar te kopiëren naar andere landen waar 
vergelijkbare pogingen van geplande institutionele veranderingen reeds gaande zijn. Zowel 
vanwege het feit dat OIB en het vermarkten van water door het allerhoogste politieke niveau 
werden gesteund als vanwege de drastische constitutionele herzieningen en andere landbouw-
hervormingen konden de nieuwe institutionele maatregelen voor waterbeheer in zo'n korte 
tijd en op zo'n grote schaal worden uitgevoerd. Dit onderzoek wijst er ook op dat 
institutionele moderniseringsprogramma's (zoals OIB en het vermarkten van water) en 
infrastructurele modernisering veel beter op elkaar aan moeten sluiten. Ondanks het feit dat 
infrastructurele verbeteringsprogramma's vaak gebruikt worden om institutionele hervor-
mingen (en de lasten die daar bij horen) aan de watergebruikers te verkopen, worden ze 
nauwelijks aan elkaar gerelateerd op een manier waarop de voorgestelde nieuwe technologie 
aansluit bij de nieuwe institutionele maatregelen die nodig zijn om deze technologie te 
kunnen gebruiken. 
Hoofdstuk 10 eindigt met een discussie over de vraag waarom onderzoek naar 
institutionele interventies zich meer moet richten op het stroomgebiedniveau in plaats van op 
het niveau van irrigatiestelsels. Daarnaast wordt er een pleidooi gehouden om de 
onderzoeksaandacht niet al te frequent te verleggen naar het doen van korte, extensieve, 
kwantitatieve en vergelijkende studies, ondanks het feit dat universiteiten en internationale 
onderzoeksinstituten gedwongen zijn onderzoek te doen in de context van een geglobaliseerde 
wereld met geglobaliseerde onderzoeksagenda's. Voor het begrijpen van institutionele 
veranderingsprocessen en de effecten daarvan op lokaal niveau zijn langdurige, intensieve en 
kwalitatieve casusstudies vereist. Alleen op die manier kan samenwerking met lokale 
onderzoekspartners volledig ontwikkeld worden. Dit zal uiteindelijk tot gevolg hebben dat de 
voor een dergelijk begrip noodzakelijk institutioneel onderzoeksgeheugen gecreëerd wordt. 
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